A portrait of William Cecil, 1st Baron Burghley, set against a background of an old map. He is depicted from the chest up, wearing a black cap with a gold cross, a large white ruff collar, and a red velvet robe with gold embroidery. He holds a silver staff in his right hand. The background map shows parts of Europe and the Mediterranean region.

WILLIAM CECIL,
Ireland, and the
Tudor State

Christopher
Maginn

OXFORD

WILLIAM CECIL, IRELAND, AND
THE TUDOR STATE

This page intentionally left blank

William Cecil, Ireland, and the Tudor State

CHRISTOPHER MAGINN

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

© Christopher Maginn 2012

The moral rights of the author have been asserted

First Edition published in 2012

Impression: 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
Library of Congress Control Number: 2011945242

ISBN 978-0-19-969715-1

Printed in Great Britain by
MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King's Lynn

Do Cholm, Fionn, agus Éamonn

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xii
<i>List of Maps and Illustrations</i>	xiii
<i>Note on Spelling and Dates</i>	xvi
Introduction	1
PART I ENGLAND AND IRELAND: A DEEPENING ASSOCIATION	
1. The Lordship of Ireland, 1520	15
2. The Kingdom of Ireland, 1550	36
PART II IRELAND MATTERS	
3. Correspondence and Points of Contact	55
4. Government and Policy	78
5. Money	113
6. The Irish	142
7. Religion	165
PART III BURGHLEY'S IRELAND	
8. The Kingdom of Ireland, 1598	191
9. 'A carefull father for this poore realm'	213
Conclusion: William Cecil, Ireland, and the Tudor State	223
<i>Bibliography</i>	231
<i>Index</i>	247

This page intentionally left blank

Preface

This book grew out of my efforts over the last decade to better understand the relationship between England and Ireland in the early modern period. That William Cecil should serve as a means to probe a broad spectrum of that relationship became apparent to me only gradually—nothing quite as dramatic as Elton's Thomas Cromwell reaching out from the grave and across centuries to pull at his sleeve and draw attention to a remarkable sixteenth-century English statesman, I am afraid. Rather it was the brief genealogical sketches which he compiled for Irish chiefs which first aroused my interest in Cecil. Here was one of the most important political figures in Elizabethan England tracing the lineage of often minor clansmen in an attempt to peer inside the tangled lines of power which coursed through the political landscape of sixteenth-century Ireland. Around this time, while conducting doctoral research on the extension of Tudor rule in Ireland, I asked the staff at the National Archives at Kew to reproduce for me an Elizabethan map of two newly created shires south of Dublin. I subsequently showed the richly coloured map to Annaleigh Margey, a fellow graduate student who was then compiling and writing a doctoral thesis on the maps of the Irish plantations in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Looking over it she casually pointed out Cecil's notes, obvious to her by his distinctive italic angular handwriting, of people and of places on the map. Here again was Cecil, this time displaying a detailed knowledge of the physical and political geography of areas in Ireland which were not yet perfectly subject to English rule. More watchful for Cecil's marks I began to notice just how frequently he appeared in the manuscript materials, most especially the state papers, upon which much of our modern understanding of Tudor Ireland is based. But in the years which followed other commitments took precedence, notably revising my doctoral thesis for publication and moving to New York to take up my current post at Fordham University; any thoroughgoing investigation of Cecil's attitudes toward Ireland and its inhabitants was pushed into the background. And William Cecil was, in any case, a daunting subject to take on. Quite apart from the mountain of archival evidence that I understood to be associated with the man in England, there were the many imposing biographies of Elizabeth's minister written over the centuries which I assumed had said all that needed to be said.

It was only through my reading (and re-reading) of Jane Dawson's and Stephen Alford's work on the 'British' dimension of William Cecil's thinking and his political responsibilities that I began to consider seriously undertaking a book-length study of the minister's relationship with Ireland. Their research showed me that, at one level, the older interpretation of Cecil as a mere functionary in Tudor government was inaccurate—that for example his notes, memoranda, and annotations (genealogical or otherwise) meant something—and also that there were dimensions to Cecil's career which previous generations of historians had ignored. Ireland,

it became clear to me, was one such area of Cecil's career that had been overlooked. At the same time, as a Tudor specialist whose field of expertise was not England, I had come to the view that Ireland was a part, however imperfect, of the Tudor state and that the study of Ireland in the sixteenth century could tell us a great deal about the process of state formation in early modern Europe. The study of William Cecil, and the richly detailed sources which come with him, offers a unique means to unite a history of Ireland in the sixteenth century with a study of the Anglo-Irish relationship under the Tudors.

The majority of the research and writing of this book was undertaken during a year of sabbatical leave from Fordham in 2008–9. The year was spent in Ireland where Professor Steven Ellis, head of the Department of History at the National University of Ireland, Galway, was kind enough to provide me with office space and the opportunity to teach two courses as a visiting professor. The scholarly environment there proved most stimulating and the book progressed much more quickly than I had anticipated. I would like to thank Gerald Power with whom I shared an office in Galway in the autumn of 2008 for patiently listening as I wrestled with the main themes of this book; and for doing so while he was finishing his doctoral thesis—I hope that the old man and I were not too much of a distraction. I would also like to thank the staff of the department of history in Galway—Dáibhí Ó Cróinín, Niall Ó Ciosán, and more recently Pádraig Lenihan deserve special mention—for showing an interest in my work and making a former student feel welcome in the department. While researching the chapter devoted to money and economic concerns, one of my students in Galway discovered an early Elizabethan coin not 200 yards from the venue where we held our colloquium on the 'Mid-Tudor Crisis'—I thought this was a good sign. Still, a year's leave, productive though it was, did not a book make, and the writing, conducted intermittently between teaching and administrative responsibilities in New York and in more sustained bursts during Christmases and summers spent in Galway, dragged on for another two years. The last of the work on the book, undertaken in summer 2011, was facilitated by a generous research grant from Fordham University.

During that time I incurred many debts. I would like to express my gratitude to Steven Ellis, Gerald Power, Kieran Hoare, Kevin Forkan, Jason McHugh, and Tomás Finn for reading all or part of the manuscript and for making many helpful suggestions. Brendan Scott deserves special thanks for agreeing to read successive drafts of the book. I would also like to thank Brendan Kane at the University of Connecticut for inviting me to present some of my ideas on Cecil and Ireland at the 'Elizabeth and Ireland' conference held in Storrs in November 2009. I benefited greatly from both the conversations and the searching questions which arose in Connecticut, and I should particularly like to thank Hiram Morgan, Rory Rapple, Vincent Carey, and Paul Hammer in this regard. I am grateful, too, to the anonymous readers, for their helpful suggestions. For the mistakes that have eluded the vigilance of my friends and peers I alone am responsible.

At Oxford University Press I am indebted to Christopher Wheeler for taking an interest in the manuscript in the first place, and for having it swiftly sent to outside

readers. I would also like to record my thanks to the kind and efficient staff at OUP who helped to see the book through the Press.

My wife Helen remains a constant source of strength. She has provided me with both the stability necessary to undertake the research and writing of a work of this kind and the children who make all the work worthwhile. This book is dedicated to my sons, Colm, Fionn, and Éamonn.

Christopher Maginn


Lackagh, June 2011

List of Abbreviations

<i>AFM</i>	<i>Annála ríoghachta Éireann: annals of the kingdom of Ireland by the Four Masters from the earliest period to the year 1616</i> , ed. John O'Donovan, 7 vols. (Dublin, 1851)
<i>APC</i>	<i>Acts of the privy council of England</i> , ed. J. R. Dasent <i>et al.</i> , new series, 46 vols. (London, 1890–1964)
<i>AU</i>	<i>Annála Uladh, Annals of Ulster</i> , ed. W. M. Hennessy and B. MacCarthy, 4 vols. (Dublin, 1887–1901)
<i>BL</i>	British Library
<i>Cal. pat. rolls Ire.</i>	<i>Calendar of the patent and close rolls of chancery in Ireland, Henry VIII to 18th Elizabeth</i> , ed. James Morrin (Dublin, 1861)
<i>CP</i>	Hatfield House Library, Hertfordshire, Cecil papers
<i>CSP</i>	<i>Calendar of state papers</i>
<i>CSPi</i>	<i>Calendar of state papers relating to Ireland, 1509–1670</i> , 24 vols. (London, 1860–1912)
<i>CUL</i>	Cambridge University Library
<i>EHR</i>	<i>English Historical Review</i>
<i>Eliz.</i>	Elizabeth
<i>Fiants Ire.</i>	<i>The Irish fiants of the Tudor sovereigns, 1521–1603</i> , 4 vols. (Dublin, 1994)
<i>Hen.</i>	Henry
<i>HBC</i>	E. B. Pryde <i>et al.</i> (eds.), <i>Handbook of British chronology</i> (3rd edn., London, 1986)
<i>HMC</i>	<i>Historical Manuscripts Commission</i>
<i>IHS</i>	<i>Irish Historical Studies</i>
<i>L. & P.</i>	<i>Letters and papers</i>
<i>LPL</i>	Lambeth Palace Library, London
<i>NHI</i>	<i>A new history of Ireland</i> (Oxford, 1976)
<i>ODNB</i>	<i>Oxford dictionary of national biography</i> , ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford, 2004)
<i>PRIA</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy</i>
<i>Salisbury MSS</i>	<i>Calendar of the manuscripts of the... marquis of Salisbury... preserved at Hatfield House</i> , 24 vols. (London, 1883–1973)
<i>SP</i>	state papers
<i>TCD</i>	Trinity College, Dublin
<i>TNA</i>	The National Archives, London

List of Maps and Illustrations

Map 1:	The Lordship of Ireland, 1520	xiv
Map 2:	The Kingdom of Ireland, 1598	xv
Figure 1:	Burghley's degrees for the government of Ireland, 1575; TNA, SP 63/49/78 (reproduced with the permission of the National Archives)	94




———— Boundary of Royal Authority

----- County Boundaries


O'Neill (Italicized) Principal Lordships



Map 1: The Lordship of Ireland, 1520



- Sir Thomas Smith's plantation in the Ards, 1570
- Leix-Offaly plantation, 1556
- Desmond plantation, 1584
- Area planted
- Essex's projected plantation, 1572-3
- 'Native plantation' in Monaghan, 1592
- County boundaries as at 1598
(with dates in brackets of shiring of Tudor counties)



Map 2: The Kingdom of Ireland, 1598

Note on Spelling and Dates

All quotations are in original spelling, though I have transcribed the thorn as 'th'. The rendering of Irish personal and familial names in English poses some difficulty. I have chosen, in an effort to maintain some consistency, to employ well-established English forms of Irish surnames—MacGillapatrik rather than Mac Giolla Phádraig, O'Toole rather than Ó Tuathail—and Anglicized forms of Irish Christian names and epithets: Hugh rather Aodh, Feagh rather than Fiach, Oge rather than Óg, and Duff rather than Dubh. The year has been taken to begin on 1 January rather than on 25 March, as was the custom in the Tudor territories.

Introduction

The relationship between Ireland and England—between their peoples, their politics, their cultures, their economies, and their faiths—is at once a compelling and a vexing subject for the historian of the Tudor age. It is a relationship which is often viewed through the very different prisms of triumph—of English government, culture, military power, and social organization in Ireland by the end of Queen Elizabeth's reign—or defeat—of the ultimately futile resistance on the part of a semi-independent Irish polity, with its own distinctive culture and forms of social and political organization, to the extension of Tudor rule in Ireland. This book seeks to offer a less deterministic interpretation of this relationship during what was a crucial time in the histories of Ireland and England. It explores Anglo-Irish interaction under the Tudor sovereigns using the long association of William Cecil with Ireland as both a chronological framework and a vehicle for historical enquiry. His life (1520–98) was lived entirely within the Tudor period: in the year of Cecil's birth the Tudor kings of England were, as English kings had been for centuries, lords of Ireland; at the time of Cecil's death the Tudors had ruled as kings and queens of Ireland for more than half a century, but by then the last Tudor was fighting a war to maintain control over the kingdom. Cecil's association with Ireland thus carries with it a certain tension which allows the historian to approach the relationship between England and Ireland without undue emphasis on a known historical outcome. But Cecil was no mere witness to the Anglo-Irish relationship whose life thus happened to coincide with an important period in the historical development of both countries. William Cecil, raised to the peerage as first Baron Burghley, who served as secretary of state under Edward VI and then as Queen Elizabeth I's chief minister and lord high treasurer of England, more than any other individual of the age, it will be argued, dictated the course and the character of the connection between England and Ireland in the sixteenth century.

Second only to the monarchs and rulers of early modern Europe, chief ministers of state make attractive subjects for the historian of high politics. In an age of growing bureaucracy and rapid political, religious, and social change, it was they who assumed many of the responsibilities of the day-to-day operation of the state—frequently leaving behind ample written records as testimony to their importance. Like most European rulers, the Tudors were served by many talented and noteworthy ministers, but only a handful of these may be said to have risen to the heights from which they played a decisive role in the formation of the early

modern state. Thomas Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell in Henry VIII's reign were such men; so too were Edward Seymour and John Dudley in the reign of Edward VI. Each came, in large measure, to control the growth and direction of the Tudor state in matters domestic and foreign. These men shared a common experience: a brief period of near total dominance under the crown, followed by a sudden fall from power and, in all but Wolsey's case, execution for treason against the crown which they had served. William Cecil may be counted among this exclusive group, but his experience of service to the Tudors, and to Queen Elizabeth in particular, was of an altogether different character, and not only because he found himself in the extraordinary position for most of his career of serving an unmarried and childless female sovereign. By virtue of his wide-ranging service to three monarchs spanning the better part of five decades, and his ability to pass intact to his son and successor much of the immense wealth and political power which he had gathered in these years, Cecil stands apart from the other chief ministers of state who served the Tudors.

That William Cecil consistently devoted his attention and considerable energies to the kingdom of Ireland, however, is a seldom-explored aspect of his life and his place in the Tudor age. Cecil, after all, made no grand Gladstonian statement of intent with regard to the neighbouring island. Nor did he, in his long service to the Tudor sovereigns, ever once travel there. Yet amid his handling of a broad assortment of matters relating to England and Wales, the kingdom of Scotland, continental Europe, and beyond, William Cecil personally compiled genealogies of Ireland's Irish and English families and pored over dozens of national and regional maps of Ireland. He also served as chancellor of Ireland's first university and, most importantly for the historian, penned, received, and studied thousands of papers on subjects relating to Ireland and the crown's political, economic, social, and religious policies there. Cecil would have understood all of this broadly as 'Ireland matters', or 'causes of Ireland', a subject which he came to know in greater depth and detail than anyone at Elizabeth's court. The history of William Cecil's attention to 'Ireland matters' forms an integral though often overlooked instalment in our understanding of the ongoing association between England and Ireland in the early modern period.

It was an association which was entirely transformed during Cecil's lifetime. At the time of his birth in 1520, Ireland was, from an English perspective, an intransigent borderland, little understood, of marginal significance and, taken as a whole, of slight resemblance to the neighbouring kingdom of England; at Cecil's death nearly eighty years later, and after decades of his attention, Ireland was central to the survival of Tudor England and yet still bore little resemblance to the kingdom of his birth. That this was so represents the failure of one of the most powerful figures of the age. Cecil sought, throughout his public career, to make Ireland like England and its inhabitants like the English (or more like the English), so as to complete the twin tasks of spreading the benefits of English 'civility' begun in Ireland in the high Middle Ages and better protecting his country in the dangerous post-Reformation world of later sixteenth-century Europe. But the extension of Tudor rule in Ireland, which was carried out under Cecil's supervision throughout

the second half of the sixteenth century, went horribly awry. The cornerstones of English society as Cecil saw them were all sacrificed by the servants of the Tudors to establish royal control in Ireland: common law gave way to martial law; long-established local nobility and gentry gave place to upstart and alien soldiers; a broadly conceived Englishness was undermined by a more pronounced regional English identity and confessional divergence; and the principles of Christian humanism and traditional notions of English 'civility' were overshadowed by the regular resort to murder and conquest. In the end, it was these deviations from established Tudor methods of governing and state formation which helped to bring about that which Cecil feared most: a broad-based rebellion in Ireland against the crown and an invasion of that kingdom by a foreign power as a prelude to an attack against England.

The historian's hesitance to address the Irish dimension of William Cecil's professional responsibilities may be explained, in part, by the daunting quantity and variety of primary evidence associated with the man. The survival of so much of Cecil's written correspondence, which touches on virtually every matter of state affairs—and which reaches into many aspects of life in Tudor times beyond the strictly high political realm—has long served to discourage historians from undertaking more numerous studies of a figure who served at the centre of English power for nearly half a century.¹ The modern historian's reluctance to tackle Cecil may also be attributed to the existence of Conyers Read's magisterial two-volume biography. Described by the publisher in 1960 as the product of 'over ten years of exhaustive research in all sources likely to reveal the man who, next to the Queen herself, was the most significant figure in her government', the two volumes together ran to over 1,000 pages in length.² More recent biographies of Cecil are consequently much fewer in number and, with the notable exception of Stephen Alford's recent biography,³ those undertaken have sought to provide the reader with a succinct account of Cecil's significance in Tudor times, rather than an exhaustive reassessment of his long career.⁴

Thus, bound on the one side by the voluminous records which Cecil generated (and with which he is associated), and the existence of imposing biographies on the other, historians seeking to come to terms with Cecil have been moved to consider his importance in smaller, more manageable portions. This approach has proved most rewarding. Whether it is the consideration of specific historical themes

¹ For a discussion of the history of the difficulties involved in availing of the 'paper mountain' generated by, and associated with, William Cecil, see M. A. R. Graves, *Burghley: William Cecil, Lord Burghley* (London, 1998), 4–11. For an overview of which archives house the majority of Cecil's papers, see Stephen Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity: William Cecil and the British succession crisis, 1558–1569* (Cambridge, 1998), 10–14.

² Conyers Read, *Mr Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1955); id., *Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1960). See also B. W. Beckingsale's more analytical biography, *Burghley: Tudor statesman, 1520–1598* (London, 1967).

³ Stephen Alford, *Burghley: William Cecil at the court of Elizabeth I* (New Haven, 2008).

⁴ The most substantive of these is Graves, *Burghley*. See also A. G. R. Smith, *William Cecil, Lord Burghley: minister of Elizabeth I* (Bangor, 1991); Wallace MacCaffrey, s.v. 'William Cecil', in the *ODNB*.

relating to William Cecil as Elizabeth's most trusted and influential minister—such as the importance and extent of his patronage—or chronologically delimited explorations of his role in the creation of economic policy, the development of Elizabethan foreign policy and the matter of the succession, or detailed analysis of his attitude toward religion and episcopacy during Elizabeth's reign, each represents an important piece of the puzzle that, when assembled, allow for a holistic picture of Cecil's career.⁵ William Cecil has also featured prominently in the recent approach to Tudor political history which has seen historians expand their study of politics to include other concepts such as the influence of religion on political ideas, the use of language and the importance of intellectual development in political discourse, and the position of the crown vis-à-vis the state.⁶ Each of these avenues of research converges in Cecil's ideas about his duty to his queen and to his country. Cecil's service and dedication to an enduring English state, or commonwealth, an entity which historians once regarded as being thought of by contemporaries as one and the same as the Tudor monarchs themselves, has been shown to be of deeper importance to him than his devotion to its sovereigns. The most compelling evidence offered in support of this view are Cecil's efforts—in the 1560s and again in the 1580s—to have the English parliament granted powers to 'sanction a conciliar interregnum' and choose a successor in the event that Elizabeth died unexpectedly. Cecil's actions in these years have formed the basis for a wider reconceptualization of Elizabethan England as a mixed polity, or a 'monarchical republic'.⁷ To pursue this compelling line of argument still further would make William Cecil a 'monarchical republican'; and if Cecil may be described in this way then what place did the kingdom of Ireland occupy in his vision of the state to which he was devoted above all else? Recently, however, a study of Cecil's relationship with Elizabeth has questioned this interpretation, arguing that though he might have contemplated an England without a sovereign, every aspect of his life and his career in fact revolved round the monarchy.⁸ Cecil was, in this view,

⁵ Pauline Croft (ed.), *Patronage, culture and power: the early Cecils, 1558–1612* (New Haven, 2002); J. E. A. Dawson, 'William Cecil and the British dimension of early Elizabethan foreign policy', *History*, 74 (1989), 196–216; N. L. Jones, 'William Cecil and the making of economic policy in the 1560s and early 1570s', in P. A. Fideler and T. F. Mayer (eds.), *Political thought and the Tudor Commonwealth: deep structure, discourse and disguise* (London, 1992), 169–93; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*; id., 'Reassessing William Cecil in the 1560s', in John Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy* (London, 1997), 233–53; Brett Usher, *William Cecil and episcopacy, 1559–1577* (Aldershot, 2003). Professor Croft is at present overseeing a project at Royal Holloway, University of London, devoted to the physical health of the Cecils.

⁶ Alford, 'Reassessing William Cecil', 233–4; id., 'Politics and political history in the Tudor century', *Historical Journal*, 42 (1999), 535–48. See also Markku Peltonen, *Classical humanism and republicanism in English political thought, 1570–1640* (Cambridge, 1995); Dale Hoak (ed.), *Tudor political culture* (Cambridge, 1995).

⁷ Patrick Collinson, 'The monarchical republic of Elizabeth I', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy*, 110–34; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, 112–16. Cf. J. F. McDiarmid and Patrick Collinson (eds.), *The monarchical republic of early modern England: essays in response to Patrick Collinson* (London, 2007).

⁸ Mary Partridge, 'Lord Burghley and il Cortegiano: civil and martial models of courtliness in Elizabethan England', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 19 (Cambridge, 2009), 95–116.

more typical of a Renaissance courtier than a proto-republican whose fear of international Catholicism and classical education formed the primary facets of the prism through which he viewed the Tudor kingdoms.

Still, studies of William Cecil remain surprisingly few in number relative to the volume and variety of the manuscripts associated with him. Too often Tudor scholars have been content to rely on biographies of Cecil to cover those areas where more nuanced studies of his career and his place in Tudor society do not exist. The minister's relationship to the kingdom of Ireland is an area of study which has been almost entirely overlooked in this way.⁹ But in the case of Ireland, Conyers Read's biography—for decades the definitive account of Cecil's career—may actually have exerted a negative influence. In the preface to his second volume, Read reported on his findings:

The one part of Burghley's public life which I intended to write but have not written was his relations to the Irish problem. I think I have read all his extant dispatches on Irish affairs. Those to Sir Henry Sidney in the 'sixties, preserved in the Public Record Office; those to Sir William Fitzwilliam in the 'seventies, among the Carte MSS in the Bodleian Library, and those to Nicholas White in the Lansdowne MSS at the British Museum, are numerous. But they all deal either with English news or with details of Irish administration... I find no memoranda from him on the Irish problem analogous to those which he prepared on almost every other matter of royal concern. Ireland was for him a drain on English resources and a convenient base of operations for England's enemies. What he strove for there was the restoration of order in the English interest. But he does not appear, even in those terms, to have proposed any programme for action. In short, I have found little or nothing in the record of Burghley's relations to Ireland to throw fresh light either upon the history of the island or of the man.¹⁰

In a survey of Irish historiography undertaken in the early 1970s, two leading Irish historians concluded that Read's bold statement represented 'an extraordinary example either of the dominance of the Bagwellian picture [i.e. unionist and with a Victorian concern for high politics] or of quite unusual obtuseness on the part of a distinguished historian'.¹¹ In light of Read's forthright assertion, the historian specializing in Tudor England may be forgiven for considering Cecil's 'relations to the Irish problem' as anything more than a historical dead end. On the other side of the traditional historiographical divide, historians of Tudor Ireland have generally followed suit, accepting Read's conclusion that any sustained exploration of Cecil and his relationship to Ireland would be fruitless.¹² Cecil's appearances in histories of Tudor Ireland are frequent, though they are typically in passing: as Elizabeth's faithful minister, the ubiquitous recipient (and the more occasional

⁹ An exception is Graves, who provided a brief, but an admirably incisive, summary of Cecil's relationship with Ireland in *Burghley*, 193–6.

¹⁰ Read, *Lord Burghley*, 9–10.

¹¹ R. D. Edwards and D. B. Quinn, 'Sixteenth-century Ireland, 1485–1603', in T. W. Moody (ed.), *Irish historiography, 1936–70* (Dublin, 1971), 29.

¹² Ciaran Brady, 'Court, castle and country: the framework of government in Tudor Ireland', in Ciaran Brady and Raymond Gillespie (eds.), *Natives and newcomers: essays on the making of Irish colonial society, 1534–1641* (Dublin, 1986), 32.

author) of a range of letters relating to Irish government, and as a committed Protestant who was coldly efficient and anti-Irish.¹³ For the historian of Tudor Ireland, the names Cecil or Burghley are most often synonymous with 'the government', 'Whitehall', 'court', 'London': at once distant and ever-present. Cecil has received greater attention from Irish historians examining how political (and personal) rivalry, or 'faction', at Elizabeth's court supposedly shaped politics in Ireland. But these specialist studies are concerned less with Cecil and his position vis-à-vis the kingdom of Ireland and its place within the wider Tudor state than with the extent of his influence on the careers of individual high-ranking political figures associated with Ireland.¹⁴ Historians have drawn attention to Cecil's avid support for English colonization schemes in Ireland and have demonstrated how his views on this subject evolved over the course of Elizabeth's reign; but with the exception of his centrality in the organization and planning of the Munster plantation his role in the formation and implementation of Tudor policy in Ireland has not received sustained consideration.¹⁵

It is perhaps significant that more thoroughgoing investigations of Cecil's relationship with the kingdom of Ireland have come from historians approaching the period from what has been described as a 'New British' perspective. In a groundbreaking study, Jane Dawson demonstrated how Cecil's administrative load went well beyond the affairs of Tudor England and the workings of its government. Professor Dawson offered convincing evidence that Cecil's knowledge of geography and his belief in the necessity of integrating Ireland more closely into the English state combined to influence the Elizabethan regime's adoption of a new political strategy: the establishment of 'a united and Protestant British Isles'.¹⁶ The

¹³ See, for instance, N. N. (Peter Talbot), *Politicians Catechisme, for his instruction in divine faith, and morall honesty* (Antwerp, 1658), 75; Richard Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, 3 vols. (London, 1885–90), i. 362; ii. 1, 2, 19, 25, 34, 58, 73, 74, 101, 105, 106, 108, 120; iii. 36, 73, 89, 96, 97, 100, 101, 111, 112, 123, 132, 134, 135, 137; T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin, and F. J. Byrne (eds.), *A new history of Ireland*, iii: *Early Modern Ireland, 1534–1691* (Oxford, 1976), 81–2, 88, 95, 119; Steven Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors: English expansion and the end of Gaelic rule, 1447–1603* (London, 1998), 238, 267, 277, 286, 298, 318; Colm Lennon, *Sixteenth-century Ireland: the incomplete conquest* (Dublin, 2005), 270, 272, 276; Nicholas Canny, *From Reformation to Restoration: Ireland, 1534–1660* (Dublin, 1987), 89, 109. Cecil appears so frequently in Myles Ronan, *The Reformation under Elizabeth, 1558–1580* (Dublin, 1930) that he apparently did not warrant an entry in the index.

¹⁴ Ciaran Brady, *The chief governors: the rise and fall of reform government in Tudor Ireland, 1536–1588* (Cambridge, 1994), 81, 103, 123, 149, 170, 213–14; id., *Shane O'Neill* (Dundalk, 1996), 44–7; Hiram Morgan, 'The fall of Sir John Perrot', in John Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I: court and culture in the last decade* (Cambridge, 1995), 109–25.

¹⁵ D. B. Quinn, *The Elizabethans and the Irish* (Ithaca, NY, 1966), 124–6; Nicholas Canny, 'The ideology of English colonization: from Ireland to America', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 30 (1973), 577; id. (ed.), 'Rowland White's "Discors touching Ireland" c.1569', *IHS* 20 (1976–7), 439–63; id., *The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland: a pattern established* (Hassocks, 1976), 62–3, 65, 75–6, 80–1, 84, 86–7; Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster plantation: English migration to southern Ireland, 1583–1641* (Oxford, 1986), 38–40. Jon Crawford, in his study of the privy council in Ireland, recognized the benefits which 'a study of Cecil's Irish policy' would yield for the better understanding of Tudor Ireland: *Anglicizing the government of Ireland: the Irish privy council and the expansion of Tudor rule, 1556–1578* (Blackrock, 1993), 414.

¹⁶ Dawson, 'William Cecil and the British dimension', 196–216; id., *The politics of religion in the age of Mary, queen of Scots: the earl of Argyll and the struggle for Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge, 2002).

inclusion of Ireland in this study touched on a dimension of Cecil's career hitherto overlooked by historians, while also highlighting the importance of Ireland in the making of an early modern British state. In a similar vein, Rory Rapple's recent work has shown the influence which the soldiery element in Elizabethan Ireland exerted on Tudor political culture in both kingdoms.¹⁷ William Cecil, Dr Rapple argues, became the *bête noire* of a growing military establishment, rooted in England but increasingly dominant in Ireland, whose members believed the long-serving minister's approach to the government of the kingdom to be hostile to the soldier.

What follows seeks to incorporate these major advancements in our understanding of the Tudor age into a more wide-ranging exploration of the relationship between William Cecil and Ireland. The practical difficulty in doing so lies not so much in sifting through the considerable primary material linking Cecil to Ireland scattered throughout the records generated by the English state in the sixteenth century, but in discerning the difference between those papers that bear his hand or endorsement and those which actually reflected his thinking or political position. We would do well to apply the caution which Conyers Read expressed about Cecil's role in the peace negotiations in 1559 at Câteau-Cambrésis to much of the evidence associated with a man who served at the centre of Tudor government:

Virtually all the dispatches to the English peace commissioners, those from the Council and those from the Queen, were drafted by him [Cecil]. But that after all was his business. It would be rash to conclude that because he drafted the letters he determined their contents.¹⁸

It should also be remembered that on the other end of this process it was the sovereign (in Elizabeth's reign if not in Edward VI's) whose prerogative right it ultimately was to decide political, religious, and social policy, make appointments, and release or withdraw money. It was an age of personal monarchy; but, as historians concerned primarily with Tudor England have shown, the queen and her councillors frequently disagreed on a great many points of government and it was possible for a councillor like William Cecil to manipulate, cajole, or pressure his queen into taking a certain action or deciding a matter against her will.¹⁹ As will be seen with regard to Ireland, Cecil's expertise on the subject became such that much of the framework within which Elizabeth made her decisions was erected and fashioned by him. The same holds true for the privy council on which he sat: while Cecil was not alone in the consideration of Ireland matters, his unrivalled knowledge of the

On Cecil and geography, see R. A. Skelton and J. Summerson, *A description of maps and architectural drawings in the collection made by William Cecil, first Baron Burghley now at Hatfield House* (Oxford, 1971). For the British context in the sixteenth century more generally, see Hiram Morgan, 'British policies before the British state', in Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (eds.), *The British problem, c.1534–1707: state formation in the Atlantic archipelago* (New York, 1996), 66–88.

¹⁷ Rory Rapple, *Martial power and Elizabethan political culture: military men in England and Ireland, 1558–1594* (Cambridge, 2009).

¹⁸ Read, *Mr Secretary Cecil*, 126.

¹⁹ John Guy, 'Tudor monarchy and its critiques', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy*, 95–9; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*.

other Tudor kingdom at the council board frequently dictated that body's executive functions and recommendations to the queen regarding Ireland. Those occasions when Elizabeth and Cecil were at variance on matters pertaining to Ireland are relatively easy to identify; a more difficult task, in an Irish context, is to identify consistently—when queen and minister were of a common mind—where the queen's mind ended and the mind of her minister began.

It remains to consider the current state of historical research on Tudor Ireland, an area of study which remains quite distinct from the study of Tudor England. Apart from the recent inclusion of overviews of Tudor Ireland in wider surveys of Ireland or Ireland's place within the state emerging in the British Isles, the last attempt to synthesize the subject in its entirety came, more than a decade ago now, in the form of the second, and expanded, edition of Steven Ellis's survey of Ireland in the Tudor period.²⁰ Authoritative on the period until Elizabeth's reign (more reminiscent of a monograph than a survey), the work is chiefly a synthesis for the half-century or so thereafter, drawing heavily on the pioneering studies of early Elizabethan Ireland conducted by Nicholas Canny and Ciaran Brady. But Ellis's reliance on Richard Bagwell's nineteenth-century narrative of Ireland in the Tudor age from the 1570s until the outbreak of Tyrone's rebellion in the mid-1590s reflects how little attention the middle years of Elizabeth's reign have received from historians.²¹ In historiographical terms, Ellis's survey may be viewed as marking the conclusion of an era when the debate surrounding historical revisionism dominated the writing of Ireland's history.²² His reference to the difficulty of 'writing history in the middle of a civil war', in a monograph published shortly before the appearance of his revised version of his survey of Tudor Ireland, reflected the extent to which Ireland's history and, at times violent, contemporary politics continued to intersect into the later 1990s.²³

In the decade and more since, Ireland has been transformed in political terms; but ironically it was the (not unrelated) economic transformation of the country in these years which may in years to come be viewed as having had the greatest impact on the writing of Irish history. Buoyed by increased funding for university research and the ability of domestic publishers to publish (and presumably to sell) academic titles, publications on Irish history greatly increased: nearly a dozen theses and monographs exploring Ireland in Tudor times have been written since

²⁰ S. J. Connolly, *Contested island: Ireland, 1460–1630* (Oxford, 2007); S. G. Ellis, with Christopher Maginn, *The making of the British Isles: the state of Britain and Ireland, 1450–1660* (London, 2007); Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors* (originally published as *Tudor Ireland: crown community and the conflict of cultures, 1470–1603* (London, 1985)). A second edition of Lennon's *Sixteenth-century Ireland* (1994) was published in 2005 with updated endnotes, but research completed after the mid-1990s was not integrated into the author's arguments.

²¹ A comprehensive history of Ireland in the 1590s has yet to be written, but see Hiram Morgan, *Tyrone's rebellion: the outbreak of the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland* (London, 1993); John McGurk, *The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland: the 1590s crisis* (Manchester, 1997).

²² Cf. Ciaran Brady (ed.), *Interpreting Irish history: the debate on historical revisionism, 1938–1994* (Blackrock, 1994).

²³ S. G. Ellis, *Tudor frontiers and noble power: the making of the British state* (Oxford, 1995), 14.

1998.²⁴ Broadly, these works are marked neither by a common historical ideology, nor competing historical or political agendas—indeed scant attention is paid in these works to historiography at all. Rather the tendency toward detailed research into localities, regions, or individuals is the methodological thread that runs through recent research into the history of Tudor Ireland. As to the sudden absence of historical agendas (whether they were real or imagined) in a field once riddled with them, this is probably the result of the more normalized political relationship between Ireland and the United Kingdom: once common labels applied to historians such as ‘revisionist’ or ‘nationalist’ are outmoded; to create new ones seems forced and, in the present climate, gauche. The sudden proliferation of local and regional studies may be understood as a reaction to the historical research undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s, which offered much more wide-ranging and provocative discussions of themes touching the entire island.²⁵ These works, written and published in close succession, became the basis for the current understanding of Tudor Ireland. The drive among the most recent generation of historians to assess whether these inherited ideas are borne out at the local and regional level has come to form an important aspect of the study of Tudor Ireland—not unlike how church historians in England, responding to the work of A. G. Dickens, explored how Protestantism was received at the county level.²⁶ The historian of Ireland in the Tudor period is now in a position to offer a fresh view on the subject by drawing on a deep reservoir of detailed local and regional studies, which complement and question the major works of a generation ago.

The present work does not purport to be a biography of William Cecil. Such studies have already been done well and done recently. Rather it seeks to show that this most important of Tudor statesmen’s experience administering the kingdom of

²⁴ It should be emphasized that this represents a selection of key monographs and unpublished Ph.D. theses devoted entirely, or in large part, to localities, regions, and individuals in Tudor Ireland: M. A. Lyons, *Church and society in county Kildare, c.1470–1547* (Dublin, 2000); Vincent Carey, *Surviving the Tudors: the ‘wizard’ earl of Kildare and English rule in Ireland, 1537–1586* (Dublin, 2002); David Edwards, *The Ormond lordship in county Kilkenny, 1515–1642: the rise and fall of Butler feudal power* (Dublin, 2003); Christopher Maginn, ‘Civilizing’ Gaelic Leinster: the extension of Tudor rule in the O’Byrne and O’Toole lordships (Dublin, 2005); Anthony McCormack, *The earldom of Desmond, 1463–1583: the decline and crisis of a feudal lordship* (Dublin, 2005); Darren McGettigan, *Red Hugh O’Donnell and the Nine Years War* (Dublin, 2005); Brendan Scott, *Religion and reformation in the Tudor diocese of Meath* (Dublin, 2006); Valerie McGowan-Doyle, ‘The Book of Howth: the Old English and the Elizabethan conquest of Ireland’ (Ph.D. thesis, University College, Cork, 2005); Gerald Power, ‘The nobility of the English Pale in Tudor Ireland, 1496–1566’ (Ph.D. thesis, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2008); James Murray, *Enforcing the English Reformation in Ireland: clerical resistance and political conflict in the diocese of Dublin, 1534–1590* (Cambridge, 2009); J. P. Mannion, ‘Landownership and Anglicisation in Tudor Connaught: the lordships of Clanrickard and Hy Many, 1500–1590’ (Ph.D. thesis, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2010). To these must be added the many local studies which appeared in article form and the scores of early modern lives which were published in the *ODNB* and the *Dictionary of Irish Biography*, ed. James McGuire and James Quinn (Cambridge, 2010).

²⁵ Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*; Brendan Bradshaw, *The dissolution of the religious orders in Ireland under Henry VIII* (Cambridge, 1974); id., *The Irish constitutional revolution of the sixteenth century* (Cambridge, 1979); Ciaran Brady, ‘The government of Ireland, c.1540–83’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Dublin, 1980); S. G. Ellis, *Reform and revival: English government in Ireland, 1470–1534* (London, 1986).

²⁶ A. G. Dickens, *The English Reformation* (London, 1964); Christopher Haigh, *The English Reformation revised* (Oxford, 1987).

Ireland offers a unique insight into the early modern state during what was a pivotal period of Anglo-Irish political, cultural, and social development. The work is divided into three parts.

The two chapters in Part I offer a view of Ireland and its place within the Tudor territories in 1520, the year of William Cecil's birth, and in 1550, the year in which Cecil was admitted to Edward VI's privy council and made a secretary of state. These chapters are designed to present an original commentary on the character and the state of Tudor rule in Ireland through the synthesis of recent scholarly research at dates which illustrate both the early and mid-Tudor experience there. The first uses the relationship between William Cecil's father, Richard, and William Wise of Waterford, both royal servants at the court of Henry VIII, as an *entrée* to an exploration of society and government in the lordship of Ireland in 1520. This will provide the necessary historical background and the political, social, and legal framework for understanding Ireland and its deepening relationship with England in the Tudor period. The second chapter, constructed around William Cecil's appointment to high political office in 1550, gives an account of Ireland, by then a kingdom, at a time when the implications of the constitutional and political changes introduced late in the reign of Henry VIII were steadily revealing themselves against a backdrop of religious polarization and war in Europe which had altered the traditional relationship between Ireland and England.

The five chapters which comprise Part II, covering the period 1550–98, constitute the core of this book. Each chapter considers a theme which over the course of William Cecil's long career in the service of the Tudors regularly caused his thoughts to turn to Ireland. The first of these considers Cecil's correspondence and his principal points of contact in Ireland, and questions the received interpretation that Cecil was both a major player in the politics of 'faction' at Elizabeth's court and operated a patronage network that stretched from Whitehall to Ireland. A second chapter, beginning in Edward's reign and concluding in Elizabeth's last years on the throne, explores what may be Cecil's most important legacy with regard to Ireland: his role in the formulation and oversight of Tudor political policy and the operation of government there. It shows that Cecil's influence with Elizabeth and his unparalleled knowledge of Ireland combined to make him the key to the functioning of Tudor government in the kingdom in the later sixteenth century; and though policy for Ireland never originated from him, his support was essential to see it pursued and implemented. Next in this section, Cecil's role in the economic relationship between the kingdoms will be assessed. It follows Cecil's efforts, both as lord high treasurer of England and before, to grapple with the Tudor state's dual monetary system and to find and to provide the money, men, and the materials necessary to sustain Tudor rule in Ireland. A fourth chapter then probes the intractable subject of national identity in Tudor Ireland through an analysis of Cecil's attitudes toward not only Ireland's Irish, or Gaelic, population, but also the two varieties of Englishmen resident in Ireland by the second half of the sixteenth century: the so-called 'Old English' and 'New English' populations. Lastly, his role in the government of the national Protestant church in Ireland and

his views on the progress of religious reform there will be considered, culminating in Lord Burghley's appointment in 1592 as the first chancellor of Ireland's first university, Trinity College in Dublin. Religion, it will be argued, though a subject of central importance to Cecil and his world view, was accorded the lowest priority in his thinking about Ireland. The division of William Cecil's interaction with Ireland into separate subjects is something of an artificial construct. Cecil would have understood and approached all matters, or causes, pertaining to Ireland as facets of a single undertaking, which was itself but one facet of his service to the Tudors. For the purposes of historical analysis, however, such compartmentalization, unhistorical though it may be, provides the best means to deconstruct what was a deeply complex relationship.

Part III will examine, in two chapters, Lord Burghley's relationship with Ireland in the final years of his life, after nearly half a century of service to the Tudors. The first of these chapters provides a final account of the state of Tudor rule in Ireland in 1598, the year of Burghley's death, as the rebellion of Hugh O'Neill grew in strength and the prospect of the loss of the kingdom came into view. This is followed by a chapter which considers contemporary perceptions of Burghley and his relationship with Ireland. Described by some as the 'careful father' of the kingdom of Ireland, and yet resented by some in the army for allegedly placing the preservation of the queen's treasure before the well-being of those many thousands of men fighting her wars, this chapter will explore the extent to which Burghley's association with Ireland entered into political, and where possible public, consciousness.

The analysis of the interrelated and often intersecting themes set within broad surveys of Ireland at key points in the early sixteenth century—when a young Henry VIII was lord of Ireland—at mid-century—when Edward VI was king of Ireland—and at the close of the sixteenth century—when Queen Elizabeth I, the last Tudor sovereign, was fighting a major war to retain her kingdom against an Irish confederacy backed by Spain—will reveal the depth of involvement of one of early modern Europe's most important ministers of state in the affairs of Ireland. To the modern observer conditioned by nation-centred approaches to history, Burghley's understanding of Ireland, his complex views on its inhabitants, and the depth of his commitment to all aspects of preserving and extending Tudor rule there may appear striking. This dimension of his career, however, serves to underscore the necessity of including Ireland in the study both of Tudor statecraft and the development of the early modern English state. William Cecil was not bound by the confines of modern national units: his long experience administering the kingdom of Ireland highlights the fact that the territory over which the Tudor sovereigns ruled consisted of more than the kingdom of England.

It has been said that to write the history of William Cecil is to write the history of England in the later sixteenth century.²⁷ The same can be said with regard to Ireland in these years. Thus, at one level, this study will provide a history of sixteenth-century Ireland. But an extended analysis of Cecil's long relationship

²⁷ J. W. Burgon, *The life and times of Sir Thomas Gresham*, 2 vols. (London, 1839) i. 220.

with Ireland will also highlight the complexity of Anglo-Irish interaction in the Tudor age and will show that more than the basic binary features of conquest and resistance characterized this relationship. At another level, this work will demonstrate that the second half of the sixteenth century witnessed the political, social, and cultural integration of Ireland into the multinational Tudor state and that it was William Cecil who, more than any other figure, consciously worked to achieve that integration.

PART I

ENGLAND AND IRELAND:
A DEEPENING ASSOCIATION

This page intentionally left blank

1

The Lordship of Ireland, 1520

William Cecil was born in September 1520 in the village of Bourne on the western outskirts of the Fens in the kingdom of England. He was the grandson of a Welsh soldier who had served Henry VII, the first Tudor king of England. William's grandfather followed the new king to England leaving the Cecils' ancestral home on the borders of Herefordshire to settle 100 miles north of London in southern Lincolnshire.¹ Richard Cecil, William's father, was not a soldier. He did not have to be. The dynastic wars out of which Henry Tudor emerged to claim the throne had ended by the time of Richard's birth. Richard Cecil grew up an Englishman and a member of the Lincolnshire gentry. Like his father Richard served the crown, by then worn by Henry VII's second son and successor Henry VIII in whose chamber he served as a page. Richard's son William began his life at the start of King Henry VIII's second full decade on the throne in the eastern midlands near to the heart of the English kingdom.

As a Renaissance prince, however, William Cecil's king was of the firm belief that his empire was not confined to the boundaries of a single kingdom, that it could, in fact, have many hearts.² If the king needed an example of the possibilities of composite, or multiple, monarchy he need only look to his queen's nephew, the recently elected Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, whose patchwork of domains stretched across Europe and further still across the Atlantic Ocean. Henry VIII laid claim to the crown of France, and had fought a massive though ultimately unsuccessful war (1512–14) against the native Valois dynasty to regain England's medieval French territories beyond what remained in the English enclave at Calais. Henry VIII also claimed overlordship of Scotland, the other British kingdom, where his sister Margaret was mother to the king of Scots; but just as in France the existence of a native dynasty and a hostile population had prevented the king of England from exercising any real power there. The only territories outside of England to which Henry VIII laid claim, and where his authority was consistently felt, were Wales and the island of Ireland which lay to the west. Henry VIII's predecessors as kings of England had conquered and annexed both territories to the English crown in the later Middle Ages. That Wales was both smaller than and contiguous to England, coupled with the fact that the Tudors themselves were of Welsh ancestry, paved the way for that territory's closer association

¹ Alford, *Burghley*, 1–7.

² See John Guy, 'The Tudor theory of "imperial" kingship', *History Review*, 17 (1993), 12–16.

with England, and allowed a man like William Cecil's grandfather to emigrate to the eastern midlands of England. Ireland, by contrast, shared an entirely different relationship with England: nearly 300 miles west of Lincolnshire, and separated from Britain by the Irish Sea, a reigning English monarch had not set foot there in nearly 125 years.

At the time of William Cecil's birth the relationship between England and Ireland was ambiguous. It was an ambiguity which stemmed chiefly from the king of England's centuries-old claim to the lordship of Ireland itself. By right of a twelfth-century papal grant and Henry II's subsequent military conquest, Henry VIII was lord of the entire island of Ireland. Yet in practice his lordship was confined to certain areas, concentrated in the fertile lowlands of the south and in the east, and to that segment of the population of Ireland understood and acknowledged by the crown to be Englishmen—in the main, those men and women descended from the English subjects who had settled there in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This community, the English of Ireland, had, with the support of the crown, overseen the gradual development in the lordship of English institutions of government and English administrative units—most notably shires, or counties, subdivided into baronies (hundreds and wapentakes in England), and their attendant social and legal features.³ However, the conquest of Ireland begun in the twelfth century, and the settlement of the island which followed in the century or so thereafter, was never completed. Parts of the island, mainly in the north-west but also in the mountainous and boggy territory in the south and east, were untouched by English settlement and royal government; and some of those areas which had been won in the thirteenth century by subjects of the crown of England had been lost in the following centuries. Henry VIII's own inheritance in Ireland reflected both the limits of royal authority in the lordship and the loss of English ground: as heir to the earldom of Ulster in the north and to the lordship of Connaught in the west, the king of England was, far and away, the largest landowner in the lordship, but he exercised little authority in either region and collected scarcely any rents.

To whom were these territories lost? Those areas outside of royal control were ruled by dozens of Irish lords or chiefs, though English observers might also refer to them as 'captains'.⁴ They were the leaders of clans—extended kinship groups—whose members laid claim to a common male ancestor and which functioned as political entities.⁵ The clans shared a common set of legal customs—known as Brehon law—and a highly developed sense of their own history and cultural and racial identity. Collectively these clans formed an

³ For this, see J. F. Lydon (ed.), *The English in medieval Ireland* (Dublin, 1984); S. G. Ellis, 'Crown, community and government in the English territories, 1450–1575', *History*, 71 (1986), 187–204; id., *Reform and revival*.

⁴ Historians most commonly refer to Ireland's native population and its political leadership as 'Gaelic' or 'Gaelic-Irish', but, as will be discussed in greater detail below in Chapter 6, 'Irish' was the only term available in the English language of the period to describe this population.

⁵ K. W. Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland in the Middle Ages* (Dublin, 2003), a book which remains the standard account of Gaelic (Irish) society and which presents in detail the material summarized in this paragraph.

identifiable Irish polity.⁶ With the exception of a handful of powerful clans which could exert influence on a regional level, however, politics and power in Irish society were, by the later Middle Ages, highly decentralized by contemporary western European standards (and exceptionally so by English standards). Irish chiefs ruled their individual lordships, or ‘countries’ as they were then known in English, as independent political units, though weaker clans were frequently vassals of their more powerful neighbours. Militarily, even the most powerful chiefs—or the combinations of them that formed from time to time—were no match for the might of the combined force of the English crown and its subjects. Irish warfare, when compared to standard forms of political violence in early sixteenth-century Europe, was a tame exercise, consisting chiefly of intimidation, hostage taking, and cattle-raiding.⁷ If we may judge from the reform treatise penned for an audience in England in the late 1520s by Patrick Finglas, appointed chief baron of the exchequer in 1520, the military weakness of Irish chiefs was a widely accepted fact in early Tudor Ireland. ‘Irishmen’, Finglas explained,

have not suche wysdome ne pollycie in warre but Englishmen when they sett themselves therunto excede them to farre and as towchyng harneys and artyllerye Englishemen excede them farre, and as for hardynes I have seene thexp[er]ience that in all my daies never hearde that i^c foote men ne horsemen of Irishemen woulde abyde to fyght with so manye Englishe men.⁸

Appended to Finglas’ treatise was a ‘Description of the power of Irishmen’, which listed the military strength of nearly every Irish chief. It concluded:

God do p[ro]vide for the kynges subiectes here that he sendeth dailye dissencions amonge the saide Irishemen, so as more then three of the saide capitaynes loveth not other and make mortall warre dailye on thother so as thei cannot loke on us the kynges subiectes ne p[er]ceyve our debylite ne strenghte.⁹

Not surprisingly, then, English ground in the lordship was not lost in one fell swoop to a coordinated Irish military or cultural offensive; rather, from the early fourteenth century areas of English settlement and political control contracted gradually in the face of the sporadic military advances of individual, or sometimes several, chiefs—the English colony was suffering death by a thousand cuts. Concomitant to this Irish political advance, moreover, was the gradual and peaceful replacement, in many parts of the Englishry, of English farmers by members of the

⁶ I use the term ‘polity’ here to mean a particular form of government or political organization, rather than a state as a unitary political and administrative entity: *Oxford English Dictionary*, ed. John Simpson and Edmund Weiner (2nd edn., Oxford, 1989), *sub* ‘polity’.

⁷ David Edwards, ‘The escalation of violence in sixteenth-century Ireland’, in David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan, and Clodagh Tait (eds.), *Age of atrocity: violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2007), 34–78.

⁸ A treatise by Patrick Finglas, c.1529, TNA, SP 60/2/7; An abbreviate of the getting of Ireland, 1529, LPL, MS 600, fos. 204–7.

⁹ Description of the power of Irishmen, CP 144, fo. 8. On the crucial, but often overlooked, subject of the military weakness of the Irish, see Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 248–9.

more numerous Irish peasantry. The presence in the Englishry of a sizeable proportion of Irish tenants served further to blur the distinction between areas of predominantly English settlement and subject to some degree of crown control, and Irish areas ruled by Irish chiefs and clans. By the time royal government was revived in the later fifteenth century and the subsidence of the English colony in Ireland was arrested, approximately half of the island lay in the hands of Irish chiefs. The Irish polity stretched in an unbroken arc from the gates of the English towns of Limerick in the south to Carrickfergus in the north-east, and continued into the Western Isles and Highlands of the kingdom of Scotland; non-contiguous segments of the Irish polity, meanwhile, clung on in the mountains and forests south of Dublin and in the extreme south-west of Munster.¹⁰ Yet the nominal claim of kings of England to lordship over the entire island of Ireland was unchanged. So too was the English legal and constitutional determination which had developed since the thirteenth century that the Irish clans, and the Irish population more generally, were not subjects of the king of England; they were frequently denounced in England, and in English parts of Ireland, as the 'king's Irish enemies', or the 'wild Irish' who were disabled from availing of English common law.

Only the authority of the church extended across the entire island, but the character of ecclesiastical structures in the lordship mirrored political realities. There existed, in effect, two churches in Ireland: the church *inter Anglicos* and that *inter Hibernicos*.¹¹ The most notable difference between the two churches was the prevalence in the latter of hereditary succession. The Irish church was not above the reach of this seemingly irresistible force in Irish society. Clerical families produced the Irish church's ecclesiastical elite, including many of its bishops; its monastic communities were similarly dominated by ecclesiastical lineages; even the tenants on church-owned lands, who enjoyed quasi-clerical status, were drawn from Irish clerical families.¹² By English standards, the church *inter Hibernicos* was very poor and was generally comprised of outspread parishes; but popular religion and religious practice remained strong, as some of the devotional literature commissioned by the Irish nobility in the early sixteenth century attests.¹³ It also remained distinctly Irish in character, as the oft-cited comparison in Irish literature of the crucifixion of Christ to the payment of a blood-fine (monetary compensation for a homicide) suggests. The church *inter Anglicos* more closely resembled the early Tudor church in England even down to the populations of major urban centres, such as Kilkenny and Dublin, performing pageants to celebrate St George's Day. It too was poor in comparison to the church in England, but it had generally adopted

¹⁰ Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 21–2. See now also Christopher Maginn, 'Gaelic Ireland's English frontiers in the late Middle Ages', *PRIA*, sect. C, 110 (2010), 173–90.

¹¹ On this, see now Henry Jefferies, *The Irish church and the Tudor reformations* (Dublin, 2010).

¹² Henry Jefferies, *Priests and prelates of Armagh in the age of reformations, 1518–1558* (Dublin, 1997), 125–6; Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland*, 224.

¹³ Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 193–7; Salvador Ryan, 'Windows on late medieval devotional practice: Máire Ní Mháille's "Book of piety" (1513) and the world behind the texts', in Rachel Moss, Colmán Ó Clabaigh, and Salvador Ryan (eds.), *Art and devotion in late medieval Ireland* (Dublin, 2006), 1–15. For the late medieval Irish church in general, see Canice Mooney, *The church in Gaelic Ireland 13th to 15th centuries* (Dublin, 1969).

few of the features of the Irish church.¹⁴ Yet, no matter its differences, there was only one Christian church in Ireland. There was thus a greater degree of interaction between the two manifestations of the Irish church than between the two political spheres on the island. The Observant movement, for instance, cut clean across Ireland's ethno-political divisions; so too did the periodic assembly of the spiritual peers together in parliament. To circumvent the laws established in Ireland prohibiting such interaction between the Irish and English nations, the government regularly made exceptions, granting Irish clerics English liberty (discussed below) so that they might move freely in English society and licences so that these Irish bishops and archbishops might sit in parliament.¹⁵

In 1520, the year of William Cecil's birth, his father Richard was a page in the privy chamber of Henry VIII. Serving alongside him there as a page was William Wise.¹⁶ The two men were present with King Henry in France at the Field of Cloth of Gold in the summer before William Cecil was born. Wise was from Ireland, a native of the important south-eastern coastal city of Waterford where his family were merchants. By the early sixteenth century, Waterford was a bustling commercial centre whose lucrative exports of manufactured woollen cloths had brought great wealth to the city and its citizens.¹⁷ Though born and reared outside of England, Wise was English—'English by blood' as he would have understood it. He was a subject of the king of England and was thus no less an Englishman in legal or political terms than the Lincolnshire-born Cecil.¹⁸ We can be fairly certain that the spoken English of the two pages would have differed somewhat, but disparity in accent or diction was insufficient to impair communication. Indeed, William Wise was remembered by the later sixteenth-century Dublin chronicler Richard Stanyhurst for his clever use of English at the court of King Henry VIII:

Hauing lente to the King his signet to seale a Letter, who hauing powdred Erimites eng-rayled in the Seale: 'Why, howe now, Wise,' quoth the king, 'What? Hast thou Lise here?' 'An', if it like your Maiestie,' quoth sir William, 'a louse is a riche Coate, for by giuing the Louse, I part Armes with the French King, in that he gyueth the Floure de Lice.' Whereat the king heartily laughed, to heare how pretily so byting a taunt (namely proceeding from a Prince) was sodaynly turned to so pleasaunte a conceyte.¹⁹

William Wise was very probably Richard Cecil's only connection to the English population in the lordship of Ireland; yet there was much in the Ireland of William Wise which his fellow page would have recognized. The community into which

¹⁴ Mooney, *The church in Gaelic Ireland*, 32–50; Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 196–7.

¹⁵ A. J. Otway-Ruthven, *A history of medieval Ireland* (London, 1980), 292–3.

¹⁶ *Letters and papers, foreign and domestic, Henry VIII*, 21 vols. (London, 1862–1932) (hereafter *L. & P. Hen. VIII*), 1519–21, no. 1215.

¹⁷ Eamonn McEneaney, 'Mayors and merchants in medieval Waterford city, 1169–1495', in William Nolan and Thomas Power (eds.), *Waterford: history & society* (Dublin, 1992), 167.

¹⁸ R. A. Griffiths, 'The English realm and dominions and the king's subjects in the later Middle Ages', in John Rowe (ed.), *Aspects of government and society in later medieval England: essays in honour of J. R. Lander* (Toronto, 1986), 83–105.

¹⁹ Raphael Holinshed, *The... chronicles of England, Scotlande and Irelande...* (London, 1577); 2nd edn. by John Hooker and others, 3 vols., 1587, ed. Henry Ellis, 6 vols. (London, 1807–8), 307.

Wise was born was modelled on society and government in England: the common law, the English language, English-style landholding, urban settlements, and above all loyalty to the king of England were all features of the world from which Wise departed for the court of Henry VIII. The most extensive settlements of the English in Ireland, however, lay northwards of Waterford in the four shires surrounding the city of Dublin, the centre of royal government in the lordship, in a district which had in recent decades come to be referred to as the English Pale. The city of Waterford, in the province of Munster, was thus located outside the Pale, and for a time in the later Middle Ages the threat of attack from the Irish overland had moved its mayors to seek exemption from making the journey to Dublin to take their oath of loyalty to the crown.²⁰ Yet, through these years, Waterford served as a beacon of loyalty to the English crown; in 1488 Henry VII granted the city a new charter and powers of self-government in gratitude for the unflinching loyalty of its citizens to him in the face of the appearance in Ireland of the Yorkist pretender Lambert Simnel. Like Waterford, the Wises were formally connected to crown government in the lordship. William Wise's father John had served as chief baron of the exchequer in the early 1490s and must have had sufficient standing in Ireland to procure for his son a position at the Tudor court.²¹ William Wise was described in early 1511 as 'groom of the chamber in the Household', and from this position royal favour followed: in 1516, Henry VIII appointed Wise, though he remained a servant in the chamber, constable of Dublin castle; in 1519, he received a licence to act by deputy as receiver of custom in the English port of Bristol, which maintained a vigorous commercial trade with south-east Ireland.²²

The most notable difference that Cecil would have recognized between government in Tudor England and Tudor Ireland was the absence in the latter of the king and his court.²³ Because the English monarch was normally resident in England, the king, as lord of Ireland, appointed a lord lieutenant who governed the lordship in his name. By Tudor times, this position had become honorific and was usually reserved for royal princes: as a boy the future Henry VIII had been his father's lieutenant of Ireland, just as Richard III's young son, Edward, had been his father's lieutenant. The king appointed a deputy lieutenant, or lord deputy, to represent him in Ireland and to serve as head of both a governing executive and a small standing military retinue. The principal officers in the Irish executive—the chancellor, the treasurer, the master of the rolls, the king's sergeant, the chief justices, and the chief baron of the exchequer—mirrored their English counterparts in name and in function, forming the core of a larger king's council in Ireland which

²⁰ Art Cosgrove, *Late medieval Ireland, 1370–1541* (Dublin, 1981), 64.

²¹ *Statute rolls of the Irish parliament, Richard III–Henry VIII*, ed. Philomena Connolly (Dublin, 2002), 95, 115. Cf. J. C. Walton, 'Church, crown and corporation in Waterford, 1520–1620', in Nolan and Power (eds.), *Waterford: history & society*, 180.

²² *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, i, no. 679; ii, nos. 1812, 4275; iii, no. 492 (10). On the importance of Ireland to trade in Bristol, see Susan Flavin and E. T. Jones (eds.), *Bristol's trade with Ireland and the continent, 1503–1601: the evidence of the exchequer customs accounts* (Dublin, 2009).

²³ Ellis, *Reform and revival*, 12–48, explores in great detail the material summarized in this paragraph.

both advised the deputy and apprised the king and his council in England of events in the lordship. The deputy's frequent military campaigning meant that he, and those members of the executive attendant on him, were peripatetic, but with the settling of the royal common law courts in Dublin in the later medieval period, the core of the king's council had also put down roots in the capital. As chief baron of the exchequer and a councillor, William Wise's father—described in 1508, following a career spent in the service of Henry VII, as the king's 'learned councillor'—played an integral role in the functioning of the Tudor executive in Ireland.²⁴

With the king's licence, the deputy was empowered to summon the lordship's centuries-old legislative assembly—last convened at Dublin in 1516.²⁵ Modelled on the English institution of the same name, the king's parliament of Ireland, like the Irish executive, was subordinate to government in England, but even more explicitly so. The parliament in the kingdom of England had always reserved the right to legislate for Ireland, but since 1494, with the enactment by the parliament in Ireland of what became known as 'Poynings' law', bills had to be approved by the king and his council in England before they could be introduced in the lordship's parliament.²⁶ The convening of parliament afforded the English community in Ireland an opportunity to legislate and authorize taxation within what its members referred to as the king of England's 'land of Ireland'. The gathering together in parliament of Ireland's English population, if the compelling argument levelled by later medieval historians may be applied to the early modern period, also served as a platform from which they might demonstrate their Englishness through the enactment of law.²⁷ The upper house of parliament was the preserve of the spiritual and temporal peers, the preponderance of whom were drawn from the English Pale.²⁸ A handful of temporal peers, however, most notably the powerful Fitzgerald earls of Desmond and the Butler earls of Ormond, were Munster-based. Chief among the lay nobility were the Fitzgerald earls of Kildare, territorial magnates whose military strength and proximity to Dublin had allowed them to dominate the executive and parliament for decades through their service as the king of England's deputy in Ireland.²⁹ Each shire and corporate borough sent two elected representatives to the parliament, where they sat in the lower house. Members from the city and county of Waterford occupied four seats in the House of Commons in the parliament of Ireland.

²⁴ *Calendar of Ormond deeds*, ed. Edmund Curtis, 6 vols. (Dublin, 1932–43), iii, no. 301 (4).

²⁵ 'The bills and statutes of the Irish parliaments of Henry VII and Henry VIII', ed. D. B. Quinn, *Analecta Hibernica*, 10 (1941), 108–15.

²⁶ H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, *The Irish parliament in the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia, 1952), 61–2, 248–51, 260; S. G. Ellis, 'Parliament and community in Yorkist and Tudor Ireland', in Art Cosgrove and J. I. McGuire (eds.), *Parliament and community: historical studies XIV* (Belfast, 1983), 43–68.

²⁷ Brendan Smith, 'Keeping the peace', in James Lydon (ed.), *Law and disorder in thirteenth century Ireland: the Dublin parliament of 1297* (Dublin, 1997), 57–65.

²⁸ Power, 'The Pale peerage'. In a notable difference from practice in England, clergy in Ireland sat in a third house of clerical proctors until the 1530s: Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 206.

²⁹ Ellis, *Tudor frontiers*, 107–45.

The Wises thus belonged to a vibrant and highly centralized society, which was English both in its identity and its political and social organization. Yet this society was also distinctly un-English. And this was not because the English community resided outside of the kingdom of England. Rather, what most differentiated the English of Ireland from the English of England was the regular interaction of the former with an indigenous Irish population which was both legally and constitutionally separate from them. Even as a native of one of the lordship of Ireland's most self-consciously English cities, William Wise would have had experience of Irish people. Here, as in most of the lordship's cities, municipal statutes were introduced through the later Middle Ages, and into the Tudor period, which reflected the presence in English areas of Irish people and Irish culture.³⁰ In the late thirteenth century, for example, it was a punishable offence to call a citizen of Waterford an 'Yrishman'; a statute was enacted a century later prohibiting marriage between Waterford citizens and anyone 'of Irishe blode' unless 'he have his libertie of the Kyng'.³¹ This last stipulation referred to the ability of a person of Irish ancestry to be accounted an English subject through his purchase of a charter of English liberty. To be accounted a citizen, or a freeman, of Waterford was a more difficult barrier to surmount. Apart from social distinction, citizenship brought the privilege to trade on favourable terms inside the municipal franchises and exemption from feudal levies and royal taxation. Citizenship might only be attained through marriage to a citizen, apprenticeship, heredity, or some special dispensation. Many Irish purchased English liberty, and some fewer became citizens of municipalities, as the Irish Christian names and surnames of several of the weavers in Waterford (citizens all of them) bear testimony. It is difficult to ascertain, however, how numerous were Irish people, or how prevalent were Irish language and customs, in large commercial centres such as Waterford. What is clear is that Irishness was a feature of English society in Ireland. The closeness and the ambiguity of the place of Irish people and culture in Waterford is captured in a municipal statute enacted in Henry VII's reign, just three years before John Wise assumed the position of that city's bailiff:

no manere man, freman nor foraine, of the cite or suburbes duellers, shall enpleade nor defende in Yrish tong ayenste ony man in the court, but that all they that ony maters shall have in courte to be mynstred shall have a man that can spek English to declare his matier, excepte one party be of the countre; then every such dueller shalbe att liberte to speke Yrish.³²

The 'countre' to which the statute referred was a region vital to the commercial success of Waterford city. From this hinterland—encompassing parts of the counties of Waterford and Kilkenny—flowed the raw materials, notably the animal hides and the wool, upon which the city relied. However, more than the social

³⁰ 'Archives of the municipal corporation of Waterford', ed. J. T. Gilbert in *HMC 10th report, appendix V*, 265–358.

³¹ *Ibid.* 292, 307.

³² *Ibid.* 323; Lennon, *Sixteenth-century Ireland*, 38–9.

and economic divisions which typically emerge between rural and urban areas separated Waterford city from the 'countrie'. To exit the strong walls of Waterford was to enter a region where only the faint outlines of royal government and Englishness remained. The Power family of east Waterford embodied society here. Englishmen by blood, the Powers served as sheriffs for the county—the post most central to the functioning of English local government—throughout much of the later fifteenth century. But as the power of the English crown and the protection it offered waned in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Powers grew unchecked into an extended kinship group whose many members bore the same surname and functioned as a more or less independent political unit.³³ The Powers, whose lineage-heads began serving as sheriffs for the county in the thirteenth century, had transformed the office by Henry VII's reign into a hereditary possession of the family.³⁴ Common law courts and sessions were no longer kept—the office of sheriff had become nothing more than a prop to the Powers' authority. But there was more to the emergence of the Power family as a political entity than just a family acting collectively for protection and taking law and order into its own hands in the absence of central authority. There had been a cultural shift as well. The Powers had adopted certain aspects of Irish social patterns and customs, despite the fact that there were no overbearing Irish clans in the region forcing them to do so. In a 1515 report on the state of Ireland the Powers were named among the 'greate captaynes of the Englyshe noble folke' who 'folowyth the . . . Iryshe ordre'. To judge by a later report, this consisted chiefly of quartering troops and dependants on the king's subjects (generally known as 'coign and livery') and using 'theyrishe lawes' instead of 'the kinges lawes'.³⁵ From the perspective of the government, and indeed the Waterford citizens, the Powers were 'rebels' who represented a threat both to the king's peace and to the economic well-being of Waterford city. They had, moreover, become culturally assimilated or, as it was more normally expressed in the late medieval period, 'degenerate'—the Powers had lost their race.³⁶

But there existed an English county community in Waterford which resisted the Powers' authority. For them, the Powers had through their dominance of the office of sheriff usurped the king's authority. Their resistance manifested itself in constitutional opposition: in parliament where, in 1493, the commons of counties Kilkenny and Waterford successfully lobbied for the appointment of John Wise as a special justice to administer the king's laws in the counties; and later, in the 1530s, in detailed complaints to the king's royal commissioners of the illegality of

³³ Ciarán Parker, 'Pater familias and parentela: the le Poer lineage in fourteenth-century Waterford', *PRIA*, sect. C, 95 (1995), 93–117. For this phenomenon elsewhere in Ireland, see Christopher Maginn, 'English marcher lineages in south Dublin in the late Middle Ages', *IHS* 34 (2004), 113–36.

³⁴ Ellis, *Reform and revival*, 200; Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland*, 195–6.

³⁵ *State papers, Henry VIII*, 11 vols. (London, 1830–52) (hereafter *SP Hen. VIII*), ii, 7; presentment of the jury of the commons of Waterford, 12 October 1537, TNA, SP 60/5/32.

³⁶ On this point, see R. R. Davies, 'The peoples of Britain and Ireland, 1100–1400: 1. Identities', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th series, 4 (1994), 1–20.

the Powers' behaviour.³⁷ The position of the county community was expressed most clearly in their complaint that Katherine Butler, wife of the head of the Power lineage and daughter of the earl of Ormond, had had the audacity to refer to the king's shire of Waterford as 'Powers countrey, w^out title or graunte of the kings magesty or his deputie of this land of Ireland'.³⁸

The Powers' relationship with the English community of the city and county of Waterford at one level, and with the English crown at another, was a feature of society in Ireland under the early Tudors. Similar instances of English families having drifted away from royal authority and having adopted aspects of Irish culture and social organization were evident to greater or lesser degrees throughout Ireland wherever Englishmen had settled in the medieval period. This was true of isolated English families, such as the Burkes near the town of Galway in the west with little regular contact with the central administration in Dublin, as well as the most powerful and influential English lineages nearer the Pale in Leinster, such as the Butlers and Fitzgeralds, who interacted more regularly with the institutions of Tudor government. The Fitzgerald earls of Kildare, for instance, had dominated the government of Ireland since the mid-fifteenth century, but they also married their daughters to leading Irish chiefs and patronized Irish poets; the Butler earls of Ormond, similarly, intermarried with the leading lights of the Irish polity and even institutionalized aspects of Irish law in their lordship.³⁹

Richard Cecil would never have experienced such behaviour in Lincolnshire. Yet this is not to say that instances of acculturation, or cultural assimilation, were unknown in other parts of the Tudor state. In parts of Wales and the far north of England, English families living along a border with Welsh districts—Welshries, as they were called—and with subjects of the king of Scots had over the course of the later Middle Ages also deviated from traditional English social structures as a method of survival in regions characterized by decentralized government and unsettled frontier conditions.⁴⁰ When referring to this phenomenon in Ireland, some historians have employed the term 'Gaelicization'.⁴¹ It is an accurate term in so far as it describes acculturation, that is the adoption by men and women of English ethnic descent of aspects of Irish culture. The term, however, can become problematic on two counts. In the first place, it implies that acculturation was particular to Ireland and to Anglo-Irish interaction: the 'Scotisation' of Englishmen in the far

³⁷ *Statute rolls of the Irish parliament, Richard III–Henry VIII*, 95.

³⁸ Presentment of the jury of the city of Waterford, 12 October 1537, TNA, SP 60/5/31; presentment of the jury of the commons of Waterford, 12 October 1537, TNA, SP 60/5/32.

³⁹ For the earls of Kildare, see Ellis, *Tudor frontiers*, 135–6, 141–2; *AFM*, s.a. 1519. For the Ormond lordship, see Edwards, *Ormond lordship*, 146–7.

⁴⁰ Rees Davies, *Lordship and society in the march of Wales, 1282–1400* (Oxford, 1978), 443–56; Ellis, *Tudor frontiers*, 46–77.

⁴¹ The most extensive exposition of this phenomenon is in Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland* and id., 'Gaelic society and economy in the high Middle Ages', in Art Cosgrove (ed.), *A new history of Ireland*, ii: *Medieval Ireland, 1169–1534* (Oxford, 1987), 397–438. For a similar interpretation, see also the essays in P. J. Duffy, David Edwards, and Elizabeth FitzPatrick (eds.), *Gaelic Ireland, c.1250–c.1650: land, lordship and settlement* (Dublin, 2001).

north, or the 'Wallicanization' of Englishmen in Pembroke, is unheard of.⁴² Second, and more importantly, it implies a political departure, an implicit rejection of 'English' rule in favour of 'Irish' rule.⁴³ This last inference can be misleading, for the Irish polity was a common form of government underpinned by a highly developed commonality of language, culture, and history rather than a centralized administrative or political entity, and was thus incapable of accepting into its rule, in any formal sense, English lineages which had drifted away from what had become, since the fourteenth century, a faltering and loosely governed colonial community.⁴⁴ Indeed, because the Irish polity lacked unified administrative institutions to confer political or constitutional belonging, 'national' identity in Irish society was based on agnatic descent. This emphasis is borne out in the evidence generated from within the Irish polity: Irish annalists and poets consistently distinguished between *Gaedhil*, as the Irish population referred to itself, and *Gaill*, that is those Englishmen, literally 'foreigners', who had settled in Ireland. *Gaill* was not necessarily a derogatory term. Nor was it an expression of the incompatibility or separateness of the two peoples. Rather it was a statement of historical fact. The identity and collective memory of the leaders of Irish society was too long, and the importance placed on a person's ancestry too great, to forget an Englishman's paternal origins no matter how deeply he might embrace Irish culture and interact with the Irish polity.⁴⁵ This did not leave families such as the Powers in a state of political or cultural limbo, for Englishmen were in most instances just as keenly aware of their own paternal descent and nationality as Irishmen. Of more importance was the position of the Tudor state: degenerate and rebellious though some Englishmen in Ireland had become, the Tudor government continued to regard them as Englishmen, subjects of Henry VIII, in legal and constitutional terms. The complaint of the commoners of Waterford in the 1530s that the leader of the Powers had levied a subsidy upon them so as to subsidize the sending of the lineage-head's son to England offers an indication that even the Powers maintained ties to their ancestral home beyond blood and nominal service to the crown.⁴⁶

Should Richard Cecil (or anyone at Henry VIII's court) have sought these insights into the English community in Ireland his Waterford-born fellow page would have been well positioned to articulate them. Indeed, William Wise's father had furnished Henry VII, at the king's behest, with an account (now lost) of the state of Ireland at the end of the fifteenth century.⁴⁷ Had Cecil, or anyone else at court, sought such a detailed view of the Irish districts which predominated in the north and west of the lordship, however, William Wise would have proved much less insightful. That some sixty Irish 'captains' controlled this region was common enough knowledge. According to the 1515 report on the lordship, these 'captains'

⁴² S. G. Ellis, 'Nationalist historiography and the English and Gaelic worlds in the late Middle Ages', *IHS* 25 (1986), 1–18 (esp. 5).

⁴³ Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland*, 209.

⁴⁴ Maginn, 'English marcher lineages', 125.

⁴⁵ Maginn, 'Gaelic Ireland's English frontiers', 1–17.

⁴⁶ Presentment of the jury of the commons of Waterford, 12 October 1537, TNA, SP 60/5/32.

⁴⁷ *Ormond deeds*, iv. 336.

lyveth onely by the swerde, and obeyeth to no other temperall person, but onely to himself that is stronge: and every of the said capytaynes makeyth warre and peace for hymself, and holdeith by swerde, and hath imperiall jursdyction within his rome, and obeyeth to noo other person, Englyshe ne Iryshe, except only to suche persones, as maye subdue hym by the swered.⁴⁸

English officials had for long deemed the Irishry a 'land of war', legislating against it and contrasting it with the inner areas of the English Pale inhabited by the king's loyal subjects, the so-called 'land of peace', or 'maghery'. Yet Wise's knowledge, and English knowledge more generally, of the state of politics and society deep within the Irishry of the north-west was limited. Royal influence was scarcely felt there in 1520. This part of the lordship was virtually untouched by medieval English settlement and was largely devoid of urban centres or shire ground. Here, Irish society functioned with little regard for the Tudor state of which it was, according to English thinking, a part.

Indeed, by 1520 a major war was brewing between the most powerful Irish clans in the Irish north-west: the O'Neills and O'Donnells. The O'Neills, whose power emanated from their lordship of Tyrone in central Ulster, were much the most dominant force in the region. The O'Neill chief could count O'Reilly, MacMahon, O'Hanlon, and Magennis among his vassals—his *uirrithe*, as he knew them—from whom he exacted tributes. For a century and more the O'Donnells had resisted the O'Neills' attempts to exert suzerainty over the O'Donnell lordship of Tyrconnell, which was situated to the west of Tyrone; but in the later fifteenth century the O'Donnells, principally through their dominance of the O'Rourkes and the extension of their influence into Lower (northern) Connaught, began to grow in power and stature. The O'Neills, locked in factional struggles which had produced a string of unspectacular chiefs into the early sixteenth century, could do little to thwart their rivals' rise.⁴⁹

The election of Conn Bacach as the O'Neill chief in 1519, however, marked an intensification of the O'Neill–O'Donnell rivalry.⁵⁰ In Irish society, a chief had the capacity to wield enormous power and influence within his lordship. His inauguration required the support, or 'election', of his people. This was a process that ran contrary to English forms of political organization and has been frequently misunderstood. For one, it was not 'the people' of the O'Neill lordship who did the 'electing', as turn of the twentieth-century socialists understood it.⁵¹ Rather it was the members of the clan, those men who were possessed of the O'Neill surname and who thus belonged to a common unilineal descent group stretching back centuries, who lent their political support to a claimant. The claimant, for his part, not only had to be an O'Neill, he also had to be possessed of both the military strength necessary to execute the office and an ancestor, no more than four generations

⁴⁸ *SP Hen. VIII*, ii. 1.

⁴⁹ Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland*, 151–6, 163; Brady, *Shane O'Neill*, 11–13.

⁵⁰ *AFM*, s.a. 1519.

⁵¹ James Connolly, *The re-conquest of Ireland* (Dublin, 1915), 9–10.

removed from him, who had been chief. Often, a successor, or *tánaiste*, was nominated during the chief's lifetime in an effort to avoid the power struggles which often followed a chief's death. In this case, Conn Bacach had succeeded his half-brother Art Oge, who had served as chief 1513–19, and followed in the footsteps of his father, Conn More, who had been chief 1483–93. A second misunderstanding arises from the chief's relationship to the land. It was the clan, not the chief alone, who collectively held land in Irish society, though certain demesne lands in a lordship might be attached to the office of chief. The exercise of political power and authority in Irish society was thus confined to clansmen who were set apart by their political importance and landed wealth which stemmed from their patrilineal ancestry. Below this ruling elite, and the other professional hereditary families of poets, doctors, soldiers, and historians which rounded out the elite of Irish society, were the peasants. The common sort were, so far as can be surmised, landless, politically powerless, and generally held in contempt by the Irish elite.⁵²

Conn's accession to the O'Neill chieftaincy did not go unopposed. His nephews—the sons of Art Oge O'Neill, led by Niall Conallach—mounted opposition. They allied with the neighbouring O'Donnells, who were led by Hugh Duff O'Donnell. The O'Donnells were receptive to any interest capable of destabilizing the O'Neill lordship. Such succession disputes were commonplace in the Irish polity. Yet it was not the mindless fratricidal grasping for power portrayed by English commentators. Though clansmen up to four generations removed from the outgoing chief were eligible for the chieftaincy, in theory inviting dozens upon dozens of men to seek the office, claimants usually numbered only a handful. And the designation of a *tánaiste* while the chief still lived, in effect a mechanism for the smooth transfer of power, was not uncommon. Still, there was much that rings true in the English assessment that only the strongest and most resourceful clansmen assumed power. Conn O'Neill was one such individual. He not only retained power among the O'Neills, within three years he set about assembling a grand coalition drawn from Ulster and Connaught designed to subject the O'Donnells to O'Neill power.⁵³ Conn O'Neill's efforts to destroy the O'Donnells were ultimately unsuccessful—the O'Donnells beat back successive assaults in 1522—but the new O'Neill chief had established himself as a leading force in the Irish polity.

Ostensibly, then, politics and society in the Irishry of the north-west played out independently of the Tudor state and without the knowledge of men like William Wise. This is true, in so far as the Irish clans in the region were not directly subject to royal authority and had scarcely any contact with English culture. But closer examination reveals that even this distant region of the lordship was not beyond the reach of royal power and English influence. During the reign of Edward IV, for example, the O'Neill chief had enjoyed a good relationship with the English crown and was referred to in government records as 'the king's friend'. It was in many respects a feudal relationship of the sort that the king of England maintained with

⁵² Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland*, 22–32, 41–3, 91–104.

⁵³ *AU*, s.a. 1522.

English magnates in Ireland.⁵⁴ Later, as the earls of Kildare grew in power and as their service as the king's deputy became more regular, an alliance developed between the Fitzgeralds of Leinster and the O'Neills of Ulster. Conn Bacach's father, Conn, wed the eighth earl of Kildare's sister, prompting the parliament of Ireland to pass a statute declaring Conn and his male heirs English and the king's subjects.⁵⁵ The alliance grew closer still with Conn Bacach's own marriage to the eighth earl of Kildare's daughter. By the early sixteenth century, the Kildares had begun to intervene more regularly in the affairs of the O'Neill lordship and backed rival claimants to the chieftaincy. Conn Bacach was himself a Kildare-backed claimant: in 1517–18 the earl led an army into Tyrone and destroyed the then chief's principal castle, at the behest of Conn Bacach's Geraldine wife according to one source.⁵⁶ The O'Donnells, by virtue of the remoteness of Tyrconnell from Dublin, maintained a more distant relationship with the Tudor state, but Hugh Duff O'Donnell after completing a pilgrimage to Rome spent a portion of 1511 in London. There, Henry VIII received O'Donnell, whom he knighted; the Irish annalists recorded the occasion, adding that O'Donnell 'received great honour and respect' from the king of England.⁵⁷ Englishmen also took part in the wars of the Irish of the north-west: O'Neill's grand coalition against O'Donnell included both *Gaill* of County Meath and English lineages like the MacWilliam Burkes from Connaught.⁵⁸

In June 1520, far from Ulster, and the shifting political sands of the Irish polity, Richard Cecil and William Wise were in France with Henry VIII at the Field of Cloth of Gold. The king of England had transported his entire court to the makeshift palaces erected outside of Calais in an effort to overawe (or at the very least to match) the splendour of the court of the French King Francis I. Conspicuous by their absence at this display of English wealth, power, and nobility were the principals of the Howard family. Led by Thomas, the old duke of Norfolk, the Howards were one of England's foremost noble families. Norfolk was left behind in England and entrusted with the defence of the kingdom. The duke's son and heir Thomas, earl of Surrey, meanwhile, was in Ireland, where he had already begun his service to Henry VIII.

The appointment of Surrey as lord lieutenant of Ireland in March 1520 marked a departure from the established Tudor method of governing the lordship. Like his father, Henry VIII had accepted that the earls of Kildare—Gerald FitzMaurice Fitzgerald, the eighth earl, until his death in 1513 and then his son Gerald FitzGerald, the ninth earl—should serve as his representatives and chief governors there. This arrangement made perfect sense from London: at little cost to the crown, the Geraldines, from their power-base on the borders of the Pale, defended the Englishry from Irish raids and maintained Tudor government and law in English areas of the lordship.⁵⁹ Even outposts of English settlement distant from the

⁵⁴ Katherine Simms, "'The king's friend': O'Neill, the crown and the earldom of Ulster", in James Lydon (ed.), *England and Ireland in the later Middle Ages* (Dublin, 1981), 214–36.

⁵⁵ See below, 153.

⁵⁶ *AFM*, s.a. 1518; *AU*, s.a. 1517. ⁵⁷ *AFM*, s.a. 1512.

⁵⁸ *AU*, s.a. 1522. ⁵⁹ Ellis, *Tudor frontiers*, 107–45.

Pale, such as Galway in the west, were not beyond the reach of royal power exercised through the earls of Kildare: in 1504 at the battle of Knockdoe the eighth earl defeated a confederation of overbearing English rebels backed by Irish enemies—the burgesses of Galway rejoiced and the king rewarded Kildare with election to the Order of the Garter.⁶⁰ What was more, decades of access to the lordship's revenues (typically granted to Irish-born governors) and its small military retinue had helped successive earls of Kildare to extend Geraldine interests in southern Leinster at the expense of the king's 'Irish enemies'.⁶¹

Such reliance on Kildare power, however, had its disadvantages. King Henry may have believed that the days when a Kildare earl might be tempted to use his power against a Tudor king were well and gone, but the earl's style of governing provoked criticisms from some among the English of Ireland. The earl campaigned frequently to maintain control of the lordship, and in order to proceed without greater military and financial support from the crown, he established, through marriage and intimidation, suzerainty over a number of chiefs from across the fissiparous Irish polity, allowing him to harness additional military strength and employ it against his enemies when need arose. Central to the functioning of the Kildare military machine was, no doubt, the unlawful imposition of coign and livery and other exactions on the king's subjects. Thus it was not difficult for Englishmen in the less exposed parts of the Englishry, like the undertreasurer Sir William Darcy of Meath, to complain to the king and his council that Kildare was making war and peace unilaterally and behaving no differently from an Irish lord, with the result that English districts were becoming Irish.⁶²

Complaints about Kildare rule and the decayed state of English Ireland were no doubt exaggerated in an effort to interest the young king in the position of his subjects in the lordship. Henry must have understood this, for he was content not only to retain the earl as his deputy but also to strengthen Kildare authority there. But the remonstrations succeeded at least in drawing the king's attention to the lordship. By 1518, Henry was in personal correspondence with the earl of Desmond and the civic leadership of Cork city. From late 1518, moreover, thanks to Thomas Wolsey's much-vaunted peace accord concluded in London, England was at peace with France. This development may have afforded Henry the opportunity to address the state of Tudor rule in the lordship. Early the following year the king's council in England was discussing Ireland matters and Kildare was summoned to court to take part. Questions again emerged concerning the earl's conduct as deputy. It was in these circumstances that Henry VIII took the decision to pursue a new strategy in Ireland.⁶³ Just what the king hoped to achieve by dispatching to Ireland one of his foremost generals, one of the heroes of the resounding English

⁶⁰ For the battle of Knockdoe, see G. A. Hayes-McCoy, *Irish battles* (London, 1969), 48–67.

⁶¹ Ellis, *Reform and revival*, 16; id., *Tudor frontiers*, 128–34.

⁶² 'William Darcy's Articles', 24 June 1515, LPL, 635, fo. 188; S. G. Ellis, 'An English gentleman and his community: Sir William Darcy of Platten', in Vincent Carey and Ute Lotz-Heumann (eds.), *Taking sides? Colonial and confessional mentalités in early modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2003), 19–41.

⁶³ D. B. Quinn, 'Henry VIII and Ireland, 1509–34', *IHS* 12 (1960–1), 323–4.

victory at Flodden, is unclear (to judge by the vague instructions given to Surrey to 'reduce' the lordship 'to obedience and good order' it is unlikely that Henry knew himself). In the end, the earl's mission amounted, in effect, to what has been aptly described as 'a reconnaissance in force'.⁶⁴

Surrey, at the head of a small military retinue and armed with several pieces of artillery, arrived in Dublin late in May 1520. He found the English Pale beset by plague and generally impoverished. It is clear from the earl's correspondence with the king and with Cardinal Wolsey that he knew little of the land he was sent to govern. Surrey did not speak Irish, was unprepared for 'the variaunt condicions of thinhabitauntes', and was unfamiliar with the lordship's geography and politics.⁶⁵ As a military man, the earl was particularly struck by the decentralized nature of Irish power, it being 'assembled in soo many sundrye places, soo ferre distaunt the oon from thoder, in woddes, and other strong groundes', and so had to make war with unwanted regularity.⁶⁶ From the start, Surrey blamed Kildare for using his far-reaching influence in the lordship to undermine his government. Though Kildare remained at court, and accompanied his king to the Field of Cloth of Gold, Surrey maintained that the earl was by letter and through his servants ordering Irish chiefs to attack him.⁶⁷ The lord lieutenant arrived at this conclusion with the help of his closest advisers in Ireland: Sir William Darcy of Meath and Piers Butler of Pottlerath in Kilkenny. Darcy, as we have seen, was one of Kildare's most vocal critics, but it was Butler, who was fast emerging as Kildare's chief rival in the lordship, upon whom Surrey most relied.

The rise of Butler power in Ireland formed the subtext to both Surrey's term as governor and events in the lordship more generally.⁶⁸ The Butlers and Fitzgeralds, Ireland's most prominent English noble houses, had had a history of rivalry and feuding which was more recently exacerbated by opposing loyalties during the Wars of the Roses. But the absence in England for fifty years of the Butler earls of Ormond had allowed the Fitzgeralds of Kildare to establish influence over the collateral branches of the Butler lineage in Kilkenny. Indeed, Piers Butler, as the ninth earl of Kildare's brother-in-law and the Geraldine-backed leader of the most powerful branch of the Butler family in Ireland, was in many respects the product of Kildare hegemony. The death in 1515 of Thomas Butler, seventh earl of Ormond, however, led to a dispute over succession to the earldom which also included lands in England and Wales. Henry VIII supported the claim of Ormond's daughters, Anne St Leger and Margaret Boleyn, with a view to the latter's son, Thomas, succeeding to the earldom. Piers, by contrast, anticipated that he, as the resident senior male heir of an earldom originally established in tail male, would be acknowledged earl. Kildare, the then deputy, was unable to accommodate both the

⁶⁴ Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 118–19.

⁶⁵ *SP Hen. VIII*, ii. 31–8 (quotation, 32).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 32, 37 (quotation, 32).

⁶⁷ C. W. FitzGerald, *The earls of Kildare, and their ancestors from 1057 to 1773* (Dublin, 1858), 85.

⁶⁸ For this paragraph, see Edwards, *Ormond lordship*, 143–57.

king's wishes and Butler's expectations. He and the council in Ireland saw that Butler received livery of the Ormond lands in Ireland in April 1516; Henry, however, continued to press the claims of Ormond's heiresses to whom he had already granted livery of the earldom's lands in England and Wales. The dispute dragged on in the Irish council and was eventually (a decade later) heard in Star Chamber.⁶⁹

Yet Kildare's inability to secure for Piers Butler the king's acknowledgement of his right to the earldom of Ormond led to a rift between the two men, and paved the way for a Butler challenge to Kildare hegemony. It has been observed that Kildare's greatest weakness lay in what was ostensibly his greatest strength, that 'though he had the largest network of friends, he also had more enemies than any other Irish lord'.⁷⁰ Indeed there was no shortage of disgruntled clansmen who paid high rents to Kildare, groaned under the weight of the Geraldine military machine, or who had been politically marginalized by the earl's power. And so decentralized was power within individual Irish lordships that Butler had little difficulty in detaching branches of clans from their elected leadership. Thus, from 1516, Butler began to construct a system of alliances within the Irish polity to rival the Geraldine affinity. Irishmen like Melaghlin O'More, Donough and Owney O'Carroll, and Maurice Kavanagh all became Butler clients, despite the fact that their respective clans continued loyal to Kildare.⁷¹ Butler was also keen to build up support among the English gentry of the lowlands of County Kilkenny whose backing he required if he was to appear as a legitimate English earl, rather than a degenerate warlord—which was precisely the way Kildare was then being portrayed.⁷² Following a rapid increase in military strength, mainly in the form of gallowglass—hereditary clans of professional fighters whose ancestors had been imported from the Western Islands of Scotland and who had, by the sixteenth century, become the backbone of military power in Irish society—Butler was in a position to make war on Kildare power: in 1518, Piers Butler seized the Geraldine stronghold at Mountgarret castle in County Wexford.⁷³

Surrey thus arrived in a lordship in which politics and power were polarizing between Fitzgerald and Butler power blocs. Some Irish chiefs, like O'Donnell, O'Toole, and MacCarthy, however, did not turn to Ormond for protection from the Kildare affinity. Rather they appealed directly to Surrey. Sir Hugh O'Donnell, for example, took it upon himself to travel to Dublin where he informed the lord lieutenant that Kildare had instructed O'Neill to 'moeve warr' against the new governor and that O'Neill had attempted to convince him to do likewise. In a subsequent letter to the king, Surrey explained that O'Donnell 'answerid, that he was your true subgiet, and who soo ever Your Grace appoyntid to have the rule here, he wold truly serve and defend him'.⁷⁴ Turlough O'Toole, for his part, had witnessed his clan's fortunes steadily diminish as the earls of Kildare established greater control over the O'Tooles' lordship in south Dublin. He too showed him-

⁶⁹ Ellis, *Reform and revival*, 157–8.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* 153.

⁷² *Ibid.* 147–9.

⁷⁰ Edwards, *Ormond lordship*, 152.

⁷³ *Ibid.* 154–6, 158.

⁷⁴ *SP Hen. VIII*, ii. 37.

self most receptive to the new governor.⁷⁵ Cormac Oge MacCarthy, who in September 1520 inflicted a major defeat against Kildare's kinsman James Fitzgerald, tenth earl of Desmond, in Munster, also came before Surrey 'without any saufconduct' to offer the new governor his services.⁷⁶ As for those chiefs who had held firm to their alliance with Kildare and had attacked him, Surrey launched military expeditions against them: before the end of 1520 he had invaded the lordships of O'More, MacMahon, O'Neill, and O'Byrne.⁷⁷

Surrey was, by summer's end, in a position to 'assemble the Counsaill of the land', that is the general council of Ireland which advised the king's representative and included both the spiritual and temporal nobility of the lordship and the core officers of the executive in Dublin. The earl, however, subsequently made reference to his plans to assemble 'Your Gracis Privey Counsaill here'.⁷⁸ Indeed a letter to the king dated 25 August was signed by Surrey and four councillors, though the lord lieutenant expressed his regret in a letter to Wolsey dated two days later that he had had 'no lysour to have the Consell to gyders to loke for caussis consernyng the Kynges proffight'.⁷⁹ The appearance of a privy council as distinct from the larger and more unwieldy general council, it has been shown, was Wolsey's doing and marked a major institutional development in the government of the lordship, anticipating the emergence in England of a privy council a decade later.⁸⁰ At one level, the function of the council as an advisory body was augmented—Surrey was instructed before his coming to Ireland to abide by the advice of this privy council, three of whom were drawn from his own councillors in England. But it also took on a new role from 1520 as an executive body which was able to perform political functions independently of the chief governor.⁸¹ Surrey and the privy council looked to the meeting of the general council so that acts of parliament could be discussed before the convening of the lordship's legislative organ.

The reach of royal authority in Ireland, however, remained much the way Surrey had found it. Surrey understood this. He informed the king in July of his, and apparently the privy council's, 'feare' that the Irish 'wol not bee brought to noo good order, onles it bee by compulsyon, which woll not bee doon without a great puissance of men, and great costis of money, and long contyuaunce of tyme'. The following year he refined his thoughts on the matter, noting that a conquest of Ireland would require an army of 6,000 men drawn and financed from England; he reckoned that a smaller army, of 2,500 men, would take many years to conquer Irish parts of the lordship and would provoke an Irish confederacy against the crown.⁸² The prospect of conquest was never far from Henry VIII's thinking about Ireland. He had instructed Surrey that 'at the begynnyng' the earl should use 'politique practises', so as to divide and weaken the leadership of the Irish polity. The king then envisioned a second phase, forecasted to begin in Surrey's second year as governor, in which the earl would be sent additional troops to 'annoye' what remained

⁷⁵ Maginn, *'Civilizing' Gaelic Leinster*, 14–15, 34.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* ii. 41.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* ii. 37.

⁸⁰ Ellis, *Reform and revival*, 42–4.

⁷⁶ *SP Hen. VIII*, ii. 46–7, 64.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* ii. 40–1.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *SP Hen. VIII*, ii. 37, 72–5.

of the Irish 'rebelles'. The possibility of conquest must have been raised at the Field of Cloth of Gold, for Francis I, according to Henry, offered to send troops, 'suche number of horsemen or footemen, as We shall require of hym', for service in Ireland.⁸³ But when confronted with the reality of conquest as articulated to him by his lieutenant, Henry reconsidered. He had already sent the earl additional troops and, in October 1520, a further £4,000 before any forward military policy had even begun. Here was the overriding problem with Tudor rule in Ireland: the conquest of the Irishry was too expensive a prospect for the crown and the military weakness of the Irish polity did not make conquest an immediate necessity.

After some consideration Henry VIII and his council instructed Surrey that 'circumspecte and politique waies be used' to bring the Irish to 'ferther obedience, for thobservaunce of lawes, and governyng theym selffes according to the same, but also folowing justice'. Henry's arrival at this conclusion was greatly influenced by financial concerns. 'To be plain unto you', the king explained to Surrey,

to spende so moche money for the reduccion of that lande, to bring the Irishry in apparaunce oonly of obeisaunce, without that they shulde observe our lawes, and resourte to our courtes for justice, and restore suche dominions as they unlauffully deteigne from Us; it were a thing of litle policie, lesse advauntage, and leste effecte.

The king could recommend such a course because many of the Irish leaders had, according to Surrey, come before him and recognized Henry VIII 'as their Sovereain Lorde'. Indeed Henry advised Surrey to assemble the leaders of the Irish polity and 'declare unto theym the greate decaye, ruyne, and desolacion of that commodious and fertile lande, for lacke of politique governaunce and good justice, whiche can never be brought in goode order, oonelesse the unbridled sensualities of insolent folkes be browght under the rewles of the lawes'. Here was the underlying problem of Tudor rule in Ireland: the king's 'Irish enemies' showed a ready willingness to treat with the lord lieutenant and to accept Henry as their king and, in some cases, even made clear their desire to hold their lands of the crown. What form, then, was Surrey's 'politique' engagement with the leaders of a not unreceptive Irish polity to take? How precisely was the earl to proceed with a people governed by their own laws and customs and not recognized as subjects of the English crown? Henry expressed a readiness to accept aspects of Irish law in Irish areas, provided the laws were 'good and reasonable'; he was also prepared to moderate the rigours of English law, so as to accommodate Irishmen under his rule.⁸⁴ From the king's writing—specifically his repeated references to 'our Irishe rebelles' and to 'their naturall duetie of liegeaunce' to the crown—it is evident that he deemed all of the inhabitants of Ireland to be his subjects.⁸⁵ It is difficult to imagine Henry VIII in discussion with Francis I at their elaborate summertime meeting in France conceding that the majority of the population of his lordship of Ireland was not in fact his subjects; that the Irish were somehow beyond his control. This view, however, was very much at variance with the way government and society in Ireland had

⁸³ Ibid. 34. ⁸⁴ *SP Hen. VIII*, ii. 52–3.

⁸⁵ See, for example, *SP Hen. VIII*, ii. 31, 51. See also Maginn, 'Civilizing' Gaelic Leinster, 74.

developed over the course of the Middle Ages. The notion that there were two peoples in Ireland, one Irish and the other English, one entitled to the king's protection and the common law, the other outside it, was an established feature of politics and society in the lordship, even if such distinctions were never so clear cut in practice.

It was within Henry's power in 1520 to change this relationship which had developed in Ireland. If he accepted in principle that the conquest of the Irishry was not an option, then his instructions for his lieutenant to employ 'politique waies' in engaging the leaders of the Irish polity formed the basis for a new departure in the lordship and between England and Ireland. Moreover, Henry's personal communication with an anonymous Irish chief in 1520, in which the king suggested that the Irishman hold his lands of the crown and be granted an English noble title, offered an outline of a procedure for 'normalizing' the crown's relationship with Irish chiefs.⁸⁶ Typical of King Henry's personality was the sudden interest he would take in a given matter; the other side of this, of course, was that the king's interest tended to dissipate with startling rapidity.⁸⁷ So it was that other more pressing concerns—the resumption of war on the continent and, eventually, the king's own 'great matter'—were shortly to capture the interest of the one man capable of effecting lasting change in Ireland. The earl of Surrey, meanwhile, though he saw the benefit of accepting certain chiefs, such as Cormac Oge MacCarthy, as English subjects and English-style nobles, was of the belief that the reduction of Ireland demanded a substantial and sustained showing of Tudor military might.⁸⁸ By 1521 such an outlay could not be countenanced and the decision was made to recall Surrey from Ireland—it was hoped that his replacement, Piers Butler, earl of Ormond, would govern as effectively and as cheaply as Kildare once had.

Henry VIII's burst of interest in Ireland at the start of his second decade on the throne failed to alter substantially the situation in the lordship, much less the character of the association between Ireland and England. The reversion to the *status quo ante* in the lordship—Kildare was restored as deputy in 1524—had little impact at the king's court. William Wise continued as a page of the chamber until the early 1530s when he returned to Ireland and became mayor of his native Waterford.⁸⁹ Wise's friend and fellow page of the chamber, Richard Cecil, remained in royal service for the rest of his life, rising from page to groom of the royal wardrobe and, ultimately, to yeoman of the royal wardrobe, in which office he died in March 1553. Years of service to the crown had made Cecil wealthy—Henry VIII even thought to leave Cecil 100 marks in his will. More importantly, however, Richard's experience at court allowed his son and heir, William, access to the most influential people in the kingdom. Richard had lately, in 1541, plucked his son from St John's College, Cambridge—where the young William had spent six years of study without having attained a degree—and sent him to London to concentrate on the study of the law at Gray's Inn. It is unlikely that events in Ireland

⁸⁶ *SP Hen. VIII*, ii, 59.

⁸⁸ *SP Hen. VIII*, ii, 64.

⁸⁷ Bradshaw, *Irish constitutional revolution*, 58.

⁸⁹ Alford, *Burghley*, 8, 32.

featured prominently in the lives of either Cecil beyond Richard's familiarity with William Wise, but in late 1542 William Cecil witnessed the arrival at court of Conn Bacach O'Neill and his Irish entourage.⁹⁰ The younger Cecil probably never had cause to give Ireland sustained thought prior to this, but the erection of Ireland into a kingdom with Henry VIII as its king in 1541 and the appearance at court of the most powerful of Irishmen to accept an earldom from his sovereign may well have changed that.

⁹⁰ Discussed below, 41–2, 167–8.

2

The Kingdom of Ireland, 1550

In September 1550 William Cecil was made a principal secretary of state to King Edward VI and appointed to his privy council.¹ Cecil was the junior of the king's two secretaries—the other was the experienced Henrician minister Sir William Petre. At 30 years of age Cecil occupied one of the most influential offices in the Tudor state. That he owed his appointment to the influence of John Dudley, earl of Warwick, gives some indication of the great political upheavals that had characterized the minority of Edward VI. For Cecil had risen to political prominence as a member of the household of Warwick's rival, Edward Seymour, duke of Somerset, the king's uncle and, for a time, protector of the realm. In late 1549 Warwick overthrew Somerset: Cecil was briefly sent to the Tower along with the duke. Cecil's intelligence, political acumen, and what may only be described as a staggering natural aptitude for administrative detail had attracted Somerset's attention, and by 1548 he had become the duke's personal secretary. However, such was the value of Cecil's abilities to the efficient exercise of government, Warwick, now the lord president of the privy council, adopted Cecil as his own man and put the young man's considerable talents to work for him. Cecil proved an invaluable official. He was, according to Warwick, 'such a faithful servant and by that term most witty councillor, as unto the King's Majesty and his proceedings, as was scarce the like within this his realm'.²

The royal court at which William Cecil served as secretary was very different from the court his father (who lived still) would have known; and not only because the elder Cecil had occupied a position of inferior political importance or because the younger Cecil's sovereign was a boy. The Edwardian regime was explicitly Protestant. William Cecil was part of a first generation of royal servants who had come of age in a world in which the unity of western Christendom had already been fractured but who were also possessed of youthful memories of an attachment to Rome. Martin Luther had recognized the difference between men like himself, who were born and reared Catholic, and those who belonged to what has been described as 'a second generation of the Reformation'. As an older man in 1531 Luther explained to his students:

¹ *APC, 1550–52*, 118. Cf. Dale Hoak, *The king's council in the reign of Edward VI* (Cambridge, 1976).

² Alford, *Burghley*, 41.

We old men, soaked in the pestilent doctrine of the papists which we have taken into our very bones and marrow . . . cannot even today, in the great light of the truth, cast that pernicious opinion out of our minds . . . But young men like you, your heads still fresh and not infected by such pernicious teaching, will have less difficulty in learning about Christ purely than we that are old have in rooting out these blasphemies from our minds.³

William Cecil was somewhere in between. Having grown up in England, where religious change did not begin in earnest until the 1530s, Cecil, like Luther, was the product of a Catholic world, but he embraced the reformed faith sometime in his early adulthood, committing himself to the new religion thereafter with the zeal of a convert.⁴ His years at Cambridge, and the classical humanist training he received there, most importantly the idea that knowledge in itself had a usefulness that should be applied to the service of the state, were crucial to the fusing together of his intellectual and religious development; a second marriage, in 1545, to Mildred, the formidable daughter of the religious reformer and humanist Sir Anthony Cooke, seems to have played no small part in Cecil's espousal of what he would later refer to as 'the truth' of the gospel.⁵ In Edward's reign, an adherence to Protestantism served as a political lodestar for young, Cambridge-educated, government ministers like Cecil in a way that it had not in the old king's reign. Cecil was now an integral part of a self-consciously Protestant government which saw itself as completing a revolution in religion begun by Henry VIII's break with Rome in the previous decade.⁶

With the revolutionary changes in religion the Edwardian regime inherited a greatly changed Tudor state. Territorially, acts of parliament—in 1536 and 1543—had united to the kingdom of England the marcher lordships and principality of Wales. The semi-autonomous marcher region where William Cecil's grandfather was born and whence he came to England was no more—it had been annexed to the English county of Hereford and was now governed by English law and English-style local government. The government of the border territories in the north of England and in Calais, meanwhile, had been reorganized so as to strengthen royal authority in both. Administratively, the Henrician regime had, under Cromwell's guidance and owing to the crown's assertion of authority of the church, developed new courts of financial administration, so that by 1550 there numbered six departments of state dedicated to crown finances. Reforms in the administration of Tudor government, moreover, gave rise to the importance of the offices which Cecil came to occupy in 1550: the position of royal secretary, which Cromwell himself had occupied, was emerging as an essential office of Tudor government, and the council

³ G. R. Elton, *Reformation Europe, 1517–1559* (London, 1973), 147.

⁴ Alford, *Burghley*, 12–32.

⁵ Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, 15–16, 25–5; Pauline Croft, 'Mildred, Lady Burghley: the matriarch', in Pauline Croft (ed.), *Patronage, culture and power: the early Cecils, 1558–1612* (London, 2002), 283–300.

⁶ W. S. Hudson, *The Cambridge connection and the Elizabethan settlement of 1559* (Durham, 1980).

on which he sat had been transformed into a more clearly defined body—the king's privy council—with executive functions under the crown.⁷

In the thirty years since 1520 England's relationship with Ireland had also undergone great change. Cecil did not have far to look to see signs of the change. O'Neill's elevation to the peerage at Greenwich in 1542 was followed, in July 1543, by the creation before the assembled court of Henry VIII of Ulick MacWilliam Burke and Murrugh O'Brien, as earls of Clanrickard and Thomond, respectively, and Donough O'Brien, as baron of Ibracken. James Butler, ninth earl of Ormond and holder of the earldom of the greatest antiquity in Ireland, had acted his part, leading Burke and O'Brien before the king to be raised to the peerage as earls. Barnaby Fitzpatrick, the newly created lord of Upper Ossory, and several of O'Brien's sub-chiefs—MacNamara, O'Grady, and O'Shaughnessy—were knighted. William Wise of Waterford was there too—he was knighted for the loyalty that he (and his native Waterford by extension) had shown to the crown in the face of the earl of Kildare's rebellion in 1534.⁸ According to his later recollection, Cecil had represented Lincolnshire at parliament in London until its prorogation in May 1543, and thus may have been in attendance at court later that summer to witness the ceremony.⁹ But for William Cecil the presence of the son of an ethnically Irish peer among Edward VI's innermost circle of young companions, which included Ormond's son, Thomas Butler, and Northumberland's son, Robert Dudley, was the nearest indication of the changes in the Anglo-Irish relationship. Brian Oge MacGillpatrick, or Barnaby Fitzpatrick, as he was known in English circles, son and namesake of the first baron of Upper Ossory, was left behind at court in 1543 both to be educated after the English fashion and to ensure the continued loyalty of his father in Ireland. He became King Edward's closest companion and also his 'proxy for correction', or whipping boy. For this reason, Fitzpatrick was sworn a gentleman of the privy chamber in August 1551 and assumed a measure of political importance thereby. Cecil, who was involved in the king's education, knew the Irishman well and thought highly of him; Fitzpatrick, for his part, maintained a fond regard for his sometime tutor, the secretary of state.¹⁰

What lay behind the more frequent appearance of Irishmen at the English court was a fundamental change in the crown's approach to the lordship of Ireland. It became evident in 1540–1 with the development of a process whereby Irish chiefs

⁷ For all this, see G. R. Elton, *The Tudor revolution in government* (Cambridge, 1953); Penry Williams and G. L. Harris, 'A revolution in Tudor history?', *Past & Present*, 25 (1963), 3–58; G. R. Elton, 'The Tudor revolution: a reply', *Past & Present*, 29 (1974), 26–49; Christopher Coleman and D. R. Starkey (eds.), *Revolution reassessed: revisions in the history of Tudor government and administration* (Oxford, 1986); G. R. Elton, *England under the Tudors* (London, 1991), 478–84.

⁸ Creation of Thomond, Clanrickard, and Ibracken, 1 July 1543, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XI, fo. 338; *SP Hen. VIII*, iii. 345, 450–1, 453, 455, 463–4, 473. Cf. Christopher Maginn, 'The Gaelic peers, the Tudor sovereigns and English multiple monarchy', *Journal of British Studies*, 50 (2011).

⁹ *Calendar of the manuscripts of the . . . marquess of Salisbury . . . , preserved at Hatfield House*, 24 vols. (London, 1883–1973), v. 69.

¹⁰ Cecil to Sussex, 26 August 1561, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 21, fo. 24; J. G. Nichols (ed.), *Literary remains of King Edward the sixth*, 2 vols. (New York, 1857), 76.

acknowledged English sovereignty and ‘surrendered’ to the crown the lands belonging to their extended kinship group. In return, these men were to be accounted English subjects and ‘regranted’ their lands to hold of the king by feudal charter. This process, known to historians as ‘surrender and regrant’, was the central component of a wider strategy which sought through conciliatory means to incorporate into the Tudor state both Ireland’s constitutionally alien Irish polity and those wayward English lineages which had drifted away from royal authority. Some of the latter grouping, like James Fitzgerald, thirteenth earl of Desmond, were simply reconciled with the crown, while other English lords, like MacWilliam Burke, who did not possess legal title to their lands—the Burkes, as Henry VIII was well aware, lived on lands belonging to the crown in Connaught but paid no rent—underwent the process of ‘surrender and regrant’ after the fashion of Irish chiefs.¹¹

The introduction of the new Tudor policy for Ireland was inseparable from Sir Anthony St Leger’s appointment as deputy in July 1540. St Leger, whose calm demeanour and reputation for integrity had brought him to King Henry’s attention early in the reign, had served as a royal commissioner sent to Ireland in 1537 to enquire into abuses in government and the state of Tudor rule there.¹² It was during his service as a commissioner that he must have formulated some of his ideas for the gradual, and the agreed, extension of Tudor rule throughout Ireland. The political order in the lordship had yet to come to terms with the upheaval wrought by the crown’s suppression in 1535 of the Kildare rebellion and the subsequent attainder of the leading Geraldines. With Kildare power destroyed, and Henry now unwilling to appoint as his deputy another resident Irish-born magnate, a way had to be found to govern the lordship effectively yet inexpensively. St Leger and his fellow commissioners thus arrived in Ireland at a time when the crown had a rare opportunity both to reform Tudor government there and make good its rhetoric of ‘reducing’ the lordship ‘to a due civility and obedience’.¹³ The king’s insistence on cutting costs, however, ensured that the commissioners’ actions and recommendations were largely conservative: the army was halved, a chronically underfunded English-born deputy was retained in office, and the administrative reform of the Englishry was given precedence over extending Tudor rule into Irish areas.

Yet the commissioners also held inquisitions in English parts of Leinster and Munster. St Leger witnessed at first hand the disorder and absence of royal authority in those shires furthest removed from Dublin. Much of the lawlessness in these areas, they learned, stemmed from the ambiguous relationship between the Irish and English populations at one level, and the Irish population and the English government at another. People who were ethnically Irish were not the king’s natural

¹¹ Bradshaw, *Irish constitutional revolution*; Christopher Maginn, ‘The Tudor policy of “surrender and regrant” in the historiography of sixteenth-century Ireland’, *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 38 (2007), 955–74.

¹² Alan Bryson, *s.v.* ‘Anthony St Leger’, in the *ODNB*; Bradshaw, *Irish constitutional revolution*, 117–21.

¹³ Henry VIII’s instructions for the high commissioners, 31 July 1537, TNA, SP 60/4/36.

subjects and Englishmen in Ireland were legally forbidden to interact with them; but the commissioners heard evidence that regular contact with the Irish was a reality of life in many parts of the Englishry.¹⁴ In an effort that sought at once to bolster the crown's presence in border areas and address the constitutional status of Irish clansmen, the commissioners collected the submissions of two chiefs—MacGillpatrick and O'More—both of whom agreed to abandon Irish customs and hold their lands of the crown by feudal charter.¹⁵ The work of the royal commission between 1537 and 1538 provided St Leger with an insight into the obstacles confronting English government in Ireland; his efforts to extend English law to certain Irishmen reflected his conviction that these obstacles were most easily surmounted through the Tudor state's assimilation of Irish chiefs.

The praise which St Leger received for his service in Ireland and his subsequent attachment at court to Thomas Howard—the former governor of Ireland and by now duke of Norfolk—made him the clear choice in 1540 to replace Leonard Grey, a soldier and a client of the soon to be executed Thomas Cromwell, as lord deputy of Ireland. To the new deputy fell the task of responding to the Irish confederation (the so-called Geraldine League) which had emerged in 1539 to challenge King Henry's Erastian settlement and restore the house of Kildare. Grey had routed the confederation in August 1539, but the near island-wide alliance of Irish chiefs did not disintegrate. What followed defused the confederation and set St Leger's deputyship apart from those of his predecessors. Following a sharp military campaign in south Leinster, St Leger handled Turlough O'Toole, the confederacy's representative in Leinster, in a conciliatory manner: not only did he accept O'Toole's submission to the king—a not uncommon device to secure the temporary loyalty of a chief—he also concluded a detailed indenture which provided for the reorganization of the O'Toole lordship along English lines. In return, O'Toole was to be granted his clan's lands and accounted an English subject. St Leger also recognized the merit in O'Toole's request to submit before the king at his court in England. O'Toole's submission at Greenwich in December 1540 served both to interest Henry VIII in Irish policy and to reveal to the chief the extent of the power and grandeur of his new sovereign. This public display of the majesty of the English crown appealed to Henry, who subsequently wrote that all Irishmen should submit at court and have their lands regranted to them 'with the like conditions' of O'Toole.¹⁶ In the months that followed, St Leger set about negotiating similar arrangements with other chiefs.

'Surrender and regrant' was not a fully formed policy which St Leger had pre-conceived prior to his arrival in Ireland, or which he systematically applied once he arrived there. Rather, it evolved from some of Henry's earlier suggestions for the

¹⁴ The proceedings of the commissioners are collected in H. F. Hore and J. Graves (eds.), *The social state of the southern and eastern counties of Ireland in the sixteenth century* (Dublin, 1870).

¹⁵ MacGillpatrick's submission, 8 November 1537, TNA, SP 60/5/41; O'More's submission, 24 August 1538, TNA, SP 60/7/38.

¹⁶ Maginn, 'Civilizing' Gaelic Leinster, 65–76.

conciliatory handling of Irish lords and was then regularly modified to accommodate vastly differing familial and local circumstances.¹⁷ The process as it developed, however, generally consisted of three stages. An initial indenture was concluded between the deputy and a chief in which the latter acknowledged the king's sovereignty, rejected papal authority, applied for a crown grant of his lands, and in the cases of more powerful chiefs requested (or was put forward for) a peerage. Following further negotiations, a second indenture specified that the chief renounce Irish customs (including his title and language), uphold royal government, perform military service, and pay the crown rent. He would then receive a grant of lands to hold of the crown by knight's service. The final stage provided for the resolution of the discrepancies within the lordship that would inevitably arise between the English and Irish socio-political systems by binding former clansmen, vassals, and clients to the lord as sub-tenants.¹⁸ Here was the combination of raw public displays of submission to both representatives of the English crown in Ireland and the king himself and the use of written instruments to define the new relationship between the English crown and Irish chiefs. Though writing about an earlier relationship between the king of England and the peoples of Britain and Ireland, the importance which R. R. Davies accorded to written agreements is no less appropriate for the developments witnessed in Ireland of the early 1540s: 'Written documents define and sharpen relationships; they permit little of the elasticity and informality of interpretation which had been one of the features of earlier high kingships'.¹⁹ The importance of such records was not lost on Henry VIII who observed, as a growing number of chiefs made their submissions, that 'the records have not been so well kept and preserved as appertained'. The king instructed St Leger to ensure that from henceforth the records should be more carefully preserved and that the undertreasurer, whose responsibility the keeping of the records was, 'should suffer no man to take any of the records out of the house or Treasury where they be kept'.²⁰ It was the scale of this effort on the part of the Tudor state to define more exactly the relationship of Irishmen to the crown which sets St Leger's policy apart from previous attempts to bind the Irish polity to England.

The political momentum which the policy created was irresistible: the following three years saw dozens of Irish chiefs begin on the process of 'surrender and regrant'. The first to make the transformation from Irish chief to English noble was MacGillpatrick, created Lord Fitzpatrick of Upper Ossory in June 1541, but much the most important was Conn Bacach O'Neill who, in late 1542, travelled to Henry VIII's court to be elevated to the peerage as earl of Tyrone. It was there that the young William Cecil encountered and supposedly entered into debate

¹⁷ Ciaran Brady, 'The O'Reillys of East Breifne and the problem of surrender and regrant', *Breifne*, 23 (1985), 233–62; Christopher Maginn, 'The limitations of Tudor reform: the policy of "surrender and regrant" and the O'Rourke', *Breifne*, 43 (2007), 429–60.

¹⁸ Bradshaw, *Irish constitutional revolution*, 187–230.

¹⁹ R. R. Davies, *The first English empire: power and identities in the British Isles, 1093–1343* (Oxford, 2000), 21.

²⁰ *Calendar of patent and close rolls of chancery in Ireland, Henry VIII to 18th Elizabeth*, ed. James Morrin (Dublin, 1861), 87.

with O'Neill's chaplains. Ostensibly, a lord of English ethnic extraction, such as Ulick 'na gceann' (of the heads) Burke, whom Henry created first earl of Clanrickard in 1543, was treated identically to an Irish chief, though he was, by his own description, of 'Ynglis blode', whose ancestors had been 'in tyme paste a Baron of the Parleament'.²¹ But, in this case, the crown was possessed of unrealizable feudal claims to the Burkes' lands in the west of Ireland: St Leger convinced Henry to relinquish his claim to lands in Clanrickard, which the king held as lord of Connaught, in exchange for Burke's recognition of Tudor sovereignty and his pledge to pay rents to the crown.²²

The extension of common law to the Irish elite demanded a change in the constitutional relationship between the English crown and Ireland: in June 1541 the parliament of Ireland, attended for the first time by Irish chiefs, passed an act declaring Ireland a kingdom and Henry VIII its king. In this, as in much of the policy associated with him, St Leger was supported by Ireland's English community, which had long sought to involve the crown more closely in Irish affairs. Thomas Cusack, the Commons' speaker from County Meath, emerged as St Leger's chief and like-minded local ally, but more importantly perhaps it was the concurrent and generous distribution of dissolved monastic lands to government officials and local elites alike which secured for his administration support from across the political spectrum. Henry, too, was instrumental in the development of the new policy. As we have seen, the king had suggested an engagement with the Irish polity based on persuasion and land grants, and it was King Henry who became an ardent supporter of the new political departure. That the king initially objected both to the added responsibility which kingship entailed and the implication that his title to Ireland derived from statute (rather than original conquest) mattered little: in one stroke the crown was tied more closely to the affairs of its new kingdom and Ireland's Irish population was (nominally at least) 'accepted as subjects, where before they were taken as Irish enemies'.²³ In sum, St Leger offered a sceptical king an alternative strategy for Ireland's governance, one that promised to reduce crown expenditure and increase revenue through an agreed extension of English government throughout the island.

Henry VIII's break with Rome helped to set in motion the events that led to these changes in the Anglo-Irish relationship. The king's supreme headship of the Church of England and Ireland threw into sharp relief the ambiguity of his lordship over Ireland. It was no longer possible for a monarch in a Europe fast dividing along religious lines to allow a territory to be so loosely governed and its relationship to the crown to be so imprecisely defined. For while Henry was of the belief that his right to the sovereignty of Ireland rested on the military conquest of it by his ancestor, many in Ireland and elsewhere still held that the crown's claim to Ireland flowed from the twelfth-century papal bull *Laudabiliter*. With the papal connection now

²¹ *SP Hen. VIII*, iii, 290–1.

²² Maginn, 'The Tudor policy of "surrender and regrant"', 972.

²³ Bradshaw, *Irish constitutional revolution*, 231–57; *SP Hen. VIII*, iii, 326 (quotation).

severed—the parliament of Ireland had passed the English ecclesiastical legislation in 1536 containing the principle of Henry VIII's royal supremacy—the right to the sovereignty of Ireland was, in the minds of some, open. Rumours spread among English officials that 'Oneiles mynde is to be Kinge of Irlande, and to proclame him self King, if he maie come to the hill of Tarighe' (Tara, the ancient capital of Ireland).²⁴ In summer 1538 O'Neill had received a letter from Rome. Styling O'Neill 'our noble King of our Realm of Ireland', Pope Paul III explained how 'Adrian the 4th our predecessor confirmed this nation of Ireland unto Henry the second', but that Henry VIII had 'fallen from the mother church of Rome and sacred chaire of Peter' and was 'no longer fitt to rule over you'.²⁵ O'Neill does not appear to have made any real effort to re-establish a native high kingship, but reports then emerged in 1539 of Irish efforts to transfer the sovereignty of Ireland to a Catholic prince: the Geraldine League offered their allegiance and the sovereignty of Ireland to James V, the Catholic king of Scots, and (after James proved uninterested) to Charles V.²⁶

Yet 'surrender and regrant' and the new policy of which it was a part appeared to usher in a new era in Anglo-Irish relations. Gone was the ambiguity surrounding an English monarch's sovereignty over Ireland; gone too were the ethnically based divisions of Ireland's population into 'Irish enemies', 'English rebels', and 'loyal English subjects'. In 1542 O'Neill and O'Donnell turned away the first Jesuit mission to Ireland and the English garrison, based in Ireland since the time of Kildare's rebellion, was greatly reduced. By 1544–5, Irish troops were serving in Henry VIII's armies in Scotland and France.²⁷ The new departure was not lost on outside observers. The English physician, traveller, and writer Andrew Boorde, in his travel guide, *The fyrste boke of the introduction of knowledge*, which he completed in 1542, continued to view Ireland in essentially medieval terms, that is a land divided between Irish and English: 'It... is deuyded in ii. partes. one is the Engly[sh] pale & the other, the wyld Irysh'. The former, according to Boorde, boasted 'good townes & cities... where the English fashion is', while 'the wilde Iryshe' was 'full of marcyces & mountaynes', where the population was 'slouthfull, not regarding to sow & tille theyr lands'. But he made equally clear: 'Irlond belongeth to England, for the kynge of Englonde is kyng of Irlond'.²⁸ In a letter to the queen of Hungary, Eustace Chapuys, the imperial ambassador in London, remarked on the sudden recall of the Scottish ambassador, 'the cause being... that the Irish are nowadays under the obedience and rule of this king [Henry], and have just made a raid on the Scotch'.²⁹ Two years later, following St Leger's recall,

²⁴ Confession of Conor More O'Connor, 17 April 1539, TNA, SP 60/8/21(i).

²⁵ Pope to O'Neill, 1538, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MS B. 488, fo. 43r; John Alen to Cromwell, 10 July 1539, TNA, SP 60/8/21.

²⁶ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, xv, nos. 570, 710; Christopher Maginn, 'Whose island? Sovereignty in late medieval and early modern Ireland', *Eire-Ireland*, 44 (2009), 229–47.

²⁷ Bradshaw, *Irish constitutional revolution*, 247–8; D. G. White, 'Henry VIII's Irish kerne in France and Scotland, 1544–1545', *Irish Sword*, 3 (1957–8), 213–25.

²⁸ Andrew Boorde, *The fyrste boke of the introduction of knowledge...*, ed. F. J. Furnival (London, 1870), 132–3.

²⁹ *Calendar of letters, despatches, and state papers, relating to the negotiations between England and Spain, Henry VIII, 1542–1543: preserved in the archives at Simancas, Vienna, Brussels, and elsewhere*, ed. Pascual de Gayangos (London, 1895), 115.

a group of Irish chiefs took the unusual step of expressing their support for St Leger in a letter to the king.³⁰ Indeed in St Leger's absence a council which included the earls of Desmond, Tyrone, and Thomond, the lord of Upper Ossory, O'Connor, O'Molmoy, the O'Carrolls, MacGeoghegan, 'with dyverse other Iryshe lordes, also for all thEnglyshe lordes of this realme', was convened in Dublin to maintain order in the kingdom. Thomas Cusack informed Henry's secretary, William Paget, 'thaunkes be to God, those, which woulde not be brought undre subjection with 10 thousaunde men, cometh to Dublin with a lettre'.³¹

At the same time, however, progress was grinding to a halt. St Leger's government was not equipped to cope with the great many chiefs undergoing the process of 'surrender and regrant' and the attendant conflicts arising within Irish lordships from former clansmen now excluded from land, prestige, and power. Few chiefs completed the process, and those who did often found themselves abandoned to rival interests by an overstretched government. The earl of Tyrone, for example, received little support from the government despite the fact that the death in 1544 of his *tánaiste*, his designated successor by Irish custom, threatened to give rise to a clash between English and Irish laws of succession which were represented in the lordship, respectively, by his eldest son, Matthew, baron of Dungannon, and several of the earl's younger but more powerful sons.³² By 1546, moreover, after a period of five years in which the king's revenues in Ireland regularly exceeded his expenses, the crown faced a deficit, a phenomenon that would continue for the remainder of the century.³³ The St Leger-led administration came under increasing criticism from within the political establishment in Ireland for its slow progress in extending Tudor rule and its conciliatory approach to Irish chiefs. James Butler, ninth earl of Ormond, emerged as a rallying point for anyone disaffected from the government. He and his supporters were thus particularly vocal in their criticisms of the deputy and his administration, and it was their criticisms which occasioned St Leger's summons to England in spring 1546. Had the king lived longer to defend the new policy, 'surrender and regrant' might have had the necessary time to produce results. Henry VIII's backing of St Leger at court in 1546 helped to ensure that the allegations levelled against the lord deputy and his government were brushed aside. But the combination of the outbreak in 1546 of hostilities in the midlands between the government and the O'Mores and the O'Connors and the old king's death in January 1547 fatally undermined St Leger's administration. Much of the policy pursued since 1540 was subsequently abandoned by the new regime in favour of more coercive methods of extending and strengthening Tudor rule in Ireland. Sir Edward Bellingham, a soldier and privy councillor, replaced St Leger as deputy in spring 1548. He spearheaded an aggressive strategy in Ireland

³⁰ Only a copy of the letter has survived, and without the signatories' names. It is dated 10 April 1545 but the subsequent letter suggests that it was written in 1546: Irish chiefs to king, 23 March 1546, TNA, SP 60/12/40.

³¹ Thomas Cusack to Paget, 28 March 1546, TNA, SP 60/12/41.

³² Christopher Maginn, *s.v.* 'Conn O'Neill', in the *ODNB*.

³³ Questions and considerations touching Ireland, January 1553, TNA, SP 61/4/75.

which availed of Protector Somerset's preparedness both to pursue and to finance the establishment of garrisons outside the English Pale as a means of protecting English areas and breaking the power of border chiefs.³⁴

Somerset's application in Ireland of the strategy he was then employing in his war in Scotland achieved tangible results. Garrisons were established: in the midlands, at the new-built forts Governor and Protector in O'Connor's country in Offaly and O'More's country in Leix; in the north-east, at Newry and Lecale; and as far west as Nenagh and Athlone. Within two years, O'More and O'Connor had submitted and were sent to London where they were imprisoned in the Tower. Royal government was now felt in areas well beyond the regular reach of Tudor rule.³⁵ But it came at great cost: the crown faced a deficit of £17,898 for the two years 1548–9, and Bellingham's campaigning and rough handling of Irish chiefs had provoked 'a co[m]bynacon of the wilde Yrishe' who reputedly stood in expectation of Scottish military assistance.³⁶ By the time of William Cecil's appointment as secretary in September 1550, the privy council had already decided on St Leger's reappointment. His return to Ireland, it was hoped, would allay Irish chiefs' apprehension that a general conquest was afoot and herald an increase in crown revenues and a concomitant reduction in costs at a time when Northumberland was disentangling the Tudor kingdoms from the wars against Scotland and France begun by the king's father and continued by his uncle.³⁷ It was also hoped that St Leger's return would create an environment in which the recent changes in the Tudor church might be more readily accepted.

The task of instituting in Ireland the sweeping religious changes which the Edwardian regime had introduced in England would not be easy. For at the heart of the new Protestant settlement lay the reading or preaching of the gospel, the written word of God, in the English language. However, this new bibliocentrism emanating from the council in England, and from King Edward and Thomas Cranmer, the archbishop of Canterbury, in particular, posed serious difficulties in Ireland where the majority of the population understood no English and where royal authority and resources remained limited.³⁸ The English parliament nevertheless introduced the Book of Common Prayer in 1549 so that everyone in the Tudor

³⁴ D. G. White, 'The reign of Edward VI in Ireland: some political, social and economic aspects', *IHS* 14 (1964–5), 197–211; Christopher Maginn, 'A window on mid-Tudor Ireland: the "matters" against Lord Deputy St Leger, 1547–8', *Historical Research*, 78 (2005), 465–82.

³⁵ White, 'The reign of Edward VI in Ireland', 197–211; Fiona Fitzsimons, 'The lordship of O'Connor Faly', in William Nolan and T. P. O'Neill (eds.), *Offaly: history and society* (Dublin, 1998), 207–42; Vincent Carey, 'The end of the Gaelic political order: the O'More lordship of Laois, 1536–1603', in Pádraig Lane and William Nolan (eds.), *Laois: history and society* (Dublin, 1999), 213–56.

³⁶ Questions and considerations touching Ireland, January 1553, TNA, SP 61/4/75; Chancellor Alen's instructions for Thomas Alen to declare to the government of England, February 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/50 (quotation); William Brabazon and council to privy council, 26 March 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/52.

³⁷ Instructions by king and council to St Leger, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/57; Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 266–7.

³⁸ Brendan Bradshaw, 'The Edwardian Reformation in Ireland, 1547–53', *Archivium Hibernicum*, 34 (1976), 83–99.

territories would be compelled to worship according to the same form using a state-regulated English translation of the Latin services. St Leger's predecessor, Edward Bellingham, had advocated the strict enforcement of the state religion. Bellingham and the council in Ireland had ordered that 'idolatory, papistry, the mass sacram[en]t & the like' be abolished, and that the use of the Book of Common Prayer be enforced from June 1549.³⁹ He had also clashed with George Dowdall, the archbishop of Armagh, who refused to support the government's programme of religious reform. But, apart from seeing the prayer book come into use in English areas, Bellingham's administration appears to have made little progress in winning significant support for the Protestant settlement. A broad spectrum of the political establishment in Ireland, from conservative clergy in English areas to the Irish elite, were prepared to accept the negligible alterations in worship which had accompanied the royal supremacy, but the iconoclasm which Bellingham sought to promote held the potential to cause disruption of the kind then being witnessed in parts of England.

St Leger seems to have been alive to the fundamental difficulty of the religious aspect of his charge and did not therefore pursue religion with any great enthusiasm. The privy council, for its part, was prepared to allow the lord deputy the latitude to proceed at his own pace in matters of religion.⁴⁰ St Leger was empowered, for example, to permit the service to be translated and administered in Irish in those areas 'where the inhabitantes understand not the Englishe tongue unto such tyme as the people maye be brought to understand the Englishe'.⁴¹ He reported to Cecil, in early 1551, that he had had 'the whole s[er]vice of the comunyon . . . drawn into Latten', and a Latin version of the prayer book was sent to the English-speaking city of Limerick.⁴² The lord deputy also adopted a softer, though ultimately unsuccessful, approach with Dowdall in an effort to win the primate's support for the Act of Uniformity. In this way, St Leger defused any potential disturbance or revolt over religion; but the task of institutionalizing and garnering local support for the Edwardian settlement was left to future chief governors.

St Leger's administration in 1550 was possessed of a feature not evident in Surrey's government thirty years earlier. The privy council, a body first introduced in 1520, had, by 1550, become an established component of Tudor government in Ireland. A 'greater' council, which included some of the nobility, was still to be seen—in 1550, for instance, all of Ireland's four earls sat at the council board together.⁴³ But there existed a core of privy councillors who sat more regularly and who were specifically acknowledged as possessing an advisory function by the crown. Of the thirteen men on the king's privy council in Ireland appointed to assist Lord Deputy St Leger, five of them were born in England.⁴⁴ The archbishop of Dublin—George Browne—and the bishop of Meath—Edward Staples—were

³⁹ Walter Cowley to Bellingham, 25 June 1549, TNA, SP 61/2/47.

⁴⁰ Bradshaw, 'The Edwardian Reformation in Ireland', 91–4.

⁴¹ Instructions by king and council to St Leger, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/57.

⁴² St Leger to Cecil, 19 January 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/3.

⁴³ St Leger to Cecil, 19 January 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/3.

⁴⁴ Instructions by king and council to St Leger, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/57.

both of them councillors and from England, but it was common enough for these relatively wealthy clerical offices to be occupied by English-born men. It was the presence on the council of Sir Edward Basnet, Sir Ralph Bagenal, and William Brabazon which reveals something of the changes which had taken place in Tudor government in Ireland since 1520. Incoming governors routinely brought their own men with them to Ireland, but Basnet, Bagenal, and Brabazon were Englishmen who had come to Ireland in the king's service in the 1530s and who had stayed on to make their careers there. Bagenal was the most recent arrival. A soldier who had fought in Scotland at the battle of Pinkie, he followed his brother Nicholas to Ireland after the latter was made knight marshal of the army.⁴⁵ Basnet and Brabazon had come to Ireland in 1534 as part of the military expedition led by Sir William Skeffington sent to crush the Kildare rebellion. Originally the receiver to Captain John Musgrave, Basnet went on to become dean of St Patrick's in Dublin and ultimately a clerk of the council. Brabazon had been secretary to Thomas Cromwell before Henry VIII appointed him undertreasurer and treasurer-at-war in 1534. Brabazon served as a privy councillor and undertreasurer until his death in 1552.

The presence of Englishmen at the council board mirrored the presence of a new minority population in Ireland that had secured leases of lands once belonging to the earls of Kildare or dissolved religious orders which they then exchanged or converted for land in freehold. Behind their appearance lay a steep population increase in England over the course of the Tudor period. Not surprisingly, then, the majority of these men were soldiers and younger sons of gentry families, such as Sir William Brereton, Thomas Agard, and Francis Cosby, who found both steady employment in one of the Tudor state's few standing armies and opportunity for advancement in the administration as royal government increased its normal area of operation.⁴⁶ Some, like Lord Deputy Bellingham and Sir Ralph Bagenal, were committed Protestants, but most of these men serving in Ireland showed no overt religious leaning at mid-century. This population, referred to by historians as 'New English' so as to distinguish them from the established English community in Ireland, did not in 1550 constitute the identifiable political or social interest in the kingdom that they would later become in Elizabeth's reign—their numbers were too small, and their goals of strengthening and extending Tudor rule in Ireland too similar to those already established residents of the Englishry to mark them out. Still, the appearance in Ireland in the two decades before 1550 of New English represents the beginning of a population flow from England to Ireland which was to increase steadily for the rest of the century and bind the kingdoms more closely together.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Colm Lennon, *s.v.* 'Nicholas Bagenal', in the *ODNB*.

⁴⁶ S. G. Ellis, 'The Tudors and the origins of the modern Irish states', in Tom Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds.), *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996), 132–4.

⁴⁷ On the New English, see now Gerald Power, 'Migration and identity in early modern Ireland: the New English and Pale community', in S. G. Ellis and Lud'a Klusáková (eds.), *Imagining frontiers, contesting identities* (Pisa, 2007), 243–62.

What was to attract Englishmen to Ireland in numbers not seen since the thirteenth century was already evident in 1550. Among the instructions for the government of Ireland prepared for St Leger was the order to survey the recently won Irish countries of Leix and Offaly—deemed by the government to be the rightful possession of the crown following the ‘rebellion’ of the O’Mores and O’Connors—with a view to leasing the lands there on behalf of the king. The terms offered were to be favourable to the tenants: the deputy and council were empowered to allow one or two years’ free rent so as to entice farmers to dwell on what were now crown lands.⁴⁸ The instructions did not specify to whom the crown envisaged leasing the lands, but the survey of Offaly alone conducted in November 1550 revealed a large expanse of territory to be occupied.⁴⁹ One option, which had been mooted in 1549, was to ‘restore’ the lands to the Irish inhabitants shorn of their leaders—O’Connor remained in the Tower while O’More had died in captivity.⁵⁰ Another option which presented itself, around the time of St Leger’s arrival, was the offer by a private grouping of government officials, gentlemen, and soldiers to be granted all of the O’Mores’ former lands in Leix. In return, they pledged to inhabit the lands, maintain the garrison at Fort Protector, and pay the crown an annual rent of £600 (Ir).⁵¹ But the Edwardian regime was not prepared to accept this innovation: a private corporate plantation of an Irish territory. Instead, dozens of leases were made for lands in Leix and Offaly over the following year to New English soldiers, Pale gentlemen, and, in one instance, an Irishman native to the territory. The leases came with the provision that the lessee must dwell on the lands; and many of the leases in Leix required that the ‘lessee shall not cause any of the lands to be inhabited by any of the name of O’More, or of such surname as were possessors in the country of Leix’.⁵²

The granting of leases to confiscated Irish lordships, however, effected little change in Leix and Offaly. The survey itself was poor—the territory was found to be a good deal larger than the government had anticipated. The leases, moreover, were granted with little thought given to how best to colonize a region still possessed of its native inhabitants. Yet the scheme captured the imagination of members of Ireland’s English community and government officials alike. For the former, men like Edward Walshes of Waterford, who penned an influential reform tract in 1552, it represented an opportunity to begin a wider colonization of Leinster and Munster which would at last wipe out the Irish influences which had over centuries crept into these otherwise loyal English districts.⁵³ The English population of Ireland had long recognized that they could not hope to re-colonize, or ‘plant’,

⁴⁸ Instructions by king and council to St Leger, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/57; Robert Dunlop, ‘The plantations of Leix and Offaly’, *EHR* 6 (1891), 61–96.

⁴⁹ Survey of Offaly, 10 November 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/65.

⁵⁰ Privy council to Bellingham and council, 24 June 1549, TNA, SP 61/2/46.

⁵¹ Offer for the inhabiting of Leix, 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/69.

⁵² *The Irish fiants of the Tudor sovereigns, 1521–1603*, 4 vols. (Dublin, 1994), *Edw. VI*, nos. 661, 663, 673, 674, 683–93, 697, 699–701, 703–4, 709–10, 712, 716, 724–5, 733, 735–6, 741, 765–8.

⁵³ ‘Edward Walshes’s “Conjectures” concerning the state of Ireland [1552]’, ed. D. B. Quinn, *IHS* 5 (1946–7), 303–22.

parts of Ireland out of their own number, and had in the past written of the need to seek additional Englishmen for that purpose 'out of England'.⁵⁴ For government officials, especially successive lords deputy, the settlement of Leix and Offaly with Englishmen became a feature of governing the kingdom of Ireland and served as an example for future colonization schemes.

But the resort to colonization as yet played only a small part in Tudor thinking in and about Ireland. Of greater import in 1550 was the furthering of the policy, begun in Henry's reign, of integrating the Irish polity and semi-autonomous English lineages into the English state. The policy had seen representatives of both communities raised to the peerage as earls and barons and had sent Barnaby Fitzpatrick to court to be educated alongside King Edward. Anthony St Leger, more than any other Tudor official, was well positioned for this. As we have seen, his personality and the success of his first deputyship had earned him the trust of many Irish chiefs. The Irish annals record that upon his return to Ireland in 1550 a number of them travelled to Dublin to meet him.⁵⁵ St Leger, for his part, understood that the crown's judicious dealing with Irishmen was a key to the success of royal policy in Ireland in the early 1540s. Prior to his coming over to Ireland as deputy, St Leger had requested that the privy council allow him to treat Irishmen with 'humanity, lest they by extremity should adhere to other foreign powers'.⁵⁶ But for all of St Leger's intentions to deal fairly with Irishmen, the crown was sending out mixed signals with regard to the Irish polity. St Leger was instructed, for instance, to explore the possibility of noblemen in Ireland exchanging parcels of their lands with land in England. This was presumably an effort to draw the newly created peers, such as Tyrone, Thomond, Clanrickard, and Upper Ossory, more closely into the orbit of English noble culture and 'civility', and accorded closely with St Leger's earlier methods of conciliatory dealing with Irishmen and wayward English lords. Yet, at the same time, St Leger was also instructed to reduce to order that portion of south Leinster inhabited by the O'Byrnes, O'Tooles, and Kavanaghs, overlooking, it would seem, the fact that the leadership of each of these clans had concluded agreements with the crown a decade earlier. He was further directed that no more than 10 per cent of every band of soldiers in the king's pay were to be 'of the nation of Ireland'.⁵⁷ In an effort to win support for his new government and the policy which it was sponsoring, St Leger had recommended that a parliament be summoned. 'I thincke it necessarie', he wrote before coming to Ireland, 'that ther were a p[ar]lyement wherby all the lordes mought be together to consulte abowte thaffayres of the realme'.⁵⁸ The privy council in England did not disagree, but the parliament of Ireland, which had not been convened since 1543, would not be summoned again until 1557, and then at the behest of Mary I. St Leger's

⁵⁴ 'A breviat of the gettingyng of Ireland and of the decaye of the same': CP 144, fo. 4^v.

⁵⁵ *AFM*, s.a. 1550.

⁵⁶ Remembrances for Ireland, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/55. The document is endorsed: 'M^r S^r Legers reme[m]bra[n]ces'.

⁵⁷ Instructions by king and council to St Leger, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/57.

⁵⁸ Remembrances for Ireland, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/55.

very suggestion that the Irish be treated with humanity was afterward struck out of the manuscript on which it was written; in the margin the council's tepid response was recorded: 'to use gentleness to such as shall show themselves conformable, to others to do as occasion shall show'.⁵⁹ All of this was not lost on the leaders of the Irish polity: the privy council learned of rumours in 1550 that Irish chiefs were attempting to procure aid from France or Scotland because of their fear of being driven off their lands like O'More and O'Connor had been. 'The hole nobilitie of Irelande from the highest to the lowest', according to Sir John Mason, the English ambassador at the French court, 'had conspyred to rydde them selves from the yoke of Englande'.⁶⁰

The root of the problem was that the status of Irishmen in Tudor society remained ambivalent. Though Edward VI was king of Ireland, with the implication that the entire population of Ireland were his subjects—regardless of whether they were of paternal English or Irish ancestry—Irishmen who did not belong to a clan continued to feel compelled to take out, and the government was prepared to grant, charters of English liberty so that they might avail themselves of the common law and free themselves from 'Irish servitude'.⁶¹ As for the Irish chiefs and clansmen who had formally agreed to acknowledge Tudor sovereignty and hold their lands of the crown, very few made a successful transformation from Irish chiefs to English nobles or landed gentlemen. The experience of Barnaby Fitzpatrick might be held up as a model of what the new Tudor dispensation in Ireland might achieve, but this must be weighed against the experience of such chiefs as Turlough O'Toole, who was killed by his own kinsmen shortly after returning from his meeting with Henry VIII.⁶² A more typical experience, however, was the uncompleted process of transformation: the vast majority of chiefs were left in limbo, having failed to progress through the successive phases of submission.⁶³ And even those who did complete the 'surrender and regrant' process continued to face difficulties arising from the sudden political change. English lords undergoing 'surrender and regrant' fared little better. Ulick Burke, for example, received an earldom from Henry VIII and agreed to hold his lands of the king and pay rent to the crown. But he was unable peacefully to pass his earldom on to his son and heir. It was not until 1550, some six years after the first earl's death, that Clanrickard's son Richard—significantly referred to as Richard 'Sasanach' (the Englishman) in the Irish annals—was styled second earl of Clanrickard.⁶⁴ According to the second earl himself he had not been able to 'beare uppe head in Connacht' since his father's death owing to the infighting among the Burkes.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ Remembrances for Ireland, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/55.

⁶⁰ John Mason to privy council, 29 June 1550, TNA, SP 68/9a, fos. 23–4.

⁶¹ See, for example, *Fiants Ire.*, *Edw. VI*, nos. 702, 759; *Cal. pat. rolls Ire.*, *Hen. VIII–Eliz.*, 238. For this point more generally, see Maginn, 'Civilizing' *Gaelic Leinster*, 115–17.

⁶² Maginn, 'Civilizing' *Gaelic Leinster*, 74–5.

⁶³ Maginn, 'The limitations of Tudor reform', 429–60.

⁶⁴ *AFM*, *s.a.* 1544, 1550; *The Annals of Loch Cé*, ed. W. M. Hennessy, 2 vols. (London, 1871), *s.a.* 1550, 1551.

⁶⁵ Richard Burke to privy council, 31 January 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/5.

Part of the problem was the crown's insistence that Irishmen, through a process which was tantamount to 'legal alchemy', be made Englishmen.⁶⁶ Rather than accepting the Irish elite *en masse* as peers or gentry, with the understanding that they were now the king's Irish subjects, dozens of individual agreements were concluded which sought to make members of the Irish elite English subjects.⁶⁷ The other part of the problem lay in the nature of the Tudor programme of reform itself. Rapid cultural change in the Irish polity, of the sort Barnaby Fitzpatrick had undergone, would take generations to take effect unless every son of an Irish chief was raised at court. And even if a new tier of Irish-cum-English aristocrats were to be brought up as Englishmen in London, these men would still one day be confronted with an Irish lordship, and their extended kinship within it, in the throes of a process of a socio-economic transformation. Considerable military and diplomatic assistance from the government would be necessary to shore up the submissions and support the chiefs. In the case of Richard Burke, earl of Clanrickard, such assistance was forthcoming: St Leger dispatched Thomas Cusack, the lord chancellor, and Patrick Barnewall, the master of the rolls, to Connaught in 1550 to resolve the differences among the Burkes.⁶⁸ Cusack's intercession secured for Burke the earldom, but he brought with him no permanent solutions either for stamping out coign and livery or strengthening English government there: the second earl would spend years fighting his kinsmen in an effort to establish his own power.⁶⁹ In short, neither the strategy of integration championed by St Leger, nor the change in Ireland's constitutional relationship with England, was sufficient to remove the centuries of legal and constitutional separation which had grown up in Ireland. It was by 1550 a separation which was increasingly difficult to sustain, even in legal terms, and it steadily began to break down in the decades that followed. But the cause of the breakdown owed more to the unsuitability of the medieval rhetoric of separation in a period marked by the extension of Tudor rule into Irish areas than to a coherent move on the part of the state to safeguard or regularize the position of Irishmen in the kingdom of Ireland. The result was the disaffection of many of the leaders of the Irish polity and the willingness of some of them to seek military assistance from foreign powers against the English crown—precisely the eventuality which St Leger had feared.

For William Cecil and his fellow privy councillors these fears were confirmed when in late 1550 intelligence was received that the French were planning an invasion of Ireland.⁷⁰ It was believed that an invasion, when it came, would be launched against the southern coast of Munster, but it was equally possible that the Western

⁶⁶ The description of what was at work here as 'legal alchemy' was first made to me by Dr Brendan Kane.

⁶⁷ This point is explored more extensively in Maginn, 'Gaelic peers'.

⁶⁸ Lord deputy and council to privy council, 15 February 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/7.

⁶⁹ For this, see Bernadette Cunningham, 'From warlords to landlords: political and social change in Galway, 1540–1640', in Raymond Gillespie and Gerard Moran (eds.), *Galway: history & society* (Dublin, 1996), 97–130.

⁷⁰ Privy council to St Leger and council, 26 January 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/4; *APC, 1550–52*, 223.

Isles of Scotland might be used as a bridgehead for invasion.⁷¹ The betrothal of Mary, queen of Scots, to the dauphin threatened to transform Scotland into a satellite of Valois France. The final collapse in the mid-1540s of the MacDonnell lordship in the Western Isles, moreover, had already seen thousands of the queen of Scots' Irish-speaking subjects pour into north-east Ireland where they established settlements and generally upset the traditional balance of military advantage in the north of the kingdom.⁷² St Leger's position and his instructions for Ireland's government were immediately superseded by the need to defend the kingdom.⁷³ Questions surrounding the progress of the new faith, the status of Irishmen under English law, how best to proceed with the colonization of the midlands, and the general need to integrate the kingdom more closely into the Tudor state would have to wait. The premature death of Edward VI in 1553, followed by the short and unsuccessful reign of his elder sister Mary I—symptomatic if not of a more general 'mid-Tudor crisis' then, in the kingdom of Ireland at least, of a mid-Tudor loss of political initiative—ensured that these questions would not receive sustained consideration until after Queen Elizabeth's accession to the throne late in 1558. Still, that such fundamental aspects of the relationship between England and Ireland were questions at all in the mid-Tudor period provides some indication of the degree of change which had occurred since 1520.

⁷¹ George Dowdall to John Dowdall, 22 March 1549, TNA, SP 61/2/51; Articles for the expedition to Ireland, 7 January 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/2; St Leger to Somerset, 18 February 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/9.

⁷² St Leger to privy council, 13 August 1545, TNA, SP 60/12/19; Nicholas Maclean-Bristol, *s.v.* 'James MacDonald', in the *ODNB*; Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 245–6.

⁷³ See below, 79.

PART II
IRELAND MATTERS

This page intentionally left blank

3

Correspondence and Points of Contact

William Cecil never set foot in Ireland. He never fought as a soldier in the Irish wars or occupied one of the many administrative posts which became available in the kingdom as Tudor rule there steadily expanded. He owned no lands in Ireland, and had neither familial affiliations nor substantive economic ties to the neighbouring island. The extent of Cecil's acquaintance with Ireland (political or otherwise) prior to his rise to political prominence in Edward VI's reign can now only be guessed at.¹ What is certain is that William Cecil's knowledge of the kingdom of Ireland came to exceed that of any other figure at the court of Queen Elizabeth I. But it was an expertise gained indirectly. His only physical connections to Ireland were the myriad men (and the more occasional women) who were normally resident in the kingdom, or who were in the crown's temporary employ there. They formed a protean network of confidants and clients with whom Cecil maintained regular written and oral correspondence for the better part of fifty years. More than merely informing Cecil's decisions and shaping his attitudes pertaining to Ireland and Ireland matters, their writings, conversations, spoken accounts, and also their pictorial representations and maps formed the foundation upon which he constructed his mental outline of a kingdom about which he thought daily but never once saw or experienced at first hand. For the historian, this correspondence, which began in the reign of Edward VI and which continued into Elizabeth's final years as queen, forms the bulk of the evidential framework upon which any study of Cecil's relationship with the kingdom of Ireland must hang.

William Cecil's Irish correspondence began in earnest within months of his appointment in early September 1550 as secretary of state and a privy councillor.² By comparison with Elizabeth's reign, Cecil's Irish correspondence in the early 1550s is slight: all that have survived are the less than two dozen letters written by members of the Tudor administration in Ireland to the young councillor.³ Still, this

¹ But see the letters and political tracts concerning Ireland from the 1540s which are preserved among Cecil's papers: *Salisbury MSS*, i. 21, 37, 52, 75, 76. The most important of these is a compendium of Irish material which includes, *inter alia*, Patrick Finglas' tract 'A breviat of the gettingyng of Ireland and of the decaye of the same': CP 144, fos. 1–15'.

² *APC, 1550–1552*, 118. St Leger to Cecil, 5 December 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/67. The only surviving letter addressed to Cecil out of Ireland prior to his appointment as principal secretary is dated July 1547, when he served as master of requests under Protector Somerset: Joan, countess of Ormond and Ossory, to Cecil, 6 July 1547, TNA, SP 61/1/4. The following year, St Leger sent Cecil, as master of requests, a letter, from Southwark in England, desiring to exchange certain lands with the archbishop of Dublin: St Leger to Cecil, 13 July 1548, TNA, SP 12/4/27. Cf. M. L. Bush, 'Protector Somerset and requests', *Historical Journal*, 17 (1974), 451–64.

³ *CSP*, i. 106–31.

number is greater than all of the surviving letters which three of Edward's other councillors who maintained Irish correspondence—William Paulet, Edward Seymour, and John Dudley—received from Ireland in Edward's reign combined. Some letters offered observations on the state of politics and society in Ireland, reporting back what had been heard or witnessed; others contained the hope that Cecil would, through his influence with the sovereign and his access to the corridors of power in England, further one's own (or one's client's) political position or economic well-being. In these respects, Cecil's Irish correspondence was no different from the many other communications which he received as principal secretary and later as lord treasurer. What made this correspondence so markedly different, however, was that it almost invariably contained suggestions for how best to effect the 'reformation' of Ireland—that is, to improve, strengthen, and extend Tudor rule in the kingdom. Roughly half the kingdom lay beyond the effective control of the crown, with large swathes of territory in the north and west still under the control of dozens of more or less independent Irish chiefs. Areas answerable to the crown outside the English Pale and the major cities and towns, moreover, often bore little resemblance to English norms, inviting usually negative comparisons with society in England. The letters that Cecil received from and about Ireland and the kingdom's affairs thus regularly carried with them a prescriptive quality and an urgency for action absent from most of his other correspondence. It was through this medium that the secretary became acquainted with the realities of Tudor rule in Ireland.

The first letters out of Ireland directed to Cecil were written during Anthony St Leger's government. St Leger was, as we have seen, closely associated with the policy introduced late in Henry VIII's reign which had sought to integrate into the Tudor state Ireland's constitutionally alien Irish chiefs and its recalcitrant English lords by offering them confirmation of their lands in exchange for their acceptance of Tudor sovereignty over the newly created kingdom of Ireland. By 1550, however, the considerable success which this policy had enjoyed had ended, and St Leger was on the defensive. His critics—most notably John Alen, the embittered former lord chancellor of Ireland—alleged that the deputy was a Catholic, and attributed the still unreformed state of large parts of the kingdom to the failure of St Leger's methods of governing.⁴ The embattled deputy, without a patron at court since King Henry's death, appealed to Secretary Cecil for support in early December 1550. The following month St Leger offered the privy council's newest member thanks 'for the goodenes I heer youe dayly mynistrre to my furtheraunce & the mayntenice of my goode name' and requested that one of his servants might consult the secretary 'for knowledge of yo^r mynde from tyme to tyme'. St Leger dismissed as untrue the 'malicious reports' levelled against him, explaining to Cecil his conviction that 'the kinges Ma^{tie} hathe now v^m hartes moo in Ireland than he had at my repaier'.⁵ John Alen also wrote to

⁴ White, 'The reign of Edward VI in Ireland', 197–211. Cf. Maginn, 'A window on mid-Tudor Ireland', 465–82.

⁵ St Leger to Cecil, 19 January 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/3.

Cecil, angrily refuting allegations which, he claimed, St Leger's messenger, Andrew Wise, the son of Sir William Wise of Waterford, and others had lately made against him. But Cecil's other correspondence suggests his closeness with St Leger and the deputy's allies in Irish government.⁶ He had already received a warm letter from William Wise, in which Wise took the opportunity both to commend his son Andrew to the secretary and to remind him of his friendship with Richard Cecil. 'Being here', Wise wrote,

in a realme of contynuall dissencon and nev[er] without the help of God like to be totally reformyd I am as an abiect from the wonnted honorable company wherin my youth delited and good M^r Sec^tory am now enforced to seke upon my nyw al [new all], tho I take yo^e for none of them as long as yo^e worshipful fader liveth.⁷

The letters which Cecil received from William Crofton and Thomas Wood, both agents of the English privy council in Ireland, meanwhile, gave accounts of St Leger's government which were generally favourable.⁸

But an affiliation with Cecil counted for little in Edward's reign. Cecil was powerless (or unwilling) to prevent Andrew Breerton—a soldier whom St Leger had relieved of his Ulster command in late 1550 for falsely accusing Conn O'Neill, first earl of Tyrone and the embodiment of the success of the 'surrender and regrant' programme, of treason—from using his connection to Cecil's fellow councillor, Sir William Herbert, earl of Pembroke, to have the deputy recalled.⁹ Fears of a French invasion had already seen St Leger's position eclipsed by the arrival in March of the soldier Sir James Croft: as Herbert's cousin, and a client of the increasingly dominant John Dudley, earl of Warwick, Croft was appointed deputy of Ireland within a month.¹⁰

James Croft's letters to Cecil, by contrast, were those of a man confident in his position within the administration of Ireland and anxious to lay bare the difficulties arising from Tudor rule in the kingdom to an interested councillor. Croft, though his deputyship lasted only eighteen months, was especially concerned with how the recent debasement of the kingdom's coinage was inhibiting his ability to govern. In his penultimate surviving letter to Cecil the deputy spoke plainly:

⁶ John Alen to Cecil, 5 April 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/19.

⁷ William Wise to Cecil, 10 December 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/68; St Leger to Cecil, 23 March 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/18.

⁸ William Crofton to Cecil, 12 April 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/20; Thomas Wood to Cecil, 24 April 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/21.

⁹ White, 'The reign of Edward VI in Ireland', 205–6.

¹⁰ Nichols (ed.), *Literary remains*, ii. 310; *APC, 1550–52*, 256, 260. In July 1551 Cecil was moved to support John Alen's seemingly endless entreaties for remuneration for his past services to the crown, when less than two months earlier Alen intimated that Cecil had wilfully ignored his petitions: 'L. Cobham [George Brooke, ninth baron Cobham] of late wrote to me that he movid yo^e hono^r of my sutis: and ye said ye ded not wel rememb[re] them thogh my agent at his retorne declared to me that he lefte them all wth yo^e honor in aredines.' The egregious Alen's most recent complaint was that he spent £100 to 'put my silf in aredines' according to the privy council's instructions to prepare for Cobham's arrival in early 1551. Only Cobham never came, the council having decided to send Croft in his stead: Alen to Cecil, 10 August 1551, CP 151, fos. 15, 18; Cobham to Alen, 20 April 1551, BL, Harleian MS 292, fo. 156; Alen to Cecil, 27 May 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/26 (quotation).

What goode I shall do here without this be remedied I knowe not. P[ro]vicon will not be had without monney, and monney s[er]vith not where it is not estemed: so can I not goo to reforme any other cuntry, but lye and destroye the Englishe pale. And so may it be said, what do I do here?¹¹

For Cecil, these letters out of Ireland in Edward's reign represent the first tentative beginnings of a correspondence which, in Elizabeth's reign, would increase exponentially. Cecil, so far as can be discerned, had not yet developed an extraordinary understanding of Ireland matters, nor had he established any discernible network of contacts there by the time he retreated from high politics following Mary's accession to the throne. But this Edwardian correspondence proved an invaluable introduction to both the people and the circumstances which most influenced politics and society in Ireland and the extent and character of Tudor rule there.

Cecil's formal appointment as principal secretary, on 20 November 1558 three days after Elizabeth became queen, was in itself sufficient to transform his Irish correspondence. For Conyers Read, the office of secretary with its multifarious responsibilities defied definition, but more recent historians have found the words:

This office, through which all official correspondence flowed—outgoing and incoming, foreign and domestic—offered an ambitious man the opportunity to become the centre to which all public business gravitated. Nothing would be done in which his voice had not been heard.¹²

As secretary, Cecil was:

everywhere and everything... No piece of paper, no report, no policy, no event or panic or crisis at home or abroad could escape his attention. By design and by instinct he was at the heart of Elizabeth's court. He controlled the machinery of power. He ran the royal secretariat and chaired meetings of the Privy Council.¹³

For the Spanish ambassador based in London in the early days of Elizabeth's reign William Cecil was simply 'the man who does everything'.¹⁴ In addition to the countless letters addressed to him, Cecil later explained that in his capacity as secretary he opened all letters addressed to the privy council, though he only opened letters directed to Elizabeth in the queen's presence and with her assent.¹⁵ The correspondence sent to him from (and concerning) Ireland in Elizabeth's reign far outweighs his own outgoing letters. This discrepancy between letters 'in' and letters 'out' may be accounted for in part by the high-profile nature of his office and the many responsibilities which went with it; but internal examination of the letters sent to him reveals that Cecil, throughout his career, wrote more frequently to people in Ireland, for both public and private causes, than the surviving documentation would suggest. Letters which reached Cecil at court were more likely to have

¹¹ Croft to Cecil, 14 March 1552, TNA, SP 61/4/27. The debasement is discussed below in Chapter 5.

¹² Read, *Mr Secretary Cecil*, 119; Wallace MacCaffrey, *s.v.* 'William Cecil', in the *ODNB*.

¹³ Alford, *Burghley*, 91.

¹⁴ P. W. Hasler (ed.), *The history of parliament: The House of Commons, 1558–1603*, 3 vols. (London, 1981), iii, 179.

¹⁵ Cecil to Sidney, 23 December 1565, TNA, SP 63/15/69.

been saved and preserved there, either by Cecil himself or by others serving at the heart of Tudor government, than those which left his hand bound for Ireland, where conditions were less stable and concern for the preservation of documents was often of secondary importance. In the absence of a greater abundance of Cecil's letters, the historian may, on occasion, find echoes of his words, and impressions of his thoughts, ideas, and attitudes referenced in the vast number of letters and documents sent to him.¹⁶ Those letters which William Cecil wrote, and which survive, thus assume added importance, for they contain a direct expression of the minister's thinking about the kingdom of Ireland.

Cecil's appointment in 1572 as lord high treasurer of England saw the breadth of his workload (and correspondence) narrow. In fact, as is suggested below, as Lord Burghley, as Cecil then was, assumed greater responsibility for financial matters in both kingdoms, a significant proportion of the Irish correspondence once directed to him fell to his protégé, Sir Francis Walsingham, his successor in the office of secretary. In a 1576 letter to Nicholas White, the master of the rolls and a privy councillor in Ireland, Burghley reflected on his time as secretary, 'by which occasio[n]', he explained, 'I did by wryty[n]g more entermedle wth the affayres of that realme than now I do'.¹⁷ Following Walsingham's death in 1590, however, Burghley returned to the role of secretary, though in an unofficial capacity. His Irish correspondence increased sharply in these years until his son Robert Cecil, to whom he gradually gave additional responsibility for Ireland matters and who was appointed secretary of state in July 1596, superseded him.¹⁸ William Cecil's Irish correspondence continued until shortly before his death in August 1598: it was only in 1597, the last full year of his life, that letters out of Ireland directed to the son outnumbered those sent to the father, and then only just: of the nearly 400 letters and memoranda pertaining to the affairs of Ireland preserved among the state papers for 1597 directed to the two Cecils, just over half were addressed to the secretary.¹⁹ By way of comparison, the balance of the approximately 175 letters directed out of Ireland to William and Robert Cecil preserved among the state papers for 1596 were directed to the lord treasurer.²⁰ Even in 1597, however, it was the elder Cecil who continued to carry the greater political weight, as the muster-master of Ireland's letter asking Robert Cecil to remind Burghley to speak with the queen on his behalf attests.²¹

Yet no matter his office, or his age, William Cecil constantly sought out information from and about Ireland; written correspondence, the medium through

¹⁶ For example, see below, 60.

¹⁷ Burghley to White, 24 July 1576, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 89.

¹⁸ The first letter addressed to the younger Cecil out of Ireland that I have discovered is Henry Pyne's dated 4 June 1593, TNA, SP 63/170/2. By the end of 1593 Burghley was sending Robert letters from the lord deputy and council of Ireland directed to the privy council: CUL, MS Ee. iii. 56, no. 8.

¹⁹ The earl of Ormond wrote to Burghley 2 August 1598 and referenced a letter he had received dated 14 June in which the treasurer wrote of his infirmity and how it kept him from court: TNA, SP 63/202(pt.3)/2. Compiled from: *CSPI*, vi. 199–499.

²⁰ Compiled from: *CSPI*, vi. 3–198.

²¹ Ralph Lane to Robert Cecil, 18 January 1597, TNA, SP 63/197/39.

which much of this information was conveyed, was the lifeline that connected Cecil to the other Tudor kingdom. In the 1560s he gently (though repeatedly) reprimanded both the earl of Sussex and Sir Henry Sidney for not writing to him more frequently.²² More than a decade later, William Gerrard, the lord chancellor of Ireland, wrote that while at court he had heard Burghley complain of the tendency for those in the Irish service not to make report when there was little or no news to report. Sensing the opportunity to bring his suits before the busy lord treasurer, Gerrard wrote to Burghley: 'seing here no one day passe, but occasion offered to wryte I am the bolder the oftener to trouble you'.²³ Nor did age and experience diminish Burghley's craving for regular information: at nearly 78 years of age he wrote to his son in France and related to him how the absence of news from Ireland troubled him.²⁴ There was more to this than mere impatience or pedantry. William Cecil was in Elizabeth's reign central to the exercise of Tudor government in Ireland: any delay in the payment of bills, the arrival of money, victuals, and soldiers on account of the failure of intelligence to filter through to him might result in disaster.

A sizeable proportion of Cecil's correspondence from Ireland sought to procure his favour, but his power and influence, considerable though it was, should not be exaggerated. Only the queen or the privy council in England were empowered to initiate the bureaucratic process which might result in a grant of land, the appointment to an office, or, as will be discussed at greater length later, the decision to pursue a specific political policy. It is true that as master of the court of wards and liveries, an office which he held from 1561, and later as lord treasurer, a great deal of patronage was at Cecil's personal disposal. Through his exercise of the former office he was entitled, for instance, to sell wardships and receive money payments from suitors hoping to gain his support; as treasurer, it was within his gift to grant patents of appointments to custom posts.²⁵ The fruits of his exercise of the latter office might extend to Ireland, but the lord deputy and council would appear to have presided over the management of the kingdom's wardships and, no more than in England, was it within Cecil's power to make political or spiritual appointments, or grants of land in Ireland.²⁶ In 1590 a grant was made of a castle and lands in County Cork to one of the MacCarthys under authority of Burghley's letter, but it came on foot of a letter from the queen authorizing the grant.²⁷ Only in his capacity as lord high treasurer, and very late in his career, was Burghley so entrenched in government that he was prepared to disregard standard conventions governing

²² Cecil to Sussex, 1561, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 21, fos. 17–33; Cecil to Sidney, 24 October 1568, TNA, SP 63/26/8; Cecil to Sidney, 19 November 1568, TNA, SP 63/26/46.

²³ Gerrard to Burghley, 3 August 1580, TNA, SP 63/75/6.

²⁴ Burghley to Cecil, 23 February 1598, TNA, SP 12/266/73.

²⁵ A. G. R. Smith, *Servant of the Cecils: the life of Sir Michael Hicke, 1543–1612* (London, 1977), 51–3, 64; Joel Hurstfield, *The queen's wards: wardship and marriage under Elizabeth I* (Cambridge, 1958), 267–8.

²⁶ There is a need for a study of the operation of the court of wards in Tudor Ireland, but see *Calendar of patent rolls, Elizabeth I*, 9 vols. (London, 1939–86), i, 444, 472; Fitton and White to Thomas Smith, 28 September 1573, TNA, SP 63/42/30.

²⁷ *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, no. 5520.

the execution of royal office and authorize warrants for exchequer payments in the name of the privy council without having consulted them.²⁸

Still, Cecil's support for a particular suit or 'cause'—be it public or private—mattered a great deal in the decision-making process of the queen and her council. This was evident even in the early years of Elizabeth's reign. In 1559, for example, the mayor and council of the Munster town of Youghal wrote to the queen for confirmation of their town's charter, but they also directed a petition to Cecil in an effort to win his favour in the matter.²⁹ Later, in 1562, Joan, countess of Desmond, wrote simultaneously to the secretary and the queen in support of Andrew Skiddy's suit for a grant of the site of the Greyfriars' monastery in Cork.³⁰ The offer of gifts to Cecil in return for his support was not uncommon, and might appear to the modern observer to smack of jobbery and corruption, clear signs of Cecil's self-interest and partiality—and there can be little doubt that the relationship between the offices which he held and his political role in administering the kingdom of Ireland added to the immense personal wealth which Cecil amassed in his long career; but such practices were standard features of Tudor government and the functioning of early modern European governments in general. When Jacques Wingfield, master of the ordnance in Ireland, sought to salvage his career following allegations of cowardice in the field, for instance, he not only appealed to Secretary Cecil, he also begged Cecil's wife to use her influence with her husband to help his cause. Wingfield offered a 'forayred tassel of a goshalke [goshawk]' as a sign of his gratitude. Mildred Cecil duly passed on her correspondence to William, though not before writing a note to him on Wingfield's letter: 'if you reseave this hauk w^c m^r Wingfeld sendith, it would be fine for my brother Richard Coke, if I thoughte it were a hauk fit for his grownd but if he be not fit for him, you may bestow him wher please you.'³¹ The corporation of Waterford gave Burghley a 'yearly benevolence', which in 1597 amounted to two bed coverings, a green mantle, and a Waterford-made 'rondell of aqua vitae', in return for the lord treasurer's 'furtherance' of the corporation's causes (mainly their export of sheepskins and other raw goods to England).³² Even Henry Sidney, lord deputy of Ireland in the later 1560s, sent presents of stone over to Cecil (and other members of the council) for the secretary's use in the building of his house at Theobalds at a time when the lord deputy was not seeking anything in particular.³³

Yet Cecil was reluctant to step beyond the limitations of his station for personal gain. The secretary's hesitancy is illustrated by his appeal to the earl of Sussex during the earl's lieutenantancy of Ireland in the early 1560s. Cecil required for his personal use in England timber for 'y^e palyng of a litle close grownd', and requested that

²⁸ John Guy, 'The 1590s: the second reign of Elizabeth I', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy*, 14; M. B. Pulman, *The Elizabethan privy council in the fifteen-seventies* (Berkeley, 1971), 88.

²⁹ Mayor and brethren of Youghal to Cecil, 15 March 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/21; mayor and brethren of Youghal to queen, 15 March 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/22.

³⁰ Countess of Desmond to Cecil, 24 April 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/95; countess of Desmond to queen, 24 April 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/96; *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, no. 864.

³¹ Wingfield to Lady Cecil, 1 September 1562, TNA, SP 63/7/1.

³² James White, mayor of Waterford, to Burghley, 14 July 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/20–1.

³³ Sidney to Cecil, 3 March 1566, TNA, SP 63/16/41.

Sussex provide him with forty trees for that purpose from Ireland. Cecil explained that he was 'loth in so small a matter to trouble Her Ma^y', but rather than pay Sussex outright, or seek to obtain the trees illicitly or as a gift, Cecil referenced the practice whereby 'former deputees' sold timber in Ireland for money and sent over an old warrant made by the former lord high treasurer of England and Richard Sackville, the chancellor of the exchequer, to Sir Walter Mildmay, the surveyor of augmentations, 'having onely cha[n]ged there names into yours'. Cecil asked the lord lieutenant to sign the warrant so that he might purchase forty trees (Mildmay had, according to the secretary, bought fifty).³⁴ Upon his appointment as principal secretary Elizabeth had instructed him: 'you will not be corrupted by any manner of gift and that you will be faithful to the state.' Cecil, it would seem, did not take the words which his mistress uttered to him lightly.³⁵

The diverse responsibilities that came with being secretary meant that William Cecil communicated and developed relationships across the Irish political establishment irrespective of local rivalries, or the quarrels that might begin at court and continue over the Irish Sea, or vice versa. Yet, in the historiography of sixteenth-century Ireland, Cecil has been portrayed as belonging to a definite 'faction' at the Elizabethan court. The events surrounding the appearance before the queen in January 1562 of Shane O'Neill in particular have been placed within the context of a linear factional struggle between the lord lieutenant of Ireland, Thomas Radcliffe, earl of Sussex, Thomas Howard, duke of Norfolk, and Secretary Cecil on one side, and on the other the queen's favourite, Robert Dudley, and the mostly Irish-born Geraldine affinity—the earls of Kildare and Desmond, leading Palesmen, and Shane O'Neill.³⁶ To do so, however, is to interpret the rivalry which existed between the queen's erudite secretary and her dashing favourite as 'faction', and to assign Cecil a definite 'side' in both the long-established political divisions which permeated the government of the kingdom of Ireland and what was soon to become a very real feud at court between Sussex and Dudley.³⁷ It was Sussex's reputation in fact which was most damaged by O'Neill's visit to court. The earl of Kildare had been using his influence in Ireland and his near kinship with the recalcitrant Ulster chief to undermine Sussex's government. Sussex, who had staked his reputation to defeating O'Neill, was alive to Kildare's machinations, and now was made to watch as the earl was charged with organizing O'Neill's visit to England.³⁸ Only months

³⁴ Cecil to Sussex, 17 September 1561, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 21, fo. 25.

³⁵ Quoted in Read, *Mr Secretary Cecil*, 119.

³⁶ Brady, *Shane O'Neill*, 44–5; id., 'Shane O'Neill departs from the court of Elizabeth: Irish, English, Scottish perspectives and the paralysis of policy, July 1559 to April 1562', in S. J. Connolly (ed.), *Kingdoms united? Great Britain and Ireland since 1500: integration and diversity* (Dublin, 1999), 23–5; Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 278 (n. 23); Christopher Maginn, s.v. 'Shane O'Neill', in the *ODNB*.

³⁷ Collinson, 'The monarchical republic of Elizabeth I', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy*, 117; Simon Adams, *Leicester and the court: essays on Elizabethan politics* (Manchester, 2002); id., s.v. 'Robert Dudley', in the *ODNB*; Alford, *Burghley*, 121–2. For the older view of a court riddled with faction, see Conyers Read, 'Walsingham and Burghley in Queen Elizabeth's privy council', *EHR* 28 (1913), 34–58; W. T. MacCaffrey, 'Place and patronage in Elizabethan politics', in S. T. Bindoff, Joel Hurstfield, and C. H. Williams (eds.), *Elizabethan government and society: essays presented to Sir John Neale* (London, 1961), 95–126.

³⁸ Carey, *Surviving the Tudors*, 111, 117–18.

before, O'Neill had inflicted a sharp defeat against Sussex in the field. This effectively ended any possibility of subduing O'Neill by force before the onset of winter. Cecil had actively canvassed for a more aggressive military policy against O'Neill and was devastated when he learned of Sussex's discomfiture. In a letter to Sussex Cecil explained that there were none at court in whom he might confide for 'it wold content them to here amiss of you'.³⁹ But while Cecil was the figure at court most closely associated with Sussex's failure, there is no evidence to suggest that he attempted to thwart Robert Dudley's development of influence within the Irish government, or that Dudley maintained a position with regard to O'Neill different from his own. In an echo of their cooperation in formulating the queen's policy toward Scotland and France in the early 1560s, the two men acted in concert on Ireland matters following O'Neill's stay at court and Dudley's appointment to the privy council.⁴⁰ The extent of their cooperation is most vividly evident in Dudley's letter to Cecil in 1566. Dudley, who was by then earl of Leicester, made it plain that he shared the secretary's desire to see both the queen's honour increased in Ireland and any future combination of the Irish and the Scots prevented through the reduction to obedience of Shane O'Neill.⁴¹

Cecil, moreover, maintained a good working relationship and a close personal relationship with both Sussex and Sir Henry Sidney—Sussex's successor as chief governor of Ireland and the earl's brother-in-law—even after the pair fell out following Sidney's decision to attach himself to the earl of Leicester.⁴² With regard to the Sussex–Leicester feud, Cecil showed himself to be outside the fray. In a letter written to Sidney in late 1565, he explained his relief that 'there was a frendly ato[ne]ment made betwixt my L of Leicester, and my L of Sussex and y^e lyke w^t the D of Norfolk'; 'it semed', Cecil continued, 'that ther was no ground of offence, but mistakynge, misreportyngs and strangnes'. He expressed his hope that 'God [would] gyve them grace, on[e] to iudg right of y^e other . . . for therof groweth all y^e restless troobles of this court'.⁴³ In the politics of Elizabethan Ireland, as in the politics of Elizabethan England, William Cecil should not be seen, prior to the mid-1590s, as belonging to or pursuing the interests of an organized faction at court.⁴⁴ Nor did he seek to develop a firm nexus of dependants or a personal affinity in Ireland—something that Leicester was to do with great success in both kingdoms. Cecil deemed such actions to be potentially harmful to his queen's

³⁹ Cecil to Sussex, 12 August 1561, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 21 fo. 20.

⁴⁰ Alexander Craik, bishop of Kildare, to Cecil, 5 August 1563, TNA, SP 63/8/62; queen to Nicholas Wrothe and Nicholas Arnold, c.9 November 1563, TNA, SP 63/9/55; Thomas Cusack to Cecil, 14 February 1564, TNA, SP 63/10/14; Nicholas Arnold to Robert Dudley and Cecil, 29 January 1565, TNA, SP 63/12/20; Shane O'Neill to queen, 28 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/32. For their cooperation in the 1570s, see below, 91.

⁴¹ Leicester to Cecil, 20 March 1566, TNA, SP 12/39/4.

⁴² See the twenty-one letters from Cecil to Sussex, June–January 1561–2, in BL, Cotton MS, Titus B. XIII, 21; Sussex to Cecil, 29 June 1567, TNA, SP 63/21/35; Burghley to Sussex, 31 July 1577, BL, Cotton MS, Vespasian F. XII, 89, fo. 127. For Cecil's relationship with Sidney, see below, 64–6.

⁴³ Cecil to Sidney, 23 December 1565, TNA, SP 63/15/69.

⁴⁴ P. E. J. Hammer, 'Patronage at court, faction and the earl of Essex', in Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I*, 65–86. Cf. id., *The polarisation of Elizabethan politics: the political career of Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex, 1585–1597* (Cambridge, 1999).

interests which, as we shall see, he placed above all things, saving perhaps God and country. His success in transforming the office of principal secretary into the linchpin of royal government, moreover, meant that the vast majority of correspondence flowed through him, so making the building up of a personal affinity in Ireland unnecessary.⁴⁵

Yet, in the mass of letters, notes, political treatises, and requests for political preferment and personal enrichment that crossed William Cecil's desk in Elizabeth's reign, two parallel networks of his contacts in Ireland are evident. The first was comprised of men who may be described as his confidants. They were few in number in comparison to a second network of contacts in Ireland which will be referred to here (and discussed in greater detail below) as the minister's clients. Cecil's confidants were individuals, taking Sir Henry Sidney and Sir William Fitzwilliam as examples, with whom he maintained both regular correspondence and personal relationships but whose high-ranking positions in the government of Ireland—both men served as lord deputy on multiple occasions under Queen Elizabeth—owed little (or nothing) to his patronage.

Cecil developed an especially close relationship with Sidney, undertreasurer in Ireland during Sussex's first government and, from 1560, president of the council in the marches of Wales. Sidney was appointed lord deputy of Ireland in October 1565, the first of three periods as the chief governor there. From the first, Cecil struck a new tone in the relationship between the lord deputy of Ireland and the principal secretary in England: 'I promoss you contynua[n]ce of my ministry to my urthermost, for I doo take to hart the shame that y^e crown of England hath long susteained by y^e inobedie[n]ce of that land'.⁴⁶ By November 1568, Cecil was writing warmly to Sidney and gave the deputy his opinion on a range of Irish business before concluding in a revealing turn: 'I am sory to trouble you w^t so long a mater, but otherwise I cannot delyver my self of myn own trouble'.⁴⁷ Cecil's frequent letters to Sidney in these years, it would seem, served also to disburden the secretary's mind of the many travails of his office. Their friendship reached its zenith when, that same year, Cecil stood as godfather to Sidney's son Thomas—the deputy expressed disappointment that his instructions to name the child 'Wylley' if it was a boy and 'yf a wench Cycles' were ignored. Contracts were also signed for a marriage between Cecil's daughter Anne, and Sidney's elder son Philip, whom Cecil claimed to love 'as he wer myne own'.⁴⁸ The nuptial union never took place, however: Philip Sidney would later wed the daughter of Sir Francis Walsingham; Anne Cecil would be married to Edward de Vere, seventeenth earl of Oxford, who in his

⁴⁵ MacCaffrey, *s.v.* 'William Cecil', in the *ODNB*.

⁴⁶ Cecil to Sidney, 3 April 1566, TNA, SP 63/17/6.

⁴⁷ Cecil to Sidney, 5 November 1568, TNA, SP 63/26/14. In a postscript he noted: 'at y^e wryting hereof my L. of Leicester is in my house at dyce, and merry, wher he hath taken paynes to be civill lodged these 2 nights, and to morrow we return both to y^e court'. Referencing Sidney's pregnant wife, Cecil continued, 'I saw my Lady this daye at Durha[m] house, who is sick only of being w^t child which I wish hereafter to delyte to be more in y^e light than y^e mother'.

⁴⁸ Cecil to Sidney, 6 January 1569, TNA, SP 63/27/2 (quotation); Cecil to Sidney, 2 February 1569, TNA, SP 63/27/17; Sidney to Cecil, 30 June 1569, TNA, SP 63/28/58 (quotation); John Thomas to Cecil, 24 October 1569, TNA, SP 63/29/69; Alford, *Burghley*, 145–6.

youth was one of her father's wards. In late 1569, Nicholas White, one of Cecil's clients in Ireland, made reference to the projected marriage. White had seen the marriage articles and in a letter to Cecil cast doubt on the value of the lands which Sidney was offering to his daughter.⁴⁹ White had hit on something which best explains the union's failure: the Sidneys' wealth and social standing was beneath that which Cecil sought for his children. But it was too late: the finalized marriage contract, which the earl of Leicester had helped to draw up, was already en route to Sidney in Ireland. With rebellion having broken out in Munster, however, Sidney was not in a position immediately to respond. He then, by his own admission, misplaced the contract. The secretary had already begun to reconsider the match—in a letter to Cecil Sidney alluded to the 'coldness' which the secretary believed to have crept into the marriage negotiations.⁵⁰ The projected union soon collapsed. William Cecil's personal and professional relationship with Sidney was never the same.

The rift could not have come at a worse time, for Sidney's government proved to be a crucial period in the Anglo-Irish relationship. Whether Sidney's programme for the reform of Ireland constituted a departure from previous Tudor methods of governing was once the subject of debate among historians.⁵¹ It may be argued, however, that it was Sidney's periods as lord deputy of Ireland—1565–7, 1568–71, and 1575–78—which saw the realization of many of the ideas, or programmes, for the extension of Tudor rule first proposed by mid-Tudor chief governors, most notably Sidney's mentor and erstwhile patron the earl of Sussex.⁵² What is perhaps most striking about Sidney's first two terms as deputy is the degree to which his programme for the kingdom's reform captured Cecil's imagination and, as will be discussed below, shaped his approach to the administering of the kingdom. The closeness of their relationship allowed Sidney considerable latitude. Cecil gave voice to the deputy's ideas for government at court and worked to ensure conciliar and, when possible, royal support for them. In summer 1569 Cecil wrote of Sidney to Nicholas White: 'I have at this tyme, for my L. deutees causes extended all my vaynes and sy[n]ews of my good will, to show my fre[n]dshp.'⁵³ The presence among the state papers of so many of Cecil's letters to Sidney in the later 1560s would appear to offer sufficient evidence of the importance of Sidney, and his service in Ireland, to the secretary. Yet a comparison between Cecil's letters to Sussex from the early 1560s, a great many of which are preserved in another collection of papers, and his later letters to Sidney reveal the depth of the secretary's devotion to the lord deputy in the late 1560s.⁵⁴ Never before under the Tudors had the

⁴⁹ Nicholas White to Cecil, 27 October 1569, TNA, SP 63/29/74.

⁵⁰ H. R. Fox Bourne, *A memoir of Sir Philip Sidney* (London, 1862), 38–9; M. G. Brennan and N. J. Kinnamon (eds.), *A Sidney chronology, 1554–1654* (Basingstoke, 2003), 26.

⁵¹ Canny, *Elizabethan conquests*; Brady, *Chief governors*, 113–58. Cf. Nicholas Canny, 'Revising the revisionist', *IHS* 30 (1996–7), 242–54.

⁵² Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 286–7; Ciaran Brady, 'The attainder of Shane O'Neill, Sir Henry Sidney and the problems of Tudor state-building in Ireland', in Ciaran Brady and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds.), *British interventions in early modern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2005), 28–48.

⁵³ Cecil to White, 6 June 1569, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 78.

⁵⁴ Cecil to Sussex, June–January 1561–2, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B. XIII, 21.

crown's representative in Ireland an ally at court so committed to his view of governing the kingdom. For a brief time Cecil and Sidney formed a powerful duo—both were in the prime of their careers, each holding the other in high esteem, one in Ireland and one at court, one conceiving and carrying out the queen's Irish policy, and the other guiding it through the labyrinth of politics and personalities that was Whitehall. But the failure of their children to marry dealt their relationship a blow from which it never fully recovered. Cecil lent no assistance as Sidney's second deputyship and his standing at court sank beneath the weight of difficulties arising from his efforts to govern effectively and inexpensively a kingdom in which the crown's commitments were everywhere on the increase. The unique circumstances of the late 1560s were not to be repeated in Elizabeth's reign. By the time of his third term as deputy, Cecil might offer the deputy counsel, but he was no longer willing to expend his own considerable political credit at court so as to insulate Sidney and his strategies for the reform of Ireland from recrimination.⁵⁵

A more enduring confidant of Cecil's was Sir William Fitzwilliam who succeeded Sidney (his brother-in-law) as deputy in 1571.⁵⁶ He was Cecil's wife's cousin and, unlike Sidney, had few powerful connections at court apart from Cecil.⁵⁷ In Ireland, the relationship between the minister and Fitzwilliam was well known: in 1566 Sidney informed Cecil that he had dealt amicably with 'his cousin', the soldier Brian Fitzwilliam, and judged Brian's brother Sir William a 'p[er]fect, honest and a true man in all his s[er]vice and chardge to the queens ma^{tie}'; in 1573 Nicholas White, an official regularly at odds with Fitzwilliam,⁵⁸ was keen to make clear to Burghley his friendliness to the deputy, lest Mildred Cecil suspect him of ill-will toward her 'dear' cousin.⁵⁹ But Fitzwilliam did not owe his rise to the head of the administration in Ireland to Cecil. He was, at the time of his appointment as deputy, already an old hand in Ireland, having served there, originally as a Sussex client, in various capacities for well over a decade, though most recently as privy councillor and, on five occasions during Sussex's and then Sidney's absences, as lord justice. Yet Fitzwilliam yearned to return to England, and Burghley was of the opinion that a man could do no good service to the crown if he was made to serve against his will. However, Burghley's efforts to convince the queen to appoint the untested Lord Grey as deputy were to no avail.⁶⁰ It was Fitzwilliam's experience,

⁵⁵ See below, 126–7.

⁵⁶ Mary Anne Lyons, *s.v.* 'William Fitzwilliam', in the *ODNB*.

⁵⁷ Fitzwilliam's first letter to Cecil from Ireland was dated 11 April 1560, TNA, SP 63/2/11. Thereafter they communicated regularly: in September and October 1562 Fitzwilliam thanked Cecil for the favour the secretary had shown to his mother: TNA, SP 63/7/15, 63/7/28; later, in a January 1568 letter to Cecil, Fitzwilliam thanked Lady Cecil for her 'fryndly and naturall care' of him: TNA, SP 63/23/15. Late in 1560 Lady Fitzwilliam sought Cecil's arbitration in a local dispute with the Wingfield family. The secretary learned that she had had the Wingfields' property vandalized and in a letter reminded her that 'this is not the high waye'. He then gently explained that their friendship would not prevent him from acting impartially in the matter: Cecil to Lady Fitzwilliam, 26 November 1560, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 7.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Nicholas White to Burghley, 9 October 1575, TNA, SP 63/53/42.

⁵⁹ Sidney to Cecil, 24 June 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/25 (quotation); Nicholas White to Burghley, 4 November 1573, TNA, SP 63/42/69.

⁶⁰ Burghley to Fitzwilliam, 10 August 1571, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Carte MS 57, fo. 119.

therefore, rather than the influence of his kinsman, which moved Elizabeth to disregard his appeals for permission to be released from the Irish service and name him deputy.⁶¹

For his part, Fitzwilliam, whose writings show him to be something of a paranoiac, sought to align himself even more closely with Cecil in these years: through the suggestion in 1571 of a marriage between his nephew and Cecil's daughter, but more typically through frequent correspondence—thirty-six of his letters to Burghley survive among the collection of state papers relating to Ireland for 1572; and after dipping to just under thirty letters for 1573, thirty-two of his letters to the newly appointed lord treasurer survive in the state papers for 1574.⁶² More of Fitzwilliam's correspondence with Cecil survives than for any other figure in the Irish establishment in Elizabeth's reign.⁶³ But though he could thank Burghley in February 1573 for 'mitigating her matie offence' through the treasurer's 'favorable construction' of his letters—Elizabeth found Fitzwilliam's style of writing 'misticall and darke' (she preferred straightforward accounts of difficult matters)—Cecil's friendship did not spare the deputy the attacks which Sidney and Leicester levelled against his government from England. Fitzwilliam sought throughout his deputyship to abandon the former's schemes for private colonization and provincial presidencies so as to avoid provoking revolts and incurring additional costs.⁶⁴ The result was a government which kept costs down but which did little to alter the condition of Tudor rule in Ireland. With Sidney lobbying hard for a third term as deputy, and promising more immediate results this time, Fitzwilliam's replacement was inevitable. Fitzwilliam surrendered up the sword of state to Sidney in September 1575 and returned to England. What Fitzwilliam could not escape, however, was his decades of experience in Ireland: Elizabeth, once again hoping to cut costs after a decade of expenditure, reappointed him deputy in 1588.

Cecil has, in recent years, been accused by historians of using his unrivalled influence at court not only to shield Fitzwilliam from the allegations of corruption which followed him into his second deputyship,⁶⁵ but also of masterminding a conspiracy which led to the destruction in 1592 of one of Fitzwilliam's principal detractors, Sir John Perrot, who had served as deputy of Ireland between 1584 and 1588. The ageing treasurer wilfully ignored a book of evidence sent to him detailing Fitzwilliam's misdeeds and, so the argument runs, 'deliberately and systematically framed' an

⁶¹ For the Fitzwilliams' protestations, see Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 2 May 1571, TNA, SP 63/32/19; Lady Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 29 August 1571, TNA, SP 63/33/55.

⁶² *CSPI*, i. 463–92, 492–536; ii. 1–47.

⁶³ A number of additional letters between the two, dating from the 1560s and early 1570s, have been preserved in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Carte MSS, 55–8, 131.

⁶⁴ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 18 February 1573, TNA, SP 63/39/28 (quotation); Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 301–4.

⁶⁵ It has been shown that Richard Beacon's tract on the reform of Ireland was a veiled criticism of the political corruption associated with Fitzwilliam: Richard Beacon, *Solon his follie or a politique discourse touching the reformation of common-weals conquered, declined or corrupted* (Oxford, 1594), ed. Claire Carroll and Vincent Carey (Binghamton, NY, 1996). Cf. Vincent Carey, 'The Irish face of Machiavelli: Richard Beacon's *Solon his follie* (1594) and republican ideology in the conquest of Ireland', in Hiram Morgan (ed.), *Political ideology in Ireland, 1541–1641* (Dublin, 1999), 104–6.

innocent man and had him convicted of high treason—on the dubious information of a disreputable Irish ex-priest no less—all to preserve his client's position in Ireland and the Cecilian faction's dominance at court over the men gathering round Elizabeth's young favourite, Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex.⁶⁶ Yet the evidence offered in support of Burghley's complicity in the alleged conspiracy is unconvincing. As we have seen, Fitzwilliam's position in Ireland owed little to Burghley's patronage, and the allegations of bribery and corruption (levelled against him by Robert Legge, a disgruntled and disgraced former deputy to the chief remembrancer in Ireland) were not uncommon—rare was the deputy who was not the victim of such complaints in sixteenth-century Ireland.⁶⁷ The claims made by the ex-priest, Denis O'Roughan, and supported and sent to Elizabeth by Fitzwilliam, that Perrot had worked to aid Philip II in a conquest of Ireland in return for a grant of Wales, were indeed groundless, but amid the paranoia following the recently foiled Babington plot the queen took even the most far-fetched rumour seriously; that the choleric Perrot had made enemies across the Tudor establishment did not help his cause.⁶⁸ Burghley reprimanded Fitzwilliam for having brought the matter directly to the queen's attention in the first place.⁶⁹ Fitzwilliam apologized. But he was too experienced an official to have been so careless. Nearly two decades earlier, Fitzwilliam was the recipient of much less dubious intelligence and confided in Burghley: 'I have forborne to send to her Ma^{tie} the copie of a letter w^{ch} I send to yo^r L[ordship] because the p[ar]tie... seems not be of any great credit.'⁷⁰ Whether Fitzwilliam wrote to Elizabeth about the allegations against Perrot because he believed them or because he sought Perrot's downfall is impossible to say, though he kept meticulous records of the case and was unstinting in his support for O'Roughan.⁷¹ Under pressure from Elizabeth, whose interest in the affair had been piqued, Burghley had no recourse other than to launch an investigation.

Evidence emerged that Perrot, in moments of frustration over what he deemed to be Elizabeth's failure to support his administration in Ireland, had publicly uttered such garish phrases as 'God's wounds, this is to serve a base bastard piss

⁶⁶ Morgan, 'The fall of Sir John Perrot', 109–25 (quotation, 109); Roger Turvey, *The treason and trial of Sir John Perrot* (Cardiff, 2005). The Cecils, William and Robert, have also been accused, on a dubious reading of the contemporary evidence, of inventing plots to destroy their political rivals: Francis Edwards, *Plots and plotters in the reign of Elizabeth I* (Dublin, 2002).

⁶⁷ For Fitzwilliam's support of Legge's expulsion from office, see lord deputy and council's order for Legge's removal, 26 November 1589, TNA, SP 63/166/30(vii); decree of deputy and council for Legge's expulsion, 23 June 1591, TNA, SP 63/166/30(ix). For Legge's allegations against Fitzwilliam, see Legge to Burghley, 5 April 1593, TNA, SP 63/169/2; Book of accusations against William Fitzwilliam drawn by Robert Legge, 5 April 1593, TNA, SP 63/169/3; Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, iii. 241.

⁶⁸ See Pauline Croft's review of Roger Turvey, *The treason and trial of Sir John Perrot* (Cardiff, 2005) on *H-Net Humanities and Social Sciences* (2007). Not the least important aspect of this perceptive review is the author's caveat: 'It is always worrying when modern historians insist that they have uncovered mysterious plots unknown to Tudor contemporaries'. Perrot's illegitimate son, Sir James Perrot (1571/2–1637), wrote openly of what he described as his father's 'chollericke disposition': James Perrot, *The chronicle of Ireland, 1584–1608*, ed. Herbert Wood (Dublin, 1933), 49.

⁶⁹ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 24 March 1590, TNA, SP 63/151/34. Burghley's letter to Fitzwilliam dated 8 March is, so far as I know, lost.

⁷⁰ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 7 December 1572, TNA, SP 63/38/52.

⁷¹ Northamptonshire Record Office, Fitzwilliam (Milton) Irish MS 93.

kitchen woman', and 'ha, silly woman, ha, fiddling woman, now she shall not rule me, now she shall not curb me'.⁷² Burghley carefully collected and made notes on all of the allegations against Perrot. The assembled evidence seemed to indicate that Perrot had, on several occasions, pronounced treasonous words against his queen.⁷³ Yet Burghley was loath to see the matter go any further. In early 1592, O'Roughan, the principal witness in the case, wrote to Elizabeth asking her to 'stir up, and eg forwarde my L. Thr[sur]er... though he be not very earnest or most forwarde in these actions', so as 'to have the lawe to proceede againste the treator P[er]otte'.⁷⁴ Elizabeth and indeed Perrot, who hoped to clear his name, were determined to see the case brought to trial. The prosecution seized on Perrot's words and, in April 1592, found him guilty. Essex, Burghley's supposed rival at court, sought to procure the treasurer's assistance in convincing the queen to stay Perrot's execution.⁷⁵ In this the two men, the queen's experienced adviser and her headstrong young favourite, were successful: Perrot was committed to the Tower. But he died there before his sentence could be carried out. In his letter to Burghley, Essex had explained that it would be difficult to change Elizabeth's mind, for she was 'earnestly prest to have sentence pronounced against S^r Jo. Perott' and 'very resolute' in her belief that the former lord deputy was, at the very least, guilty of having voiced treasonous words against his queen. In these circumstances Burghley was unlikely to argue too forcefully on Perrot's behalf, but, as Pauline Croft has contended, 'that was not the same as deliberately and elaborately plotting to bring Perrot down, in pursuit of unsubstantiated and rather tenuous factional advantage'.⁷⁶ Faction and conspiracy are not necessary to explain Burghley's relationship with Fitzwilliam during his second deputyship: it remained a friendship between the queen's experienced, if lacklustre and often paranoid, servant in Ireland and the queen's closest adviser at court. Fitzwilliam continued as deputy for another two years before retiring to his native Northamptonshire where he died in 1599, a year after Burghley.

Beneath the realm of high politics a second, and more numerous, grouping of Cecil's contacts in Ireland may be discerned. These men, who may most aptly be described as his clients, were of secondary political importance in Ireland and owed their position in the kingdom primarily to Cecil's influence at court and with Queen Elizabeth. Sir Edward Fitton and Sir Nicholas White fall into this category and were typical of Cecil's clients in Ireland. Both were members of the queen's privy council in Ireland, though the former was a New English administrator turned soldier from Cheshire, while the latter was a lawyer by training from a prominent Old English family from Kilkenny. A brief examination of their careers in the Irish service will serve to illustrate the relationship between William Cecil and his clients in Ireland.

⁷² Turvey, *The treason and trial of Sir John Perrot*, 114.

⁷³ Collection in Burghley's hand of the material points against Sir John Perrot, 15 November 1591, TNA, SP 63/161/19.

⁷⁴ Dennis O'Roughan to queen, 23 January 1591, BL, Lansdowne MS 69, no. 39.

⁷⁵ Essex to Burghley, 3 May 1592, TNA, SP 12/242/4.

⁷⁶ Croft, review of Turvey, *The treason and trial of Sir John Perrot*.

In 1568 Cecil proposed Edward Fitton, whom Sidney had brought to his attention, as the first president of Connaught, a position that he took up the following year.⁷⁷ Fitton was a member of the privy council after 1569 and held a lease on the castle of Athlone from where he based his provincial government. Fitton proved an able administrator and kept Secretary Cecil abreast of developments in the kingdom, particularly events in Connaught, even after he was appointed vice-treasurer and treasurer-at-wars in Ireland in early 1573. He felt compelled to alert Cecil in August 1570 to the existence in England of his troubled sister, whom he described as 'weike of body, so I fear she is not stronge in eny thinge either religeon, worldly policie, or any other'. He sought the secretary's protection in the event anyone was to exploit her weakness and use it as a means to undermine or destroy him.⁷⁸ In return for his support, Burghley received valuable information about Ireland: in July 1576 the lord treasurer learned of the rebellion in Connaught of the earl of Clanrickard's sons from both Edward Fitton in Athlone and Fitton's son (and namesake) who was based in Cheshire.⁷⁹

Fitton's advancement in the Irish administration owed much to his relationship with Cecil. Cecil's patronage, however, did not prevent him from clashing repeatedly with Fitzwilliam during the latter's first deputyship.⁸⁰ Whispers of trouble between the two began in summer 1572. In a letter to Leicester, Burghley wrote that a 'difference' had arisen between Fitton and Fitzwilliam.⁸¹ The situation boiled over when, the following summer, the deputy pardoned James Meade for the murder of one of Fitton's men.⁸² Meade, a Dublin yeoman and a servant of Captain Henry Harrington, who was Fitzwilliam's nephew, was found by coroner's inquest to have acted in self-defence. For Fitton, the verdict smacked of favouritism, and he took the unusual steps of interfering in the bureaucratic process whereby a pardon was issued and then refusing to sit at the council board.⁸³ Fitzwilliam and Fitton each wrote to Burghley in an effort to gain the lord treasurer's support. Burghley was then prevailed upon in June to intervene in the dispute by a third party, the treasurer's servant Edmund Tremayne, who was firm in his belief that 'some words of good counsell from yor L. to both p[ar]tes shall do much good'.⁸⁴ But the matter worsened and news of the disorders on the council reached the queen. Elizabeth found Fitton's actions valiant, in the face of what she perceived to be injustice; she issued a scathing warning to the lord deputy and council. Fitzwilliam, she concluded, had acted out of 'hastie affection', though the worst of her ire was reserved for her council in Ireland: 'what nede there then [for] eny counsellors', she wondered, 'if the counsellors be but the hands and applauders of

⁷⁷ Cecil to Sidney, 11 August 1568, TNA, SP 63/25/64; Cecil to Sidney, 3 September 1568, TNA, SP 63/25/75; Bernadette Cunningham, *s.v.* 'Edward Fitton', in the *ODNB*.

⁷⁸ Fitton to Cecil, 28 August 1570, TNA, SP 63/30/82.

⁷⁹ Fitton (the younger) to Cecil, 5 July 1576, TNA, SP 63/56/2; Fitton to Cecil, 8 July 1576, TNA, SP 63/56/3.

⁸⁰ Fitzwilliam to queen, 25 July 1572, TNA, SP 63/37/14.

⁸¹ Burghley to Leicester, 10 August 1572, TNA, SP 12/89/3.

⁸² Fitton to Burghley, 3 June 1573, TNA, SP 63/41/2.

⁸³ *Ibid.* ⁸⁴ Edmund Tremayne to Burghley, 17 June 1573, TNA, SP 63/41/39.

or deputie?⁸⁵ The rift was slow to heal: Fitzwilliam was still railing against Fitton in October when he informed Burghley that the murdered man's father was rumoured to be lying in wait for Henry Harrington in England near Chester.⁸⁶ By this time, however, Burghley was working to reconcile the two. He ordered Fitton 'to recover his L. [Fitzwilliam's] favour' and with the help of Nicholas White—Burghley's other client and the lone councillor whom Elizabeth excepted from her invective—the hatchet was finally buried in late October, though Fitzwilliam never forgot how Fitton, who was to die in 1579 while travelling through the Irish midlands, had earned him the queen's displeasure.⁸⁷

Nicholas White owed his first major appointment in government to Cecil. In November 1568 the queen, acting on Cecil's recommendation, commanded Sidney to prefer White to the position of seneschal of Wexford and constable of the castles of Leighlin and Ferns.⁸⁸ White's birth and upbringing in Ireland set him apart from Cecil's other clients in the kingdom, the majority of whom were born in England and knew little about the country in which they served. With Cecil's backing, White rose to become a member of the privy council in Ireland in 1569 and, in July 1572, he was appointed to the office of master of the rolls.⁸⁹ White was especially vocal in his defence of the constitutional rights of Palesmen, most notably their resistance in the late 1570s to Sidney's endeavours to introduce what they deemed to be an extra-parliamentary tax, known as a 'composition', to replace the onerous practice of victualling and billeting the queen's soldiers.⁹⁰ Sidney was against White's early advancement, and Cecil went to some length to defend his decision to support his client. Cecil explained to Sidney that in White he 'found such sufficiency of his understanding and such direct dispositio[n] to serve justice and ordre as I have not found any lack of that w^{ch} in those respects hath bene both by your L. and some others reported'.⁹¹ A decade later, with the Palesmen's resistance to the government's efforts to enforce a composition gaining in strength, Sidney complained bitterly of White, noting 'ether I am not fyt to be deputy where he is a concelar, or he not fyt to be a conselor where I am a governor'; but Sidney knew enough about Burghley's fondness for White to vent his dissatisfaction elsewhere.⁹² Cecil met and corresponded with White frequently over two decades and, in the later 1570s, he assumed the supervision of White's two sons who were studying at Cambridge.⁹³ William Cecil benefited greatly from the perspective on Ireland matters which an Englishman born and reared in Ireland might offer.

⁸⁵ Queen to lord deputy and council, 29 June 1573, TNA, SP 63/41/58 (BL, Additional MS 15891, fos. 25^v–26^v).

⁸⁶ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 13 October 1573, TNA, SP 63/42/49; Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 14 October 1573, TNA, SP 63/42/51.

⁸⁷ Fitton to Burghley, 6 November 1573, TNA, SP 63/42/74; Drury to Burghley and Walsingham, 6 July 1579, TNA, SP 63/67/25.

⁸⁸ Queen (corrected by Cecil) to Sidney, 4 November 1568, TNA, SP 63/26/13.

⁸⁹ *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Hen. VIII–Eliz.*, 548.

⁹⁰ Jon Crawford, *s.v.* 'Nicholas White', in the *ODNB*. See below, 124–6.

⁹¹ Cecil to Sidney, 24 October 1568, TNA, SP 63/26/8; Cecil to Sidney, 11 February 1568, BL, Lansdowne MS, 102, no. 73 (quotation).

⁹² Sidney to Walsingham, 20 June 1577, TNA, SP 63/58/50 (quotation). See also below, 126–7.

⁹³ White to Burghley, 10 February 1577, TNA, SP 63/57/25.

So long as White lived he was keen to remind Cecil of the importance to the crown of Ireland's reform, but he never shrank from cautioning his patron that the rights of its native English population must not be trampled over in the process.⁹⁴ Some of these attitudes concerning the English of Ireland articulated by White, as we shall see later, rubbed off on Cecil.

Given that Cecil's own writings to members of the Irish establishment are meagre, relative to the voluminous correspondence he received (and was careful to preserve), the survival of seventeen of his letters to White is of particular importance.⁹⁵ They were special to White who, on one occasion following his receipt of a letter from Burghley, remarked, 'I must confesse that nothinge hath more power to comforte me than the sight of yor hand.'⁹⁶ In addition to throwing light on events in Ireland and the relationship between Queen Elizabeth's influential adviser and a member of the English community in Ireland, Cecil's letters, written to White between 1568 and 1585, offer a view on other matters. Most tantalizingly, perhaps, Cecil revealed to White (in two letters) something of his state of mind during and immediately following the intrigue against him at court in 1569 and 1570. Historians know frustratingly little about the details of the conspiracy at court to have Secretary Cecil's influence diminished as a prelude both to effecting a sea-change in Elizabethan policy toward Spain and furthering proposals for marriage between the duke of Norfolk and Mary, queen of Scots to settle the succession.⁹⁷ In June 1569, several months after some sort of clash with Norfolk at court, Cecil intimated to White that it was too dangerous to furnish him with the particulars of 'the state of thyngs here towchyng my self' because letters 'ar casual to be lost, and ar also p[er]mane[n]t to be kept'; but lest his friend in Ireland be 'troubled w^t bruits unplesant and not satisfied w^t contrary resolutio[n]s' he offered him 'a rule to measure both sorts of reports, be they good or badd':

I am thanked be god, in good helth, I am in quyetness of mynd as feling y^e nearenes and redynes of Gods favor to assist me w^t his grace to have a disposition to serve hym befor the world, and therin have I lately proved his mere goodnes to preserve me from some clowdes or mists, in y^e middest wherof I trust my[n] honest actions ar proved to have bene lightsom and cleare.

Providence, Cecil had no doubt, was on his side, and 'to make this rule more proper and speciall', he continued:

I fynd y^e Q. Maty my gracious good Lady w^t out cha[n]g of any part of hir old good meani[n]g towards me... I am also presently moved to beleve, and so I doo, that all my Lords from y^e gretest to y^e meanest thynk my actions honest and paynefull, and do profess inwardly to beare me as much good will as ever they did hertofoer.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ See, for example, White to Burghley, 23 December 1581, TNA, SP 63/87/55.

⁹⁵ BL, Lansdowne MS 102, nos. 74–5, 77–8, 81–2, 84–5, 88–91, 96, 105, 108, 110, 120.

⁹⁶ White to Burghley, 4 December 1582, TNA, SP 63/98/11.

⁹⁷ Wallace MacCaffrey, *The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics, 1558–1572* (London, 1969), 199–243; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, 182–208; Simon Adams, *s.v.* 'Robert Dudley', in the *ODNB*.

⁹⁸ Cecil to White, 6 June 1569, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 78; Alford, *Burghley*, 156–7.

But Cecil's contentment was not to last. Assured of Elizabeth's confidence though he was, the threat which he believed Catholic Spain posed to England and Ireland weighed heavily on him.⁹⁹ He saw Spain behind the rebellion which had erupted in Munster that summer and, though he expressed to White his relief that the rebellion was not as severe as he had heard, the following May he was again writing darkly to White in Ireland of his torment and the 'dangers that ar gaping upp[on] me'. He referred to Pope Pius V's excommunication of Elizabeth, a copy of which had appeared on the bishop of London's door the day before, and the not unrelated conspiracies rumoured to be swirling round the imprisoned queen of Scots. But the secretary was determined to persevere. Adopting the persona of a soldier, he quoted from the book of Job, 'vita hominis est militia sup[er] terram', and declared, 'I use no armure of prooff ageynst y^e darts or pellets, but confide[n]ce in God by a cleare conscience'.¹⁰⁰

In Ireland, White, like Fitton, quarrelled with Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam in the early 1570s. Their falling out can be traced to the same time as Fitton's feud with the deputy. Following the death in May 1573 of Robert Weston, the lord chancellor, White claimed to exercise the authority of that office by virtue of his service as master of the rolls. He cited precedent, offering Burghley evidence from Henry VIII's reign which showed that John Alen, the then master of the rolls, had taken possession of the great seal in 1538 upon Chancellor Barnewall's, third Baron Trimblestone's, death.¹⁰¹ In this instance, however, Burghley was unwilling to see displaced the increasingly powerful archbishop of Dublin, Adam Loftus, whom Fitzwilliam had already named as lord keeper.¹⁰² Coming off this rejection, White was naturally sympathetic to Fitton when the latter's feud with the deputy erupted. But it was, ultimately, White's decision to align with Perrot which proved his undoing. During Perrot's turbulent deputyship White confessed to Burghley: 'the maners of the man are farr contrary to my nat[ure] and yet the successe of his gowernment makes me to follow it and not him'.¹⁰³ Fitzwilliam later implicated the master of the rolls in the charges of treason levelled against Perrot. White was subsequently arrested and sent over to England so that he might be examined. Burghley wrote to White in August 1590 assuring him of his favourable opinion in the matter, but he did not send the letter: at the queen's request, White was committed to the Marshalsea and, after giving evidence that Perrot had in fact spoken words against the queen, he was placed in the Tower. The following March White wrote a short note to Burghley explaining how his 'close imprison[ment]' had taken its toll on his body; he requested that the lord treasurer grant him access to better food or 'lib[er]tie of the open ayre and walkes of the town'. But with Perrot found guilty of treason Burghley did not

⁹⁹ 'A short memoryall', July/August 1569, CP 157, fo. 3^v; Cecil to White, 9 August 1569, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 81; Cecil to White, 8 September 1569, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 82.

¹⁰⁰ 'The life of man on earth is a warfare': Job 8: 1; Cecil to White, 26 May 1570, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 85; Alford, *Burghley*, 163.

¹⁰¹ White to Burghley, 4 June 1573, TNA, SP 63/41/7(i).

¹⁰² Lord deputy and council to queen, 25 May 1573, TNA, SP 63/40/52.

¹⁰³ White to Burghley, 13 August 1586, TNA, SP 63/125/55.

(immediately at least) intercede on his client's behalf, and White died in the Tower in 1592.¹⁰⁴

The Irish polity was the one segment of society within the kingdom of Ireland from which neither Cecil's confidants nor his clients were drawn, and with whose members Cecil did not regularly correspond. It was not born of some ideological refusal on Cecil's part to communicate with Irish people. Indeed even Shane O'Neill, that most 'unreformed' and recalcitrant of Irish chiefs, exchanged letters with Cecil over a period of four years in the 1560s.¹⁰⁵ But O'Neill was exceptional in this regard. In Cecil's vast correspondence there was little communication with Irish chiefs. Why was this so? Language may have presented a barrier: few Irish people had the necessary command of English to put pen to paper and write to Cecil in England; but, as O'Neill's letters to Cecil show, clerks with knowledge of English might be employed (by the Irish elite at least) without too much difficulty.¹⁰⁶ O'Neill also routinely communicated with Cecil and the administration in Ireland in Latin; and it was not uncommon for representatives of the Tudor state to have letters written in Irish translated into English.¹⁰⁷ Shane O'Neill appreciated the importance of cultivating Cecil as an ally, frequently dispatching additional letters to the secretary on the same day of his communication with the privy council in England.¹⁰⁸ He even thought it necessary to send the secretary a gift of a horse following his return to Ireland from Elizabeth's court.¹⁰⁹ Not until the rise to political power of Shane's nephew, the Pale-educated Hugh O'Neill, second earl of Tyrone, would another Irish leader correspond with Cecil with some regularity.¹¹⁰ Still, Hugh O'Neill was not close to Burghley, and the distance between them contributed to the former's decision to turn against the Tudor state in 1595. Burghley was alive to the fact that Tyrone believed that he harboured a dislike for him. In late 1594 Burghley attempted to reassure Tyrone, explaining to him in a letter that his dislike was 'never conceived against yo^r L. person', but rather it was aspects of the earl's behaviour that the lord treasurer disliked, namely maintaining known rebels among his forces.¹¹¹ Burghley's assurances, however, came to little: in the

¹⁰⁴ Burghley to White, 11 August 1590, TNA, SP 63/154/5; Notes of matters to be added to the report made of John Perrot's cause, January 1591, TNA, SP 12/238/26; Abstracts of the testimonies of the bishop of Meath *et al.*, January 1591, TNA, SP 12/238/27; White to Burghley, March 1591, TNA, SP 12/238/101 (quotation); Crawford, *s.v.* 'Nicholas White', in the *ODNB*.

¹⁰⁵ Shane O'Neill to Cecil, 12 February 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/16; O'Neill to Cecil, 2 November 1562, TNA, SP 63/7/41; O'Neill to Cecil, 20 September 1563, TNA, SP 63/9/16; O'Neill to Cecil, 18 November 1563, TNA, SP 63/9/63; O'Neill to Cecil, 29 February 1564, TNA, SP 63/10/21; O'Neill to Cecil, 23 May 1564, TNA, SP 63/10/68; O'Neill to Cecil, 18 June 1565, TNA, SP 63/13/66; O'Neill to Cecil, 25 August 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/51.

¹⁰⁶ See also O'Donnell's English letter to Cecil, 22 June 1564, TNA, SP 63/11/14.

¹⁰⁷ For the government's ability to have a letter translated into English, see Shane O'Neill to Cormac O'Connor, 20 March 1567, TNA, SP 63/20/49–50.

¹⁰⁸ See, for example, O'Neill to privy council, 25 August 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/50; O'Neill to Cecil, 25 August 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/51.

¹⁰⁹ O'Neill to Cecil, 2 November 1562, TNA, SP 63/7/41.

¹¹⁰ Hugh O'Neill to Burghley, 30 November 1583, TNA, SP 63/105/87; O'Neill to Burghley, 8 February 1584, TNA, SP 63/107/85; O'Neill to Burghley, 12 June 1585, TNA, SP 63/117/22; O'Neill to Burghley, 31 October 1585, TNA, SP 63/120/17.

¹¹¹ Burghley to Tyrone, 1 September 1594, 1594, TNA, SP 63/176/1.

crucial months before the earl committed himself irrevocably to rebellion, Captain Thomas Lee reported to Burghley that Tyrone wanted to 'come in', but that 'he knoweth not how to have the safetie of his owne p[er]sone frede of imprisonem[en]t¹¹² and perrill of his life'. Tyrone, Lee continued, 'fearethe moste' that Burghley intended either to incarcerate him or have him killed because of the earl's conviction that 'yo^u have ever ben of his adversaries side'. Yet Lee added that he had also heard Tyrone say that 'yf he weare once assured of yo^r lpps favo^r' then he would depend on Burghley more than 'all the reste'.¹¹² The absence of more regular communication between the Irish elite and William Cecil is a measure of how inarticulate were Irish chiefs, and Irish people more generally, in the English political and social world that was steadily replacing their own. In England an (unidentified) London woman was sufficiently confident in the powers and reach of Tudor government to write to Lord Burghley begging him to discipline a constable and two watchmen who, she alleged, made such a racket outside her window at night that it kept her from sleeping.¹¹³ The notion of an Irish woman, from any walk of life, writing a letter of a similar tenor to the most powerful politician in England is unthinkable.

William Cecil's Irish correspondence formed the basis of his understanding of the kingdom of Ireland and its place in the Tudor state. If the letters that trickled in and out of the kingdom during Edward's reign provided him an introduction to Ireland matters, then those which poured in and out during Elizabeth's reign presented him with an endless discourse on the subject. Having never been to Ireland, the experiences and views of other men formed the basis of his understanding of the kingdom. It is in this context that his son Sir Thomas Cecil's tour through the four provinces of Ireland in autumn 1589 must be understood.¹¹⁴ It was something for the son at least to witness and experience what the father could not. It was for this need also that Cecil placed so much emphasis on maps of Ireland.¹¹⁵ In addition to serving as an effective administrative and military tool, maps provided him a visual representation of Ireland to complement his swelling correspondence and growing intellectual understanding of politics and society in the kingdom. The year before Cecil's death, Sir Ralph Lane, formerly the leader of the doomed English colony at Roanoke, sent him a 'platt' of the rebel earl of Tyrone's 'ensconement' at the pass of the Blackwater river in Ulster. He did so because he knew of Burghley's 'likinge, that aciones shoulde (as neere as maye) be platted fourthe by lyneall discripciones... as well as circumstantially by letter'.¹¹⁶ Cecil's interest in maps of Ireland was evident from the start of Elizabeth's reign and continued throughout his career.¹¹⁷ He paid careful attention to maps of those areas which

¹¹² Thomas Lee to Burghley, 1 April 1596, TNA, SP 63/188/2.

¹¹³ BL, Lansdowne MS 99, no. 28.

¹¹⁴ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 6 October 1589, TNA, SP 63/147/11.

¹¹⁵ Peter Barber, 'England II: monarchs, ministers and maps, 1550–1625', in David Buisseret (ed.), *Monarchs, ministers and maps: the emergence of cartography as a tool of government in early modern Europe* (Chicago, 1992), 57–98; William Smyth, *Map-making, landscapes and memory: a geography of colonial and early modern Ireland, c.1530–1750* (Cork, 2006), 31–6, 47–8.

¹¹⁶ Lane to Burghley, 4 August 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/78.

¹¹⁷ *CSPI*, i. 152.

were subjected to plantation, such as Ulster and Munster; but he was also possessed of visual representations of new-made counties like Wicklow and Ferns in Leinster and such strategic towns as Athenry in Connaught.¹¹⁸ In 1574 Burghley had asked that Fitton, as president of Connaught, furnish him with ‘some notes of the nobility and gentlemen with declaration of their countrys and castles and likewise of the bishopricks’; and later, in 1580, White provided him with a detailed account of the political geography of the province of Munster.¹¹⁹ To these were later added Henry Bagenal’s detailed description in 1586 of the political geography of Ulster, which we know Burghley to have carefully read and annotated, and Francis Jobson’s description of the province which he delivered to Burghley in 1591.¹²⁰ Cecil generally left the drawing of maps to cartographers, men such as John Goghe, Robert Lythe, and Laurence Nowell. Goghe produced, and Cecil annotated, a detailed coloured map of Ireland in 1567 showing, *inter alia*, the territories of the Irish chiefs and English lords; Lythe furnished Cecil with information drawn from his surveys of the kingdom, south of a line from Killary harbour in the west to Strangford Lough in the east, undertaken at the end of the decade during Sidney’s crucial deputyship.¹²¹ Nowell drew the much reproduced map of the two Tudor kingdoms in the mid-1560s—‘A general description of England & Ireland’—replete with the depiction in the lower right-hand corner of Secretary Cecil, the indefatigable taskmaster, seated impatiently on an hourglass with books strewn about his feet staring coldly at Nowell, the cartographer, slumped in the opposite corner, under pressure and driven to drink. Cecil is said to have carried Nowell’s map of the Tudor kingdoms with him at all times—the folds are visible still.¹²² With maps before him, even the darkest corners of Ireland became illuminated. Cecil could then marry his growing knowledge of its people and places to them and, in this way, see not only the present state of Tudor rule in the kingdom, but also its extension as if it were in motion.

William Cecil’s varied Irish correspondence, and the information it yielded, was an essential aspect of his service to the crown and the key to his multifaceted relationship with Ireland. For him, it formed the framework upon which his understanding of the kingdom rested. Yet Cecil made no discernible effort to develop his

¹¹⁸ Anneleigh Margey, ‘Mapping during the Irish plantations, c.1580–1636’ (Ph.D. thesis, NUI, Galway, 2004); Map of Wicklow and Ferns, 1579, TNA, MPF 1/69; Plan of Athenry, 30 June 1576, TNA, SP 63/55/74.

¹¹⁹ Fitton to Burghley, 27 March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/35. The fruit of his request to Fitton was ‘The division of Connaught and Thomond... with some notes of the nobility and gentlemen’, 27 March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/35(j). White’s account is discussed in greater detail below, 155–6.

¹²⁰ Henry Bagenal’s description of the present state of Ulster, 20 December 1586, TNA, SP 63/127/35; H. F. Hore (ed.), ‘The description and present state of Ulster by Marshall Bagenal, 20 December 1586, with some interlineations by Lord Burghley’, *Ulster Journal of Archaeology*, 2 (1854), 137–60; Ulster’s Unity, 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.4)/83.

¹²¹ Hibernia, 1567, TNA, SP MPF 1/68; J. H. Andrews, ‘The Irish surveys of Robert Lythe’, *Imago Mundi*, 19 (1965), 22–31.

¹²² BL, Additional MS 62540, fos. 3^v–4^r; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, 50–1; Peter Barber, ‘The minister puts his mind on the map’, *British Museum Society Bulletin*, 43 (1983), 18–19. By the time of his death Burghley was possessed of two books of maps of Ireland: one ‘in colours’, and the other ‘in large’: Barber, ‘England II: monarchs, ministers and maps’, 74.

immense correspondence with members of the Irish political establishment into a coherent network of allies, still less a personal affinity, pursuing a common political or ideological purpose. Two of his confidants in Ireland were at odds with one another, and his clients there were normally at odds with his confidants. Cecil was not driven to further the careers of men in Ireland to achieve a personal design or to build a grand personal affinity. Rather he supported men who were, in his estimation, best suited to serve the sovereign and the state—men like Sidney, Fitzwilliam, Fitton, and White. In 1571 White, during a time spent observing Burghley in action at court, wrote to Fitzwilliam how Burghley was ‘so wedded to the service of the queen and realme as no respectes can drawe him to procure publicke chardge but to such as he thinkes dothe deaserve it w^t inwarde soundnes & outwarde honest dealinges’.¹²³ A decade later Cecil explained to White his system for bestowing favours on suitors: ‘I make to my self a rule, y^e allweise I preferr y^e Q. Maty and y^e co[mm]en weale above all sorts’.¹²⁴ An echo of the statement appeared years earlier, in a postscript in one of Cecil’s letters to Sussex in which he commended a suitor’s efforts to receive a lease to a parsonage in Ireland: ‘In all my suytes if y^e s[er]vice or interest of y^e Q. Ma^{ty} be towched I doo and will allweise preferr hir Ma^{ty} before all others and my self’.¹²⁵ Such statements were, perhaps, to be expected from a man who, especially in his later years, was not infrequently criticized for using his offices and influence at court, and with the queen in particular, to enrich himself and to strengthen his own political position. But analysis of his Irish correspondence suggests that there was much substance behind William Cecil’s insistence that he placed, in an Irish setting at least, the interests of the queen before his own or that of any individual.

¹²³ White to Fitzwilliam, 15 December 1571, fo. 184.

¹²⁴ Burghley to White, 11 September 1582, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 108.

¹²⁵ Cecil to Sussex, 15 August 1561, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 21, fo. 21.

4

Government and Policy

William Cecil's Irish correspondence served as a constant reminder to him that the kingdom whence it came and about which it was concerned constituted a potential danger to the crown that its other territories did not.¹ For in the background lay the ever-present fear that Ireland would be lost if Tudor government there broke down, or if efforts to extend royal authority in the kingdom were to fail. While some, like Lord Deputy Sidney—who declared to Cecil that if the queen did not provide for his government 'she will lose Ireland as her sister lost Calais'—and Fitzwilliam—who, in a fit of pique, recommended that following an anticipated Spanish invasion of Ireland, England might abandon most of the kingdom and control the English Pale as it once controlled Calais—were explicit in their fears, most of his information out of Ireland carried a general negativity and an underlying sense of foreboding.² Such was Cecil's concern for the kingdom that he considered travelling there in 1567 to assist personally in Ireland's 'pacification'; nearly three decades later, he confided in his son Robert Cecil how sickness kept him from court but that he was 'not fre, from co[n]tynuall melancholy cogitatio[n]s both night and daye of these [Ireland] matters'.³ Whether it was through foreign invasion—the French in the 1550s and 1560s, the Spanish in the 1570s, 1580s, and 1590s, or the steady infiltration of Scots into Ulster throughout the second half of the sixteenth century—or a successful Irish rebellion (or, worse still, a combination of the two) the kingdom was vulnerable, and Cecil was deeply aware of this. In a 1566 letter to Sidney, Cecil wrote that the sea-borne expedition which the king of France was then preparing in Normandy and Brittany had made him, and others at court, 'afraid' for what he described as 'o' Isles' until it was learned that the French force was in fact bound for Florida.⁴ Whether the secretary was referring in this instance to the wider archipelago or, more narrowly, to the Channel Islands is hard to say, but, as Jane Dawson has shown, control of Ireland formed part of Cecil's strategy in Queen Elizabeth's reign to defend England in British

¹ For this in general, see William Palmer, *The problem of Ireland in Tudor foreign policy, 1485–1603* (Woodbridge, 1994).

² Sidney to Cecil, 9 June 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/9 (quotation); Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 15 April 1572, TNA, SP 63/36/4. A decade later, in a letter to Elizabeth, Sidney returned to the comparison between the fate of Calais and the future of Ireland: 20 May 1577, TNA, SP 63/58/29.

³ Cecil to Sidney, 6 July 1567, TNA, SP 63/21/50; Burghley to Robert Cecil, 22 February 1594, TNA, SP 63/173/51.

⁴ Dawson, 'William Cecil and the British dimension', 196–216; Cecil to Sidney, 24 June 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/27 (quotation).

terms. To govern those parts of Ireland under royal control, and to pursue a successful policy to win the rest, were thus the most crucial features of William Cecil's relationship with the kingdom. He understood that in late sixteenth-century Europe control of the kingdom of Ireland was essential to the survival of the Tudor state.

Cecil's involvement in the making of policy for Ireland began, like his Irish correspondence, with his appointment to the privy council in the reign of Edward VI. Sir James Croft, having come to Ireland at the head of a sizeable military retinue to guard against a French invasion, sent a letter to the privy council in September 1551 seeking their direction on how best to proceed on a range of Ireland matters. Cecil's marginalia, or postils, asserting the council's answers to Croft's queries on government are unmistakable, and offer evidence of a form of note-taking that would become a hallmark of the minister's methodology of dissecting and understanding matters which came before him.⁵ He had, probably in an effort to familiarize himself with the politics of Ireland, also studied the paperwork which had been sent to Edward's council prior to his formal appointment to the board, for his endorsement and marginal notes can be found on several documents which pre-dated his membership of the council.⁶ Whether the postils written beside Lord Deputy Croft's questions in 1551 represented the new councillor's thinking alone is difficult to say, but a comparison of his answers with the king's lengthy reply to Croft, which also bears Cecil's handwriting and contains the council's resolutions to the deputy's queries, reveals many similarities.⁷ On the matter of how newly won lands in the midland countries of Leix and Offaly should be governed and leased, for example, Cecil's postil asserted that the territories should be shired and administered by sheriffs who would 'remayne in the forts as captaynes w^t such land to be lymitted to y^e forts as is necessary for there houtholds'; the council's subsequent resolution for Leix and Offaly echoed the postil: 'for the better maynteynance of the said sherives, we thinck best those two fortes... were appoynted for their habitacon and some convenient lands in demense allotted... for the better maynteynance of the houtholdes of our said sherives'. The king's letter to Croft, however, with its repeated references to 'theadvise of our counsell' in resolving each of the deputy's queries, and the appearance of marginalia in a hand which was not Cecil's, suggests that the consideration of Irish policy was very much a collective effort.⁸ Yet whether the young secretary was the

⁵ Instructions to Mr Wood to be declared to privy council, 29 September 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/54.

⁶ Matters against St Leger, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/53. I have argued elsewhere for an earlier date for this anonymous tract—c.1547—and have ascribed it to William Brabazon. Cecil, however, endorsed (but did not date) the set of allegations 'preferred by S^r Jho[n] Allen L. Cha[n]c of Irland': Maginn, 'A window on mid-Tudor Ireland', 465–70. See also Instructions by king and council to St Leger, July 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/57.

⁷ Copy (with corrections) of king to Croft, 26 November, TNA, SP 61/3/74. Cecil glossed 'Ireland the kynges Ma^{ties} l[ett]re' atop the document's twentieth page. A letter—dated 23 November 1551—from the king to the lord deputy of Ireland and members of his council there granting monastic land to Thomas Cusack bears Cecil's signature: *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Hen. VIII–Eliz.*, 258.

⁸ *Ibid.* The privy council met 23 November and the state of Ireland was among the business considered by the twelve councillors in attendance: *APC*, 1550–52, 426–7. Cecil's hand appears on nearly half a dozen documents relating to Ireland in 1552: TNA, SP 61/4/44, 48, 51–2, 71.

principal force behind Irish policy in Edward's reign matters less than the introduction to Irish political themes which he received during his brief tenure as secretary. The threat of invasion, managing colonization in the midlands, problems arising from a separate and debased Irish coinage, and the intractability of the O'Neills were all themes which would dominate his thinking on Ireland when he returned to office in Elizabeth's reign.

On 17 November 1558, Queen Elizabeth's accession day, three days before he was formally appointed principal secretary, William Cecil—the man round whom Elizabeth intended to build her council—compiled a memorandum of official matters which needed to be performed to establish the new queen's rule. Sending a new commission into Ireland in Elizabeth's name appeared sixth (below the sending of special messages to the pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the kings of Spain and Denmark) on his to do list.⁹ In early February 1559 the privy council set aside time in the week to follow—'bothe in the fore and after none'—to consider Ireland matters; but it was not until later in the year that Cecil was in a position to give the other Tudor kingdom sustained consideration.¹⁰

Still, Ireland featured indirectly in the first great test of Elizabeth's reign. The appeal to Elizabeth in 1559 of the Protestant Scots nobility, the lords of the congregation, for military assistance against the French-backed regime of Mary of Guise presented the young queen with a dilemma. To support rebels against an anointed prince—Elizabeth's cousin Mary, queen of Scots—would set a troubling precedent; but to allow the French king to rule Scotland as a satellite kingdom contiguous to England was an equally worrying prospect.¹¹ In August 1559 Secretary Cecil wrote a paper which set out the reasons for ('That yea') and against ('That no') aiding the 'nobility and Protestants of Scotland to expell the French'.¹² The evidence which he assembled was clearly weighted in favour of intervention and he cited the actions of George Paris, a shadowy dissident from Ireland, to show 'how near these dangers be at hand'. Cecil would have known Paris since his days as a privy councillor in Edward's reign. In those years Paris was thought by the council to be functioning as an interlocutor between the French and the Scots on the one side and disaffected Irish chiefs on the other.¹³ In his paper of August 1559, Cecil wrote that Paris was 'very lately gone into France with intelligence from certain lords of Ireland, wherein the Dowager of Scotland is a party, and from her the said Paris went last into France'.¹⁴ Time, the secretary's paper claimed to show, was of the essence. In the face of what her secretary presented as an imminent threat, the young queen eventually relented: an English army crossed the border in March

⁹ Memorandum, 17 November 1558, TNA, SP 12/1/2. On a memorandum written the next day, Cecil scribbled 'to send to Irela[n]d', but the section in which the names of those who were to be sent was left blank: 18 November 1558, TNA, SP 12/1/3.

¹⁰ *APC*, 1558–70, 50.

¹¹ For this paragraph, see Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, 43–70.

¹² Ralph Sadler, *The state papers and letters of Ralph Sadler*, ed. Arthur Clifford, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1809), i. 377.

¹³ Brabazon to privy council, 26 March 1550, TNA, SP 61/2/52; privy council to Croft, 11 May 1551, TNA, SP 63/3/23; privy council to Croft, 23 February 1552, TNA, SP 61/4/11.

¹⁴ Sadler, *State papers*, 381.

1560, beginning a short military campaign which resulted in the signing of the treaty of Edinburgh in July and the withdrawal of French forces from Scotland. Elizabeth's intervention in Scotland represented an early triumph for Cecil and his counsel.

It was against this backdrop that William Cecil approached Ireland matters. He had already, on a busy day in July 1559, drafted instructions to be carried out by the earl of Sussex (lately appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland) and drew up a series of memoranda, including lists of Irish and English lords to whom the new queen's letters were to be sent, and a record of the major appointments in the government of Ireland that had taken place during his near six-year hiatus from office.¹⁵ Cecil would continue to pen private memoranda, or 'memorials', along with 'notes' or 'minutes', pertaining to all aspects of the government of Ireland until the last months of his life three decades later.¹⁶ Stephen Alford, in his analysis of early Elizabethan political culture, has stressed the importance of these documents and the language employed in them. They are evidence of the application to politics of the precepts of the classical humanist education which Cecil received at Cambridge and offer insight into his 'private method of political dialogue' which he employed in debates in council and which formed a basis for the making of political policy.¹⁷ The elaborate *pro* and *contra* arguments, of the kind discussed above, became a feature of Cecil's approach to political decision-making. None of these structured rhetorical exercises, however, is evident in his memoranda pertaining to Ireland. Typically, Cecil's memoranda, memorials, and notes on Ireland matters served as an agenda for subjects to be discussed, though it would seem not debated, in council and/or presented to the queen, or as mnemonic devices for public and private matters to be performed either by him alone or in conjunction with the council.¹⁸ Robert Beale later wrote, in his 'treatise of the office of a councillor and secretary to Her Majesty', of the secretary's responsibility to 'have in a several paper a memorial or docket of those which he minded to propound and have dispatched at every sitting'.¹⁹

Policy and policy proposals for Ireland featured prominently in these writings. What is most striking, however, is that at no point do they show Cecil conceiving

¹⁵ For the successive drafts of Sussex's instructions in July 1559, see TNA, SP 63/1/47–8, 57–62; Memorandum of lords and nobility, 16 July 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/65; Memorandum of deputies and officers in Ireland, 16 July 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/66.

¹⁶ Some sixty of these papers, the vast majority of them in Cecil's own distinctive hand, have survived for Elizabeth's reign among the state papers Ireland: a dozen or so for each decade. There are several others scattered among the Cecil papers: Matters to be committed to the consideration of some special persons of the counsel, June 1562, CP 153, fo. 103, and Memorandum in Lord Burghley's hand, chiefly Irish affairs, 17 November 1573, CP 159, fo. 125; The establishment in Ireland, 1574, CP 160, fo. 19. His final memorandum—pertaining to provisions to be sent to the queen's army in Ireland—was written 10 March 1598: TNA, SP 63/102(pt.1)/80.

¹⁷ Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, 14–20 (quotation, 20).

¹⁸ Cecil frequently distinguished between what he referred to as public (or common) and private matters, but for the purposes of historical enquiry, four centuries and more removed from the events and people of the day, there is little in their substance that sets them apart.

¹⁹ Quoted in G. R. Elton (ed.), *The Tudor constitution: documents and commentary* (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1982), 125.

policy. Rather, for all the information he amassed on Ireland in his long life, Cecil's thinking on the kingdom was at all times derivative and reactionary. Patrick Collinson's cutting reference to William Cecil's 'deeply unoriginal mind' is no less appropriate in an Irish setting.²⁰ He carefully scrutinized the strategies, proposals, and ideas for the current and future direction of Tudor government in Ireland devised by other men, the majority of whom had served or lived in the kingdom. Even the opinion of someone like Sir Francis Knollys, vice-chamberlain of Elizabeth's household, who laid claim to no expert knowledge of Ireland, suddenly carried weight with Cecil and the queen following his brief stay in Ireland and his review of the situation in Ulster.²¹ Throughout Elizabeth's reign direct experience of Ireland, however brief, was accorded greater importance than indirect knowledge of the place. Cecil accepted, for example, that chief governors who were on the ground, as it were, might alter policy in light of the circumstance confronting them. When, in late 1579, Sir William Pelham, the lord justice, was facing war in Munster he sought Burghley's direction. The lord treasurer responded:

The care generally belongeth to us all alyk that s[er]ve, but p[ar]ticularly the burden must rest cheffly uppo[n] you in respect of your office there. We may here gess what is mete or unmete, but to judg truly in particular what is to be done in tymes and places must be referred to you, and such as have charg w^t you in that realme.²²

Burghley expressed his position, in extraordinarily vivid terms, in a letter to Walsingham in 1582. The queen, he wrote:

Must yeld to them [the chief governors] absolut authorityte to do all thyngs by ther discretions to pacyfy the stormes, and if hir Ma^{ty} war in a shipp uppo[n] y^e seas, and tempest shuld arise she must gyve authorityte to y^e master and pylottes to gov[er]n the shipp and much more, wher nether she nor hir counsellors of England ar present, y^e pylott of y^e ship of Irland is not to be restrayned but lett to his own discretion.²³

Later, in 1595, as royal expenditure skyrocketed in the face of widespread rebellion, Burghley reportedly 'did marvell' that the queen's council in Ireland could not devise a way to make the kingdom bear its own charges—after all who was more familiar with Ireland than they who were there?²⁴ William Cecil assumed responsibility for making the ideas and actions which were put forth and then executed by those men who served in Ireland a political and an economic reality within the context of the broader concerns of the Tudor state; his was not to conceive or to carry them out.

This reluctance on Cecil's part to devise policy supports the arguments of those Irish historians who have stressed the centrality of the chief governors of Ireland in formulating and driving Tudor policy in the middle decades of the

²⁰ Collinson, 'The monarchical republic of Elizabeth I', in Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy*, 126.

²¹ Memorandum by Cecil, 30 May 1566, TNA, SP 63/17/70; queen to Sidney, 15 June 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/17.

²² Burghley to Pelham, 30 December 1579, TNA, SP 63/70/72.

²³ Burghley to Walsingham, 16 July 1582, TNA, SP 63/94/27.

²⁴ Device how Ireland may be brought to make a contribution, February 1595, TNA, SP 63/178/67.

sixteenth century.²⁵ The sum of the chief governors' efforts was a policy which sought the extension of Tudor rule throughout the island through a mixture of what has been described broadly as conciliation and coercion, that is methods which aimed gradually to assimilate the populations of Ireland to English norms through the provision of common law and administrative structures, and which established control more immediately through the planting of English garrisons and colonies backed by martial law and, if necessary, military force.²⁶ In Tudor times these two paths to toward achieving Ireland's 'reformation' were most often referred to as 'justice' and the 'sword'. Prompted by James Croft's policy paper, entitled 'A brief remembrance of certen things concernyng Ireland', in February 1561 Cecil boiled down the main policy suggestions made by Croft, a former deputy, Sir Henry Sidney, a former lord justice, and the earl of Sussex, the current lord lieutenant of Ireland. Here, Cecil noted: Croft's emphasis on the introduction of 'justice and ministers' beside his suggestion that a colony be placed on the river Bann in north-east Ulster; Sidney's recommendation that the kingdom should be divided into shires, beside his more aggressive suggestion to 'take away y^e soveraytays of y^e p[ri]ncip[al] heades'; and Sussex's cryptic proposal for establishing 'a Gov[er]nor Irish' and 'a Gov[er]nor E[n]glish'.²⁷ Though differing in detail, these suggestions which Cecil arranged side by side shared the integration of Ireland into the Tudor state as a common goal and offered a broadly similar means of achieving it: through the provision in Ireland of an amalgam of ordinary and extraordinary forms of English government.

The first deputyship of Sir Henry Sidney exerted a formative influence on William Cecil's relationship with Ireland. It represented something of a new beginning for the secretary. He had inherited the Sussex administration from Mary's reign, but Elizabeth's decision to appoint Sidney governor in summer 1565—a full six months before he set foot in Ireland—afforded Cecil and the incoming governor both the time and the opportunity to construct a new administration and to set its direction. That the two men shared similar views on how best to strengthen and extend Tudor rule in Ireland, and that they enjoyed a close personal relationship, added to Cecil's interest in seeing Sidney succeed in his new role. Cecil's commitment to the new administration is evident in his careful preparation in July of Sidney's instructions for government. Divided into thirty-four articles, which touched on everything from the administration of justice, to the establishment of regional councils, to religious reform, the first draft represented a comprehensive

²⁵ Canny, *Elizabethan conquests*; Bradshaw, *Irish constitutional revolution*; Brady, *Chief governors*.

²⁶ The anonymous author of 'A treatise of Irlande' (c.1588) wrote that 'The plottes for reformation of Irlande are of two kyndes. One which vndertake to procure it by Conqueste and by peoplinge of Contres with english inhabitantes. . . . Another kynde is of those wherein is vndertaken to make reformation by publique establishment of Iustice': quoted in Quinn, 'Edward Walshes's "Conjectures" concerning the state of Ireland [1552]', 303. Cf. Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*, 64; Brady and Gillespie, 'Introduction', in Brady and Gillespie (eds.), *Natives and newcomers*, 11.

²⁷ A remembrance by Sir James Croft, 12 February 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/17; Memorial by Cecil, 12 February 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/18.

plan for government.²⁸ As Brady has shown, there was nothing in the instructions that had not already been proposed in Sussex's time, but they mark the beginning of the secretary's greater involvement in the framing of Tudor policy for Ireland.²⁹ Cecil then corrected and edited a second draft of the instructions and penned a separate set of instructions for the deputy relating to what were deemed private matters. The latter was entirely in the secretary's hand and dealt with a range of issues, such as the possible transfer of Hugh Curwin, archbishop of Dublin and lord chancellor, to the bishopric of Oxford, and the placing of the archbishop of Armagh in his stead, and the restoration of O'Donnell in his lordship in an effort to establish in the north-west a government-backed counterweight to O'Neill.³⁰ Cecil also wrote a series of memorials, notes, and memoranda in July devoted to Ireland matters. These documents—consisting of lists (in no discernible order) of matters or causes to be accomplished or enquired into and leading figures in the kingdom to be contacted—reveal the framework of subjects upon which Sidney's instructions, public and private, were to rest.³¹ At the same time they provide insight into the working out in England of policy for Ireland. In his 'Memoryall for causes of Irland', for example, Cecil wrote that Sidney's instructions were 'to be perfected' and outlined in the warrants and commissions which were necessary to activate the various components of the new government, beginning with 'a com[m]ssion by l[ett]res pat[ent] for y^e lietena[n]cy' for the new governor.³² Other matters which appear in Cecil's writings, such as the convening of a parliament and Sidney's repeated calls to establish in Ireland a prerogative court like that which had grown up in England—'a starr cha[m]b[er] named y^e castle cha[m]ber', as Cecil put it—were not immediately executed but signalled the aspirations of Sidney's administration.³³ Cecil's memorandum, meanwhile, shows that Lord Keeper Bacon and Lord Treasurer Paulet, the secretary's fellow privy councillors, made suggestions as to who should occupy the key positions of master of the rolls and receiver of the exchequer. Questions, too, might be raised in Cecil's writings, such as whether the military exactions due to an Irish chief, known as a 'bon[n]aught', 'shall be conv[er]ted to a rent or no'.³⁴ Though almost entirely devoid of new or

²⁸ Instructions for Sidney, 2 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/2.

²⁹ Brady, *Chief governors*, 117–19. Some indication of Cecil's thinking in the early 1560s is revealed in Matters to be committed to the consideration of some special persons of the council, June 1562, CP 153, fo. 103.

³⁰ A particular instruction by the queen given to Sidney, 9 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/8.

³¹ Remembrances for Ireland, July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/10 (the final eight of nineteen points listed here are in Cecil's hand); Memorial of advices for Ireland by Nicholas Bacon, July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/11 (Cecil appended a page of notes to the lord keeper's advices); Cecil's Memoranda of matters for Ireland, 9 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/12; Cecil's Memorial for the causes of Ireland, 19 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/25; Memorial for Ireland, 25 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/30 (endorsed by Cecil).

³² Memorial for the causes of Ireland, 19 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/25. As it happened, Sidney was not appointed lord lieutenant as Cecil hoped; he had to settle for the less prestigious title of lord deputy.

³³ Cecil's Memorial for Ireland causes, 20 March 1566, TNA, SP 63/16/63; queen to Sidney, 28 March 1566, TNA, SP 63/16/69. Cf. J. G. Crawford, *A Star Chamber court in Ireland: the court of castle chamber, 1571–1641* (Dublin, 2005).

³⁴ Cecil's Memoranda of matters for Ireland, 9 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/12.

original thinking, these writings demonstrate that the reform principles which emanated from Sidney, like Sussex and Croft before him, still had to be debated and worked out in practice, and that it was Secretary Cecil who attended to this vital aspect of shaping policy for Ireland.

It was within this ideological framework constructed by other men that Cecil guided Tudor policy for Ireland. Occasionally, however, he might seize upon a particular element of policy and, in so doing, bring it to the forefront of the privy council's and the queen's discussions on Ireland. The growing power in the 1560s of Shane O'Neill was the first matter to capture the secretary's interest. As Dawson and Alford have argued, Cecil was consumed in these years with securing Elizabeth's position within the British Isles.³⁵ The O'Neills' military strength and their semi-autonomous position in Ulster, far from Dublin and near to Scotland, naturally made this powerful clan a cause for concern; but Shane O'Neill was quite unlike any other Irish chief. The contemporary English antiquarian John Hooker wrote that O'Neill was the first Irishman to arm the common people of his lordship. O'Neill, according to Hooker, 'furnished all the peasants and husbandmen of his countrie with armour and weapons, and trained them up in the knowledge of wars'.³⁶ He certainly fielded the largest armies that the Tudor government had yet faced in Ireland, and used them both to thwart English incursions into his territory and to bludgeon neighbouring Ulster chiefs into submission. At the peak of his strength O'Neill took the extraordinary step of colonizing some of the lands of his defeated MacDonnell enemies in the Glens of Antrim and establishing garrisons to defend them: the sole recorded example in the Irishry of deliberate colonization to achieve a political end.³⁷ Shane O'Neill was coming close to realizing traditional O'Neill pretensions to be the overlords or kings of the province of Ulster.

In O'Neill, Cecil also found earlier Tudor policy working against him. From his wilderness redoubt in Ulster and before the queen and council at court in London, O'Neill argued convincingly that he was the legitimate successor of his father Conn Bacach O'Neill, whom Henry VIII had created earl of Tyrone in 1542. To deny O'Neill the earldom was to question the policy whereby Irish chiefs entered the peerage and touched upon the ambiguous constitutional relationship between Ireland's Irish population and the Tudor state more generally.³⁸ Nevertheless, Cecil determined, largely on Sussex's advice, that O'Neill should be destroyed. The secretary attempted to have the earl of Argyll, a leading light of the lords of the congregation, exert his influence in Ulster against O'Neill; and when this failed Cecil consistently frustrated O'Neill's efforts to succeed to the earldom.³⁹ In private Cecil yearned for O'Neill's death: he wrote in March 1566 to his friend, and former

³⁵ Dawson, 'William Cecil and the British dimension'; Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*.

³⁶ Raphael Holinshed, *The... chronicles of England, Scotlande and Irelande...* (London, 1577), ed. Henry Ellis, 6 vols. (London, 1807–8), ii. 113.

³⁷ Brady, *Shane O'Neill*, 56–7.

³⁸ For this, see Brady, *Shane O'Neill*; Maginn, *s.v.* 'Shane O'Neill', in the *ODNB*.

³⁹ J. E. A. Dawson, 'Two kingdoms or three? Ireland in Anglo-Scottish relations in the middle of the sixteenth century', in Roger A. Mason (ed.), *Scotland and England, 1286–1815* (Edinburgh, 1987), 113–38. See below, 149–54.

mentor at Cambridge, Sir Thomas Smith, of his belief that Shane's 'head shall be from his shoulders before any crown can be made redy to make hym ether kyng or erle'.⁴⁰ As it happened, O'Neill lost his head next year: his MacDonnell enemies killed him and sent his pickled head to adorn Dublin castle.⁴¹

O'Neill's removal from power, coming as it did during Sidney's deputyship, in which Cecil had invested so much of his energies, should have been a crowning achievement for the secretary. But Cecil could take little solace in Shane's killing. The Elizabethan regime had demonstrated its inability to control O'Neill for a decade, and his passing did little to advance Tudor rule in Ulster. The lesson which Cecil drew from his experience with O'Neill was that garrisoning and colonization were essential both to control areas where English government was unlikely to advance through ordinary means and to protect the kingdom's most vulnerable areas from foreign invasion. The secretary set to work. Embellishing ideas proposed by Sidney, Cecil drew up a comprehensive strategy for the government of Ireland in late 1567. The paper, entitled simply 'A memoryall for Irland', was the most detailed and comprehensive exposition of Cecil's plans for the direction of Tudor policy in the kingdom to date.⁴² For Cecil, establishing English rule in an Ulster now free from the ravages of a warlord like Shane O'Neill was the key to the reform of Ireland; and the key to Ulster was the north-east of the province, which the crown could lay claim to as part of the medieval earldom of Ulster. He proposed the construction of fourteen forts at strategic locations—'beginning at the entrie from the Englishe Pale to Ulster'. These, he believed, would provide the military backbone for Tudor rule in a region prone to attacks from the Irish and incursions by the Scots. To help oversee the erection of Tudor structures of government there, it was suggested that the deputy reside at Armagh for part of the year and that a provincial council be established for Ulster. Yet, as Nicholas Canny has shown, what was most novel about this strategy was Cecil's support for the inhabitation, or plantation, of this region with Englishmen. The proposed council at Armagh was to be granted a commission to 'inquire and survey . . . all abbey landes, and all demesne landes belonging in any of the sayd countries to the earldome of Ulster, so as the Queenes Matie may be counselled how to dispose them to Englishe people to occupie the same'. Lest there be any doubt as to the crown's right to these lands, Cecil sought an act of parliament 'for the recognition of the lande of Ulster, to belong to the crowne and that allso the same bee devided into shire grownde, so as ordre of justice may be there settled'. In the west, the O'Neill lordship was to be divided up among the leading O'Neills, most notably the baron of Dungannon, who would hold their lands of the crown and pay rent. It was hoped that the division of power in this way would yield the queen greater revenue while

⁴⁰ Cecil to Smith, 26 March 1566, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 71.

⁴¹ Ciaran Brady, 'The killing of Shane O'Neill: some new evidence', *Irish Sword*, 15 (1983), 116–23; Caoimhín Breathnach, 'The murder of Shane O'Neill: Oidheadh Chuinn Cheadchathaigh', *Ériu*, 43 (1992), 159–76.

⁴² Memorial for Ireland, 22 December 1567, TNA, SP 63/22/48–9; Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*, 61–3.

undermining any who might 'aspire to a tyranny as Shane O'Neyle dyd'. It remained to consider the O'Donnell lordship further to the west. Here, Cecil proposed the building of four bridges, so as to facilitate access to this most distant (but more tractable) lordship.

Cecil made clear that none of his suggestions for remaking Ulster would infringe upon the authority of the lord deputy (Sidney in other words), but given that the deputy would, in future, be spending more time at Armagh, he proposed that the lord chancellor and 'other councillors' should govern Leinster. The rest of the kingdom, wrote Cecil, would be governed through that tried and tested Tudor institution: the regional council. Councils were again suggested for Munster and Connaught, with the presidents based at Dungarvan and Athlone, respectively. Here, too, Cecil held out the possibility of plantation: 'speciall inq[u]rees' were to be made 'in all places wthin the jurisdictions of y^e same counsells, for such lands as of right ought to be long to y^e crowne of England'. Cecil presented his 'advisees' for Ireland to the queen in January 1568.⁴³ Elizabeth agreed in principle to the strategy as proposed by Cecil; however she shrank from the cost, permitting the construction of only three fortifications—at Carrickfergus, Armagh, and Olderfleet; she refused to foot the bill for English colonization in Ulster.⁴⁴

Yet, even without the queen's financial support, plantation continued to occupy a special place in Cecil's thinking. Over the next two decades he threw his increasing knowledge of Ireland and formidable political influence at court behind the private plantation ventures which were attempted in Ulster and then in Munster. Cecil was instrumental in assembling the necessary conciliar backing in the early 1570s to see the colonies of Thomas Smith, made secretary of state upon Burghley's appointment as lord high treasurer in July 1572, and Walter Devereux, earl of Essex, established on crown lands belonging to the earldom of Ulster.⁴⁵ Burghley was the largest investor after Smith, subscribing £333 6s. 8d. of his own money, for the maintenance of soldiers both to secure the twenty ploughlands allotted to him and to defend the inhabitants of the colony earmarked for the Ards peninsula in north-east Ulster.⁴⁶ The colony's first settlers reached the Ards in August 1572; but no amount of Smith's classical theorizing about Roman precedent and innovative methods of fundraising in England could surmount the poor leadership and native resistance which conspired to doom the colony. Shortly thereafter, Burghley went to great lengths to convince Elizabeth to salvage Essex's poorly supplied colony (and reputation) which the earl had established further to the north in Antrim. He did so even after the earl's execution at a Christmas feast in 1574 of the local O'Neill chief—Sir Brian MacPhelim—O'Neill's wife, and his followers threatened

⁴³ The memorial of the advices for Ireland to be declared to the queen by Cecil, 2 January 1568, TNA, SP 63/23/1.

⁴⁴ Instructions to Sidney, 1 May 1568, TNA, SP 63/24/29; Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*, 64.

⁴⁵ D. B. Quinn, 'Sir Thomas Smith (1513–1577) and the beginnings of English colonial theory', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 89 (1945), 543–60; Hiram Morgan, 'The colonial venture of Sir Thomas Smith, 1571–1575', *Historical Journal*, 28 (1985), 261–78.

⁴⁶ Burghley's receipt from Smith, 24 May 1572, CP 159, fo. 31.

to turn the entire province against the crown.⁴⁷ By 1576, the year of Essex's death in Dublin, English efforts to colonize Ulster had failed: the crown had spent over £130,000 on ventures which achieved little more than a strained relationship with the Irish population of east Ulster.⁴⁸

It was thus a measure of Burghley's commitment to the policy of colonization in Ireland that, following the confiscation of rebel lands in Munster in the aftermath of the earl of Desmond's rebellion (1579–83), he began planning and organizing a major state-sponsored plantation in the south-west.⁴⁹ The landing at Smerwick in July 1579 of the papal legate and a contingent of Italian and Spanish troops had impressed upon him, and the queen, the urgency of pursuing such an ambitious scheme. For Burghley, the settling of gentlemen from England in Munster was the key to effecting the region's rapid political and social transformation. In late December 1585 he wrote 'A note of sondry overtures for y^e granty[n]g of lands in Irla[n]d, to be inhabited wt English people'. The document outlined that 'a portio[n] of grownd of 12,000 acres to be offred to a ge[n]tlema[n] of lyvehood in England that will procure habitatio[n]'. He suggested a five-category sub-division of land holding in Munster: demesne, farm, freehold, base tenure, and cottage.⁵⁰ Out of the lord treasurer's rough notes grew the privy council's decision to grant in June 1586 seignories of 12,000 acres to undertakers who were responsible for settling ninety-one families, including the undertaker's own, by letting lands to six freeholders on 300 acres each, six farmers on 400 acres each, forty-two copyholders on 100 acres each, and thirty-six base tenures and cottagers on lots of ten, twenty-five, or fifty acres.⁵¹ Yet, for all Burghley's attention to its planning and his study of both maps of the projected plantation and the inhabitants of the region, the Munster plantation, as it became known, became mired in difficulties, arising chiefly from inaccurate land surveys and a fundamental misunderstanding of the mixture of Irish and feudal system of landholding which had prevailed (for centuries) under the earls of Desmond.⁵² In June 1586, for example, Burghley wrote on a map of Munster that 43 seignories, or 516,000 acres, had been allocated when in fact only 35 seignories, 300,000 acres, had been granted.⁵³ But the plantation struggled on and by 1589, according to the demographic information which Burghley had demanded of the Munster commissioners, several dozen English undertakers (a far cry from the 8,500 settlers originally envisaged) were possessed of nearly 300,000 acres.⁵⁴ Burghley

⁴⁷ Quinn, 'Sir Thomas Smith', 556; Memorandum by Burghley of sundry ways to be taken for Ireland, March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/44; Memorial for the enterprise of Ulster in Burghley's hand, March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/45; A consultation for Ulster written by Burghley, 17 February 1575, TNA, SP 63/49/66.

⁴⁸ For an Irish account of Essex's actions, see *AFM*, s.a. 1574.

⁴⁹ The definitive account of the Munster plantation remains MacCarthy-Morrogh, *Munster plantation*, chapters 1–4.

⁵⁰ Burghley's note of overtures, December 1585, TNA, SP 63/121/64.

⁵¹ MacCarthy-Morrogh, *Munster plantation*, 70–97.

⁵² An abstract of the articles for repeopling and inhabiting of Munster, 21 June 1586, TNA, SP 63/124/87; Burghley to [?], 21 June 1586, TNA, SP 63/124/89.

⁵³ MacCarthy-Morrogh, *Munster plantation*, 51.

⁵⁴ Instructions for the commissioners... to examine the proceedings of the undertakers in Munster, 8 July 1589, TNA, SP 63/145/60.

did not live to see his work in Munster undone when in late 1598 rebels in league with Hugh O'Neill overthrew English settlements across the province.

In stressing the importance of Cecil's role in the direction of policy for Ireland it should be indicated that at no point did he treat of Irish affairs alone. Political debate and discussion of Ireland matters was conducted in the chief executive branch of Elizabethan government: the privy council. Cecil's voice was one of over a dozen councillors and, early in the reign at least, his voice could be drowned out: in 1561 the secretary sought to secure more money for Sussex's campaign against Shane O'Neill, but explained to the earl, 'I am overruled in it w^t the opinion of y^e more'.⁵⁵ Later, by 1570, Sussex and Croft—both former chief governors of Ireland—had become privy councillors and brought with them to the council board their first-hand experience of governing the kingdom: they informed that body's frequent 'consultations' on the form and direction of the crown's Irish policy in a way that Cecil could not. At a more basic level, the outpouring of paperwork from Ireland in the later 1560s occasioned by the extension and intensification of Tudor rule there meant that Cecil could not possibly handle the workload alone. He was appointed, along with his fellow councillors, Nicholas Bacon, Francis Knollys, and Walter Mildmay, as a commissioner to hear suits out of Ireland in late 1567 and again in 1568, when the earls of Leicester and Northumberland replaced Mildmay and Knollys.⁵⁶ His fellow councillors also assisted in matters relating to the government of Ireland: in 1566 Leicester forwarded a letter from Sidney to Cecil and Lord Keeper Bacon and asked that the two men acquaint the queen with its contents along with a packet of letters from Ireland; in 1568 Mildmay, chancellor of the exchequer, assisted Cecil in determining the number of soldiers in pay.⁵⁷ By 1571, responsibility for Ireland matters was being apportioned more widely still. Croft, Sidney, Knollys, and Sir Thomas Smith, for instance, were appointed commissioners 'for the hearing of Yrland suttors'. It was in this capacity that they heard the petition in 1571 of one of the crown's long-time servants in Ireland to secure a lease in reversion of lands in the English Pale.⁵⁸ That year, Sussex, Leicester, Knollys, and Croft were also commissioners appointed to hear the earl of Desmond's requests of the queen.⁵⁹

In February 1575 Burghley, by then lord high treasurer, wrote a memorial on Ireland matters in which he suggested 'that hir Maty will name certen of hir counsell to have y^e speciall care of those causes'.⁶⁰ Professor Canny assigned the commissions issued 1567–71 an executive function within the privy council, viewing them as 'special committees' for Irish affairs.⁶¹ Indeed, writing to Cecil in early 1568, the lords justices of Ireland, Robert Weston and Fitzwilliam, declared:

⁵⁵ Cecil to Sussex, 19 June 1561, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 21, fo. 17.

⁵⁶ Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*, 84.

⁵⁷ Leicester to Cecil and Bacon, 14 March 1566, TNA, SP 63/16/55; William Bermingham to Cecil and Mildmay, July 1568, TNA, SP 63/25/54.

⁵⁸ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 19 April 1571, TNA, SP 63/32/12; Richard Manwaring's Petition to privy council, 1571, TNA, SP 63/34/47.

⁵⁹ Articles of request by Desmond, December 1571, TNA, SP 63/34/39.

⁶⁰ Memorial for Ireland, 25 February 1575, TNA, SP 63/49/73.

⁶¹ Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*, 84–5.

it comforteth us much that the Queenes Ma^{tie} through speciall respecte to this her highnes realme, hath made choise of so honorable, wyse, and woorthie to have the care and consyderation, of the matters of the same at whose hands upon o' adv[er]tismentes to them made, we trust to receive theire prudent order and advyse wth spede from tyme to tyme for the better behavinge of o'selves in oure charge.⁶²

However, Burghley's suggestion in 1575 that certain members of the privy council handle Ireland matters was more elaborate. It evolved chiefly from his recent experience in overseeing the crown's policy for Ulster. With Essex's enterprise in Ulster floundering and Elizabeth undecided on how best to proceed, Burghley penned a policy paper designed to show the necessity of recovering the province, and recommended that 'so[m]e councellors must be appoyted to tak y^e care herof fro[m] tyme to tyme, and to have authorite to execut y^e matter w^{out} new consultatio[n]s to alter that w^{ch} is resolved'.⁶³ It was not his intention to institutionalize a formal council within a council; it was to meet regularly, but he expressly stated that those councillors handling Ireland matters would acquaint the rest of the council of their proceedings. Burghley sought a means whereby the details of Irish policy—specifically the advancing of money—could be swiftly attended to without recourse to the larger body whose membership was less familiar with Ireland and who apparently were wont to press for amendments to policy decisions.

Burghley took ill at this time, and was unable to attend court. To what degree his sickness prompted his decision to suggest the sharing of responsibility for Ireland matters is difficult to know. What is certain is that without him decisions regarding Ireland could not be made. Leicester wrote hastily to Burghley to inform him that the queen sought his advice on Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam's allegations that Gerald Fitzgerald, eleventh earl of Kildare, had fomented rebellion in the midlands. Leicester explained that the queen wished for what she deemed to be a grave matter (touching as it did allegations of treason against a peer of the realm) to be kept secret and that only he, and now Burghley, were privy to it. If Burghley was not well enough to offer his counsel in person, Elizabeth commanded, then he should send his advice by letter.⁶⁴ Though Burghley's absence from court and council continued until the second week in April, he kept abreast of developments at court and advised the queen on Ireland by letter and through messengers.⁶⁵ In a revealing letter from Edmund Tremayne, whom the lord treasurer had, in 1569, sent to Ireland to gather information on the state of the kingdom but who was then clerk to the privy council and at court in Richmond to communicate his opinions on Ulster to the queen, Burghley learned that in his absence no one was prepared to discuss Ireland matters 'if her ma^{tie} herself do not call for it'.⁶⁶ According

⁶² Lords justice to Cecil, 26 January 1568, TNA, SP 63/23/22.

⁶³ The matter of Ulster, 17 February 1575, TNA, SP 63/49/66.

⁶⁴ Leicester to Burghley, 27 February 1575, TNA, SP 63/49/76 (the letter is endorsed: 'To my veary good L. the L. tresorer w' all hast possible'). See also queen to Fitzwilliam (countersigned by Burghley), 1 March 1574, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Carte MS 55, fo. 28.

⁶⁵ Burghley attended a council meeting 1 March, but not again until 10 April: *APC*, 1571–75, 348–56.

⁶⁶ Edmund Tremayne to Burghley, 13 March 1575, TNA, SP 63/50/12.

to Tremayne, Elizabeth insisted on knowing the state of Burghley's health before she would hear him convey the lord treasurer's position on the matter of Ulster.

When in April 1575 Burghley returned to council and court, Leicester, together with the earl's sometime adversary the earl of Sussex (now the lord chamberlain of the queen's household), joined him in the handling of Ireland matters. The emergence of a 'triumvirate', as this grouping has been called, to oversee crown policy for Ireland mirrored the tendency in the later 1570s and early 1580s for Burghley, Leicester, and Sussex to serve on committees of special importance apart from their fellow privy councillors.⁶⁷ Yet the dedication of the three councillors to Ireland matters proved short-lived: by September 1575 letters out of Ireland addressed to the three (or sometimes to Burghley and one of the other two) all but cease.⁶⁸ This may be explained, in part, by the combination of other responsibilities weighing on the members of the 'triumvirate' at a time when the lord deputyship of Ireland had been entrusted to Sidney, an experienced hand, and Elizabeth was bent on limiting expenditure in Ireland. As lord high treasurer, Burghley was increasingly concerned with carrying out his sovereign's fiscal restraints, both in England and Ireland. But it was Burghley's ability to shift responsibility for the day-to-day attention to Ireland matters to Sir Francis Walsingham, secretary of state along with Smith since 1573, which allowed the members of the 'triumvirate' to concentrate their energies elsewhere. Walsingham, a trusted friend of Burghley, had been steadily handling an increasing variety of Ireland matters since early 1574.⁶⁹ In 1577, Walsingham received more than three times as many letters out of Ireland as Burghley.⁷⁰ As we have seen, the plantation in Munster, and the prospect of the rapid physical and cultural transformation of this wild and exposed area of the kingdom into something more recognizably English, would again draw Burghley's attention to Ireland, but until Walsingham's death in 1590 it fell to the secretary to oversee the routine business of the Irish political establishment under Elizabeth.

Yet Burghley was never far from Ireland matters. In September 1578, for example, he offered Lord Justice Drury advice on how best to proceed with the expropriated midland clans, the O'Mores and O'Connors, and took time the following year to compile notes on whether Hugh O'Neill, the young baron of Dungannon, should be accepted as the second earl of Tyrone.⁷¹ The influence of Burghley's

⁶⁷ Simon Adams, Alan Bryson, and Mitchell Leimon, 'Francis Walsingham', in the *ODNB*; MacCaffrey, *s.v.* 'Thomas Radcliffe', in the *ODNB*.

⁶⁸ Essex to Burghley and Sussex, April 1575, TNA, SP 63/50/78; lord deputy to Burghley, Sussex, and Leicester, 8 May 1575, TNA, SP 63/51/8; lord deputy to Burghley, Sussex, and Leicester, 15 May 1575, TNA, SP 63/51/27; lord deputy to Burghley, Sussex, and Leicester, 1 June 1575, TNA, SP 63/52/2; lord deputy to Burghley, Sussex, and Leicester, 14 June 1575, TNA, SP 63/52/24; lord deputy to Burghley, Sussex, and Leicester, 20 June 1575, TNA, SP 63/52/28; lord deputy to Burghley, Sussex, and Leicester, 7 July 1575, TNA, SP 63/52/48. For letters from the three into Ireland, see Burghley, Sussex, and Leicester to lord deputy, 6 April 1575, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Carte MS 55, fos. 49–50; Burghley, Sussex, and Leicester to lord deputy, 9 April 1575, TNA, SP 63/50/52.

⁶⁹ Lord deputy to Walsingham, 25 March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/26.

⁷⁰ *CSP*, ii. 102–27.

⁷¹ Drury to Burghley, 21 September 1578, TNA, SP 63/62/14; Considerations for baron of Dungannon, January 1579, TNA, SP 63/65/7.

opinion on matters of greater import was in no way diminished in these years. In late 1578, Walsingham handled the case against Richard Burke, second earl of Clanrickard, who it was alleged had been complicit in the rebellions of his sons in Connaught. Burghley reviewed and commented on a mass of evidence presented against the earl—the attorney-general believed that half the evidence assembled was sufficient to convict a man of treason in England⁷²—but the case (and the earl) still had to come before the privy council before any decision could be made. Here Burghley's hand is evident: he made his own notes on the case and corrected the earl's submission to Elizabeth, who bound him over in 20,000 marks and, eventually, pardoned him.⁷³

Indeed, there was little that escaped Burghley's attention with regard to the kingdom of Ireland in these years. In early 1579, he drew up a paper, based on instructions sent to Drury in May 1578, which itemized two dozen points or 'considerations' (listed in no particular order) for the kingdom's government.⁷⁴ The paper touched on nearly every aspect of Tudor government in Ireland which demanded attention. Some points were very bare: 'the co[n]tryes'; 'garriso[n]'; 'fortes and castells'. Other points were more fulsome and reveal Burghley's specific intentions: patentees were to be paid out of the revenues of Ireland rather than England; inns were to be established for the lodging of itinerant justices; gaols were to be built to house prisoners; Irish chiefs were to pay 'beeves' (cattle) to the government in lieu of rents; abuses in the impost of wines were to be looked into; and a 'gov[er]nment' was to be established under which 'the people be made hable to lyve of the[m]selves w[ith]out opp[re]s[sion] of coyn and livery'. He also made note of the 'Ancient lawes' enacted by the Irish parliament in the reign of Edward III—a reference to the 'Statutes of Kilkenny' of 1366—which prohibited interaction between Ireland's English and Irish populations. Reference to these laws was made presumably with a view to having them printed and displayed for public viewing throughout the kingdom. For Burghley next noted a set of instructions, a Henrician pamphlet entitled *Ordinances for the government of Ireland*, which were printed in 1534 by the royal printer and given to Sir William Skeffington, then the lord deputy. These ordinances, proposals for administrative reform, and guidelines for the English population of Ireland to live by (namely proscriptions against their adoption of Irish customs) were to be revived, printed, and put on public display.⁷⁵ Earlier, during Sussex's government, Cecil had attempted to have the laws of the realm publicized. He had taken the time to search out these laws himself and

⁷² Gilbert Gerrard, attorney-general, to Walsingham, 15 December 1578, TNA, SP 63/63/42; Christopher Wray, lord chief justice, to Walsingham, 21 December 1578, TNA, SP 63/63/61.

⁷³ Clanrickard to privy council, 10 March 1579, TNA, SP 63/66/6; Clanrickard's submission to queen, 14 June 1579, TNA, SP 63/67/6(i); Burghley's note touching Clanrickard, 14 June 1579, TNA, SP 63/67/8.

⁷⁴ Considerations for Ireland, 25 February 1579, TNA, SP 63/65/49. See *CSPI*, ii. 134. Cf. Orders to be observed by council and others, 31 March 1579, TNA, SP 63/66/17.

⁷⁵ Queen's instructions to Lord Justice Drury, May 1578, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 89, fo. 251 (31 March 1579), TNA, SP 63/66/17). For the original ordinances of 1534, see TNA, SP 60/2/26; for their Henrician context, see S. G. Ellis, 'Thomas Cromwell and Ireland, 1532–40', *Historical Journal*, 23 (1980), 497–519.

instructed the earl to have published and proclaimed all the statutes enacted by the parliament of Ireland which were still in force.⁷⁶ Nothing came of Cecil's efforts to have the statutes of Ireland printed during Sussex's government, just as Skeffington had failed to have the *Ordinances* implemented or displayed during Henry's reign, but Burghley continued to view the publication of the laws of the realm as an important component in the kingdom's reform.

It was in February 1575, just as Burghley was preparing the ground to put into effect a more formal council to attend to Ireland matters, that he penned what was his most comprehensive (surviving) statement of his thinking on Tudor policy in Ireland since his 'Memorial' of late 1567. Entitled 'The Degrees for Gov[er]nme[n]t of Ireland', the document sought to show the 'best' means to achieve the 'Reformatio[n] of Ireland as well by force, as by ordre of justice'.⁷⁷ The document [Figure 1] reflected Burghley's appreciation of the need for a strategy in Ireland which was both nuanced and gradual. If the English could be made to obey the laws and the Irish kept from rebellion, then, Burghley reasoned:

by success of tyme y^e Irish to be brought to be gov[er]ned ether by y^e law of England, or by some constitutio[n]s to be co[m]pounded partly of ther own customs and breha[n] lawes, that ar agreeable to reason, and partly of y^e English lawes.

A broadly binary approach, one which treated Ireland's English and Irish populations separately, was proposed to achieve this end. So that the English might be 'better ordered by justice', he suggested that a legal expert, born in England 'lerner in y^e Engl[and] lawes', should be appointed lord chancellor of Ireland—a position held by clerics since 1555 and vacant since Robert Weston's death in 1573—and that another 'of lyke sort' be made chief justice of one of the benches. He then turned his attention to the English of Munster. Here, a provincial presidency had been established in 1570 with Sir John Perrot serving as its first president; but the intransigence of Sir James Fitzmaurice, the imprisoned earl of Desmond's disaffected cousin, and other neo-feudal lords of English ancestry within the province had rendered the president little more than a glorified soldier.⁷⁸ To address this troubled area, Burghley suggested the appointment of an English-born justice who was to be assisted by an Irish-born Englishman 'lerner in y^e lawes'; the execution of the law would be carried out by sheriffs, though in recognition of the still unsettled military situation, a man of martial standing with a band of soldiers would be employed to support them. It was proposed that bishops, noblemen, and freeholders should through the provision of victuals supplement the wages of the justices and soldiers. At the heart of the problem with establishing Tudor rule in Munster, however, was the existence of large private armies, captained by men like Fitzmaurice, and the ingrained use of Irish exactions on the general population to maintain

⁷⁶ Queen's instructions (countersigned by Cecil) to Sussex, 4 July 1562, LPL, 628, fos. 94–7; D. B. Quinn, 'Government printing and the publication of the Irish statutes', *PRIA*, sect. C, 49 (1943), 52–3.

⁷⁷ Degrees for the government of Ireland, February 1575, TNA, SP 63/49/78 (described as 'Consultation for the government of Ireland' in the *Calendar of state papers*).

⁷⁸ McCormack, *The earldom of Desmond*, 109–44.

The Degrees in Government of Ireland 78 591

The best is, to see y^e Reformation of Ireland as well by force, as by order
of Justice, y^e the English may see laws, and y^e Arbitrary to
be kept for rebellion. and so by success of time, y^e rights
to be brought to be Governed either by y^e laws of England
or by some constitutions to be approved partly of their own
customs and best laws, y^e are agreeable to reason, and partly
of y^e English laws.

The means presently to be used are these at this time.

first for y^e English to be better orderd by Justice.

That a convenient number of y^e Engl. laws be made & made
That an other ^{of best sort} made ^{of best} Justice of y^e on foot w^{ch} other.

That the Sheriff presently a learned man be there appointed a Justice.
and, under say to assist him for on of best bein^g heretofore in y^e
laws. and that the Sheriff may be there also w^{ch} a
band, to give y^e Juyres of y^e Juyres in execution of law, as well
for the

That means be used w^{ch} y^e Nobles and Gentlemen, to contribute in making
a convenient parcell. W^{ch} for y^e law others, and for y^e Justice.

wherby they may better live at their fees and wages.

That every noble man and other Gentlemen of y^e Counties w^{ch} hath of late years
used to take coynes and licences for murthering of one of another, may be
troubled w^{ch} all to reduce his name to a knight, and his calls of
of knights, so as y^e people's charitable thoughts may have some
yet, and y^e rest to returne to their own just.

220



Fig. 1: Degrees for the government of Ireland, 1575

590

And if at any time, they shall be occasion of any such matter
 or other shall cause cause to have me of war, to y^e prince
 of his, that against any thing, that than y^e prince
 matter may shall be thought by matter how he shall be maintained
 in a longer case, and not to take it at his own content.

For this manner of case for victuals to wage me of war, to be known
 until y^e prince of y^e prince may be demised, and they
 brought to him in a more possible manner
 For that, as have you probably in this last month of y^e Earl of Oxford may
 be considered, and may know in all these things.

That as many of these parts of countries as shall may be induced
 will take their concepts of his place by his grant to them
 and their heirs of that lands. and to pay for his place
 to be vent in victual for a knighthood.

For that such as shall be apparent to be these figures may be
 according to their ages, brought up in English, so as they
 may have knighthood of gentility to help to maintain their estate
 of inheritance.

For for such as will not take their countries by grant of y^e prince they shall
 be brought me to power and content for others of the same countries by grant
 of the prince of strength, to take y^e same countries by grant
 by him and with such high captains will be induced, to receive orders how to take

over

Fig. 1: Continued

them. Burghley suggested that those noblemen and captains ‘w^e hath of late yeres used to tak coyne and livery for mantana[n]ce of me[n] of warr’ should be prevailed upon to reduce both their bands to a certain (fixed) number and their ‘cess’ of victuals necessary to keep them. In this way, he believed, ‘y^e people chardgeable therof may know what to yeld, and y^e rest to reteyne to ther own p[ro]fit’. Burghley thus conceded that Irish exactions in English Munster should be continued ‘until y^e power of y^e Irishery may be demynished, and they brought to lyve in a more peasible man[n]er’. Bringing the Irish to live in peace was the next ‘degree’ for the government of Ireland to be considered. For the Irish, Burghley held that the conclusion of surrender and regrant agreements between the crown and Irish captains—as he called them—was the best way forward. They would be induced to hold their territories of the queen and by primogeniture, and, in return, would ‘paye to Hir Maty so[m]e yerly rent in victuall for a knolledg’. Central to the process was Burghley’s recommendation that eldest sons of Irish chiefs be ‘brought upp in English sort, so as they may have knolledg of cyvillyte to help to mayntene ther estats of inherita[n]ce’. Were a chief to show himself unwilling to hold his lands of the crown, he proposed that the crown should ‘entyce’ another member of the clan to receive a royal grant of his lands. Burghley’s ‘Degrees for the government of Ireland’ then ends abruptly; its last line—‘by litle and lytle such Irish captay[n]s wold be induced to receive orders how to’—is struck out, the last word unfinished. Whether the paper formed part of a more comprehensive document which went on to consider the future direction of Tudor rule in other areas of Ireland or to expand on the concept of establishing special ‘constitutions’ for the Irishry is not clear.

There is not much original thinking evident in Burghley’s ‘Degrees’. Its binary framework and the tantalizing notion of amalgamating common and Brehon law was borrowed almost entirely from the earl of Sussex’s elaborate suggestions for the direction of Tudor government in Ireland made in December 1562. The idea of ‘degrees’, moreover, he borrowed from James Croft’s suggestion for the extension of Tudor rule in Ireland put forward in early 1561. In Burghley’s own record of Croft’s suggestions, Croft is attributed with the thinking that ‘y^e Irishry wold be reduced to order by degrees, that is by p[re]scriby[n]g certen orders, not so exactly as y^e co[m]en law p[re]scribeth’.⁷⁹ Even Burghley’s willingness to accept aspects of Irish law which were ‘agreable to reason’ can be traced back to the ideas of Henry VIII expressed to the earl of Surrey in the early 1520s. Yet the unoriginality of Burghley’s ideas matters less than the window the document provides on his thinking on Ireland after a quarter-century of guiding Irish policy.⁸⁰ It remained distinctly ‘mid-Tudor’ in its recommendations for the governing of the kingdom.

Cecil’s thinking as expressed in his ‘Degrees’ can be fleshed out somewhat if read in conjunction with two other papers: his ‘Memoranda for Ireland’ and his

⁷⁹ Memorial of matters of Ireland for 55 years, TNA, SP 63/125/35, fo. 89^v.

⁸⁰ Report of the earl of Sussex, December 1562, LPL, 609, fos. 2–23. Cf. Brady, *The chief governors*, 74–5.

'Memorial of things to be considered' which were written slightly earlier (in February and March 1574, respectively).⁸¹ In the former, Burghley makes similar references to inducing Irish captains to hold their lands of the crown and the need for an English-born justice—with regard to the latter he included the novel suggestion that the Englishman who occupied the position would then be guaranteed a place on one of the benches in England. The document, however, also contains more wide-ranging recommendations: Munster was to be governed according to the orders of Perrot; in Ulster, Essex should be supported and Hugh O'Neill, baron of Dungannon, admitted to the earldom of Tyrone; in Connaught, the earl of Clanrickard was to be consulted, so as to avoid rebellions against the provincial president Captain Nicholas Malby. Like his 'Degrees', Burghley's 'Memoranda' returned to the problem surrounding coign and livery and proposed a similar twofold solution:

a consultatio[n] w^t the nobleme[n] of Irland, that they will agree how w^t the Q. force, and the force of y^e nobillite, y^e Irish captay[n]s may be compelled to aba[n]do[n] ther coyn and lyvery and that doone that y^e nobillite also will yeld to leave ther own exto[r]tio[n]s and to have reco[m]pe[n]ce of the tena[n]ts and freholders that have been charged.

His 'Memorial' was more ambitious, setting out how 'y^e generall reformation of Irland' might be achieved. His plans for Ulster and Munster were essentially those outlined in the 'Memoranda', but he added a third prong to his strategy: 'that y^e depute have a force to pacefy Leinster, and that doone lye at Athlone, and fro[m] the[n]ce to direct forces to bryny [bring] Co[n]naugh into obedye[n]ce and so to gyve directio[n]s to Munster and Ulster'. It is likely, however, that Burghley permitted himself to sketch such a straightforward vision of the reform of Ireland because he knew that the queen was unlikely to pay for it. For the remainder of the 'Memorial' presented a much more detailed and conservative strategy which sought to maintain Tudor rule until such time as a general reform received royal backing. In Ulster, for instance, he recommended that Essex seek the submissions of Turlough Luineach O'Neill and other Irish chiefs. In this way, he hoped, the Irish might be convinced to banish all Scots from their territories and to provision garrisons of English soldiers at Knockfergus and Newry. In the rest of the kingdom he advised that the assistance of local magnates be sought: from the far-flung and capricious earls of Clancare, Desmond, and Clanrickard in the south and west to the more accountable earls of Kildare and Ormond in the east. But Burghley, who referred to this conservative strategy as 'certen te[m]porisy[n]gs for this yere', clearly hoped to return to a 'general reformation' at some point in the near future. The absence of suggestions, in both documents, for plantation outside of Essex's endeavours is also significant, for it shows that Burghley was not, by the mid-1570s, wedded to the policy which came to dominate his thinking with regard to Ireland in the following decade. It was only after the queen's refusal to fund a 'general reformation', and in the changed circumstances in Munster following the

⁸¹ Memoranda for Ireland, February 1574, TNA, SP 63/44/65; Memorial of things to be considered, 16 March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/10.

suppression of the papally supported rebellion and the attainder of the earl of Desmond, that Burghley was moved to supplement his 'Degrees' for the government of Ireland with the plantation of Englishmen in exposed parts of the kingdom.

Thus, even after his appointment as lord treasurer in 1572, William Cecil's thoughts often turned to the reform of Ireland and he continued to work to frame the various ideas put forth to achieve this end into a coherent policy. But this does not change the fact that it was the queen alone who ultimately decided policy. Such decisions remained Elizabeth's royal prerogative. That most courses of state action, both public and private, were dependent on her approbation or rejection is widely accepted by historians of Tudor England: to paraphrase Professor Collinson, Cecil and others at council or at court might very well propose, but it was Elizabeth who disposed, and that was it.⁸² Widely accepted, too, is Elizabeth's natural hesitancy and indecisiveness, traits which became amplified when confronted with the prospect of financial expenditure. Elizabeth's record of decision-making on Ireland matters supports the consensus which has emerged with regard to Elizabeth's role in government and the making of policy. Writing to Sidney in early 1569, for example, Cecil confessed that the queen liked the deputy's grand strategy to colonize Ulster, but that she was unlikely to agree to it because of the expense it would entail.⁸³ Later, in his 1574 'Memorial' discussed above, Burghley outlined two contingencies for how Tudor policy in Ireland should proceed: 'whither y^e Q. Matey will p[ro]cede to y^e general reformation of Ireland or no'.⁸⁴ Similarly, early the following year, he resorted to laying out how the crown should proceed in Ulster if the queen allowed Essex's request for further financial and military support and if she did not.⁸⁵ Even the most essential appointment in an Ireland context was subject to the queen's hesitancy: Burghley was kept in suspense for several months in 1574 not knowing whether his confidant, William Fitzwilliam, would continue as lord deputy.⁸⁶ And it was problems arising from the queen's inability to act decisively on Ireland matters which moved Cecil to consider travelling to the kingdom in 1567. In a letter to Sidney, Cecil expressed his sorrow in seeing him, 'daily traversed w^t uncertainty of resolutions, w^t reprehending upon[n] co[n]iecture'. The suggestion that 'her Matey might be disburdened by sending some of trust w^t full resolution' had met with Elizabeth's approval, but Cecil thought his 'comi[n]g' doubtful, and urged Sidney to return to England for further consultations on Ireland.⁸⁷ Cecil never did go: with civil war looming in Scotland he could not afford to absent himself in Ireland indefinitely. Important though Ireland matters were, they were only one of a great many of the secretary's concerns. The

⁸² Pulman, *The Elizabethan privy council in the fifteen-seventies*, 151; R. B. Wernham, *The making of Elizabethan foreign policy, 1558–1603* (Berkeley, 1980), 4–6; Wallace MacCaffrey, *Queen Elizabeth and the making of policy, 1572–1588* (Princeton, 1981), 300; Collinson, 'The monarchical republic of Elizabeth I', 129 (quotation).

⁸³ Cecil to Sidney, 6 January 1569, TNA, SP 63/27/2.

⁸⁴ Memorial of things to be considered for Ireland, 16 March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/10.

⁸⁵ Memoranda by Burghley to be considered for Ireland, 24 February 1575, TNA, SP 63/49/68.

⁸⁶ Memoranda for Ireland, February 1574, TNA, SP 63/44/65.

⁸⁷ Cecil to Sidney, 6 July 1567, TNA, SP 63/21/50.

'burden' of resolution remained Elizabeth's alone. Burghley's frustration with the queen's indecisiveness eventually found expression in his 1572 tract 'Certen matters wherin the queen's majestie's forbearing and delays hath produced, not only inconveniences and incesse of expences, but also dangers'.⁸⁸ Yet the saying, attributed to William Cecil, that Elizabeth had 'so rare gifts, as when her counsellors had said all they could say she would frame out a wise counsel beyond theirs' was more than just his sensible public representation of the queen's role in government—it spoke to the centrality of the monarch in the execution of policy.⁸⁹

The queen could be influenced, however, and, on occasion, made to change her mind; and no opinion carried more weight with Elizabeth than Cecil's. As we have seen, Cecil's knowledge both of Ireland and the suggestions for its reform meant that the matters which the privy council considered and the decisions which the queen ultimately made were, in large measure, based on the information presented to them by Cecil. Thus, though the strategy for colonizing Ulster outlined above did not proceed in the way Sidney had envisaged it, Cecil's support ensured both that a scaled-back version of the strategy was implemented and that further colonization schemes were attempted.⁹⁰ The manner in which Cecil went about influencing or advising Elizabeth is revealed only in glimpses. By virtue of his centrality to the running of Tudor government and Elizabeth's faith in his counsel, Cecil had greater access to the queen than most men, though a favourite, such as Leicester, might be afforded more prolonged and more intimate periods in her presence.⁹¹ In January 1567, for instance, Cecil informed Sidney that the queen will consider the deputy's 'matters' today, and that he would 'attempt to creep to her for the despatch of Sidney's business'—two days later the queen wrote to Sidney with her decisions on a range of Ireland matters.⁹² He might also employ an approach with Elizabeth that was less direct. Broaching the subject of money, for instance, was always tricky business: in response to Sir Henry Wallop's, then the lord justice of Ireland's, request for more money Burghley made clear that the queen would release no further treasure and added, 'I have to often tasted of her offence for my soliciting of money'.⁹³ Nearly fifteen years later, Burghley explained to Wallop, who was by then the undertreasurer, how 'unpleasing an office' it was 'to move Her Ma^{tie} for money for Ireland', and suggested that Wallop should come to court and ask Elizabeth for the money himself. Wallop responded to Burghley 'that if yo^r Lo: in yo^r greatnes and favo^r wth Her Ma^{tie} find it so difficult' than he could hardly be expected to prevail in so weighty a matter.⁹⁴ Burghley, however, was not above using other men in his efforts to persuade the queen to part with treasure. In late

⁸⁸ 'Inconveniences', April 1572, BL, Cotton MS, Caligula C III, fo. 457.

⁸⁹ Edward Nares, *Memoirs of the life and administration of the Right Honourable William Cecil, Lord Burghley*..., 3 vols. (London, 1828–31), iii. 517.

⁹⁰ Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*, 60–7.

⁹¹ Pulman, *The Elizabethan privy council in the fifteen-seventies*, 240–1.

⁹² Cecil to Sidney, 11 January 1567, TNA, SP 63/20/3; queen to Sidney, 16 January 1567, TNA, SP 63/20/8.

⁹³ Burghley to Wallop, 28 October 1582, TNA, SP 63/98/1(i).

⁹⁴ Henry Wallop to Burghley, 2 October 1596, TNA, SP 63/194/3.

1582, Walsingham reported to Burghley, who was then convalescing away from court, that he and the earl of Ormond had prevailed upon the queen to increase the soldiers' wages in Ireland, a measure which the privy council had agreed to. In this instance, she could not be moved.⁹⁵ Walsingham had already, a year earlier, bemoaned the fact that Elizabeth had directed Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, to discharge the army which he had assembled to bolster the position of the Anglo-ophile earl of Morton and his allies at the court of the young King James in Scotland. 'By which accompt', Walsingham gloomily wrote, 'I see that Scotland is clene lost, and a greate gate opened therby for the losse of Irland. My lords here have carefully and faithfully discharged their duties in sikinge to stave this dangerous course, But God hath thought good to dispose otherwise of thinges, in whose handes the heartes of all princes are'.⁹⁶

The level of complexity that an indirect approach with Elizabeth might reach is demonstrated in James Croft's letter to Burghley penned shortly thereafter.⁹⁷ Burghley had entrusted letters touching Ireland matters to his fellow privy councillor, instructing him to discuss their contents with the queen. Croft reported back: 'her highness had soom[e] speeches with me, and seemed not to like of the opinion[es] in them... nevertheless she will conferre with your lordship farther in those matters at your next comming hether'. Because the contents of the letters are now obscure, Burghley's design is hard to know. Indeed, that their discussion concerned Ireland at all is only apparent from the letter's endorsement.⁹⁸ As the remainder of Croft's letter makes clear, however, he was not the only one prepared to deceive his sovereign to achieve an end:

But I must let your lordship understand the yse is broken already, and I trust the way open to such a course as your lordship will like well. The motion proceeded from me, but not so known to her highness, fo' that I would not show my self in the matter till I should fined how her M^{tie} would like yet, which by means I do understand is well accepted, saving some little obstacle in the handling of the matter, which your lordship may easily remove, and so the matter brought to such effect as shall well satisfies your lordship.

Croft, who had known and served Elizabeth for decades and who was by then the comptroller of her household, had felt the queen's displeasure earlier in his career. He was thus just as careful as Burghley to use another as a bell-wether of her attitude. The nature of Croft's 'motion' is also obscure, but the episode demonstrates the lengths which Cecil and his colleagues on the privy council might go to manipulate their queen.

The key to William Cecil's influence at court and with Elizabeth on Ireland matters was his thorough pursuit and mastery of information—itsself a central tenet of the humanist-classical education which he had received at Cambridge.

⁹⁵ Walsingham to Burghley, 13 November 1582, TNA, SP 63/97/36. For Burghley's illness, see Croft to Burghley, 13 November 1582, CP 12, fo. 88.

⁹⁶ Pulman, *The Elizabethan privy council in the fifteen-seventies*, 238.

⁹⁷ Croft to Burghley, 21 November 1582, TNA, SP 63/97/42.

⁹⁸ The letter is endorsed: 'M^{tie} comptroller of hir Ma^{ties} howshold his dealing with hir Ma^{ties} touching affaires of Ireland'.

Where some men impressed the queen with their military valour, the antiquity of their lineage, or their charisma, Cecil's value to his sovereign was founded on his knowledge—of policy, of the working of government, of people, and of places. He was prepared to search through medieval or early Tudor records pertaining to a particular matter so as to obtain a more thorough understanding of it. He made detailed notes, for example, on the names of the governors, lords chancellor, and vice-treasurers of Ireland dating from 1564 back to the reign of Edward I.⁹⁹ But the most striking example of Cecil's understanding of Ireland was the detailed record of information which he compiled relating to the kingdom, to which he might turn to retrieve information so as to be better prepared to advise his fellow councillors, and ultimately his mistress, on Ireland matters. His 'collections of Irish causes', as one of Burghley's servants endorsed it in October 1588, is a remarkable chronicle of information relating to the kingdom.¹⁰⁰ The work is almost entirely in Cecil's hand, runs to 152 pages, and covers fifty-five years (April 1531–July 1586) spanning the reigns of four Tudor sovereigns. It begins, rather inexplicably, in spring 1531 with a notice that 'Odo' [Sir Hugh Duff] O'Donnell did homage to the then lord deputy Sir William Skeffington.¹⁰¹ It then assigns notes on political proposals, persons, or events to the appropriate month and year in chronological order until 1570 (fos. 81–7), at which point some extracts concerning the earl of Sussex's government in 1559 are presented. From here the chronicle resumes, and continues in a broadly chronological fashion until July 1586 when it concludes with the note: 'x ba[n]ddes of footmen[n] delivered to S^r Henry Stanley'. The collection is not a reflection on Irish affairs written by Lord Burghley later in his career, nor is it a 'history' of key events relating to Ireland. It is rather a dispassionate log into which Cecil, over time, transferred a selection of his notes on Ireland matters. And it was a deliberate exercise in record keeping: Cecil wrote out the month and the year on the leaves of the parchment in anticipation of future entries. The structure frequently broke down, either through Cecil's failure to make entries—many of the leaves remain blank except for the month and year (fos. 95–7 for instance)—or the inclusion of other papers out of chronological order, Cecil's notes on 'cess' for 1556–9 (fo. 94), for example. Still, the work represents the longest and most detailed record of Tudor government in Ireland in the possession of any Tudor politician. The editors of the *Calendar of state papers, Ireland* remarked that the work's principal value was that it provided confirmation of the completeness of the collection of state papers rather than the originality of its content.¹⁰² But the fact that William Cecil had access to so complete a record of English government in Ireland, and that he was in a position to influence Tudor policy there, is important. What other figure in Elizabeth's reign might

⁹⁹ Notes relating to appointments of state officers, 1564, LPL, 614, fos. 2–12. It is not uncommon to find Cecil's handwriting on documents from the reign of Henry VIII. For an example pertaining to Ireland, see *L. & P. Hen. VIII, addenda*, 85. See also below, 152–3.

¹⁰⁰ Memorial of matters of Ireland for 55 years, July 1586, TNA, SP 63/125/35, fos. 81–157.

¹⁰¹ O'Donnell's submission, 6 May 1531, LPL, 603, fos. 35–6.

¹⁰² *CSPi*, ii. 116.

retrieve information from a single source showing, for example, that Sir William Fitzwilliam was made lord deputy in December 1571 ‘and co[n]tynewed until xxii september 1575 w^c was 3 whole years and x mo[n]these ii day’, or that an abridged version of the plans for the government of Ireland presented by Croft and Sidney might be found under the entry for 12 February 1561, or that the recalcitrant midland chief Rory Oge O’More submitted to the lord deputy in November 1573? Armed with such a detailed and readily available source of information on Ireland the minister was better prepared to advise on the subject than anyone else at the court of Queen Elizabeth.

Cecil was keen to control the information he amassed and mastered. And central to this was managing what Elizabeth knew. The queen, like the vast majority of early modern sovereigns, did not spend her days and nights poring over papers and handling correspondence. Cecil did, and this allowed him to attempt to manage what information flowed to the queen. This was evident, as we have seen, when Burghley reprimanded Fitzwilliam for sending incriminating information on John Perrot directly to the queen, rather than sending it to him first so that he might decide what, and how much, Elizabeth needed to know.¹⁰³ Another more vivid example of Cecil’s efforts to control what information reached the queen may be found earlier on in the reign. Cecil, as has been shown, placed great store in the destruction of Shane O’Neill. The secretary had pushed the queen to make additional funds available for the earl of Sussex’s 1561 campaign against O’Neill, and stretched his own credibility in doing so. He thus received the news of Sussex’s defeat at the hands of O’Neill in July with dread. Cecil wrote to Sussex that when he read the earl’s letter to the queen it ‘so appalled me that I had much ado to behave my self in sort to keep close y^c deep greefs of my hart’. Cecil pulled himself together, however, and downplayed the loss to Elizabeth, explaining to Sussex that he ‘also scattered y^c matter abrode to be a playne overthrow of Shane’s power’ and retarded other reports of the encounter coming out of Ireland. Cecil confided in Sussex his fear that Elizabeth ‘smelleth y^c offence’, but still chose not to disclose to his queen all of the information known to him.¹⁰⁴ By the end of Burghley’s career, some in the Irish administration had taken the conscious decision to convey vital information on the state of Ireland to the lord treasurer alone. During the critical years of Tyrone’s rebellion, for example, the archbishop of Dublin and bishop of Meath jointly imparted their concerns about the state of the kingdom exclusively to Lord Burghley because, they claimed, it was through his ‘wisedome & good polittie, [that] the course of this gov[er]nment hath bene hitherto most happelie directed’.¹⁰⁵

More often, however, Cecil shared his knowledge with his queen and she accepted his counsel. Indeed many of the letters from the queen concerning Ireland were at one point in their gestation entirely in Cecil’s hand, or were heavily edited

¹⁰³ See above, 68.

¹⁰⁴ Cecil to Sussex, 12 August 1561, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 21, fo. 20.

¹⁰⁵ Loftus and Jones to Burghley, 22 November 1596, TNA, SP 63/195/27.

by him.¹⁰⁶ These were copies or drafts upon which the final letters sent into Ireland (often lost) were based. Stephen Alford has drawn attention to this phenomenon in the first decade of Elizabeth's reign, noting that though the queen might sign letters and diplomatic letters to her political representatives and to her subjects in England and Ireland or further afield, it was Cecil who typically drafted and corrected them. 'Structure, language, and emphasis', Alford has argued, 'were Cecil's responsibility' unless the queen chose to dictate her instructions verbally, or to do the drafting and redrafting of material herself. Elizabeth did, on occasion, exert herself in this way, as in 1566 when she asserted her prerogative right concerning the matter of her marriage and the succession over that of the English parliament.¹⁰⁷ When in early 1574 Burghley was ill, gravely so it would seem, and unable to attend to the direction of Essex's failing enterprise in Ulster, the queen, according to Secretary Smith, who was keeping the ailing lord treasurer abreast of developments at court, threatened that 'she wold se all the l[ett]res w^{ch} came fro[m] Ireland'.¹⁰⁸ Burghley recovered and Elizabeth never had to follow through with her threat. Indeed there is little evidence to suggest that the queen took an active interest in the refinement and implementation of Irish policy beyond a desire to limit expenditure there. It is difficult to imagine Elizabeth being sufficiently familiar with the minutiae of Ireland matters to dictate their contents to Cecil; the two of them working closely together on paperwork pertaining to the kingdom seems equally unlikely. Rather, it was he—sometimes having consulted the council, or individual councillors, sometimes not—who routinely determined the contents of the queen's letters. Such letters would in most instances have been presented to the queen for review before receiving the royal signature, but so long as Elizabeth did not seize upon a specific issue her orders flowed through, and sometimes from, William Cecil.

Following Walsingham's death in April 1590, Burghley assumed the role of acting secretary. He was nearly 71 years old, ancient for Tudor times. It has been suggested that with Walsingham dead Tudor policy in Ireland fell solely into Burghley's hands and under his supervision went 'completely haywire'.¹⁰⁹ Apart from ascribing too much credit to Burghley's role in conceiving Irish policy, this suggestion intimates the existence of some fundamental difference of approach between the two to the direction of Tudor rule in the kingdom. This, as we have seen, was not the case. And, as will be shown, after April 1590 Burghley picked up the threads of the day-to-day running of the kingdom that his long-time friend had been handling. What separated the course of Tudor policy for Ireland in the

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, queen to Sussex, 15 December 1560, TNA, SP 63/2/50; queen to Sidney, 15 June 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/17; queen to Sidney, 17 March 1571, CP 157, fo. 23; queen to Fitzwilliam and council, 3 May 1594, TNA, SP 63/174/34 (corrected by Burghley); queen to William Russell, 7 January 1595, CP 24, fo. 89.

¹⁰⁷ Alford, *The early Elizabethan polity*, 32–3, 150–2.

¹⁰⁸ Smith to Burghley, 31 January 1574, BL, Lansdowne MS 19, no. 81 (quotation); Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 6 January 1574 TNA, SP 63/44/2; Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 31 January 1574, TNA, SP 63/44/21.

¹⁰⁹ Morgan, 'The fall of Sir John Perrot', 125.

1590s from earlier decades was not the absence of Walsingham or Leicester, who had died in 1588; rather it was the changed character of the Anglo-Irish relationship. The ongoing war with Spain and the rebellion which was to erupt in Ulster, and was to spread throughout much of the kingdom in the mid-1590s, did much to change this relationship. The large-scale amphibious assault attempted against England in 1588 saw Spanish sailors—survivors of the great Armada—shipwrecked in Ireland, and was proof, if any was needed, that the fortunes of the kingdoms of Ireland and England were intertwined. When in 1595 Hugh O'Neill, the earl of Tyrone, went into open rebellion against the crown the threat of a Spanish invasion became particularly acute. Defence of the kingdom and then war thus set the tone for Burghley's relationship with Ireland in the 1590s.

But a more fundamental reason for the change in Tudor policy in Ireland in the 1590s was the basic fact that Tudor rule had, by then, been extended to most parts of the island. For decades, Ireland matters had revolved around various suggestions for the extension of royal government throughout the kingdom; by the 1590s Burghley was left to oversee the operation of a framework for Tudor government which encompassed most of the kingdom of Ireland rather than schemes for its expansion. The key had been the enactment in 1569 of a statute which empowered the lord deputy to erect Irish territories into shires. Cecil, as we shall see, became closely associated with this innovation in Tudor government which saw new counties, and the attendant features of English government, extend Tudor rule well beyond the areas of medieval (and early Tudor) English settlement.¹¹⁰ Concurrently, provincial presidencies had brought English government to the once distant west and south and, in the former, feudal exactions traditionally due to local lords, most notably the earl of Clanrickard, had been converted into fixed rents in a scheme known as 'composition'.¹¹¹ Small colonies of English settlers—a mixture of English gentlemen and Englishmen already in the Irish service—were finally established on lands in Desmond where forces loyal to the pope had a decade earlier made landfall. Nearly every major chief in Ireland, moreover, had, by 1590, concluded some form of a surrender and regrant settlement with the crown. Much of Ulster remained beyond the crown's effective control, but Hugh O'Neill had been allowed in 1585 to accede to the earldom of Tyrone, in abeyance since the death in 1559 of his grandfather, and efforts were under way to have the machinery of local government introduced to what was now nominally shire ground.¹¹² The last parliament, held in 1585, was a measure of the changed political landscape in Ireland: Lord Deputy Perrot declared in his installation speech, given before a body that included seven new boroughs and as many new counties, that the queen regarded her subjects of her two kingdoms, Ireland and England, equally. Moreover,

¹¹⁰ Christopher Maginn, 'Elizabethan Cavan: the institutions of Tudor government in an Irish county', in Brendan Scott (ed.), *Culture and society in early modern Breifne/Cavan* (Dublin, 2009), 69–84.

¹¹¹ Bernadette Cunningham, 'Political and social change in the lordships of Clanricard and Thomond, 1569–1641' (MA thesis, NUI, Galway, 1979), 31–5.

¹¹² Morgan, *Tyrone's rebellion*, 29–54.

representatives of nearly every clan attended the parliament at the behest of the government for, according to the Irish annalists, most of 'the men of Ireland' were then obedient to their prince.¹¹³

Yet Burghley looked upon the framework for Tudor government established in Ireland with a troubled brow. The threat of rebellion coupled with the prospect of foreign invasion cast a shadow over all that had been accomplished. With Walsingham dead, responsibility for distilling and investigating intelligence fell to Burghley: even the most far-fetched rumour had to be countenanced. It was in this context that Denis O'Roughan's allegations that Perrot had communicated with the king of Spain were entertained in early 1590.¹¹⁴ The following year Burghley commented extensively on intelligence brought before him by one of Walsingham's spies on the continent.¹¹⁵ It came in the form of two letters, both purportedly authored by a Captain Edmund Barrett, but one attributed to Sir Donough O'Connor Sligo, which sought to procure Spanish aid through the exiled archbishop of Tuam, Miler O'Higgin.¹¹⁶ Burghley concluded that the letters were forgeries, but that he investigated them at all reflects the uneasiness of the Elizabethan regime. Problems arising from the framework of Tudor government in Ireland presented Burghley with an altogether different problem, however. Here, too, Burghley picked up where Walsingham had left off. The former secretary had been working with Robert Gardiner, chief justice of the queen's bench, to have the excessive use of martial law in the kingdom restrained. Walsingham had instructed Gardiner to consider the matter in early 1590 and quickly produced a plan to call in commissions of martial law and redouble efforts to make the common law available throughout the kingdom.¹¹⁷ As will be discussed in greater detail below—in Chapters 5 and 6—Burghley was of the firm belief that abuses committed by the soldiers and officials in local government in Ireland were now the chief factors driving the Irish to rebellion. In 1592, he succeeded in having commissions of martial law in Ireland called in.

The restriction of the exercise of martial law was part of a wider effort, spearheaded by Burghley and approved by Queen Elizabeth, to reform Tudor government in the kingdom of Ireland. No longer was 'Ireland' in need of 'general reformation', rather it was the character of English government in Ireland, now extending to most areas, which required reform. The new reform initiative took the form of a book of articles, containing a series of enquiries and instructions for the queen's lord deputy and council in Ireland to answer and to abide by.¹¹⁸ The

¹¹³ Victor Treadwell, 'Sir John Perrot and the Irish parliament of 1585–6', *PRIA*, sect. C, 85 (1985), 259–308; Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 319–20; *AFM*, s.a. 1585.

¹¹⁴ Above, 68–9.

¹¹⁵ Memorandum... relative to the copies of two letters written... to an Irish bishop, 13 August 1591, TNA, SP 63/159/43.

¹¹⁶ Deposition of Captain Barrett, 13 August 1591, TNA, SP 63/159/42; O'Connor Sligo to archbishop of Tuam, 17 March 1590, TNA, SP 63/159/47; Barrett to archbishop of Tuam, 18 March 1590, TNA, SP 63/159/48.

¹¹⁷ Gardiner to Walsingham, 4 January 1590, TNA, SP 63/150/4; A memorial for Ireland delivered by Justice Gardiner, 4 January 1590, TNA, SP 63/150/5.

¹¹⁸ Articles containing sundry things to be considered by lord deputy and council, May 1592, TNA, SP 63/164/49(i).

articles were divided into five categories: causes ecclesiastical; better administration of justice; reformation of warders of castles and forts; the better ordering of the crown's revenue; and the reform of the manner in which treasure was sent to Ireland. Space in subsequent chapters will be devoted to the exploration of the 1592 articles. What is of greatest import for the present discussion of the making and execution of political policy is the fact that the articles, to which the lord deputy—Sir William Fitzwilliam—and the queen's council in Ireland had subscribed in May 1592, were not implemented. Nearly two years later, after it had been decided to recall Fitzwilliam, Burghley penned a memorandum which was to form the basis of an enquiry into the outgoing administration's failure to execute the articles.¹¹⁹ 'It is necessary', Burghley wrote, that

before y^e L. depute shall co[m]e fro[m] Irla[n]d, that sondry matters . . . be examyned how y^e same hath bene executed by y^e L. depute and y^e cou[n]sell, and if any p[ar]t of y^e same have not bene executed, as was p[ro]mised by y^e L. depute and cou[n]sell, that l[et]res of answers made to Hir Maty, and subscribed by the hands of y^e L. depute, y^e Lord Cha[n]cellor, y^e ch. Justyce in May 1592.¹²⁰

At about the same time, Burghley corrected a draft of a letter from the queen commanding the lord deputy and council to implement the 1592 articles 'for the benefit of Ireland'.¹²¹

Yet the siege of the recently established English ward at Enniskillen castle in Maguire's country in June 1594 put paid to Burghley's effort to see English government in Ireland reformed. The attack on Enniskillen was carried out by Hugh Roe O'Donnell and Hugh Maguire, the sons-in-law of the earl of Tyrone. The earl was by then the most influential figure in Ulster and since his accession to the earldom had featured prominently in the crown's plans to see Tudor rule extended into the north-west. But as English military government advanced into Irish Ulster, the earl was finding it increasingly difficult to strike a balance between his own interests, the interests of his kinsmen, control of the traditional O'Neill vassals, and his duty to the crown. In early spring 1594 the Pale-educated earl complained of English military government in Ulster, specifically the conduct of its captains and seneschals.¹²² The earl's complaints echoed Burghley's feelings about martial government, and might have been allayed by the proposed reform of the dispensation of justice in the kingdom. Whether Burghley understood the closeness of Tyrone's views on the execution of justice to his own in 1594 is difficult to know. After all, it was he who, when questioning the failure to implement the 1592 articles on justice, drew special attention to 'those that tended to reform y^e exercise of martiall law by shyryves, and to reduce y^e seneshalls of cou[n]try to cesser fro[m] exactio[n]s

¹¹⁹ Burghley's Memorandum, 16 March 1594, TNA, SP 63/173/88.

¹²⁰ 'to certefy truly y^e causes why the same have not bene' is struck out and 'than to certefy y^e cause why they war not p[er]formed accordy[n]gly' is inserted between sentences: *ibid.*

¹²¹ Queen to lord deputy and council, c.14 March 1594, TNA, SP 63/173/85.

¹²² For Tyrone's position in these years, see Morgan, *Tyrone's rebellion*. See also Nicholas Canny, 'Taking sides in early modern Ireland: the case of Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone', in Carey and Lotz-Heumann (eds.), *Taking sides*, 94–115. Cf. earl of Tyrone's griefs delivered to the commissioners, 14 March 1594, TNA, SP 63/173/89(ii).

and Irish tributes'. Yet Burghley, it would seem, failed to appreciate that the recent rebellions of O'Rourke, MacMahon, and Maguire were directly linked to the introduction of English sheriffs and garrisons in these distant Irish lordships. He regarded them simply as rebels whose lands should be retained by the crown and whose exactions should be 'levyed to y^e may[n]tena[n]ce of a ward in such of his houses as may be made gardable'.¹²³ Ultimately, the violence which erupted in summer 1594, and the rumours of a Spanish invasion accompanying it, created an environment in which Burghley found it impossible to curtail the reintroduction and the expansion of military government. Burghley had anticipated trouble in Maguire's country. In March he had proposed the establishment of additional garrisons at Belleek and Bundrowes to support the garrison at Enniskillen, and recommended that boats be employed to command the rivers and lakes that dominate the region.¹²⁴ Burghley, however, did not foresee Tyrone's rebellion. Nor did he divine the earl's covert support for the rebels. He wrote to Tyrone in September 1594, explaining that he 'misliked such thinges' in him, such as the earl's maintenance of rebels among his forces, but he also assured the earl: 'if yo^r L shall p[er]forme yo^r promises nowe lately made . . . yo^r L shall cleare all former sinister opinions & shall deserve Hir Maties favo^r, whereto I for my part shall be a furtherer to my power'.¹²⁵ Tyrone remained unconvinced and came out in open rebellion the following year. It was the earl's decision to join the emerging Irish confederacy which transformed a localized rebellion into a regional war, ensuring that the siege of Enniskillen marked the beginning of nine years of sporadic military conflict in Ulster.

By the normal lights of his career, Burghley's response to the Irish confederacy assembled by Hugh O'Neill, second earl of Tyrone, to resist the extension of Tudor rule in Ulster was feeble. Advancing age and declining health were conspiring to limit his ability to gather information and direct policy, but his influence with Elizabeth and thus on policy decisions was little diminished. He adopted an increasingly advisory role on Ireland matters as the war dragged on, leaving his son Robert, secretary of state from July 1596, to oversee the logistics of most of the crown's efforts to thwart the rebel earl's confederacy. The queen, as ever, was loath to spend the money necessary to see Tyrone speedily vanquished, and with no end in sight to the war against Spain, Burghley's response to the rebellion was coloured by the overriding pressure to save money. In early autumn 1595 Sir John Norris, general of the queen's forces in Ireland, outlined the crown's options with regard to how best to respond to Tyrone. After reviewing Norris' proposals, Burghley boiled the crown's options down to two: either to accept the earl's submission or to increase the army for six months and invade Ulster.¹²⁶ Burghley advised against the latter, reckoning that such a campaign would cost £32,000 and was unfeasible anyway with winter nearing. He recommended pardoning Tyrone on three counts:

¹²³ Burghley's Memoranda, 16 March 1594, TNA, SP 63/173/88.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Burghley to Tyrone, 1 September 1594, TNA, SP 63/176/1.

¹²⁶ Memorial, 9 September 1595, TNA, SP 63/183/20 (LPL, 614, fos. 237–8).

Because thereby the whole realm may be in peace; the strange potent enemy may be frustrated of his purpose to invade that realm of Irelande as therby meaninge to conquer it for himself, or to reduce it to the Pope's pretended usurpation to the rule of a king of the Irish nation, or to divide it betwixt two of their nation; By the earl's submission he may be so limited, as the Queen may hereafter disable him to be a head of any dangerous faction for generallie noe rebell gaineth against a prince souveraine, but contralelie the prince maie well incroache uppon a rebell.

'The strange potent enemy' of whom Burghley wrote was Philip II. It was he whom Burghley regarded as the real threat, and the lord treasurer was then scrambling to guard England against invasion. In August he had prepared 'A memoryall' of matters to be considered in which he outlined a series of measures to strengthen English forces on land and at sea. This included diverting ships of war from the Low Countries 'to w'stand y^e en[n]emyes armados, fro[m] invadi[n]g this realme'.¹²⁷ Burghley understood that the crown was in no position to wage war in Ireland at this juncture. With the prospect of a full pardon on offer, Tyrone submitted in October and was pardoned the following May.¹²⁸ It was reported, rather dramatically, that news of O'Neill's submission had, like a thunderclap, raised an ailing Burghley from his sickbed and brought him to court.¹²⁹ In actual fact, the lord treasurer had been working to assure the rebel earl of a pardon whose terms were favourable enough to win an immediate cessation of the conflict.¹³⁰ The queen, it would seem, was determined that O'Neill, who had been proclaimed a traitor, should surrender his noble title and most of his lands in return for her pardon. In legal terms this would entail attainting him and reversing the attainder, if the queen thought it sufficient to do so. Concerned that O'Neill would reject such terms, Burghley pushed for an immediate pardon and instructed the lord deputy to place a series of indictments against O'Neill and his confederates lately taken 'at a sessions holden near unto Tyrone' in the keeping of the clerk of the crown, rather than to have them forwarded on to the queen's bench and thereby risk the rebels entering 'into some suspicion that ther attaynders were intended'.¹³¹

In any case, the truce proved impossible to preserve: the confederates were drifting inexorably toward an open alliance with Philip II and Elizabeth, for her part, was coming to terms with the inevitability of renewed war in Ulster. Following the dispersion by autumnal storms of a Spanish fleet bound for England or Ireland in 1596, the queen was prepared to sanction an invasion of Tyrone. Elizabeth was alarmed: some Spanish soldiers had made landfall in Ireland and, in expectation of further Spanish assistance, Tyrone's confederacy grew in confidence and spread outside of its west Ulster stronghold.¹³² A campaign against the rebel earl was

¹²⁷ Memorial of sundry matters to be considered, 10 August 1595, TNA, SP 63/182/60.

¹²⁸ Tyrone's submission, 18 October 1595, TNA, SP 63/183/108(i); *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Eliz.*, 373.

¹²⁹ Arthur Collins (ed.), *Letters and memorials of state... written and collected by Sir Henry Sidney*... , 2 vols. (London, 1746), i. 362.

¹³⁰ Draft instructions for dealing with Tyrone, October 1595, TNA, SP 63/183/110.

¹³¹ Lord deputy and Robert Gardiner to Burghley, 9 November 1595, TNA, SP 63/184/13 (quotation); Project of a pardon for Tyrone, November 1595, TNA, SP 63/184/42.

¹³² *Calendar of state papers relating to English affairs in the archives of Venice*, ed. H. F. Brown (London, 1897), ix, nos. 506, 510.

prepared for the summer. A two-pronged assault was envisaged. Sir Conyers Clifford, lord president of Connaught, was to enter Ulster from the south-west, crossing the river Erne at Ballyshannon, and Lord Deputy Burgh was to march west across the province from Newry and fortify the ford at the Blackwater, and 'pierce into the heart' of Tyrone's country, according to Burgh. The simultaneous landing of a great proportion of victual and the establishment at Lough Foyle of a garrison would allow Clifford and Burgh to replenish their armies and, if necessary, provide winter quarters for their men. This strategy was in fact a modified version of a plan twice suggested by Lord Chancellor Loftus, first in late 1595 and again late in 1596, which had called for a third army 'to invade and pursue the rebell' from Scotland.¹³³ Advised by Burghley, however, the queen and her council had rejected this strategy in previous years on the grounds that it was 'impossible . . . for lacke of sufficient victuall to be provided in those remote partes, but also how inconvenient it is and improbable by these meanes to pursue the rebells in their wild countries'.¹³⁴

Though old and sick, the details of the 1597 campaign were presented to Burghley—first in the form of a 'platt & proiect sent owt of Ireland' for the campaign against O'Neill and then in a set of thirteen articles concerning Irish policy more generally which were framed as questions to the lord treasurer.¹³⁵ This seems to have been the procedure for handling Ireland matters at court in the years before Burghley's death. Robert Cecil was by then receiving and initiating the bulk of Irish correspondence and was beginning to oversee the day-to-day administering of the kingdom the way his father and Walsingham once had. Cecil, however, continued to rely on Burghley's counsel, grounded as it was in decades of experience with Ireland matters. Elizabeth would have it no other way. When in early 1596 Norris raised questions to the secretary regarding how he should execute the privy council's instructions lately sent to him, the queen insisted that Cecil go to his father, who was then too ill to attend court, in order to get Burghley's opinion on the matters. Cecil sent back Burghley's answers to Norris, and though the lord treasurer was too sick to sign them, the secretary explained to Norris that they should serve as a warrant for action.¹³⁶ The following year, Secretary Cecil penned a memorandum to the lord treasurer in which he left behind a 'book of all Irish despatches' which he had worked through for the old man to cast his eyes over.¹³⁷

¹³³ Adam Loftus and Thomas Jones to Burghley, 22 November 1596, TNA, SP 63/195/27.

¹³⁴ Opinions of privy council (in Burghley's hand), 26 December 1596, TNA, SP 63/196/27; *APC*, 1596–97, 416–17 (quotation).

¹³⁵ A consideration of the plot and proiect sent out of Ireland, 30 March 1597, TNA, SP 63/198/52; Questions of Lord Burghley, founded upon certain articles concerning the affairs of Ireland, 1597, BL, Lansdowne MS 84, no. 40. I have not located the articles to which Burghley was responding, but the campaign was presented in outline in Lord Deputy Burgh and council to privy council, 4 July 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/7 (quotation).

¹³⁶ Robert Cecil to Norris, 13 April 1596, TNA, SP 63/188/30.

¹³⁷ Memorandum from Robert Cecil to Burghley, 1597, CP 58, fo. 10. For examples of Burghley's communications with his son on matters pertaining to Ireland in the mid-1590s, see his letters in CUL, MS Ee. III 56, nos. 7–9, 13, 27, 40, 75, 82, 99, 132.

It was in these circumstances that Burghley commented on the two documents which came before him in 1597. He noted that the campaign against O'Neill as it was set out in the original 'platt' made no provision for the defence of the realm in the event of a Spanish invasion. He then altered the 'platt' in light of the omission. In particular he identified the ports of Waterford, Limerick, and Galway as being especially vulnerable on account of the fact that their inhabitants had a long history of trading with Spain. Burghley suggested that 'a catalog of traytors servy[n]g y^e K of Spain' in the towns be compiled and placed at the lord deputy's disposal. His answers to the questions set out in the articles, probably in the spring or early summer, dealt primarily with the planned offensive against Tyrone, but also included suggestions for limiting the king of Scots' communication with the confederates and the pursuit of Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne's son in the Leinster mountains. Burghley devoted himself primarily to pointing up the logistical weaknesses in the plan to invade Tyrone. He questioned, for instance, the proposal, made with 'no counsell gyve[n]', that Burgh should lead an army of 5,000 men across the Blackwater, wondering how such an army could be marched 'so far, w^out a store of victell'. He indicated, moreover, that the article for garrisoning Lough Foyle was devoid of specific numbers and asked where the 5,000 soldiers projected to be placed under Clifford's command would be found. It is hard to judge to what extent the campaign was modified in light of Burghley's comments. It went ahead in mid-July, but intense fighting both at Ballyshannon and over the Blackwater forced Burgh to abandon his plans to march on to Lough Foyle. The difficulties which Burghley anticipated would arise from a shortage of victuals and soldiers were overshadowed, as it transpired, by the desertion of large numbers of soldiers under Burgh's command. The queen's soldiers were, according to the lord deputy, 'English raw and of the last levy'.¹³⁸ Having failed to deliver a decisive defeat to the confederates, the lord deputy pursued a policy of garrisoning the borders of Ulster and maintaining his hard-won fortification at the Blackwater river toward Tyrone.¹³⁹ This, as we shall see, guaranteed that the war against O'Neill would continue long after Burghley's death.

William Cecil was, for four decades, the guiding hand behind Elizabethan policy in Ireland. The queen valued his knowledge of Ireland and Ireland matters above that of any other. However, in adopting the proposals for the extension of Tudor rule in Ireland put forth by chief governors and other men with first-hand experience of the kingdom, Cecil appropriated for the crown a fundamental dilemma: the policies which were designed to eliminate obstacles to English rule became problems in their own right. The shiring of Irish lordships and the introduction of English structures of government, for example, rapidly extended English ground in Ireland over the course of Elizabeth's reign, but this led to new problems such as local officials' abuse of martial law. Irish policy under Cecil's guidance thus had a

¹³⁸ Lord Deputy Burgh to lord chancellor and council in Ireland, 23 July 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/55(i).

¹³⁹ For the campaign, see Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, iii. 284–7; Cyril Falls, *Elizabeth's Irish wars* (London, 1950), 201–7.

circular quality to it, with Cecil—first as secretary and then as lord treasurer—reacting to problems many of which were created by policies which he had supported. Cecil of course, if he had had it his way, would have seen Elizabeth entrust the responsibility for the making and implementation of policy in her kingdom of Ireland to a chief governor. Elizabeth never agreed to this—we are left to wonder how this might have worked out in practice—so Cecil assumed a degree of responsibility for directing royal policy in the kingdom which he thought was inappropriate. Yet if the queen would not countenance granting total authority to her representative in Ireland then Cecil ensured at least that the strategies for Ireland's reform which these men proposed would form the basis for Tudor policy there. In this, Cecil was most influenced by the ideas of men like Croft, Sussex, and Sidney, whose experiences of Ireland were forged in the mid-Tudor period. Long after they had shuffled off the Irish stage Burghley's continued influence on the making of policy for Ireland ensured that their ideas on how to reform the kingdom lived on. But the destruction wrought in Ireland by the rebellions of the early 1580s and Burghley's own obsessive attention to the planting of English colonies in Munster, set against the backdrop of the plots to kill Elizabeth which crowded round the queen of Scots and England's war with Spain at sea and on the continent, caused the prospect of a reformed kingdom of Ireland to recede from Burghley's view. It was only after 1590, after the defeat of the rebellions in Ireland, after the establishment of the Munster plantation, after the execution of Mary Stewart, and after the defeat of the Armada, that Burghley returned to the consideration of Irish policy. Though he was by then old and infirm, the overhaul of the government of Ireland, most notably the reform of the execution of justice, which he oversaw in the early 1590s, was a significant undertaking. It shows that Tudor policy in Ireland was not, even in the last full decade of Elizabeth's reign, set inexorably on a course of conquest and coercion in Ireland. That this reform initiative came at a time when the structures of English government had been introduced, however tentatively, in most parts of the kingdom offered Burghley hope that Ireland's reform was finally within reach.¹⁴⁰ But the rebellion which erupted in Ulster and continued beyond Cecil's death in 1598 overshadowed much of what he had achieved in Ireland.

For Cecil, the overarching goal of royal policy for Ireland was to see the kingdom reduced to English rule. As he explained to Sidney in July 1567, the lord deputy was 'God's instrument und^r the Q. Maty, for y^e reducyng of that crowne to be hono^rably and proffitably a[n]nexed to y^e crowne of England as well in dede as it hath bene in phrase'.¹⁴¹ With the establishment in Scotland from 1561 of an English-backed Protestant regime, his nightmare scenario was that of a Catholic power invading Ireland—the area in the British Isles where Tudor influence was weakest. All of the energy which Cecil devoted to the framing of policy for Ireland in his career can be seen as efforts to prevent such an eventuality. He went so far as to prepare emergency plans in the event the kingdom was invaded: in 1571 he

¹⁴⁰ This is discussed in greater detail below, 160–2.

¹⁴¹ Cecil to Sidney, 6 July 1567, TNA, SP 63/21/50.

drew up notes entitled 'upon adv[er]tisements fro[m] Spayne', which recommended the immediate dispatch of men and ships from England, backed by a diplomatic offensive, to defend Ireland; in 1590 he provided Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam with £10,000 'to be kept sacred for the defence of the realm against foreign invasion till we see what shall follow of this summer threatenings'.¹⁴² Given that the last years of Elizabeth's reign saw O'Neill's confederacy wage a near decade-long rebellion against the crown and the landing of a substantial Spanish army on Irish soil in 1601 to support them, William Cecil's policies for the government of the kingdom can only be judged to have failed.

¹⁴² Burghley's Memorial...devising means to withstand invasion threatened to Ireland, 9 March 1571, TNA, SP 63/31/19; Burghley to Fitzwilliam, 2 July 1590, TNA, SP 63/154/38(i).

5

Money

Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, succeeded Sir William Paulet, first marquess of Winchester, as lord high treasurer of England in July 1572. Paulet had died in March, having been head of the royal treasury for twenty-one years. Cecil's appointment as treasurer, among the most ancient offices of state in the kingdom of England, followed hard on his elevation to the peerage as first Baron Burghley and was a reflection of his prominence in the by now maturing Elizabethan regime. The new office also heralded a shift in his relationship with Ireland. The former secretary would now play a much greater role in the regulation of the economy of the kingdom of Ireland which, though subordinate to the larger economy of England, had its own coinage, customs revenue, and its own exchequer which collected and disbursed the revenues generated there. Burghley's appointment as treasurer, however, also effected a change in the function of the office with regard to Ireland. Lord Treasurer Paulet had during his tenure routinely deferred to Cecil decisions on most money matters which pertained to the kingdom of Ireland. In 1561, for example, Paulet refused to release money to the undertreasurer of Ireland until he had received instruction from Secretary Cecil to do so.¹ From 1572, however, direct responsibility for the queen's treasury was combined in a minister who exercised unequalled influence on the character and direction of Tudor rule in Ireland. As he had done through his occupation of the office of secretary, William Cecil was to transform the office of treasurer into the most important post in Tudor government.

The principal fiscal responsibility with relation to Ireland facing Burghley as lord treasurer was the provision from England and Wales of the supplies (victuals), the soldiers, the equipment, and the money payments that were necessary not only to keep the machinery of Tudor rule in Ireland turning, but to see its remit expanded. Owing chiefly to the growing military establishment in Ireland, Tudor government there had become dependent on monetary subventions from England, amounting to approximately £34,000 per annum at the time of Burghley's appointment as treasurer.² This aspect of the Anglo-Irish relationship was anathema to the Tudors. 'The basic desideratum of all Tudor governments in their dealings with Ireland' was, as Brady so neatly put it, to defend 'England's interests in the island in the cheapest possible manner'.³ Queen Elizabeth, whose treasure it was being pumped

¹ Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 22 August 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/40.

² Anthony Sheehan, 'Irish revenues and English subventions, 1559–1622', *PRIA*, sect. C, 90 (1990), 35–65.

³ Brady, *Chief governors*, 16.

into Ireland and whose unwillingness to part with money is renowned, was no different. As a result, the royal presence was much more evident in discussions of matters fiscal than it was in other areas pertaining to Ireland. Burghley, for his part, understood that expenditure on Ireland had to be conducted within the context of the wider fiscal concerns of a Tudor state whose commitments also included maintaining the queen's political and military standing in Britain and Europe, not to mention the day-to-day running of government in the kingdom of England. In his nearly thirty years as treasurer, Burghley tried to strike a balance between the queen's and his own instinctual desire to limit expenditure in Ireland and the need to provide the financial backing necessary to see Tudor rule extended throughout the kingdom.

The economy of Ireland and its relationship to the economy of England in the later sixteenth century has yet to receive a comprehensive historical study. This chapter intends to touch on the broad lines of the subject through the exploration of some of the most prominent features of William Cecil's role in the economic relationship between the two kingdoms.⁴ It will begin with a discussion of Cecil's efforts early in Elizabeth's reign to include the Irish currency in his broader strategy to overhaul the currency of England—the so-called recoinage—in the wake of the debasements of the mid-Tudor period. The episode provided Cecil with his first sustained insight into the functioning of the separate but dependent economy of Ireland within the Tudor state. The remainder of the chapter will show how, as lord treasurer, Lord Burghley's aspiration of making Ireland an economically self-sustaining and ultimately a profitable kingdom for the crown was overtaken by his need to finance with the resources of England a permanent military establishment and a series of wars to maintain control of the kingdom.

For the life of the Tudor state two currencies existed within it: the one English and the other Irish, the latter intended exclusively for use in Ireland. The currency of Ireland was minted under the auspices of the English crown, but since 1460 it had been separate from England's currency and, to prevent its use in England, was generally worth two-thirds of a pound sterling.⁵ But the interrelatedness of the Irish and English economies, the tendency for merchants to pass off similar-looking but inferior Irish coins in England, and the steady influx of men and material from England into Ireland as the century progressed, meant Ireland's currency was a perennial cause for concern for the lord treasurer of England. Burghley was well prepared to address this subject. He had already encountered the problems arising from a separate Irish currency in Edward VI's reign. The debasement of the Irish coinage, which began in 1534 with the establishment of an 'Irish mint' at the Tower of London to produce lower-grade coins, had seen the value of 'coin of the

⁴ Eighty years on, A. K. Longfield's study remains the exception, *Anglo-Irish trade in the sixteenth century* (London, 1929). An overview of the Irish economy after 1550 may be found in Raymond Gillespie, *The transformation of the Irish economy, 1550–1700* (Dundalk, 1991).

⁵ For this, see S. G. Ellis, 'The struggle for control of the Irish mint, 1460–c.1506', *PRIA*, sect. C, 78 (1978), 30–4. Cf. J. M. McDowell, 'The devaluation of 1460 and the origins of the Irish pound', *IHS* 25 (1986), 19–28.

harp' or 'harps' (so-called because of the symbol which appeared on the reverse of Irish coins) sink as low as 3 oz (.250) by the time of Henry VIII's death. Early efforts to restore the value of Ireland's currency in Edward's reign had seen the re-establishment of a mint at Dublin and the issue of coins worth 4 oz (.333); but this was as against the 11 oz fine being issued in England from April 1551 as part of Northumberland's scheme to reverse the ravages wrought by nearly a decade of debasement there.⁶ From his arrival in Ireland in 1551, Lord Deputy Croft identified the discrepancies between the two currencies as the root of the 'grete darthe soddenly ryssen', that is the sharp price rise which the kingdom of Ireland was experiencing.⁷ Specie in Ireland was of added importance because, as Croft explained: 'The Yrishemen ar in best case, for he hath least nede of money, he careth onley for his bealy [belly] and not that delicately... we that ar stypendaries must lyve upon our stypends, and by with our money whiche no man estemeth'.⁸ The use and dependence on money also formed part of the cultural divide in Tudor Ireland.

With the support of the kingdom's lords, gentlemen, and merchants, Croft and the king's council in Ireland appealed to Northumberland and the privy council to bring the Irish currency to the same standard as English money.⁹ Croft then raised the matter with Cecil individually in the hope that the young secretary, who had already persuaded Northumberland to authorize a recoinage in England, would use his influence to have the council address the currency in Ireland.¹⁰ Cecil, however, had already shown in his marginalia—printed beside Croft's recommendation 'that the money may be of lyke value as it is in England'—the privy council's inclination for lowering the Irish currency to a 3 oz standard.¹¹ From the perspective of Edward's councillors, calling in the base monies circulating in Ireland and replacing them with a higher grade of silver was, at this juncture, just too costly. A possible remedy was the discovery and refinement of precious metals at source, and the crown was already funding an exploratory mining operation to this end in County Wexford. But the quantity of precious metals in Ireland was known to be meagre and the Edwardian enterprise in Wexford—notwithstanding the presence there of a group of German miners ('Almains' as they were called)—came to little.¹² Only Edward VI's premature death in July 1553, and the collapse of Northumberland's

⁶ Michael Dolley, *Medieval Anglo-Irish coins* (London, 1972), 40–1; id., 'The Irish coinage, 1534–1691', in *NHI* iii. 410–11; Cf. C. E. Challis, *The Tudor coinage* (Manchester, 1978).

⁷ Croft to Northumberland, 11 November 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/63; Croft's opinion touching the currency, 22 December 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/80(i) (quotation).

⁸ Croft to Winchester, 22 March 1552, TNA, SP 61/4/31.

⁹ Croft and council to privy council, 27 January 1552, TNA, SP 61/4/5; Common supplication to privy council, 27 January 1552, TNA, SP 61/4/5(ii).

¹⁰ John Guy, *Tudor England* (Oxford, 1988), 217; Croft to Cecil, 14 March 1552, TNA, SP 61/4/27.

¹¹ Instructions to Mr Wood, 29 September 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/54; see above 79.

¹² Joachim Gundelfinger to privy council, 12 January 1552, TNA, SP 61/4/1; Extracts from the daily book of check of the Almains, February 1553, TNA, SP 61/4/77. Cf. Des Cowman, 'The German mining operation at Bannow Bay, 1551–52', *Journal of the Wexford Historical Society*, 11 (1986–7), 67–82.

regime, saved Cecil from having to reckon with what Croft had vividly described as the 'great misery' in Ireland 'by reason of bad state of currency'.

But the matter of the Irish coinage was waiting for Cecil when he returned to a position of influence at the start of Elizabeth's reign. In the intervening five years, the Marian regime had abandoned the Wexford mining operation and reopened the 'Irish mint' in the Tower. Mary's government produced more than £125,000 worth of 'harp money'—base coinage (3 oz fine shillings)—for use in Ireland which did little to remedy the dearth there.¹³ For the first year or two of Elizabeth's reign production in England of base coinage for Ireland continued. However, Cecil intended to address Ireland's currency as part of a wider move to place the debased currency of England on a sound and stable footing. The new secretary had played a key role in convincing Northumberland of the benefits of a restoration of the integrity of English silver and, under the continued direction in all matters fiscal of his friend the merchant and financier Sir Thomas Gresham, Cecil argued a similar line to the new queen.¹⁴ The result was the successful overhaul of the coinage in England: the rate of the base coin was devalued ('decried') by a quarter in late 1560, and by late 1561, £670,000 of base money had been collected and replaced with new coins with higher silver content (11 oz fine).¹⁵ The recoinage was a remarkable achievement for an early modern government. It has been argued that the consensus among Elizabeth's councillors was that the provision of a single monetary standard across the two kingdoms would place English merchants at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their counterparts in Ireland.¹⁶ This, however, was only a secondary concern. A more likely explanation for the council's reluctance to establish a single currency for Elizabeth's kingdoms was the fear, prevalent in contemporary thinking, that coinage would naturally gravitate toward large centres of commerce and trade, so denuding of specie more remote and less densely populated areas like Ireland. Still, Cecil understood that Ireland and its currency had to be addressed in order for the recoinage in England to be successfully undertaken. As early as July 1559, Cecil identified 'y^e decrye[n]g of y^e base mony there' and 'y^e raty[n]g of English mony there' as essential points to be considered for Ireland.¹⁷ He also contemplated 'the rate of quoyne and whether the harped monye shalbe current in Ireland or called in to the myntte in Ingla[n]d'.¹⁸

¹³ Queen's instructions for St Leger, October 1553, TNA, SP 62/1/2; Memorandum of harp money made for Ireland in the mint within the Tower, 4 February 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/14; Sussex to Secretary Boxoll, 3 June 1558, TNA, SP 62/2/49.

¹⁴ Burgon, *The life and times of Sir Thomas Gresham*, i. 485; Challis, *The Tudor coinage*, 125.

¹⁵ Challis, *The Tudor coinage*, 118–27. Crawford's analysis of the Irish privy council's role in the recoinage represents the only attempt in the recent secondary literature to draw attention to the fiscal policy pursued by the Elizabethan regime in Ireland in the early 1560s: *Anglicizing the government of Ireland*, 359–69.

¹⁶ Crawford, *Anglicizing the government of Ireland*, 362.

¹⁷ A memorial in Cecil's hand relative to the points to be considered for the dispatch of Sussex, 16 July 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/47 (quotation); Remembrance for the causes of Ireland, 16 July 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/48.

¹⁸ Memorandum of deputies and officers in Ireland, 16 July 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/66.

Days later, Elizabeth informed the earl of Sussex, then preparing to return to Ireland as deputy, that 'a masse of [English] monyes', lately coined in the Tower, was being sent over to Ireland. She instructed him to 'rate', that is to tariff, the already debased English money, so that each teston, worth 6*d.* in England, would be valued at 8*d.* in Ireland. The queen also authorized Sussex and the council in Ireland to issue a proclamation decrying recently issued money: rose pennies, harp groats, and harp shillings were to be valued, respectively, at ½*d.*, 2½*d.*, and 7½*d.*¹⁹ But the appearance in September 1560 of the proclamation announcing the devaluation of the English coinage upset the already ambiguous relationship between the two currencies.²⁰ Sussex wrote to Cecil expressing his concern that 'strangers' might carry base English coins into Ireland and pass them there at greater value.²¹ To prevent the transportation of base coins to Ireland, Cecil saw that security was tightened at certain English and all Irish ports.²² More importantly, however, the effects in Ireland of the imminent devaluation of the English currency had to be addressed. Cecil's annotations can be found on a series of documents from late 1560 in which he attempted to come to grips with both the values of Irish coins vis-à-vis the new English currency and the amount of base coin then in circulation in Ireland.²³ This was no mean feat, and not only because the early modern understanding of the causes in the fluctuations in the value of currency was limited. Older money dating back to the fourteenth century was still in circulation in Ireland alongside the newer debased Irish currency and, inevitably, English money. An analysis of these documents reveals that the government intended to decry all Irish monies and rate them against English money, the former being generally accounted as being worth two-thirds of an English pound. The prospect was also held out that Ireland would, in the near future, be 'comforted w' fyne monyes, as of ancie[n]t tyme was used'. Regulating the currency in Ireland, and setting the value of the coins lower than the worth of their metal content, would, it was hoped, turn the crown a healthy profit, as the recoinage in England was shortly to do.²⁴ With Elizabeth's letter to Sussex in December to this effect, this became official government policy.²⁵

Over the next year Cecil worked, through the queen's council in Ireland, to ensure that the broad outline for the reform of the Irish currency set out in later 1560 was implemented.²⁶ Prompted by Sussex's complaints about the ambiguity of

¹⁹ Queen to Sussex, 19 July 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/68; Challis, *The Tudor coinage*, 321.

²⁰ Proclamation for calling in all base money from circulation, 27 September 1560, TNA, SP 12/13/39.

²¹ Sussex to Cecil, 24 October 1560, TNA, SP 63/2/39.

²² Winchester, Sackville, and Mildmay to Cecil, 12 December 1560, TNA, SP 12/14/59.

²³ Queen (in Cecil's hand) to Sussex, 15 December 1560, TNA, SP 63/2/50; A note of the monies now current in Ireland, 20 December 1560, TNA, SP 63/2/53; An estimate of the base monies in Ireland, 20 December 1560, TNA, SP 63/2/55; Memorandum of rates for the base monies in Ireland, 20 December 1560, TNA, SP 63/2/56.

²⁴ Frederic Youngs (ed.), *The proclamations of the Tudor queens* (Cambridge, 1976), 105.

²⁵ Queen to Sussex and lord chancellor, 21 December 1560, TNA, SP 63/2/57.

²⁶ Memorial by Cecil, 14 April 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/54; Crawford, *Anglicizing the government of Ireland*, 359–69.

the queen's instructions for the currency, the secretary wrote a detailed paper which restated the crown's position and which, in light of Sussex's corrections, computed the value of Irish money against English money. Irish money was, to employ Cecil's own words, to be valued 'a fourth part above y^e value' of English money: 12*d.* sterling would be accounted 16*d.* Irish; 6*d.* sterling would be accounted 8*d.* Irish; 3*d.* sterling would be 4*d.* Irish.²⁷ Cecil's 'memorial' formed the basis for the queen's subsequent order in March to decay the Irish currency.²⁸ Central to the enterprise was the establishment of a mint in Ireland. Cecil placed great store in such an undertaking. A site was chosen in Dublin, near the sea and near to the forests of south Dublin whose woods were to fire the mint's furnaces.²⁹ The Dublin apothecary Thomas Smyth, the same man who, as we shall see, furnished Cecil with an extensive description of Irish society around this time, also apparently possessed some expertise in metallurgy: he was charged with overseeing the operation which was to produce Ireland's fine money.³⁰ Cecil originally intended for the base coins to be brought to Dublin where they would be converted into fine silver, but when the cost of erecting a Dublin mint became evident the operation was abandoned: acting on Cecil's advice the queen decided that all such coins of Ireland should be brought to the mint in the Tower where the bringer would receive a favourable rate of exchange.³¹ The mint in England also began producing in March 1561 a series of Irish shillings and groats (11 oz fine). The new money was possessed of very nearly the same silver content as English money, but was of lesser weight and was thus worth two-thirds of its English equivalents.³²

The 'crying down' of the Irish currency and the provision of new Elizabethan coins was not without its difficulties. Though proclamations emanating from the Irish privy council strictly forbade it, merchants reportedly hoarded Irish coins, while others carried the currency out of the kingdom. In July, moreover, Sussex and the Irish council pointed to what they deemed to be errors in the rates of the various Irish coins sent over from England.³³ This last difficulty Cecil referred to the treasurers of the mint in London—Thomas Stanley and Thomas Fleetwood—who were quick to indicate that Sussex and the council had miscalculated and that the rates were in fact correct.³⁴ Hoarding and carrying money out of Ireland, however, was almost impossible to stop entirely. The Irish council worked with the merchants of the major cities and towns of Dublin, Waterford, and Drogheda to

²⁷ Sussex to queen, 13 January 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/1; Cecil's memorial for money matters of Ireland, 16 February 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/19.

²⁸ Queen to Lord Justice Fitzwilliams and lord chancellor, 8 March 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/34.

²⁹ Lord justice and council to queen, 5 May 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/65.

³⁰ Thomas Smyth to Cecil, 5 May 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/66.

³¹ Memorial by Cecil, 14 April 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/54; queen (in Cecil's hand) to Sussex, 16 June 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/6; Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 23 June 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/12.

³² 'Hibernia' appeared prominently on the obverse of new coins, while a crowned shield adorned with three harps was displayed on their reverse: Dolley, *Medieval Anglo-Irish coins*, 44; Herbert Grueber, *Handbook of the coins of Great Britain and Ireland in the British Museum* (London, 1899), 232.

³³ Crawford, *Anglicizing the government of Ireland*, 364–7; Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 25 March 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/43; 14 July 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/18.

³⁴ Thomas Stanley and Thomas Fleetwood to Cecil, 4 August 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/26.

have the base coins in their possession conveyed *en masse* to the London mint, but it is difficult to gauge how successful this policy was.³⁵ The new Irish shillings and groats, meanwhile, do not seem to have been produced in sufficient quantity to replace the older Irish coins (of varying vintage) that continued to circulate in the kingdom. In practice, as Michael Dolley argued, the more valuable English currency flooded into the kingdom, creating what was in effect a two-tier currency of Irish money and English money.³⁶ Cecil had initially hoped to prohibit the circulation of English money in Ireland 'but such as shall be coyned w^t harps'; but this was never viable.³⁷ Sussex's request that he and his entourage be paid in sterling—previous English governors had been paid this way he explained—was granted.³⁸ Cecil himself wrote that while the 'ordynary' garrison would be paid in Irish money, what he referred to as the 'extraordinary' garrison was to be paid in sterling. In the following decades the latter more than doubled, so reinforcing the kingdom's need for sterling. In short, Tudor government in Ireland could not function without sterling, and there is no evidence to suggest that Cecil made any effort after 1561 to see additional coins minted for Ireland. The minting of 'harp money', in either kingdom, was probably too expensive an operation to be continued; with concern, and costs, growing over the increasingly aggressive behaviour of Shane O'Neill, the secretary was content to see that the new valuation of money which he had helped guide to completion in England was at least acknowledged in Ireland. The Tudor state's dual monetary system would continue to cause confusion, but owing to the steady influx of sterling alongside the existence of older Irish money Ireland was never devoid of specie.

By the time Burghley was appointed treasurer a decade later the economic relationship between England and Ireland had long since ceased to pivot on the matter of the Irish currency. For Elizabeth, the 1560s in Ireland had been, above all, a decade of expenditure. The crown had diverted more than £300,000 from its coffers into the kingdom of Ireland in these years, a figure well above the crown's total estimated annual revenue of £200,000 in Elizabeth's first decade.³⁹ It had seen Tudor rule extended and strengthened in many parts of the kingdom, but as the area under the queen's effective control increased so too did her costs; the wars against Shane O'Neill and the recent suppression of the rebellions which had broken forth in parts of Munster, Leinster, and Connaught in 1569–70 increased royal expenditure still further.⁴⁰ The overriding goal of the 1570s (and thereafter) was to see the crown's expenditure in Ireland diminished. The clearest signal of the new fiscal determinism was the appointment as deputy at the end of 1571 of Burghley's confidant Sir William Fitzwilliam. Fitzwilliam was not wedded to any of the grand (and costly) 'programmes' for government which had characterized

³⁵ Proclamation for decrying the base coins of Ireland, July 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/18.

³⁶ Dolley, *Medieval Anglo-Irish coins*, 45.

³⁷ Memorial for money matters of Ireland by Cecil, 16 February 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/19.

³⁸ Private requests of Sussex, 22 May 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/27.

³⁹ Brady, *Chief governors*, 135–6; Penry Williams, *The Tudor regime* (Oxford, 1979), 71.

⁴⁰ David Edwards, 'The Butler revolt of 1569', *IHS* 28 (1992–3), 228–55; Maginn, 'Civilizing' *Gaelic Leinster*, 120–1.

the viceroalties of Sussex and Sidney and had set the course of Tudor policy in Ireland for the previous decade. As an experienced royal servant in Ireland, and a former undertreasurer, the ever-cautious Fitzwilliam was thought to be the ideal choice to see costs cut and innovation resisted.

In the months before his appointment as treasurer, Burghley identified Ireland's swollen military establishment as an area of excessive charge to the crown. A document was prepared for him in February, showing the number of soldiers in pay but who could not serve in the field; it was one of several papers setting out ways to reduce the queen's charges in Ireland.⁴¹ Cecil had investigated the state of the army in Ireland before. In 1561 he asked that Fitzwilliam, then the lord justice, provide him with the name of every soldier in the Irish military establishment, with a view to assessing the true costs of maintaining an army in the kingdom.⁴² And it was around this time that Cecil was said to have asked his learned friend Sir Thomas Smith, 'What was th'ordinary wage of a soldier at Rome', prompting the latter to dedicate his 1562 treatise 'The wages of a Roman footsoldier' to the secretary.⁴³ Smith's study noticed a direct correlation between a debased coinage and high prices and high wages: with the recoinage complete Cecil could expect the queen's costs arising from her army in Ireland to go down. But the threat posed by O'Neill, together with the exhortations of influential figures at court like Sussex and Sidney for a larger army, combined to ensure that the military establishment increased in size with little civilian oversight. Cecil, as we have seen, backed this intensification of Tudor involvement in Ireland (particularly those policies pursued by Sidney)—with the notable exception of an interlude during Nicholas Arnold's government (1564–6) when the secretary sought the reform of the disposal of money for military uses. Cecil was thus complicit in the army's largely unregulated growth for over a decade.⁴⁴ Abuse in the financing of the army was, of course, a perennial problem during Elizabeth's reign, but the cost and the number of soldiers in the queen's pay in Ireland, at a time when the kingdom faced no immediate external military threat, demanded attention.⁴⁵ The privy council's response was to draw up a Book of articles designed to tackle what it described as 'the excessive & importable charge grown' in Ireland.⁴⁶ The Book enumerated thirty-nine areas across the military establishment in the kingdom, ranging from the deputy's personal retinue to the numbers in garrisons and in receipt of pensions, where either the numbers

⁴¹ Remembrances for savings in Ireland, 10 January 1572, TNA, SP 63/35/10; Memoranda of defalcations and savings to be effected in the establishment of Ireland, 18 February 1572, TNA, SP 63/35/14; Memorandum drawn up for Burghley, 24 February 1572, TNA, SP 63/35/18.

⁴² Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 25 March 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/43; Book of the last musters of the queen's army, TNA, SP 63/3/47(i).

⁴³ Mary Dewar, 'The authorship of the "Discourse of the commonweal"', *Economic History Review*, 19 (1966), 390–1.

⁴⁴ A brief note of things to be ordered for the reformation of payments of the garrison in Ireland, September 1563, TNA, SP 63/9/26; Commission to enquire into the disposal of money for military uses, December 1565, BL, Lansdowne MS 8, no. 41.

⁴⁵ C. G. Cruikshank, 'Dead-pays in the Elizabethan army', *EHR* 53 (1938), 93–7.

⁴⁶ Articles for the government of Ireland, 3 March 1572, TNA, SP 63/35/27. At the end of what was either a draft or a copy of the document Burghley wrote: 'signed by y^e whole consell at Westm[inster]. 3 Martii 1571 a^o xv^o Elizab[eth]'

of soldiers in pay might be reduced or measures might be taken to achieve greater efficiency and transparency. It concluded with a clause which sought to hold the deputy and council to greater account for the instructions sent from England:

greate lacke is found that her Ma^{tie} hath not bene adv[er]tised howe nor in what sorte her comandemente or directions have been executed... her Ma^{tie} dothe now charge the said deputie & counsell that they shall at the ende of every quarter or oftenor if cause so requier, distinctlie certifie her Ma^{tie} or her counsell in what sorte they do p[ro]ceede in the execucon of her Ma^{tie} orders.

Fitzwilliam was loath to see the instructions contained in the Book of articles implemented. In the lord deputy's view, a smaller army would only invite attacks against his government. Fitzwilliam explained to the privy council that he was not in a position to reduce the army because Leicester had lately furnished him with intelligence that a rebellion and a Spanish invasion was imminent. Indeed in 1572 Fitzwilliam requested additional troops and money so as to better protect the kingdom.⁴⁷ It was the first of a series of letters which sought to impress upon the councillors the danger of the situation: the deputy wrote that the Book of articles had turned the soldiers against him, leaving the country 'in such a joyllitie by heringe that so many souldiars shuld be dischargd as almost they begyn to ringe us awaye'; in letters to Burghley he predicted 'fyer rownd a bought in every quarter' if the Book's contents were implemented. He intimated, moreover, that in the event of a Spanish invasion Ireland might be lost just as England's possessions in France had been lost in the fifteenth century.⁴⁸ Burghley held firm, however, marshalling the council in England to press Fitzwilliam to reduce costs. In adopting this approach to the government of Ireland, Burghley could only have enjoyed the support of his penurious queen.

The result was a memorial for government which restated the crown's commitment to reducing the military as outlined in the Book of articles and identified additional areas where the lord deputy and council might make further 'diminution of hir Ma^{ty} excessive charges'.⁴⁹ To judge by his careful working over of the document, Burghley played a central role in its preparation. His chief intention as expressed in the new dispensation was to ascertain the queen's yearly charge in the kingdom and then to send over treasure from England in quarterly instalments. This was primarily to more efficiently pay the garrison which Fitzwilliam was instructed to muster quarterly. The deputy was also to register the names of every soldier in a roll to be delivered to the clerk of the cheque 'whereof there shall be no cha[n]ge of any person to be newly e[n]tered but by speciall argreme[n]t and warra[n]t signed by y^e depute'. The roll was then to be reviewed at each muster. In this way, Burghley hoped to dissuade captains from claiming treasure for soldiers that did not exist—so-called 'dead-pays'—and address the growing problem caused

⁴⁷ Fitzwilliam to privy council, 24 March 1572, TNA, SP 63/35/40. Fear of a Spanish invasion began in February: Fitzwilliam to privy council, 27 February 1572, TNA, SP 63/35/24.

⁴⁸ Fitzwilliam to privy council, 15 April 1572, TNA, SP 63/36/3; Fitzwilliam to privy council, 8 May 1572, TNA, SP 63/36/17; Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 15 April 1572, TNA, SP 63/36/4.

⁴⁹ Instructions and memorial of things meet for the better government of Ireland, 24 April 1572, TNA, SP 63/36/11.

by soldiers and captains returning to England without licence. Beyond the army, the cost to the exchequer of the provincial councils in Munster and Connaught also came under scrutiny. The queen was grieved, the memorial explained, for she had expected the councils to bring

hir people in those provinces to better obedience, as allso for y^e recovery of hir revenues wthin the same provinces . . . that neyther of y^e sayd effects have folowed, but that rather more disobedience hath folowed . . . and y^e lack of any recovery of any revenue not only co[n]tinued, but . . . increased hir charges directly contrary to hir expectation.

When compared to ‘formar yeres’, moreover, revenues from the crown’s lands in Ireland were found to be diminished. The deputy and council were instructed to consider how best to make the provincial councils profitable and increase the revenues flowing into the exchequer. Finally, the phenomenon of ‘concordatums’ was broached. These were extraordinary money payments, authorized by the privy council, which were made to individuals in return for a variety of services rendered to the government—a kind of ‘slush-fund’ that greased the wheels of Tudor government in Ireland. During the 1560s the expense to the crown of concordatums had grown excessive, and Fitzwilliam was ordered to make a quarterly report to the queen, or to her council in England, of all such special payments.

The lord deputy reluctantly complied. In May 1572 he compiled a document for Burghley, showing the names of the soldiers to be discharged; next month he sent the queen an official book containing the total numbers of the garrison remaining in pay and those men who had been discharged.⁵⁰ In adhering to the Book of articles, Fitzwilliam shed 1,674 men from the garrison. Burghley (after an initial miscalculation) carefully glossed ‘1674’ at the end of the deputy’s book. The deputy also made his first quarterly declaration of all concordatums entered into since March.⁵¹ So as to ease the transition to a smaller garrison, Burghley saw that £9,300 sterling was paid to Fitzwilliam, who proceeded to pay out a third of the money to discharged soldiers, another third for victualling, and the final third for what he described as ‘growing’ charges. But Fitzwilliam immediately demanded 800 additional men and more money.⁵² The earl of Clanrickard’s sons had broken out in rebellion in Connaught, the deputy explained, and he doubted the capacity of Sir Edward Fitton, president of Connaught, whom he also mistrusted, to suppress it. Burghley, by now lord treasurer, viewed the situation primarily in financial terms: it was, he wrote privately to Leicester, likely ‘to breed cost’.⁵³ Still, the ‘cost’ of governing Ireland to the English exchequer had been reduced, and largely through Burghley’s efforts: expenditure dropped from approximately £34,000 for 1571–2 to just under £13,000 for 1572–3.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Memorandum for Burghley, 8 May 1572, TNA, SP 63/36/17; Book of the garrison lately discharged, 1 June 1572, TNA, SP 63/36/46(ii).

⁵¹ Declarations of concordatums, 30 June 1572, TNA, SP 63/36/46(v).

⁵² Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 1 July 1572, TNA, SP 63/37/1.

⁵³ Burghley to Leicester, 10 August 1572, TNA, SP 12/89/3.

⁵⁴ Sheehan, ‘Irish revenues’, 41; Memorial of revenue and expenses, April 1573, TNA, SP 63/40/23.

But keeping costs down proved impossible. The fact remained that significant areas of the kingdom were as yet beyond the effective control of the crown, leaving those that were vulnerable to attack. The extension and preservation of Tudor rule in Ireland demanded a standing army, and an army required money beyond that which could be found in the meagre revenues of Ireland: for 1572–3 the clear remain of the Irish revenues amounted to a little less than £4,500.⁵⁵ Burghley understood the situation. For all of Elizabeth's bluster about the necessity of reducing her charges, he knew that cost-cutting measures had to be undertaken without weakening the Irish executive to the point of jeopardizing the Tudor state. It was in this spirit that he drafted a letter for the queen to Fitzwilliam in late 1572 appointing a sum of money to be sent over and authorizing him to increase the garrison as the deputy thought necessary.⁵⁶ The lord treasurer's recognition of the crown's responsibilities in Ireland helps to explain his avid support of the privately financed colonial enterprises which were being attempted in Ulster at this time. Indeed it was hoped that some of the men brought to Ireland in August by Thomas Smith junior might be used to bolster the lord deputy's diluted military retinue.⁵⁷ As we have seen, however, the colonization ventures in Ulster backfired and became a further drain on royal finances.⁵⁸ Over the next four years the army increased in size—Burghley estimated the garrison to number 2,400 men in 1574—and the English exchequer was spending on average £35,244 annually on Ireland.⁵⁹ Burghley tracked these increases closely: he knew in detail the numbers in pay down to the number of impotent soldiers and the forty-three Irish horsemen and 266 kerne.⁶⁰ The collection of such exact statistics as a means to ascertain the precise level of expenditure necessary was to become a feature of Burghley's service as treasurer. This was, as Lawrence Stone has observed, evidence of a 'new mental outlook' at the centre of government which employed statistical knowledge as the basis for the framing of policy in Elizabeth's reign.⁶¹

Monitoring the queen's financial burden in Ireland was one thing, but alleviating it was another. One way to offset expenditure was to make the queen's subjects in Ireland pay for their own defence. The parliament of Ireland might be summoned and a subsidy sought. Though Sidney's parliament (1569–71) had already renewed the subsidy for another ten years, in 1574 Burghley suggested that 'a subsidy wold be had of y^e realme' to repay the crown if the queen consented to investing the money necessary to effect the 'generall reformation' of Ireland.⁶² He had been a firm supporter of the shiring of Irish lordships as counties in Ireland with a

⁵⁵ Sheehan, 'Irish revenues', 45.

⁵⁶ Queen to Fitzwilliam, 11 November 1572, TNA, SP 63/38/34.

⁵⁷ Queen to Fitzwilliam, 5 August 1572, TNA, SP 63/37/23.

⁵⁸ See above, 87–8.

⁵⁹ Lord treasurer's computations of soldiers, 22 March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/16; compiled from Sheehan, 'Irish revenues', 47.

⁶⁰ Conference between books of musters, 25 March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/27; Note of queen's charges in Ireland, March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/23.

⁶¹ Lawrence Stone, 'Elizabethan overseas trade', *Economic History Review*, 2 (1949), 31–2.

⁶² Victor Treadwell, 'The Irish parliament of 1569–71', *PRLA*, sect. C, 65 (1966), 57; Memorial, 16 March 1574, TNA, SP 63/45/10.

view not only to spreading English government and 'civility' but also to increasing the value of the subsidy.⁶³ Even an enlarged parliamentary subsidy in Ireland, however, levied at 13s. 4d. for every ploughland, would yield only a fraction of its English counterpart. In the memorial for government discussed above, Fitzwilliam was informed that the crown sought an 'abridgment of y^e charges now yet growing, or for some increase of revenue wⁱⁿ that realme to mainteyne y^e excess of y^e charges there'. Were such means not found, he was told, 'Hir Ma^{tie} seeth not how in tyme to come to continew y^e same w^{out} y^e extraordinary burden of y^e subiects of that realme w^{ch} hertofore hath bene very great and much to y^e mislykyng of hir Ma^{tie}'.⁶⁴

The 'burden' which so troubled the queen (and of which Burghley wrote) was the complex phenomenon known in Ireland as 'cess'. Cess referred to a variety of government impositions levied upon the civilian population of the country, most notably the crown's right to pre-empt food and procure transportation for the governor's retinue and the responsibility of the populace to victual soldiers, with beef, pork, mutton, and grain, at a price often fixed below market rate. And because it was English areas which were sufficiently populated and well stocked with provisions, the burden fell disproportionately on Palesmen. At the same time, the Pale community, more than any other community in Ireland, were possessed of the necessary legal and constitutional understanding of English law and custom to argue the illegality and the abuse of these exactions. Ciaran Brady's painstakingly detailed analysis of cess has revealed not only the material cost of the practice to the country, but also the creeping social and political disaffection which it caused.⁶⁵ According to Brady's admittedly conservative calculations, each soldier in Ireland cost the country an estimated 29s. per month. If the army numbered 2,400 as it did in 1574, then the equivalent of £3,480 a month, or £41,760 a year, was paid by the country in cess.⁶⁶ Still, the leaders of the Pale community agreed, in early 1572, to 'remit and forgive unto the Queen's Majesty all such sums of money and debt as is due unto us by any way for finding, tabling, and victualling of the soldiers'. It was also agreed that the inhabitants of the English Pale would continue the provision of the soldiers in garrison.⁶⁷ In return, Fitzwilliam pledged to have the soldiers stationed in garrisons upon the Pale's borders for three years. Burghley, speaking through the queen's letter, sought repeatedly to have the lord deputy put a value on 'y^e gift w^{ch} the contrey gave to us, in remitty[n]g of y^e dett of o^r garriso[n] for victell and such lyk', so that the crown might better comprehend its debt and, in future, remunerate the country for its charges.⁶⁸ Cess, however, proved too amorphous a phenomenon for Fitzwilliam to quantify to Burghley's satisfaction; and, for all the threats to the contrary, Elizabeth was reluctant to compel her loyal

⁶³ Memoranda for Ireland, 1 April 1570, TNA, SP 63/30/39.

⁶⁴ Instructions and memorial of things meet for the better government of Ireland, 24 April 1572, TNA, SP 63/36/11.

⁶⁵ Brady, *Chief governors*, 209–44.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 223.

⁶⁷ Articles concerning cess, 18 February 1572, LPL, 619, fo. 109.

⁶⁸ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 1 July 1572, TNA, SP 63/37/1; queen to Fitzwilliam, 30 December 1572, TNA, SP 63/38/62 (quotation).

subjects in the Pale to pay for a greater proportion of the military establishment when they were already paying an annual subsidy and living with the burden of cess.

The propensity for the military establishment to abuse the cess was well known in England. Burghley read, and heard, countless reports of the soldiers' oppressions in Ireland. The earl of Desmond's relation to the lord treasurer in 1577 of the plight of the common sort was particularly vivid: 'if yo^r Lp had seen them you would rather geve them yo^r charitable almes then burden them wth eny kynd of chardge whose dolefull exclamaton is so pittiful as if yo^r honor herd of the same yo^r Lp would in harte lament'.⁶⁹ To Burghley's mind, the abuses which surrounded the practice were not only to the detriment of the queen's coffers but also to the commonweal. Thus when, in 1575, Henry Sidney proposed the abolition of cess as part of a new programme for government, the queen and her council were receptive. Appointed deputy in August 1575, Sidney's programme was in keeping with the fiscal determinism of the 1570s.⁷⁰ It promised to relieve the English exchequer of its annual Irish subvention in three years at a cost of £60,000, just over a quarter of which was to come from Irish revenues. And central to the projected annual Irish revenue was Sidney's proposal to convert the Palesmen's payment of cess into an annual tax, or a 'composition' as it was called.⁷¹ This suggestion grew chiefly out of the recommendations which Burghley's servant Edmund Tremayne had made after travelling to Ireland, first in 1569 and again in 1573, at his master's instigation. Tremayne wrote to Sidney in early 1576 of the 'grievousnes of the cesse to the comons of the Englishpale'. If, Tremayne argued, the new deputy would 'draweth' the Palesmen 'to a composition', then 'the poore men beinge by your meanes freed from the souldior be not ther uppon dubblic oppressed by their land lords'.⁷² Tremayne's argument reflected twin beliefs in government circles: that the queen's prerogative empowered her representative in Ireland to make a 'composition' so as to offset her charges incurred in the defence of her subjects there, and that it was the common sort who bore the brunt of cess. Tremayne's ideas represented a departure from the thinking of Burghley who, in his earlier 'Degrees' for the government of Ireland and again in a 1577 memorandum, expressed his belief in the necessity of the continued levy of cess until such time as the Irish were weakened.⁷³ But, like Tremayne, the lord treasurer also recognized the necessity of alleviating the burden of the commons. Writing of the practice of 'coyne and livery' and the cess of victuals in Munster, Burghley hinted at what benefits would accrue to the commonweal if the cess were brought to a 'certay[n]te,

⁶⁹ Desmond to Burghley, 20 March 1577, TNA, SP 63/57/43.

⁷⁰ Sidney to Burghley, 24 February 1576, TNA, SP 63/50/18. For Sidney's programme in general, see Brady, *Chief governors*, 136–58.

⁷¹ Brady, *Chief governors*, 145; Plot by Sidney to govern Ireland, 15 November 1575, TNA, SP 63/53/67.

⁷² For the importance of Tremayne's suggestions, see Brady, *Chief governors*, 140–1, 150. Tremayne to Sidney, 24 January 1576, TNA, SP 63/55/6.

⁷³ Above, 95–6; Provisions for coign and livery in Ireland, 1577, CP 160, fo. 147.

so as y^e people chardgeable therof may know what to yeld, and y^e rest to retheyne to ther p[ro]fitt’.

Thus, when in 1577 a group of leading Palesmen, comprised of nobles and gentry, objected to the proposed composition on the grounds that it was an extra-parliamentary tax and therefore unconstitutional, the queen and her council interpreted it as the landowners’ greed cloaked in misguided constitutionalism. Sidney had foreseen this difficulty. Though he reported to the council that he had had discussions with leading Palesmen, and that he found the ‘greater and wyser sort of them’ would ‘willinglye yeld a certeine yerelye rent out of everye ploughland to be a p[er]petuitie to her ma^{tie} and her posteritie’, the deputy was concerned that his actions might be construed as an ‘innovation’.⁷⁴ He was correct as it turned out. Even in the face of royal disapproval the Pale leadership showed remarkable resolve and cohesion in their refusal either to accede to the deputy’s composition or to pay cess in its current form. Nicholas White felt compelled to indicate to Burghley that petition and complaint—the avenue chosen by Palesmen to seek redress—‘was the gate of obedience by w^{ch} they might enter wth humble peticion for redresse to their sov[er]aine and princes’.⁷⁵ Though Elizabeth and Burghley were at one in their belief that the Palesmen’s objections were an infringement of the royal prerogative, they were not prepared (despite an initial knee-jerk reaction which saw their representatives imprisoned in London) to force the Pale community into the composition and risk alienating this most loyal bloc of subjects thereby. Compromise was sought. Burghley’s involvement in the discussions that followed was uncharacteristically slight, but he worked to diminish the cost to the country of the most conspicuous consumer of victual and the symbol of cess: the deputy’s household. He intimated that the deputy’s household was bloated—Sidney was requesting 3,900 muttons which, Burghley wrote, ‘semeth very grete’—and suggested shifting the responsibility for providing beeves, pork, and mutton to the Irish. Certain Irish lordships were also subject to cess, but their leaders were not possessed of the political sophistication in an English context to articulate their grievances. With regard to the Irish, Burghley was unequivocal: the Irishry, he believed, should yield up such livestock ‘so y^e English should be y^e less burdened’. More generally, a compromise was reached which saw the Palesmen agree to a year’s composition rent and to pay for an increase in the daily wage of 1,000 soldiers by 1*d.* sterling.⁷⁶

The crown’s response to the rebellions that gripped Ireland for nearly four years after the summer of 1579 puts Sidney’s failure to compel the Pale community to subsidize a greater proportion of the army in perspective. With Spanish and Italian troops having landed in Munster in July, Elizabeth had no choice but to pour money into her kingdom in order to save it. The cost to the English exchequer reached unprecedented levels: over the course of the rebellion average annual expenditure

⁷⁴ Sidney to privy council, 15 December 1575, TNA, SP 63/54/17.

⁷⁵ White to Burghley, 13 June 1577, CP 160, fo. 131.

⁷⁶ Considerations for the deputy’s household, 1577, TNA, SP 63/58/79; Brady, *Chief governors*, 154–5. For the levy of ‘cess’ upon certain Irish lordships, see Maginn, *Civilizing’ Gaelic Leinster*, 114.

was approximately £50,000; at the height of the rebellion—in 1582–3—the exchequer spent £60,280 on Ireland.⁷⁷ The vast preponderance of money was spent on the army, which swelled to more than 6,000 men. Viewed in this light, the Palesmen's contributions, in both money and victual, were small, peaking at just over £1,700 in 1578–9; only the English exchequer was capable of providing such large quantities of treasure so quickly. But treasure alone was useless. It had to be spent, on men, on armaments, and on victuals. And these human and material commodities had to be sourced. Only the kingdom of England possessed the necessary resources—in terms of population, weapons, and foodstuffs—to field an army in Ireland large enough to preserve Tudor rule there. To wage war on this scale in Ireland would require a national effort in England and Wales; it fell to Lord Burghley, as treasurer, to undertake the administration, coordination, and planning of the largest war in Ireland that Queen Elizabeth's reign had yet witnessed.

The lord treasurer was not without experience of fielding and provisioning an English army in Ireland from England. The two great Tudor offensives launched against Shane O'Neill—the first, in 1561, led by Sussex, the second led by Sidney in 1566–7—had forced him to assume a central role in the levying of soldiers and materials in England to be conveyed into Ireland. Cecil, acting through the queen's letters, commanded Sidney, then the president of the council of the marches of Wales, to levy 200 troops from north and south Wales to serve in Ireland in 1561; the mayors of the ports of Chester and Bristol, meanwhile, were instructed to assist in the embarkation for Ireland of soldiers from the adjoining counties.⁷⁸ The secretary also saw that surplus troops from the Tudor stronghold at Berwick in the north were sent to Ireland—brought over in this instance by William Fitzwilliam, whose brother Brian captained the bands from Berwick.⁷⁹ This dimension of Sussex's campaign was experimental and, as it transpired, unsuccessful. O'Neill's refusal to give battle on open ground and his ability to retreat ever deeper into remotest Ulster stretched Sussex's supply lines beyond capacity. Cecil's piecemeal efforts to channel troops into the lieutenant's army from England were to little effect; the secretary complained of the logistical difficulties involved in having hastily to raise English and Welsh soldiers for service in Ireland.⁸⁰

For Sidney's campaign six years later, Cecil went to much greater lengths to ensure that the war against O'Neill would not be lost for lack of provisioning. The size of the army in Ireland, even after Sussex's war against O'Neill had been brought to a close, had necessitated the regular provision of victuals and munitions from England.⁸¹ To aid him in this, Cecil had turned to Edward Baeshe, a naval

⁷⁷ Compiled from Sheehan, 'Irish revenues', 41.

⁷⁸ Queen to mayors of Chester and Bristol, 25 April 1561, TNA, SP 12/16/63; queen to Sidney, 25 April 1561, TNA, SP 12/16/64. Cf. queen to the lord treasurer, 25 April 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/58.

⁷⁹ Memorandum by Cecil, 20 August 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/56; Sussex and council to queen, 21 September 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/55.

⁸⁰ For the campaign against O'Neill, see Brady, *Shane O'Neill*, 36–7; Memorandum by Cecil, 20 August 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/56.

⁸¹ Memoranda of a provision of victual, 3 December 1562, TNA, SP 63/7/52.

administrator and general surveyor of the queen's victuals for sea causes. Baeshe, in turn, employed Geoffrey Vaughan to purchase and convey the supplies (from Bristol) to Ireland.⁸² Thus, when in 1566 Sidney advised an even greater assault against O'Neill predicated on greater material support from England, a chain was in place through which men and provisions might be requisitioned and then sent over. The scale of the planned assault led Cecil to increase the size and strengthen the military character of his chain: Baeshe was joined in the overseeing of the collection of victual and procuring transport by Admiral William Winter, master of the naval ordnance; Edward Randolph, lieutenant of the ordnance, was appointed colonel and was charged with conveying treasure and the preponderance of the soldiers to Ireland.⁸³ Throughout the summer of 1566 Cecil wrote and edited a stream of papers in which he scrutinized every detail on the English end of the campaign's organization.⁸⁴ Time was limited. A winter campaign in Ulster would be difficult and Elizabeth was uneasy about committing herself to war in Ireland. Cecil explained to Sidney in June that 'I am by hir com[m]a[n]ded to use all y^e dilligence that I can to expedit y^e whole exploit of this intended enterp[ri]se aswell in sendy[n]g you y^e victell req[ui]red, as y^e whole no[m]bre of y^e me[n] from England'.⁸⁵ The secretary had set a deadline in May: 'the army out of England must be in Irland xv August'. To this end, he directed the queen's letters to the sheriffs and justices of the peace in Devon, Somerset, Gloucester, Hereford, and Monmouth to raise 700 troops. The army would be placed under Randolph's command and sent from Bristol to fortify a position at Derry in the north-west of Ireland; an additional 300 soldiers were to come from Berwick and were to be sent over via the Isle of Man.⁸⁶ But Randolph did not arrive until September, and from Derry he wrote to Cecil that his supply of victuals was insufficient. Sidney, meanwhile, was forced to borrow money from Dublin merchants so as to pay his troops, and even then wrote to the privy council of a mutinous and underpaid army.⁸⁷

Cecil scrambled to find more money so as to keep the enterprise afloat. With some difficulty, he found money to repay the Dublin merchants the £1,200 they were owed, but had little choice other than to dispatch Thomas Gresham to Antwerp to borrow another £8,000; additional money amounting to £8,000 was obtained from the customs revenues, and a further £1,149 18s. 6d. came from the Lady Mason, the widow of John Mason the former treasurer of the cham-

⁸² Wrothe and Arnold to privy council, 7 April 1564, TNA, SP 63/10/46; A proportion of munition to be sent into Ireland, 24 October 1565, TNA, SP 63/15/21.

⁸³ Winter and Baeshe to Cecil, 12 June 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/16; Instructions to Geoffrey Vaughan, 7 July 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/44; Baeshe to Cecil, 6 August 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/74; Proportion of ordnance, artillery, and munitions appointed to be sent to Ireland, 29 June 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/36; queen to Sidney, 5 July 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/41.

⁸⁴ Memorandum by Cecil, 30 May 1566, TNA, SP 63/17/70; Memoranda by Cecil, 30 May 1566, TNA, SP 63/17/71.

⁸⁵ Cecil to Sidney, 24 June 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/27.

⁸⁶ Memoranda by Cecil, 30 May 1566, TNA, SP 63/17/71 (quotation); queen to sheriffs and justices, 4 July 1566, TNA, SP 12/40/22-3; queen to Sidney, 5 July 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/41.

⁸⁷ Randolph to Cecil, 27 October 1566, TNA, SP 63/19/29; Sidney to privy council, 9 and 14 September 1566, TNA, SP 63/19/11.

ber.⁸⁸ Thanks in large part to Cecil's efforts, the campaign was begun in the autumn and continued into the new year. In February 1567, Cecil wrote to reassure Sidney that he had spared no diligence in accommodating the lord deputy's necessities.⁸⁹ There were changes in the personnel of Cecil's network in England: on the military side, Colonel Randolph, who was killed in action in November, was replaced by William St Loo; on the civilian side, John Bland, a merchant based in Liverpool, superseded and eventually replaced Vaughan as victualler in May 1567, and more agents were drafted in to help in the bringing over of provisions.⁹⁰ An additional 250 soldiers were also levied in England—this time from Lancashire and Derbyshire—and sent to Ireland via Chester.⁹¹ But no amount of Cecil's organization of resources from England could draw O'Neill from the dense forests of Tyrone: the campaign dragged out over months and Cecil's provisioning network was all but spent by the time Shane O'Neill was killed at Cushendun in early June 1567, not by English soldiers raised in Berwick or the West Country, but by O'Neill's Mac-Donnell enemies.⁹² At one level, the campaigns against O'Neill had showed Cecil's ability to oversee the raising and provisioning of more than 1,000 men in England and to have them conveyed to Ireland by sea. Indeed the execution of an amphibious landing of English troops and supplies in a distant corner of Ulster was quite an accomplishment. Yet the failure to root out O'Neill from central Ulster also pointed up the limitations of royal power: payments were chronically late and provisions were inadequate to mount an effective military campaign in remote parts of the kingdom of Ireland.

Burghley's response to the uprising which began in Munster a decade later was to be different. The geography of the rebellion ensured that it would be. Less than a month after James Fitzmaurice and his contingent of papal troops fortified Smerwick harbour on the south Munster coast, Burghley confided in Walsingham that a naval assault against the rebels would be more effective than '10,000 men by lande'.⁹³ To this end, English ships were immediately dispatched to patrol the coast south of the Shannon, so as to prevent the landing of any further foreign troops and to identify a landing point from which to strike at the rebels.⁹⁴ For this

⁸⁸ Queen to Edward Horsey, 17 August 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/90; Cecil to Sidney, 13 August 1566, TNA, SP 63/18/81; Account of the money received for Ireland from Thomas Gresham and others, 1566, TNA, SP 63/19/82, which Cecil endorsed 'The acco[m]pt of y^e mo[n]ny received for Irla[n]d'.

⁸⁹ Cecil to Sidney, 25 February 1567, TNA, SP 63/20/36.

⁹⁰ Sidney to Cecil, 20 November 1566, TNA, SP 63/19/52; John Bland to Winter and Baeshe, 29 January 1567, TNA, 12/42/9; An estimate how victuals provided by John Bland may be uttered in Ireland, 11 May 1567, TNA, SP 63/20/82; privy council to Vaughan, 12 May 1567, TNA, SP 63/20/85; Cecil to Sidney, 25 February 1567, TNA, SP 63/20/36.

⁹¹ Queen to mayor and customer of Chester, 17 February 1567, TNA, SP 12/42/15; queen to sheriffs and justices of Lancaster, 18 February 1567, TNA, SP 12/42/16; queen to earls of Derby and Shropshire, 18 February 1567, TNA, SP 12/42/17; Laurence Smith and Hugh Cholmondeley to privy council, 4 May 1567, TNA, SP 12/42/55.

⁹² See above, 86.

⁹³ Walsingham to Burghley, 6 August 1579, TNA, SP 12/131/54; Walsingham to Burghley, 8 August 1579, TNA, SP 12/131/56.

⁹⁴ Instructions by privy council to Perrot, 11 August 1579, TNA, SP 12/131/60.

campaign, Burghley was also in a position to avail himself of Walsingham's not inconsiderable administrative talents. The secretary handled the bulk of the correspondence in and out of Ireland pertaining to the war effort and much beside. But the crown's response to the war remained under Burghley's direction. Walsingham (and everyone else) reported to him, for it was he, in his capacity as treasurer, who provided the money necessary for the war to be waged.⁹⁵

Yet, for all Burghley's hope that the rebellion would be suppressed by an overwhelming naval assault, his response to the war soon came to resemble earlier Elizabethan campaigns in Ireland. From Smerwick the rebellion rapidly spread inland—even after the cutting down of Fitzmaurice in August; it then erupted anew on the borders of the English Pale in the hills and mountains of south Leinster. The navy, under the command of William Winter, continued to hover off the south coast, but an amphibious landing—like that undertaken at Derry—was not attempted. In these circumstances Burghley had no recourse but to raise, equip, and provision another army in England to fight a land war in Ireland. He did so in the only way he knew how: he returned to the system of raising troops and victualling that he had developed over nearly two decades. By 1578, the Elizabethan regime had raised troops for service in Ireland throughout much of Wales and in at least fourteen different English shires in the western half of the kingdom. Sheriffs and justices in England and Wales had become accustomed to the government's calls for men and weaponry for the Irish service and could act quickly, if in some cases reluctantly.⁹⁶ On the other side of this, Burghley again turned to Edward Baeshe to oversee the victualling of the navy; the victualler, John Bland, meanwhile, was once again a key to the functioning of the operation.⁹⁷ In Ireland, Burghley relied on Thomas Might, who had been awarded victualling contracts in the 1560s and who was, in 1569, appointed surveyor of the victuals.⁹⁸ On account of the presence of foreign forces in Ireland, Burghley took extra care, employing his servant, Edmund Tremayne, and another agent, William Glaseour, vice-chamberlain of Chester, to aid in the coordination of men and victual in England for the Irish service.⁹⁹

The man responsible for receiving and distributing the treasure which Burghley secured for the war in Ireland was Sir Henry Wallop. Walsingham's client and an

⁹⁵ Walsingham to Burghley, 10 August 1579, TNA, SP 63/68/24.

⁹⁶ See, for example, Certificate for musters of Somerset, April 1570, TNA, SP 12/67/90; queen to justices in Berkshire, Oxfordshire, Lancashire, Cheshire, and Shropshire, 25 January 1574, TNA, SP 12/95/12; queen to justices in Stafford and Derby, 25 January 1574, TNA, SP 12/95/14; Plot for 2,000 soldiers to be sent into Ireland, 1 June 1577, TNA, SP 63/58/43(i). In 1577, before the war, the justices in Somerset had already begun to complain of the 'heavie burthen' of furnishing men for service in Ireland: justices of Somerset to privy council, 15 June 1577, TNA, SP 12/114/15.

⁹⁷ See for example: Baeshe to Burghley, 10 January 1580, TNA, SP 12/136/2; Baeshe to Burghley, 1 April 1580, TNA, SP 12/137/1; Burghley to Walsingham, 29 July 1579, TNA, SP 63/67/67; Bland to Burghley, 10 September 1579, TNA, SP 63/69/22.

⁹⁸ *Fianis Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 1402, 3661; Brady, *Chief governors*, 232.

⁹⁹ Tremayne to Burghley, 11 December 1579, TNA, SP 12/133/2; Glaseour to Burghley, 10 January 1580, TNA, SP 12/136/2; Glaseour to Burghley, 30 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74/80.

outsider to the Irish service, Wallop had replaced Burghley's client, Edward Fitton, as undertreasurer in August 1579.¹⁰⁰ Wallop's experience in the kingdom offers a window on the difficulties which the lord high treasurer encountered in overseeing this latest war in Ireland. Once again the overriding problem was that the war was being fought in Ireland and Burghley, the queen's treasure, and much of the victual was in England. With the exception of his first coming to Ireland when he personally carried £10,000 of the queen's treasure, Wallop had to appoint other men to receive money from Burghley in England and convey it to him in Ireland. Fitton, for example, had employed his brother and sons to this end. Wallop's use of several of his servants for that purpose, however, led to Burghley's censure and the queen's offence.¹⁰¹ Burghley intimated that it was Wallop's servants' unhurried transport of treasure which had 'retarded' the lord justice's efforts to march against the rebels. He explained, moreover, that one of Wallop's men, Thomas Fauntleroy, stood accused in England of lending money destined for Ireland at interest to a man of dubious reputation.¹⁰² Worse still, the queen had learned of the matter. Elizabeth accused her lord treasurer of having 'made no better choice of the man to carrie the treasure', refusing to authorize any further money for Ireland without first learning precisely where and how her money was being spent. She demanded that information on the state of the army in Ireland, specifically books of musters, be sent over for inspection. Burghley recognized the difficulty of taking army musters while at war, but the queen was resolute and enjoyed the support of most of the privy council. The lord treasurer spoke plainly to undertreasurer Wallop: 'the sooner yo^u and the L. Justice shall sende the state of tharmye wth the monethlie chardges, and the extraordinarie also, and what somes yo^u have towards the same of the revenue there, the soner shall yo^u, as I hope, have more treasure from hence, for otherwise I finde that I cannot prevaile.'¹⁰³

But the queen, through Burghley, continued to find money for Ireland. She had no choice: the rebellion had to be defeated and, once again, it was necessary to harness the crown's resources in England to do so. Wallop, for his part, redoubled his efforts to see that the books of musters, belonging to the clerk of the cheque, were sent over quarterly.¹⁰⁴ The undertreasurer, however, did not shrink from drawing attention to the shortcomings of the crown's war effort. No aspect of the war was beyond his criticism: money was in short supply; the victuallers in both kingdoms were negligent; the soldiers were underfed, underpaid, and made to sleep rough. To his credit, Wallop did not idly complain. He did his best to try to find solutions to these problems in Ireland. He acted as victualler himself—early in the

¹⁰⁰ Wallop's patent, 10 August 1579, TNA, SP 63/68/28; R. H. Fritze, *s.v.* 'Henry Wallop', in the *ODNB*.

¹⁰¹ Wallop to Burghley, 17 October 1579, TNA, SP 63/69/68; Burghley to Wallop, 6 March 1580, TNA, SP 63/72/5.

¹⁰² Fauntleroy survived the allegations against him and continued to receive money from Burghley and transport it to Wallop: Wallop to Burghley, 4 February 1582, TNA, SP 63/89/13; Burghley to Wallop, 18 February 1582, TNA, SP 63/91/2(i).

¹⁰³ Burghley to Wallop, 6 March 1580, TNA, SP 63/72/5.

¹⁰⁴ Wallop to Burghley, 14 August 1580, TNA, SP 63/75/43.

rebellion he estimated that his efforts had saved the queen £500—and channelled all of the victuals for the army in Ireland to a single store in Limerick, so as to keep better account of the provisions; Wallop even went so far as to put 1,000 acres of land to tillage, so as to create a source of victual nearer at hand.¹⁰⁵ Yet Wallop's innovative efforts did little to improve conditions for soldiers on the ground or to offset the crown's spiralling expenditure in Ireland: by 1581 the rebellion raged on and the number of soldiers in pay on land and at sea reached 7,781.¹⁰⁶ Burghley, moreover, bristled at Wallop's criticism, for implicit in the undertreasurer's complaints was the intimation that the war was being mishandled.

An underlying problem in the war to suppress the rebellions in Ireland was the quality of the soldiers provided from England and Wales. To meet the government's unprecedented demands for soldiers, the typical fighting men recruited from English and Welsh counties were supplemented by those who were poor, lame, sick, vagrants, criminals, or aged.¹⁰⁷ Sir William Morgan, whose responsibility it was to transport a contingent of soldiers to Ireland in summer 1580, described the men to Burghley as 'light p[er]sons . . . div[er]s of them were taken out of gayles and straungers being not of the country from whence they were sent hither'. Morgan exhorted the lord treasurer

to wrytte unto the shires to have a better care for the choise of habler men . . . for these weare the meanest for hablenes of bodies that ev[er] I sawe goe out of England, for manie weare lame, div[er]s impotent, some burst, and some above lx, and some in suche case they had not shoves on their feete.¹⁰⁸

Lord Grey de Wilton, appointed lord deputy and commander of the queen's army in Ireland in summer 1580, echoed Morgan's description, complaining that the soldiers sent to him were barely serviceable: 'old and impotent and divers of them badly furnished', as he put it.¹⁰⁹ A related problem was the penchant for such men to desert—in most cases they returned to England. It was compounded by the fact that English captains did not report such wastage of their bands. Instead, they would continue to collect the wages of the disappeared men. To make up the necessary numbers at musters, Irishmen would be employed to take the missing soldiers' place, at half the wage of an English soldier. Wallop wrote to Burghley of what he perceived to be the dangers of training up 'this countrie men' as soldiers, lest they go over to the rebels and turn their knowledge of war to the advantage of the enemy. In the margin Burghley scratched: 'and for y^e supply of Irla[n]d me[n], it was wrytten that they [the privy councillors] thought not good to tak them but it semeth, y^e captay[n]s will mak pay'.¹¹⁰ There was

¹⁰⁵ Wallop to Burghley, 27, 29 November 1579, TNA, SP 63/70/38; Wallop to Burghley, 29 December 1579, TNA, SP 63/70/70; Wallop to Burghley, 6 January 1580, TNA, SP 63/71/11; Wallop to Burghley, 14 August 1580, TNA, SP 63/75/43.

¹⁰⁶ Sum of the army, 4 and 9 October 1580, TNA, SP 63/77/25.

¹⁰⁷ Nicholas Canny, *Making Ireland British, 1580–1650* (Oxford, 2001), 66–73.

¹⁰⁸ William Morgan to Burghley, 4 August 1580, TNA, SP 63/75/9.

¹⁰⁹ Grey to privy council, 10 June 1581, TNA, SP 63/83/45.

¹¹⁰ Wallop to Burghley, 1 August 1580, TNA, SP 63/75/1; more generally on this point, Canny, *Making Ireland British*, 67–9.

indeed little that the lord treasurer could do but to reiterate the government's displeasure at the employment of Irish soldiers. The spectre of the ill-disciplined and rapacious English soldier in Ireland was to haunt the Anglo-Irish relationship for the remainder of Elizabeth's reign and beyond, but it should be stressed that a significant proportion of the English army in Ireland in these years was comprised of Irishmen.

The scale and the state of the war effort in the early 1580s confounded the lord treasurer. He cast about for ways to finance it more cheaply. His papers show that he scrutinized most matters pertaining to the provision of men, money, and supplies for the campaign.¹¹¹ Burghley, it would appear, had come increasingly to rely on Glaseour for men and victual, and in late 1580 he authorized his agents in Chester to purchase 20,000 Newfoundland herring from a merchant in London for the use of the army in Ireland.¹¹² Allegations of corruption dogged Glaseour, however, and in early 1581 Burghley saw that another man, George Beverly, assumed control of the victualling in Chester.¹¹³ Burghley also made it known—in late 1580 and again two years later—that he suspected Wallop of negligence in the execution of his office. On the former occasion, Burghley criticized Wallop's 'slender and seldom' advertisements of the number and state of the garrisons; in 1582, Burghley's close reading of the book of charges and receipts purportedly revealed serious discrepancies with the undertreasurer's accounts.¹¹⁴ Wallop wrote to Secretary Walsingham of his fear of offending Burghley. He had reason to fear: the undertreasurer was responsible (in less than a three-year period ending July 1582) for £150,614 9s. 8½*d.* of the queen's treasure.¹¹⁵ But on both occasions Wallop showed sufficiently convincing evidence of his innocence. Much of Burghley's criticism of Wallop was born of frustration. In September 1582 the lord treasurer endorsed a document 'Notes of lacks in Irla[n]d' in which he outlined a list of areas, including extraordinary army officers, concordatums, and a 'multitud of officers for victelly[n]g', where great increases in charges had been witnessed.¹¹⁶ Elizabeth had insisted on the discharge of 4,600 troops between summer 1581 and the following spring, which made it difficult for the government in Ireland to put an end to the rebellion—Geoffrey Fenton, the secretary of state in Ireland, wrote chillingly to Burghley of the prospect of a twenty-year war in the kingdom. By

¹¹¹ See, for example, Burghley's memorandum... for levying 1,000 men for Ireland, 8 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74/13; Burghley's memorandum for large proportions of victual, 9 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74/15; Remembrances for Irish causes, November 1582, TNA, SP 63/97/56; Burghley's notes for victuals, November 1582, TNA, SP 63/97/65.

¹¹² Indenture of commissioners at Chester, 12 November 1580, TNA, SP 63/78/34; Glaseour to Burghley, 13 November 1580, TNA, SP 63/78/36. Cf. D. M. Woodward, *The trade of Elizabethan Chester* (Hull, 1970).

¹¹³ Beverly to Burghley, 20 January 1581, TNA, SP 63/80/22; Gerrard to Burghley, 7 February 1581, TNA, SP 63/80/54.

¹¹⁴ Wallop to Burghley, 14 August 1580, TNA, SP 63/75/43; Waterhouse to Burghley, 16 September 1580, TNA, SP 63/76/32; Wallop to Burghley, 30 September 1582, TNA, SP 63/95/76.

¹¹⁵ Wallop's Book, 30 September 1582, TNA, SP 63/95/76(i); Wallop to Walsingham, 30 September 1582, TNA, SP 63/95/77.

¹¹⁶ Memorandum on the increase of charges, 26 September 1582, TNA, SP 63/95/70.

October 1582 Elizabeth resolved to send no further money until she was shown more explicitly how her treasure and victual was spent.¹¹⁷

What was worse, however, was that Burghley's considerable efforts to suppress the rebellion seemed to be causing more damage than the rebellion itself. Burghley read (and no doubt heard) troubling accounts from Ireland: that there was famine in Munster; that Lord Deputy Grey executed indiscriminately; that the Palesmen were groaning under an onerous cess; and that the abuses of the soldier were widespread. A downcast Nicholas White had written him shortly before Christmas 1581 to rail against 'this violent and warlike forme of governm[en]t' which had developed in Ireland out of the crown's efforts to crush the rebellion. White concluded that the queen's current policy, specifically her support of Grey's government,

will but exhawste her Mats treasury, waste her revenue, depopulate her pale, weaken her Englishe nobilitie, that have bene, and may be made the suertie of this state, leave the wilde Irishe to ther dasires that be the p[er]jill therof, and consume w^t mysery of the warrs her soyldo's w^c she sendithe hither, whose captens hathe ther payes fuller than ther bandes.¹¹⁸

Barnaby Googe, Burghley's servant and kinsmen, wrote in 1582 that he scarcely recognized Dublin when he arrived there on account of the poverty of its inhabitants. He related how after his horse perished in a stable fire the city's 'poor sowles' devoured its carcass 'in trayles and all', something he feared might lead to pestilence.¹¹⁹ The misery in which much of the population of Ireland now lived was brought home to Burghley and his fellow privy councillors late in 1583 when the mayor of London sought their advice as to how to proceed with the fifty Irish men, women, and children who had fled the war in Munster and whom he had lately incarcerated for begging on the streets.¹²⁰ By then, Burghley was already working to change the direction and tone of Tudor government in Ireland which he had helped to create but which was so rapidly consuming the queen's treasure and unsettling her subjects.

The impetus came from Elizabeth. Such high levels of expenditure were always going to attract, in equal measure, the queen's scrutiny and displeasure, but the news out of Ireland that unpaid and poorly provisioned soldiers were wreaking havoc across the kingdom angered her. How, she might have wondered, could she be faced with unpaid soldiers, unhappy subjects, and continued rebellion after having expended so much of her treasure? Her instructions to Grey had explicitly commanded him to use his expedition not only to defeat the rebellion, but also to disabuse her loyal subjects in Ireland of the belief that the queen planned to root them out and replace them with her subjects from

¹¹⁷ Fenton to Burghley, 24 October 1582, TNA, SP 63/96/29; Burghley to Wallop, 28 October 1582, TNA, SP 63/98/1(i).

¹¹⁸ White to Burghley, 23 December 1581, TNA, SP 63/87/55.

¹¹⁹ Googe to Burghley, 27 August 1582, TNA, SP 63/94/98.

¹²⁰ Edward Osborne to privy council, 31 December 1583, TNA, SP 12/164/80; A list of Irishmen and women committed to Bridewell, 31 December 1583, TNA, SP 12/164/80(i).

England.¹²¹ The queen laid much of the blame on the lord deputy, with whom she found fault from the start of his service in Ireland. His notorious defeat by the rebel leader Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne in the Wicklow mountains less than a month after his arrival in Ireland was a most inauspicious beginning, and Burghley was forced to defend Grey's actions to the queen as news of 'the greate ov[er]throw' which crown forces had suffered in Glenmalure trickled back to England.¹²² By early 1581, the queen, in a draft of a letter to Grey, expressed her dissatisfaction concerning his inability to crush the rebellion in Desmond even though he was now in command of five times more troops in Munster than he originally deemed necessary to see the rebels defeated.¹²³ Grey, however, was not the type to wither in the face of such criticism. He was quick to ascribe the blame for the continuance of rebellion elsewhere: on the unreliability of the earl of Ormond; on the failure of previous governments to promote a preaching ministry; and on the basic fact that he was not sufficiently furnished with money, men, and victual to wage an effective campaign in Ireland.¹²⁴ The aspersions which Grey cast against Ormond, Elizabeth's cousin, did little to endear him to the queen; however, the deputy's allegations that he was undersupplied she took very seriously, and for this Elizabeth held her lord treasurer responsible. In early 1581 Burghley apparently received a 'sharpe message' from the queen alleging intimating that he had been slack in his oversight of the provision of victuals for the war in Ireland.¹²⁵

Under pressure from Elizabeth to see the rebellion ended and royal expenses decreased, Burghley adopted an almost identical position on the rebellion to his mistress. Early the following year, Grey wrote to Walsingham (partly in cipher) that 'hee' had fallen 'into a detestatio[n] of this place & termes it a gullf of consuming threasure'. Grey did not disagree with the lord treasurer's description—'a gullf of consuming threasure' the kingdom certainly was; but he pointedly added that this was the case: 'y^e more throwghe hys good meanes & advyce, for w^e if repentance & Gods mercies befall not y^e greater his seale wyll aunswer in y^e gullff of hell'.¹²⁶ There can be little doubt, though he did not mention him by name, that Grey was referring to Burghley. Grey had, the previous year, explained to Burghley that he had not at any point suggested that he was guilty of 'any slacknesse or want of care... to furnishe the want of victuall here'. Rather, he held the men whom Burghley trusted to furnish the victual for the soldiers in Ireland guilty of

¹²¹ *A commentary of the services and charges of William Lord Grey of Wilton, K.G. by his son Arthur Lord Grey of Wilton, K.G. with a memoir of the author, and illustrative documents*, ed. Sir Philip de Malpas Grey Egerton (London, 1847), 74–6.

¹²² John Huband to Arthur Atey, 9 September 1580, TNA, SP 12/142/10; Grey to Burghley, 12 September 1580, TNA, SP 63/76/27. For the battle of Glenmalure, see Maginn, 'Civilizing' Gaelic Leinster, 160–6.

¹²³ Queen to Grey, February 1581, TNA, SP 63/80/87.

¹²⁴ Grey to queen, 22 December 1580, TNA, SP 63/79/25; Grey to Walsingham, 12 May 1581, TNA, SP 63/83/6.

¹²⁵ Grey to Burghley, 29 January 1581, TNA, SP 63/80/41.

¹²⁶ Grey to Walsingham, 27 January 1582, TNA, SP 63/88/40.

corruption. It was the lord treasurer's continued trust in them, he insisted, which was contributing to the 'gulf'.¹²⁷ Grey was also concerned about his standing at court. He explained to Walsingham his belief, though he was careful to leave all names in cipher, that 'hee' (Burghley) had not done enough to defend his actions in Ireland: 'I wyshte of God', he wrote, 'that hee woold bee my chardger face too face before her Ma^{tie}& y^e rest of you [the privy council]'.¹²⁸ At the time, Grey was coming under criticism for having taken it upon himself to grant lands which he had seized from the rebels to his supporters—the queen and Burghley had both expressed their dissatisfaction with the deputy's actions. Grey maintained that not 'a fourth part' of the land was bestowed, but he had in fact exceeded his mandate. Prior to his going over to Ireland, in summer 1580, Grey had sought permission to seize and allocate rebel lands as he saw fit: 'to have some order proscribed for the lettyng and disposyng all suche lands as by this present rebellion'. This was precisely the kind of policy Elizabeth had sought to avoid. Burghley, writing the answer of the privy council in the margin beside Grey's requests, struck a more ambivalent note: 'to be considered hereafter uppo[n] y^e endy[n]g of y^e rebellio[n]'.¹²⁹ The grudge which Grey harboured against Burghley was not mutual, however. Burghley advocated bestowing total authority upon Grey and providing him with unlimited resources so that he might vanquish the rebellion. In a letter to Walsingham, Burghley praised Grey's service, noting, 'it is a great pite that such a hart shuld not have maytena[n]ce'.¹³⁰ Grey's service in Ireland, and the more aggressive policies which he favoured, was expensive, and the queen would tolerate no more of it. Burghley toed the line and Grey was recalled in August 1582.

By late 1583 the threat posed by the rebellion was, after three years, diminishing: the killing of Desmond in November had deprived the rebellion of the last of its leaders who had not already fled Ireland or submitted to the crown so as to secure a pardon.¹³¹ The army continued to be steadily reduced in the months following Grey's recall. In an effort to overhaul the system of provisioning of the queen's soldiers in Ireland, responsibility for victualling the troops that remained was given to one of Burghley's agents at Chester, George Beverly, who in late 1583 was appointed surveyor-general of the victuals of the queen's soldiers, an appointment which was intended to centralize and formalize the same services previously undertaken by the surveyors-general Thomas Might and later Thomas Sackford.¹³²

¹²⁷ Grey to Burghley, 29 January 1581, TNA, SP 63/80/41.

¹²⁸ Grey to Walsingham, 27 January 1582, TNA, SP 63/88/40. Upon his arrival in Ireland Grey wrote to the queen: 'I thought it requysit too devyse a cypher, whereby I myght the more safely beeteake unto you matters of most importance. . . humbly prayeng yowr hyghness too beare with my ragged characters, whytche, for secresie sake, I chose rather myselfe yllfavooeredly to sett down, then too impart too oothers fayer drawght': *A commentary of the services and charges of William Lord Grey*, 77–8. Whether this was the same cipher that Grey employed when writing to Walsingham is now impossible to ascertain; I have been unable to locate Grey's cipher(s), if it (or they) survive.

¹²⁹ Lord Grey's petitions concerning. . . service in Ireland, 15 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74/41.

¹³⁰ Burghley to Walsingham, 11 February 1582, TNA, SP 12/152/42 (quotation). See also Burghley to Walsingham, 16 July 1582, TNA, SP 63/94/27.

¹³¹ Maginn, 'Civilizing' Gaelic Leinster, 171–5.

¹³² *Fians Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 2409, 4268.

In these circumstances, the monies spent by the English exchequer on Ireland dropped: £35,736 was spent in 1584–5—nearly half the expenditure of the previous year—and spending averaged under £30,000 for the next decade.¹³³ It was hoped that the appointment as deputy in January 1584 of Sir John Perrot, the former president of Munster, would herald a return to more traditional, and less expensive, patterns of Tudor rule.

Declining health and death saved Lord Burghley from having to oversee the denouement of the Tudor dynasty's final war in Ireland. It would be other men, most notably Burghley's son Robert, who would bear witness to the vast sums of treasure—nearly £400,000—sent into Ireland 1598–1600, and the 17,300-man army which began operating there in 1599 under the command of Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, and then in 1600, in a desperate act to free up money, a further debasement of the Irish currency. In the two years immediately following Burghley's death 30 per cent of the total receipts of the English exchequer were transferred to the treasurer of wars in Ireland.¹³⁴ In the period 1594–1602, moreover, 19 per cent of the available manpower in England and Wales—estimated to have been 225,000 men—fought as soldiers in Ireland; in all, thirty-six English and thirteen Welsh counties were called upon to provide troops for the war in Ireland.¹³⁵ The lord treasurer's native Lincolnshire was not spared: in 1596 Burghley, who served as lord lieutenant of the county, was responsible for raising men for the Irish service; leading by example, he indicated that the levies should be 'known to be of good behavior'.¹³⁶ By the time of Burghley's death, the war in Ireland had become a truly national struggle which pitted the resources of the kingdom of England against Hugh O'Neill's Spanish-backed confederacy in Ireland.

The steady escalation of the war in this way followed a pattern established by Burghley earlier in Elizabeth's reign. And Burghley, though he was well into his seventies, played a central role in the coordination of men, munitions, and provisions in the war against O'Neill.¹³⁷ When in summer 1596 the lord deputy and council described the strength of the rebel forces and the need for more men and supplies to combat them, Burghley scribbled in the letter's margin: 'horsemen, men, money, munition, without limitation'.¹³⁸ Chester once again featured prominently in Burghley's management of the war effort, with George Beverly now redeployed there to oversee the provision of a substantial proportion of the army's victuals. Burghley also coordinated the dispatch of men and victuals directly to

¹³³ Calculated from Sheehan, 'Irish revenues', 46.

¹³⁴ R. W. Hoyle, 'Place and public finance', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 7 (1997), 203–4.

¹³⁵ For this see, McGurk, *The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland*.

¹³⁶ Privy council to Burghley, 10 September 1596, CP 44, fo. 79; APC, 1596–97, 164.

¹³⁷ Burghley's Memorial for Irish causes, 9 August 1595, TNA, SP 63/182/22; Memorial for money, 30 November 1595, TNA, SP 63/184/39; mayor of Chester to Burghley, 28 November 1596, BL, Lansdowne MS 81, no. 40; Memorandum of soldiers, 28 March 1597, TNA, SP 63/198/50; Lord treasurer's articles concerning the Irish service, 28 May 1598, TNA, SP 63/102(pr.2)/50.

¹³⁸ Lord deputy and council to privy council, 9 July 1596, TNA, SP 63/191/15.

Ireland from London through William Borough, clerk of the ships. In Ireland, meanwhile, Robert Newcomen, who had succeeded Beverly as surveyor-general of the victuals, was stationed in Dublin to receive and account for the victuals arriving from England.¹³⁹ The clergy in England had provided some troops for service in Ireland in the early 1580s, but the cost of the war against O'Neill by 1596 forced the lord treasurer to rely upon them more heavily. Burghley wrote to John Whitgift, archbishop of Canterbury, requiring him to make payment of the sums which had been raised from the clergy of his province and complaining that the bishop of Gloucester, rather than sending money, had sent horse to Chester 'contrarie to the corse of the other bishops'.¹⁴⁰ Recusants also offered a source, hitherto untapped, of money and men for Ireland, so in early 1595 Burghley drew up an order from the queen empowering her council to compel them to contribute to the war effort.¹⁴¹

But the problems arising from shortages of money and victual in Ireland continued; only now, set against the backdrop of England's war with Spain, the danger was much greater. In a letter to his son, the secretary of state, Burghley confessed:

I neither can myself write, nor yet forbear to expresse the grief I have to think of the dangerous estate of her Majestie's armie in Ireland, where all the treasure sent in August [1596] is expended... for which the treasurer hath never a penny in Ireland... what danger this may be I do tremble to utter, considering they will force the country with all manner of oppressions, and thereby the multitude of the Queen's loyal subjects in the English Pale tempted to rebel.¹⁴²

To address the problems in the army, and specifically the abuses in the musters which Burghley and his fellow councillors held to be the root of the problem, the privy council appointed Maurice Kyffin comptroller of the musters of the army in September 1596. He was an experienced soldier (and poet) from Wales whom they dispatched into Ireland via Chester to conduct a review of the army.¹⁴³ Kyffin's discovery of defects in the army, first at Chester and then in Ireland, was damning. Having travelled through Ireland he reported to Burghley:

I finde the difficulties and confusions here such and so unspeakable as will scarce be beleaved. The grosse ignorance and shameful corruption in the officers of musters so long continued, together with the infinite and inveterate arte of falshood here practised (and as it were authorised by general custom) hath irrecoverably damnified this state.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Burghley to Robert Cecil, 4 February 1595, TNA, SP 63/178/34; Beverly to Burghley, 14 July 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/22; Beverly to Robert Cecil, 11 December 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.4)/21; *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 5556, 5730; Estimates by William Borough, 4 January 1597, TNA, SP 12/262/2; William Borough to Burghley, 9 July 1597, TNA, SP 12/264/16.

¹⁴⁰ Burghley to Archbishop Whitgift, 16 September 1596, LPL, MS 2009, fo. 82; Burghley to Archbishop Whitgift, 2 October 1596, LPL, MS 2009, fo. 84 (quotation).

¹⁴¹ Imperfect order of council written by Burghley, 31 March 1595, BL, Lansdowne MS 78, no. 51; privy council to Archbishop Whitgift, 16 July 1598, LPL, MS 2009, fo. 92.

¹⁴² Thomas Wright (ed.), *Queen Elizabeth and her times, a series of original letters...*, 2 vols. (London, 1838), ii. 464–5.

¹⁴³ *APC, 1596–97*, 176–9, 181.

¹⁴⁴ Maurice Kyffin to Burghley, 13 February 1597, TNA, SP 63/197/89.

Kyffin cast blame on Sir Ralph Lane, the muster-master in Ireland, for the situation, but it was the 'clerkes and inferior officers of the bands', who he explained had committed the 'most fowle and shameful abuses', selling and purloining the soldiers' victualls 'whereby the poore soldio^{rs} are most lamentably hunger starven', dying 'wretchedly and woefully in the streetes and high waies farre lesse regarded than any beasts'.¹⁴⁵ We may presume that it was the lord treasurer himself who underlined the words 'clerkes and inferior officers' in Kyffin's letter.

Kyffin's findings resulted in the drawing up of a series of ordinances signed by the queen in July 1597 which sought the reform of the musters and payments to the army. They established, *inter alia*, a commissary for musters in each province and a system whereby soldiers would be paid on a weekly basis; Burghley had already written to this effect to Lord Deputy Burgh, whom he instructed to relieve the muster-master of his command.¹⁴⁶ With reform within the army afoot, Burghley launched a scathing attack in August on Wallop's execution of the offices of undertreasurer and treasurer of the wars.¹⁴⁷ Wallop, as we have seen, had for long sought innovative ways to save the queen money. When in 1597 war began again in earnest he proposed having a single sum of money sent to Ireland and placed entirely at his disposal. This, he argued, would serve to limit the opportunities for his servants and corrupt victuallers to misuse the queen's treasure and allow him to more efficiently pay and equip the army. He also proposed furnishing English soldiers with apparel purchased in Ireland, so as to eliminate the cost of importing clothes and uniforms.¹⁴⁸ Burghley, however, interpreted the suggestion as evidence of the undertreasurer's profligacy and brazen speculation, noting (apparently with little regard for Wallop's stated intention) that 'manny tymes for sondrie somes of money paid here in England by yo^r servaunts and nev[er] carried a mile from London'. And Burghley could scarcely contain his anger at the prospect of English soldiers 'furnished wth Irishe stuffe':

to have Irish freeze for good English cloth: or to have Irishe broges of calve skynnes or sheep skynnes for good shoes of neates leather out of England: and instead of English cassocks of good cloth to be provided of mantells of Irish freeze, an apparrell farr unfytt for a soldier that shall use his weapon in the feeld.

'I pray yo^u', Burghley concluded, 'to accept as one that hath of long tyme made estymation of yo^u and cannot but frankly deliv[er] unto yo^u what I mislike in yo^u at this time'.¹⁴⁹ Wallop may have touched a nerve. According to one report in May, 4,000 of the 7,000 men in the queen's army in Ireland were Irish.¹⁵⁰ For the

¹⁴⁵ Kyffin to Burghley, 1596, TNA, SP 63/196/44; Kyffin to Burghley, March 1597, TNA, SP 63/198/58 (quotation).

¹⁴⁶ A project of certain orders to be put in execution, for the reforming...the musters and payments of Her Majesty's army, June 1597, TNA, SP 63/199/133 (LPL, 601, fos. 142–5); Burghley to Lord Deputy Burgh, 24 June 1597, TNA, SP 63/199/119.

¹⁴⁷ Burghley to Wallop, 12 August 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/5(i).

¹⁴⁸ Wallop to Robert Cecil, 29 July 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/59.

¹⁴⁹ Burghley to Wallop, 12 August 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/5(i).

¹⁵⁰ Edward Stanley to Robert Cecil, 12 May 1597, TNA, SP 63/199/30.

government to clothe the rest like Irishmen was too much for Lord Burghley to contemplate. The war would continue to be waged, even after the lord high treasurer's death the following year, according to the manner Burghley had waged all of Elizabeth's wars in Ireland.

After reading the ordinances issued in July 1597 Lord Deputy Burgh concluded that economies in the army should be made 'in three sortes best: ffirst for the queene: secondlie for the soldier: and thirdly for the country'.¹⁵¹ Twenty-five years since his appointment as lord high treasurer of England, Burghley judged Burgh, who had served in Ireland for barely two months, to have concluded wisely. The prioritization of finances in this way says much about William Cecil's approach to money matters as they pertained to Ireland. That he showed his support for placing the queen's interest above all else should come as little surprise. It was, after all, her treasure being spent on and in her kingdom of Ireland, and Burghley was her servant responsible for her money. Ireland, moreover, was no place for ideas about the enduring importance of the commonwealth vis-à-vis the crown. Unlike England, the kingdom of Ireland was not yet possessed of a strong and developed polity whose interests needed to be respected. Years of experience had taught Burghley this axiom; that he regarded the soldier as the government's second priority underscores this belief. The presence of the soldier in Ireland was always intended to be a temporary expedient. They were there in the name of the queen to defend 'the country', that is Ireland—from the Irish, from rebels, from foreign enemies—and once an English-style polity was established and was sufficiently strong in all parts of the kingdom, they were to leave. As we have seen, however, the English soldier in Ireland had become a permanent fixture of Elizabeth's reign and Burghley found them impossible to control. Indeed, when in the year of his death he reflected on the merits of concluding a peace with Spain, Burghley had to consider, *inter alia*, the ramifications of discharging so many men from military service.¹⁵² Peace with Spain, he reasoned, would allow the queen to 'reduce Irela[n]d to q[ui]etnes and therby spare hir excessive charges of tresuer, vittells, munitio[n] and supplies of me[n] to be levied and sent out of Engla[n]d'; but this had to be weighed against the prospect of an Ireland at peace. What to do with the thousands of soldiers formerly fighting in the Irish wars? If left in Ireland, he continued, they would 'maik wast there, or will be redy to provok y^e Irish to new rebellio[n]'; 'such as shall return into Engla[n]d', meanwhile, 'will lyve disorderly if they be not forced to return to ther natyve co[n]tre or to ther formar trade of lyvyng'. The continuation of the war with Spain into the next century and his own death in August 1598 spared Burghley the immense task of dismantling the swollen military establishment in Ireland.

The levying of English soldiers for the Irish service—providing for them, transporting them, and paying them, and all in unprecedented quantities—came to dominate Burghley's thinking on Ireland, overshadowing his earlier work to bring

¹⁵¹ Burghley to Wallop, 12 August 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/5(i). Burghley references Lord Burgh's letter of 12 July 1597, but it has not, to my knowledge, survived.

¹⁵² Reflections by Burghley, 2 January 1598, TNA, SP 12/266/3.

Ireland's currency into line with England's and to make the kingdom profitable to the crown. It intruded upon more of the minister's time than any other aspect of his relationship with the kingdom—so much so in fact that the name Burghley, as will be discussed below, became synonymous in the minds of some of his contemporaries with money. The irony is that in his pursuit—in descending order of importance—of the financial interests of the queen, the interests of the soldier, and the interests of the country William Cecil earned the displeasure of all three. Nevertheless, Cecil's commitment of so large a proportion of England's resources to Ireland reflects that the lord treasurer had come to the determination that Tudor rule in Ireland had to be maintained at any cost.

6

The Irish

Like most Englishmen in the Tudor age, William Cecil was certain of the civility of English society and the savagery of Irish society.¹ He was equally certain of the superiority of the former over the latter. The evidence was everywhere for him to see. English society boasted villages, towns, and cities; its members used specie and were engaged in commerce based on a manorial economy of mixed agriculture; it was peaceful, profitable, and orderly—where a carefully regulated spectrum of social rank offered its people consistency and stability. English society had, moreover, developed an elaborate centralized government around a monarch whose laws ensured, *inter alia*, the smooth transfer of property and power from one generation to the next and whose justice was regularly felt throughout a kingdom divided, in most instances, into carefully drawn administrative units of shires and hundreds. By contrast, Cecil read and heard (for he never did witness) how disorder and barrenness born of non-nucleated settlement and a pastoral economy, devoid of currency and commerce, marked Irish society. There, dozens upon dozens of self-styled lords upheld an archaic and imprecise system of customs, masquerading as a legal code, which encouraged their despotism and ensured that Irish society was arbitrary, unruly, and injudicious, locking its people in a cycle of uncertainty and violence.

To state, as some historians have, that William Cecil ‘regarded the Irish as savages’ is not inaccurate.² It describes a belief common to many Englishmen, and indeed many Europeans, in the sixteenth century. Yet a potential difficulty with such a bald description is that it can implicitly intrude on early modern thinking modern notions of tolerance and openness to that which is different. It also tends to oversimplify what was in reality a deeply complicated and nuanced regard for Irishmen and Irish society. In a well-known letter written to Cecil in 1565 Nicholas Arnold, then the lord justice of Ireland, articulated his view of the Irish with brutal clarity. ‘I am wth all the wilde Irisshē’, he assured the secretary, ‘at the same

¹ For this in general, see D. B. Quinn, *The Elizabethans and the Irish* (Ithaca, NY, 1966); Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*, 117–36; id., *Making Ireland British*, 1–55; S. G. Ellis, ‘Promoting “English civility” in Tudor times’, in Csaba Levai and Vasile Vese (eds.), *Tolerance and intolerance in historical perspective* (Pisa, 2003), 155–69.

² McGettigan, *Red Hugh O'Donnell and the Nine Years War*, 41 (quotation); Graves, *Burghley*, 78; James MacGeoghegan, *Histoire de l'Irlande, ancienne et moderne, tirée des monuments les plus authentiques*, vols. i–ii (Paris, 1758, 1762); vol. iii (Amsterdam, 1763), trans. Patrick O'Kelly as *History of Ireland, ancient and modern, taken from the most authentic records, and dedicated to the Irish Brigade* (Dublin, 1844), 491.

poynnt I am wth beares and banddogges when I se them fight, so that they fight earnestly indeede & tuggge eche other: I care not who have the woorsse'. To this Cecil made a most revealing reply: your statement, he wrote, 'showeth yo^u to be of that opinion that many wise men are, from the which I do not dissent being as an Englishman'; 'but', he continued, 'being as a chr[ist]en man I am not w^out some p[er]plexity to enioy of such cruelty'.³ Cecil's response to Arnold is significant because it captures his attitude toward a section of the population of Ireland which the poet Edmund Spenser would in the mid-1590s earmark for destruction. They were, in their current state of savagery, inferior to Englishmen in all respects; and Cecil was not above passing crude and disparaging comments against Irishmen: he wrote to Leicester in 1572 that he would remove the 'bone' of contention between Fitzwilliam and Fitton 'if I can get some Irish dog to catch yt'.⁴ Yet, as a Christian, Cecil could not condone the sanctity of human life being trampled underfoot in the lurid manner suggested by Arnold. These words written to the lord justice in the prime of his life offer perhaps the clearest reflection of the union in William Cecil's mind of Christian and humanist principles: it showed that his faith in the capabilities of Man extended even to the 'wilde Irisse'. Throughout his career, the Irish and their society pitted Cecil's Christian and humanist principles against that other force which governed his actions: his Englishness and his commitment to the Tudor state. An exploration of the attitude of one of Elizabethan England's most important political figures toward this segment of society in the Tudor state is essential if a holistic understanding of the Anglo-Irish relationship in the sixteenth century is to be achieved.

Yet before an analysis of William Cecil's understanding of society in Ireland can be undertaken a distinction must be drawn between the kingdom's native Irish population and Irish-born people of English ancestry. Nomenclature used to describe the kingdom's inhabitants, both contemporary and modern, is problematic and frequently confusing. Modern historians most often employ the term Gaelic, or sometimes the tautological coupling Gaelic-Irish, to describe the native Irish population. The Irish polity, as we have seen, was possessed of a highly developed sense of racial and cultural identity based on patrilineal descent, referring to themselves collectively as *Gaedhil*, or Gaels, and their language and culture, respectively, as *Gaeilge* and *Gaelach*—both rendered Gaelic in English. But the words 'Gaels' and 'Gaelic' did not come into common usage in the English language until the last years of the sixteenth century.⁵ The word 'Irish'—and its derivatives 'Irishman/men' and 'Irishry/ries'—was employed in Tudor times to denote Ireland's native population, their culture, language, and way of life. Thus, in 1559, when considering the problem of Sorley Boy MacDonnell, chief of those MacDonnells who had colonized parts of Antrim in north-east Ulster, Cecil referred to Sorley Boy as an 'Irish Scott', that is a man who was ethnically and culturally Irish but a

³ Arnold to Cecil, 29 January 1565, TNA, SP 63/12/20; Cecil to Arnold, February 1565, TNA, SP 63/12/50.

⁴ Burghley to Leicester, 10 August 1572, TNA, 12/89/3.

⁵ *Oxford English Dictionary*, sub 'Gaelic'.

subject of the queen of Scots. In 1566, Cecil suggested placing an English ship 'betwixt Irla[n]d and Scotla[n]d and to p[ro]hibitt y^e access of Irish Scotts into Irland'.⁶ The term 'Irishry' was usually used to describe areas inhabited by the Irish. A descriptive tool such as this must not have been wholly alien to William Cecil. In Wales, the birthplace of his grandfather David 'Cyssyll' (with whom William spent much of his youth), words like 'Welshries' and 'Englishries' were commonly employed to distinguish between districts of Welsh and English settlement and cultural and linguistic prevalence.⁷ Writing in 1574, Cecil outlined means whereby 'y^e Irishery captay[n]s may be compelled to aba[n]do[n] ther coyn and lyvery', but this was a relatively uncommon grammatical usage of the word Irishry: Cecil was careful to strike out the 'ery' in 'Irishery' in his memorandum. Later in the same work, he wrote of his hope that 'y^e Capt[ains] of y^e Irishery' might be induced to surrender their 'captay[n]res' and hold their lands of the crown.⁸

The existence, in constitutional terms, of an 'Irish' subject of the sovereign of England was a relatively new phenomenon. As noticed above in Chapter 2, even in the decades after the parliament of Ireland declared Henry VIII king of Ireland in 1541, the legal position and ethnic designation of Irish people remained ambiguous. The surrender and regrant process whereby Irish chiefs accepted Tudor sovereignty was intended to transform them from 'wild Irish' non-subjects into the king of England's 'English' subjects in Ireland, rather than the king's 'Irish' subjects. This was multiple monarchy Tudor-style, and speaks to the English belief in the superiority of English culture and society just as much as it does to their conviction that Irish society and culture was innately savage and inferior. It was only in Elizabeth's reign that the queen of Ireland began to make specific reference to her 'Irish' subjects, and even then instances can regularly be found where people of Irish ancestry purchased charters of English liberty, so as to be accounted Englishmen in legal terms.⁹

Yet the word 'Irish' was also, from time to time, used by Englishmen (particularly in England), or by individuals from further afield, to describe anyone from the island of Ireland regardless of their ethnic background. The difficulty with using geography alone to describe Irishness, of course, was that it conflated the identities of the kingdom's native and its English inhabitants. Some historians refer to the latter population in the Middle Ages and in the Tudor period variously as Anglo-Irish, Anglo-Norman, Hiberno-Norman, or less occasionally as Anglo-French, in an effort to acknowledge the fact that this population had lived in Ireland for centuries, and with the inference that they had over time also developed, and were accorded, an identity which was neither Irish nor English.¹⁰ But these

⁶ Cecil's remembrances for the causes of Ireland, 16 July 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/48; Memoranda by Cecil, 30 May 1566, TNA, SP 63/17/70.

⁷ Alford, *Burghley*, 8–9.

⁸ Memoranda for Ireland in Burghley's hand, February 1574, TNA, SP 63/44/65.

⁹ Commission signed by queen, December 1565, BL, Lansdowne MS 8, no. 41. For examples of grants of English liberty in Elizabeth's reign, see, for example, *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 14, 81, 99, 112–13, 145, 177, 188, 299–301; *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Eliz.*, 386.

¹⁰ J. F. Lydon, 'The middle nation', in J. F. Lydon (ed.), *The English in medieval Ireland* (Dublin, 1984), 1–26.

terms were unknown in sixteenth-century Ireland or England: this population group regarded themselves as English by blood, a fact which, according to English thinking in the later medieval period, conferred upon them the legal rights and status of Englishmen.¹¹ It was in this context that the designation ‘mere Irish’—that is ‘pure’ or wholly Irish—was sometimes applied when discussing the native population in Tudor times so as to distinguish them from people of English ancestry born in Ireland. Occasionally, use of the term ‘Irish’ to describe people from Ireland in the sixteenth century was employed out of plain ignorance of the kingdom’s ethnic and cultural divisions. Such was the case in 1570 when Guerau de Spes, the Spanish ambassador at Elizabeth’s court, described the earl of Desmond and his brother Sir John Fitzgerald, men whose ancestors had conquered parts of Munster from the Irish, as ‘Irishmen’ who were prepared to serve the king of Spain.¹² The nineteenth-century editors of the *Calendar of state papers* were also on occasion guilty of the misapplication of the word Irish. Part of a letter from the privy council to the lord deputy of Ireland written in 1578, for instance, is summarized in the calendar as ‘order given to the earls of Kildare, Ormond, and other Irish gentlemen to repair home [from court]’. But a reading of the original letter reveals that the privy council did not in fact use the adjective ‘Irish’:

And for that it is thought that the repaire over, and presence of o^r very good ll [lordships]. The erles of Kildare and Ormond may serve to very good purpose ... together wth the assistance of the rest of the noble men and gentlemen of that realme.¹³

Again, in another letter, this from Sidney to Walsingham in 1577, part of the original manuscript referring to the ethnically English but Irish-born privy councillor Nicholas White is abridged in the calendar, as ‘Nicholas White is the worst of Irishmen’. However, the original reads: ‘Theare is not a wurs man of thys cuntry byrth [that is, Ireland] than Nycolas Whyte’.¹⁴

In the sixteenth century the term ‘Irish’ was packed with meaning: by Elizabeth’s reign English-born servants of the crown in Ireland were beginning to draw attention to the alleged deviation of Irish-born Englishmen from what were held up as English cultural norms—their ‘degeneracy’ as it was often expressed—as a contributing factor to the crown’s problems in the kingdom.¹⁵ There is an anonymous response to such attitudes from a member of the Pale community buried among three books of papers in Cecil’s possession relating to English government in Ireland in the 1560s. The author bristled at the suggestion that the English of the Pale had adopted Irish customs and abandoned English culture. ‘If we of the Inglish Pale be Irishe tyckes unmanered’, he explained, ‘the faults is in yo^r graces gov[er]nme^{nt} under whom we war broght uppe, & fo^r those mere Inglish of Ingland bred that of

¹¹ S. G. Ellis, ‘The empire strikes back: the historiographies of Britain and Ireland’, in S. G. Ellis (ed.), *Empires and states in European perspective* (Pisa, 2002), 100.

¹² *Calendar of letters and state papers relating to English affairs preserved principally in the archives of Simancas*, ed. Martin Hume, 4 vols. (London, 1894), ii, 279.

¹³ Privy council to lord deputy, 31 May 1578, TNA, SP 63/60/69.

¹⁴ Sidney to Walsingham, 20 June 1577, TNA, SP 63/58/50.

¹⁵ Nicholas Canny, ‘The ideology of English colonization’, 591–3.

so late came to Irland they arre more conversent wth Irishe manners & folowe ther rase [race] more then the Inglishe of the Pale.' It was, he continued, the English of the Pale's ancient hatred of the Irish which prevented them from forgetting 'thenglish use'.¹⁶ The majority of Ireland's English population whose descendants had settled in Ireland in the medieval period were so keen to distinguish themselves from the Irish and Irishness that the Palesman and chronicler Richard Stanyhurst, who sought both to rehabilitate and appropriate the term 'Irishmen' for a new definition of Irishness grounded in English language, culture, and loyalty to the crown, was prompted to rail against those who were prepared to call themselves 'Ireland men' though 'in no wise Irishmen'.¹⁷ 'Irish' continued into the Tudor period to be a by-word for incivility and, among the English of Ireland at least, referred specifically to the native population and their (often) recalcitrant leadership.

There was nothing new in most of this. There had, for centuries, been tensions between Englishmen of English and Irish birth and no small amount of confusion surrounding the racial identity of Ireland's inhabitants. It became particularly acute in the early fifteenth century, for example, when Englishmen born in Ireland studying at Oxford came under suspicion for being 'wild Irishmen' and thus the king's enemies. Two Dublin merchants, Ralph Hebbe and John Drake, both Englishmen so far as they were concerned, whose ship was wrecked on the coast of Kent, had their cargo seized because, it was claimed in England, the goods belonged to the 'king's enemies of Ireland'.¹⁸ Burghley's support in 1579 for the publication of the fourteenth-century 'Statutes of Kilkenny', legislation which codified the government's efforts to prohibit interaction between the Irish and English populations in the lordship and insisted that Irish-born Englishmen and English-born Englishmen, who had taken to calling one another 'dogs' and 'hobbes', respectively, should be called simply the 'English lieges of our lord the king', reflected his awareness of the continued problem of national designation in Ireland.¹⁹ What was new in the second half of the sixteenth century, however, was, on the one hand, the growing political power and increasing numbers in Ireland of men born in England, dubbed the 'New English' by modern historians, and the not unrelated phenomenon of the converging political and religious interests of disaffected Englishmen of Ireland-birth, the 'Old English' as historians most often refer to this population from the 1530s, and certain Irish chiefs. The term 'Old English' came into use in the later 1590s by this latter population to describe themselves—the New English, for whom there does not appear to have been a descriptive term other than English or perhaps 'mere English', sometimes referred to the anciently established English of Ireland as the 'English-Irish' or indeed the 'ancient English'.²⁰ The presence in

¹⁶ Affairs of Ireland, 1567?, CP 207/16, fo. 104.

¹⁷ Colm Lennon, 'Richard Stanyhurst (1547–1618) and Old English identity', *IHS* 21 (1978–9), 127.

¹⁸ Cosgrove, *Late medieval Ireland*, 75–6.

¹⁹ See above, 92.

²⁰ Nicholas Canny, *The formation of the Old English elite in Ireland* (Dublin, 1975); Ciaran Brady, 'Conservative subversives: the community of the Pale and the Dublin administration, 1556–86', in P. J. Corish (ed.), *Radicals, rebels and establishments: historical studies XV* (Belfast, 1985), 11–21. For use of the term 'ancient English' see, for example, Andrew Trollop to Burghley, 27 October 1587, TNA, SP 63/131/65.

Ireland of the New English served to motivate chroniclers born and reared within the English Pale, such as Stanyhurst and Christopher St Lawrence, eighth baron of Howth, to emphasize the purity of an earlier form of Englishness which, they were at great pains to point out, resided in their community.²¹ There were also examples of Englishmen and Irishmen making common cause against Queen Elizabeth in the name of their common hatred of Englishmen of English birth and their shared Catholic faith. In 1566, for example, Shane O'Neill wrote to Sir John Fitzgerald, the earl of Desmond's brother, of the necessity for them to concert their efforts to resist the English who, according to O'Neill, sought to 'subdue bothe the Inglish and Irishpale of Ireland'.²² The following decade, Sir James Fitzmaurice, writing in Irish to a commander of gallowglass, famously declared:

we have a just cause of war against our enemies, viz., we are defending our religion and our country, and they are abolishing the religion, and about to take our own country from us; we are on the side of truth, and they on the side of falsehood; we are Catholic Christians, and they are heretics; justice is with us, and injustice with them.²³

Fitzmaurice's sentiments anticipated the more developed ideology of 'faith and fatherland' that would become so central to Hugh O'Neill's efforts to enlist the support of the Old English in his struggle against Elizabeth in the last years of her reign.²⁴ In hindsight, it is probable that Stanyhurst's expression of Englishness, and Shane O'Neill's and especially Fitzmaurice's expressions of a common Irishness, were extraordinary and not representative of the attitudes of their respective communities in Elizabethan Ireland. A more widely held reflection of the Old English community's sense of identity and attitude to the state of Tudor rule in Ireland was expressed to Burghley late in 1581 by his client Nicholas White. With rebellion raging in the south and east of the kingdom and with a lord deputy in power who, in his efforts to crush the rebels, scarcely differentiated between Irishmen and Englishmen born in Ireland, White felt compelled to remind Elizabeth's minister of the historical place of his community:

Yf her Matie be rightly enformed of the true state of this her kingedome, it is highe tyme for her to loke to the amendm[en]t therof least (emonge other grevances) the sword by wc it was first gotten, be whett too moche against the rases of thEnglishe that wt the sworde so longe defended it, against the Irishe from whome it was first taken, and who loke daily throw the weaking of thEnglishe to recover it.²⁵

²¹ McGowan-Doyle, 'The Book of Howth'.

²² O'Neill to John of Desmond, 9 September 1566, TNA, SP 63/19/7.

²³ James Fitzmaurice to Ustun MacDonnell, July 1579[?], TNA, SP 63/67/35 (printed and translated in 'The Irish correspondence of James Fitzmaurice of Desmond', ed. John O'Donovan, *Journal of the Kilkenny and South-East of Ireland Archaeological Society*, 2 (1858–9), 363).

²⁴ Mícheál Mac Craith, 'The Gaelic reaction to the Reformation', in S. G. Ellis and Sarah Barber (eds.), *Conquest and union: fashioning a British state, 1485–1725* (London, 1995), 144–5; Hiram Morgan, 'Hugh O'Neill and the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland', *Historical Journal*, 26 (1993), 1–17.

²⁵ White to Burghley, 23 December 1581, TNA, SP 63/87/55. Cf. Nicholas Canny, 'Identity formation in Ireland: the emergence of the Anglo-Irish', in Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden (eds.), *Colonial identity in the Atlantic world, 1500–1800* (Princeton, 1987), 159–212.

It was into this tangled morass of overlapping identities (and terminology) that William Cecil had regularly to tread in his efforts to grapple with Ireland matters. He most certainly recognized a difference between English- and Irish-born Englishmen. Cecil related to Nicholas White in 1569 that he was ‘truly as well thought of here amo[n]gst us, as any of that cou[n]try’.²⁶ But in a letter written to White shortly thereafter the secretary could also remark: ‘I thynck you honest, and carefull for y^e s[er]vice of y^e Quene and your contrey.’²⁷ To Cecil’s mind, the kingdom of Ireland was a rightful possession of the crown of England and all of its inhabitants, be they of Irish or English ancestry, owed their sovereign loyalty: serving one’s country [Ireland] and one’s queen [Elizabeth], whose kingdom Ireland was, were one and the same. Thus, when, in the 1570s and 1580s, Burghley received reports from New Englishmen in Ireland that White was ‘inclyned to please [his] contre people than other [privy] councillors’, and from White that Geoffrey Fenton, the secretary in Ireland, harboured an unjust prejudice against those in government who were born in Ireland, he gave them little credence: ‘for my opinio[n]’, Cecil explained in a letter to White, ‘I do testefy that I thynck a gret p[ar]te of the misorders in that government hath rysen by such as hath bene more inclyned to private comodite, and to syngulareyes then to y^e publek benefitt for her Maty and of this opinio[n] I do remayn’.²⁸ Cecil’s feeling on the matter was in line with Elizabeth’s. The official position of the queen was that her subjects in Ireland were no different from her subjects in England. In the draft of her instructions for the establishment of a provincial council for Munster the queen wrote that she had ‘no lesse princely and naturell regarde to her saide universall realme [of Ireland], & to the people therof than even to her realme of England’.²⁹ Still, from Cecil’s perspective, the conflicting senses of Englishness in Ireland and the prospect of militant Catholicism supplanting older ethnic differences were worrying developments. Problems arising from nationality—between Irish-born Englishmen and English-born Englishmen on the one hand, and between those of Irish and English ethnic extraction on the other—continued to manifest themselves both as an underlying tension and as an explicit source of discontent in Ireland.

But Cecil did little either to assuage or to resolve them. His insistence on the appointment in Ireland of justices and a lord chancellor who were born in England—he never advocated a return to an Irish-born chief governor—only served to confirm these growing divisions between Englishmen in the kingdom of Ireland.³⁰ So, too, did his clear preference in the 1580s for the settling in Munster of English gentlemen from the West Country. Yet, when it came time to draw up

²⁶ Burghley to White, 8 September 1569, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 82.

²⁷ Burghley to White, 14 March 1570, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 84.

²⁸ Burghley to White, 6 February 1584, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 110; White to Cecil, 18 December 1587, TNA, SP 63/132/37.

²⁹ Draft instructions for the establishment of a president and council in Munster, 9 October 1568, TNA, SP 63/26/9.

³⁰ For Cecil’s recommendations that Englishmen be appointed to certain key government posts, see Degrees for the government of Ireland, February 1575, TNA, SP 63/49/78.

the legal parameters for settlement, Englishmen born in Ireland were not discriminated against. Indeed, Cecil amended the original clause forbidding the alienation of lands in Munster to individuals 'being mere Irish not descended of an English ancestor or name' to read 'being mere Irish not descended of an original English ancestor of name and blood'.³¹ He displayed the same sentiment over a decade earlier in his plans for the colonization of Ulster. In that context, he revealed that there was more to his reasoning than just the constitutional equality of the queen's English subjects in the two kingdoms:

if any borne in Irelande within the countries now subject to the Queenes writt will inhabit in any place of Ulster meete for them the same to be allowed, for that it is supposed that they may better maintayne theyr habitation with lesse charge then such Englyshemen as no meere strangers to the land.³²

At the same time, Cecil consistently discriminated against Irishmen whenever possible. On letters patent of inspeximus of fiants pertaining to the holdings of Henry Colley and John Lee in the midlands, Cecil made marginal notes prohibiting 'y^e law of Brehan' and the maintenance of 'any of y^e Irish byrth' on the lands.³³ Indeed, it was not uncommon, more than half a century since Henry VIII was proclaimed king of Ireland, for leases of land to come with restrictions on alienating 'to any except they be of English nation both by father and mother, or born in the English Pale'.³⁴ Such inconsistency came from the very top. In 1572 a set of instructions bearing Elizabeth's signature ordered that when crown lands were let in Ireland Englishmen 'borne in Englande' should be preferred, and 'if they will not take it... such as be of the English born in Ireland and lyvinge civillie after the maner of England' should be sought.³⁵ William Cecil continued to view England's relationship with the Irish in terms of a basic clash of civilizations: one superior and characterized by civility, and the other inferior and marked by savagery. For him, it was Irish society which presented the greatest impediment to the extension of English rule in Ireland. Yet, savage though Cecil knew it to be, Irishness was a feature of society in the kingdom of Ireland which Tudor government would have to reckon with before ultimately supplanting it with Englishness.

The first full decade of Elizabeth's reign saw William Cecil enter middle age and reach the height of his administrative energies, if not the peak of his political influence. It also saw him come face to face with the embodiment of one of the Tudor state's more enduring problems. In witnessing Shane O'Neill's submission before Elizabeth in January 1562, Cecil was allowed the opportunity to see at first hand the clash of cultures in Ireland.³⁶ Here, at Whitehall, was an extraordinarily

³¹ MacCarthy-Morrogh, *Munster plantation*, 34.

³² A memorial for Ireland, 22 December 1567, TNA, SP 63/22/49.

³³ Letters patent of inspeximus of fiants, 6 October 1573, BL, Additional MSS, Yelverton MS 48017, 20 fos. 215–19.

³⁴ See, for example, the lease of lands in Dublin to Sir Henry Wallop in 1596: *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, no. 6027.

³⁵ Instructions for the commissioners in Ireland, to be observed in letting crown lands, 30 December 1572, TNA, SP 63/38/59.

³⁶ Copy of O'Neill's submission, with names of those present, 6 January 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/6.

powerful and aggressive Irish lord, the would-be second earl of Tyrone, unable (or unwilling) to speak English, in native Irish dress, and surrounded by an imposing retinue of gallowglass. William Camden later chose to emphasize O'Neill's exoticism vis-à-vis the Elizabethan court: 'The English admired them no lesse, than they should doe at this day to see those of China, or America,' he wrote.³⁷ Yet here was also Queen Elizabeth's subject, a man prepared to embrace an English noble title by the law of primogeniture and reject the Irish custom which had allowed Matthew, baron of Dungannon, a man who was not the first earl's legitimate son, to be accepted as his father's heir.³⁸ As we have seen, Shane O'Neill was not the first Irish lord whom Cecil encountered. In 1542, Shane's father Conn Bacach O'Neill had submitted at court and a young Cecil was reputed to have got the better of O'Neill's chaplains in a theological disputation.³⁹ Twenty years on, however, Cecil observed and interacted with an Irish chief, within the familiar environs of Whitehall, over a period of months. Prior to his submission before the queen at court, O'Neill was brought to the lord keeper's house where Secretary Cecil, and several other councillors, examined him. And following their 'sharp rehearsal to hym of his generall faultes', Cecil suggested that O'Neill's submission to the queen, which the secretary corrected, be made both 'in Irish & E[n]glish'.⁴⁰ As secretary of state, Cecil assumed responsibility for addressing the manifold legal, social, and constitutional problems which swirled round Shane O'Neill. He met this task in a fashion apparent in most areas of his public life: he collected information.

Precisely how well Cecil understood Irish culture and society is difficult to ascertain. Cecil had certainly read some of the many tracts which proposed suggestions for the reform of the kingdom of Ireland.⁴¹ These writings, however, were concerned primarily with methods of extending and strengthening English government in Ireland and threw little light on Irish culture and society beyond an assumption of its manifest wickedness. Thus the information on Irish culture which Thomas Smythe, the Dublin apothecary lately charged with erecting a mint at Dublin, presented to the privy council in May 1561 is of particular importance.

³⁷ William Camden, *Annals, or, the historie of the most renowned and victorious princess Elizabeth, late queen of England*, ed. R. Norton (London, 1635), 90.

³⁸ For a description of O'Neill's submission at court, see *ibid.* 69–70. The controversy surrounding the earl of Tyrone's heir would appear to have stemmed from the existence in Irish society of 'named' children. These were (male) children whose mothers had declared an alternative father for them and whose father, so-declared, had been obligated to accept them as his own even if they were not. It was in this way that Matthew Kelly, reputedly the son of a lowly Dundalk blacksmith, became as a teenager the son of the O'Neill chief Conn Bacach, and later first baron of Dungannon: Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland*, 77–9.

³⁹ Francis Peck, *Desiderata curiosa: or, a collection of divers scarce and curious pieces (relating chiefly to matters of English history) in six books...* (London, 1732–5), i. 6.

⁴⁰ Cecil to Sussex, 7 January 1562, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 21, fo. 33; O'Neill's Submission, 6 January 1562, LPL, 614, fo. 178.

⁴¹ TNA, SP 61/4/44 (this treatise is transcribed in 'Edward Walshe's "Conjectures" concerning the state of Ireland [1552]', 303–22). Cecil endorsed the document: 'Ed. Walshe de Hib[er]nia'. Walshe later wrote to Cecil seeking employment in England and sent over with his letter three 'books' on Irish government, but these have not survived: Edward Walshe to Cecil 23 August 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/71.

Sent with a letter to Cecil outlining the equipment he deemed necessary for the mint's operation, Smythe described in great detail four categories of learned professionals in Irish society—'four shepts [septs] in maner all Rimers', as he broadly grouped them—before furnishing the councillors with sketches of several other social phenomena in Irish society.⁴² Cecil, who endorsed the document 'Ireland: Smyth's information for Ireland', met Smyth the following month when the apothecary delivered him a letter out of Ireland from Fitzwilliam.⁴³ By then, the idea that O'Neill should travel to England for an audience with the queen was gaining currency in government circles, and Cecil may have found aspects of Smyth's information useful in his efforts to understand O'Neill's position.⁴⁴ Smyth had written of 'a sort of women that be called goyng women' who 'rune from contry to contry . . . and if any of them happen to be with childe, she will saye that it is the greatest Lorde adjoining, whereof the Lords ar glad, and doth appoincte them to be nurysed'. He concluded his essay by offering to show the privy councillors additional information 'concerninge the fostering of the Irishe men's children'.⁴⁵ At this time, Shane O'Neill was alleging that a married woman from the northern Pale town of Dundalk—Alison Kelly—had (falsely) claimed Conn Bacach O'Neill, first earl of Tyrone, as the father of her son Matthew, and that the O'Neill chief accepted him as his son, renaming him 'Feardorcha'.⁴⁶ Shane O'Neill himself was often styled 'Shane Donnelly' because the O'Donnellys, the hereditary marshals of the O'Neills' military forces, had fostered him.⁴⁷ Such information on Irish social customs gave Cecil an early insight into the fundamental differences between English and Irish concepts of kinship and social legitimacy—something O'Neill's appearance at court would shortly make abundantly clear.

The O'Neill settlement of 1542 emerged as the main point of contention between the crown and Shane O'Neill during the chief's stay at court.⁴⁸ Shane, responding to a series of questions which Cecil put to him, held it to be invalid on account of Dungannon's illegitimacy, and pressed for the settlement's renegotiation on two counts: that he was the earl of Tyrone's eldest legitimate son; and that he was the rightfully elected leader of the O'Neill clan 'wthout anye contradiccion, whereas before diverse striffes and debates happened in the lyke election'.⁴⁹ The matter was further complicated when, in February, O'Neill's nemesis Lord Lieutenant Sussex arrived at court. Sussex responded to O'Neill's answers and dredged up myriad allegations of Shane's misconduct. The core of Sussex's position, however,

⁴² Thomas Smythe to Cecil, 5 May 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/66; Smythe's information for Ireland, 5 May 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/67. The latter document was transcribed and its contents explored by H. F. Hore, 'Irish bardism in 1561', *Ulster Journal of Archaeology*, 6 (1858), 165–7, 202–12.

⁴³ Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 23 June 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/12.

⁴⁴ Sussex to lord of Slane, 19 June 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/10.

⁴⁵ Smythe's information for Ireland, 167.

⁴⁶ See above, n. 38.

⁴⁷ Brady, *Shane O'Neill*, 23.

⁴⁸ For the following paragraph, see *ibid.* 38–40; Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, ii. 34–7.

⁴⁹ O'Neill's answer to the seven articles sent to him by the privy council, 22 February 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/22.

was his insistence that the 1542 settlement was a submission rather than a contract, and that the sovereign alone had the authority to revoke its terms. Dunganon, he contended, was Tyrone's accepted heir and he dismissed his illegitimacy as irrelevant to Shane's case. In response, Shane questioned his father's right both to alter the governance of the O'Neills' country, 'being but the captaine of his contry', and to have invested in him the O'Neills' lands 'and so make him an owner, where he was before but an officer'. Sussex's answer was that Irish political custom had no standing in English law.⁵⁰ The allegations and counter-allegations exposed many of the fundamental questions concerning crown rights in Ulster and the legitimacy of Irish custom vis-à-vis English custom in Ireland. Shane's arguments, moreover, could be applied to every Irish lord and, if successful, threatened to establish a precedent which might undo the dozens of painstakingly negotiated settlements concluded between Irish lords and the crown since the early 1540s.

Cecil's thinking on the matter is revealed in two papers written while O'Neill played the courtier in London.⁵¹ In both the secretary was careful not to reach a final decision on O'Neill's position without having procured additional information. The first paper rehearsed one by one the allegations, both minor and major, exchanged between O'Neill and Sussex: as to whether O'Neill incited certain Irish chiefs to rebellion, for instance, 'the I[ett]rs of Oralie, Odonell and other wold be seen'; on the subject of Dunganon's alleged illegitimacy, 'it is to be considered how it may be p[ro]ved yf the baron was not the sonne of therle of Tirone'. Cecil's own hand (rather than that of a clerk) is evident on the entry concerning what was the crux of the controversy: 'whyther Oneyle [Conn Bacach] cam hyther [in 1542] w'out y^e consent of his contry'. But this, too, was left to be determined. It is fitting that Cecil concluded the letter with the note: 'the records in y^e towre wold be sought for the ancient estate of Irland, and specially for y^e erldo[m] of Ulster'. This last point refers to Elizabeth's claim to the medieval earldom of Ulster, which devolved on Edward of York who subsequently became king of England in 1461, and reflects Cecil's hope that additional information would be uncovered to undermine O'Neill's case. The queen's position would be bolstered if the O'Neills could be shown to be living on crown lands. In his second paper, written the following month, the secretary was somewhat more imperative. He began by noting that O'Neill should be 'p[ro]cured to change his garments and to go like an Englysshman', and outlined several points on which he sought either to move O'Neill toward the government's position, the liberation of the O'Donnell chief whom Shane had taken captive, for example, or to know Shane's thoughts on the expulsion of the 'Scotts' from north-east Ulster. But the secretary continued to refrain from tackling the larger questions and increasingly seemed to favour deferring them indefinitely.

⁵⁰ Questions to be considered against O'Neill, 1562, LPL, MS 614, fo. 179.

⁵¹ A brief collection of the material points to be considered upon the petitions of Shane O'Neill, 14 February 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/32; Cecil's private memoranda of devices or means to be used with O'Neill, March 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/43. Both documents bear Cecil's handwriting, but were written in the main by a different hand.

There was more to Cecil's procrastination than scholarly caution. Behind it was the belief that the longer O'Neill was absent from his lordship in Ireland the weaker he would become.⁵² O'Neill, more than anyone else, knew this and was, by March, seeking permission to return home.⁵³ Cecil used the time (O'Neill did not depart until May) to gather additional information. He sketched a detailed genealogy of Shane and others of the leading O'Neills and prevailed upon Fitzwilliam, then the lord justice in Ireland, to have Bartholomew Butler, the king at arms in Ireland appointed a decade earlier, send over 'such notes of the pedegrees of the Oneyles or of eny other the Iryshe famylyes of Ulster...or of eny the noble menes of the realme'.⁵⁴ Fitzwilliam communicated Cecil's request to Butler, but felt compelled to remind the secretary that 'Ireland is no country to incorage such a servant' because 'rhymer set forth the most bestlyest and owdyus parts of menes ansestores doynge, and their own lycke wyse for whom the rymes are made'. That Cecil expected his own search for records in the Tower to produce evidence likely to damage O'Neill's case is apparent from Fitzwilliam's letter to the secretary in which the lord justice punned: 'I am glad of the rolle found consernyng the Oneyles and pleasyd god I wold such a rooll myght be found as could roll Shane and all the cursyd sept of the Oneylis owt of Irland'.⁵⁵ What was found, however, did not produce the desired result. It was revealed that the parliament of Ireland had in 1479–80 granted Conn More O'Neill, Shane's great-great-grandfather, English liberty on account of his marriage to the seventh earl of Kildare's daughter, Eleanor, and declared that their issue 'be adjudged English, and of English condition in every manner as the king's subjects'.⁵⁶ There remained the fact that the earldom of Ulster was part of the queen's Yorkist inheritance, but her father had created the earldom of Tyrone just twenty years earlier, and the crown was not in a position to assume responsibility for Ulster anyway. Cecil's hope that a binding legal solution would emerge to undercut O'Neill came to nothing.

Shane O'Neill's stay at court thus brought home to Cecil the obstacles which Irish society posed for Tudor government in Ireland. As for O'Neill himself, Cecil developed a palpable dislike for the man in the five years during which the chief held Ulster in his grip and regularly defied the state.⁵⁷ Cecil, as we have seen, in what was a rare show of vitriol, longed for Shane O'Neill's death. This attitude can be traced back to 1561 when O'Neill captured and imprisoned the secretary's

⁵² Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, ii. 38.

⁵³ O'Neill to privy council, 21 March 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/61.

⁵⁴ Ibid. (Cecil traced the genealogy on the reverse of O'Neill's letter); Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 14 April 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/83.

⁵⁵ Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 14 April 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/83.

⁵⁶ *Statute rolls of the parliament of Ireland, twelfth and thirteenth to twenty-first and twenty-second years of the reign of Edward IV*, ed. James Morrissey (Dublin, 1939), 787; Memorandum of the denization of Harry O'Neill and his son Conn, 14 April 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/81. On the memorandum Cecil sketched, with perfect accuracy, a brief genealogy showing 'Con[n]acius' O'Neill to be son of Henry and married to 'Elianora fil Thom Co Kildare'.

⁵⁷ Cecil to Smith, 26 March 1566, BL, Lansdowne MS 102, no. 71; Cecil to Sidney, 27 March 1566, TNA, SP 63/16/67.

primary allies in Ulster: Calvagh O'Donnell and O'Donnell's Scottish wife, Catherine MacLean, the dowager countess of Argyll. Following this act an exasperated Cecil wrote to Sussex: 'seing Shane thus useth the matter I see severite and terror must worke your victory'.⁵⁸ But having to reckon with O'Neill, over a period of years, also moved Cecil to develop a level of understanding of Irish culture. The queen's secretary could, in the 1560s, enquire into whether Matthew O'Neill was 'tannyst'—that is, an Irish chief's designated successor—at the time of Conn O'Neill's 1542 submission. He could also seek to devise a way for the 'bonaught'—a land tax levied by the O'Neills—and 'the coyne and livery'—the term used in Ireland to describe the custom of quartering of troops and dependants on the country—in Tyrone to be 'brought to certentie of rents'. He showed no difficulty in understanding, moreover, that Sidney's reference to 'coshery'—the custom whereby chiefs expected their tenants and supporters to entertain their lord and his retinue at certain times of the year—was a form of 'coyne and livery'.⁵⁹ Still, in response to a series of suggestions for dealing with Shane O'Neill, proposed in 1565 by the lord justice Nicholas Arnold, Cecil could write: 'I dare not enter into any judgement therein, finding my ignorance of that contry the impediment to my judgement'.⁶⁰ Cecil always craved further information, another shred of evidence which, he hoped, might help to make difficult decisions academic, but once again we see that in Cecil's view first-hand experience of Ireland always trumped whatever knowledge of the kingdom and its inhabitants he might assemble before him in England.

Cecil's desire to understand Irish society did not stop at searching through English records. In 1564 Terence Daniel, the dean of Armagh, committed himself to sending Cecil information out of Irish chronicles on native pedigrees.⁶¹ Such records, compiled orally by professional Irish 'pedigreeers' and entered into manuscripts, were of central importance in a society which placed great emphasis on patrilineal ancestry. Later, in 1572, Fitton wrote to Burghley how the use by some government officials of the Irish law of 'Kylcolgashe' (*cin comhfhocuis*, collective responsibility) was threatening to undo the gains lately made in introducing the common law in the new-made shire of Roscommon. According to standard English understanding of this law, hereditary Irish judges, known as Brehons, ordered a defendant's extended family to pay restitution to an injured party; failure to comply with a Brehon's judgement invariably resulted, in the absence of official machinery to compel a defendant to comply, in the private seizure of goods and livestock. The law, so interpreted, was thus a potentially powerful tool in the hands of individuals who sought profit and who were strong enough to take that which they believed belonged to them. This understanding of Brehon law proved anachronous,

⁵⁸ Cecil to Sussex, 19 June 1561, BL, Cotton MS, Titus B XIII, 21, fo. 17.

⁵⁹ Cecil's reference to 'tanistry' is in TNA, SP 63/5/32; his references to 'bonaught' and 'coyne and livery' are in TNA, SP 63/5/43; and his reference to 'coshery' as a form of 'coyne and livery' is in Sidney's opinion upon the articles propounded to O'Neill, 11 April 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/78.

⁶⁰ Cecil to Arnold, February 1565, TNA, SP 63/12/50.

⁶¹ Terence Danyell to Cecil, 10 March 1564, TNA, SP 63/10/28.

however. To better acquaint Burghley with the current state of Irish law, Fitton enclosed a remarkable letter written in Latin (with Irish characters) by an Irish judge. In it, the Brehon explained that he considered the concept of joint family responsibility to have no validity in Irish society and that this was based on his interpretation of divine law and Irish civil law.⁶² Burghley learned that ancient Irish custom, 'antiquam consuetudinem hibernicorum', held family members up to four generations removed from the offender, 'non solum in recta linea sed etiam in collateralibus', equally responsible for a transgression, but that Irish law was now in accordance with English law.⁶³ There can be little doubt that these insights on Irish society and law informed Burghley's ideas on a possible amalgam of common law and Brehon law which were later expressed in his 'Degrees for the government of Ireland' discussed above.⁶⁴

He also showed an interest in the precise location and meaning of Irish place names. In 1580 he asked Nicholas White, who was then travelling to Munster with the lord justice, to produce a book for him 'of all the houses, castles and lands belonging to the lordship of Desmonde and such as be in rebellion wth him'. White did not write the book, but he kept a detailed diary of his journey which he sent on to the lord treasurer in the form of an extended letter.⁶⁵ It is a fascinating account written from the perspective of an Irish-born and Irish-speaking Englishman of the people and places of the province during the early stages of the Desmond rebellion.⁶⁶ Through White, Burghley was introduced to the political and physical geography of Munster, a province he knew less well in 1580 than Ulster. White translated and annotated key place names: the bay of Ventry he rendered 'coon fyntra' (*cuan fionn trá*, white strand haven), and explained that it was so called 'because the strande is whitestrande full of white shells'; White noted that Dingle haven was 'coon edaf deryck' (*cuan damh dearg*, red ox haven), and related that it took that name because an ox was said to have drowned there 'at the first comyng over of Englishmen from Cornwall'; Dingle itself was then called 'dengle de couse', named after the town which was founded there at the time of the medieval conquest by an Englishman named De La Couson. Burghley carefully wrote each place name in the margin and, beside Ventry, penned its Irish version, 'coon fyntra'. Whether Cecil understood even the rudiments of the language spoken by a majority of the population in Ireland is unclear. That a primer in 'Iryshe–Latten–Englishe' outlining some basic phrases in the language was, sometime in the early 1560s, prepared for Queen Elizabeth is well known. Among Cecil's papers, however, is a manuscript attempting to show the supposed similarities

⁶² 'I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation': Exodus 20: 5, Deuteronomy 5: 9.

⁶³ Edward Fitton to Burghley, 31 January 1572, TNA, SP 63/35/12(i); Nicholls, *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland*, 53–64.

⁶⁴ Above, 94–6.

⁶⁵ Nicholas White to Burghley, 22 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74/56.

⁶⁶ White was an Irish speaker. One of the witnesses in the case against Sir John Perrot refers to White having served as the interpreter between O'Rourke and Perrot: Philip Williams to Burghley, 1 January 1592, TNA, SP 12/241/1.

between the Irish language and Welsh, the tongue of his paternal ancestors.⁶⁷ It would be cynical to conclude that Cecil's interest in Ulster and then Munster was motivated solely by his desire to understand those areas which he earmarked for political and social transformation through plantation. This no doubt played a part, as did an inherent scholarly curiosity; but Cecil also saw the necessity of understanding the contours of a culture and a society which was not going to vanish with the arrival of English 'civility'.

For William Cecil, Shane O'Neill had embodied all that prevented Irish society, and the Irish population more generally, from embracing English 'civility' and reinforced a belief, common to the vast preponderance of Tudor officials, that the Irish system of government was savage, despotic, and arbitrary.⁶⁸ In a tract penned the year after Cecil's death in 1598, its anonymous author offered Elizabeth an analysis of the causes of the rebellion which then threatened Tudor rule in her kingdom of Ireland.⁶⁹ He wrote that 'the lordes and great meane of the cuntry that ar ever most struggling to shake of the Englishe gov[er]nment to make them selves absolute, to tyrannuse amongst there tenauntes and would brynge yo^r Ma^{tie} to be Queene of Irlande as the king of Spayne is king of Jherusalem'. In other words, it was not a grand political strategy to liberate Ireland from English rule which drove Irish lords to rebel. Rather it was what the author identified as the desire of Irish chiefs to exert 'kinglie auctoritie' over the 'multitude' who, he continued, 'knowethe not other God then S^t Patrick nor other kinge than there land-lord'. According to the author, Cecil had 'looked into' this 'Irishe regalitie' before his death and endeavoured to replace it with English law and government so that 'the people seing the deversitie in gov[er]nment between a greatious princesse and an ungratious land lord desisting from their Irish customs might whollie inclyne them selves' to the queen.

It is important to emphasize that Englishmen and Tudor officials like Cecil were not unique in their perceptions of Irish society. Scarcely any traveller accounts offering less biased perspectives on society in Ireland in Tudor times are available to the historian.⁷⁰ However, tourists did travel to and through the kingdom in these years. Three 'German erles', for example, were touring around Ireland in August 1572. Burghley directed Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam to have them 'travell as litle waye into the cuntry' as was possible, presumably to limit their exposure to Irish society.⁷¹ Later, in 1579, a group of Austrians—led by two barons and a son of a wealthy merchant—were known to have travelled through Ireland under licence from Sidney. They had, reportedly, 'wandered through mayny realmes' before coming to Ireland (via England) and wished to travel to the kingdom's port towns before continuing on to Scotland. These travellers did not, so far as can be

⁶⁷ A specimen of the near affinity betwixt the Welsh and Irish languages, BL, Lansdowne MS 98, no. 20.

⁶⁸ Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*, 119–20.

⁶⁹ A direction to the queen how to conquer Ireland, 1599, BL, Harleian MS 292, 78.

⁷⁰ J. P. Mahaffy (ed.), 'Two early tours of Ireland', *Hermathena*, 40 (1914), 10–15.

⁷¹ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 4 August 1572, TNA, SP 63/37/22.

determined, leave behind a written account of their experience in Ireland, but the reports of the government officials upon whom they relied for direction provide some indication. They were with Drury, the lord justice, that summer at Trim in County Meath where the O'Reilly chief and his band of horsemen presented themselves in a public reaffirmation of their loyalty to the crown. The Austrians, according to one report, 'seemid to wonder much at the attyre and behavio^r of the Irishe horssemen' who wore 'glibbes' and were 'armed in maille wth pesantses, & skulls, and ridinge upo[n] pillions': Drury invited Secretary Walsingham to ponder 'how straunge the vewe of those savadge parsonadges' appeared to the Austrians.⁷²

In the following decade one of Burghley's informants on the continent informed him that the Irish who were then in Spanish military service commonly committed rapes, robberies, and murders. The Irishmen, Burghley was told, were considered to be 'so dissolute in behavior' that the Spaniards had dubbed them 'los sauvages pardidos'.⁷³ The alleged actions of a company of soldiers abroad does not, of course, provide sound evidence from which wider conclusions about Spanish attitudes toward Irishmen and Irish society more generally may be drawn, but it is worth remembering that those Spanish sailors who struggled ashore in the north-west of Ireland—survivors of the great Armada—also regarded the native inhabitants as savages. Two Spanish captains, both of whom were interrogated by the government, readily distinguished between English captains 'that caried the Quenes ensigns' and 'Irishmen' whom they referred to variously as 'the savage people', 'wild men', and 'wild people'.⁷⁴ The most complete and best-known account from one of these survivors is that of Captain Francisco de Cuéllar.⁷⁵ After washing up in Ireland he fled inland among the Irish, eluded capture thereby, and eventually returned to the Low Countries, by way of Scotland, to tell his tale. He too deemed the Irish to be 'savages', noting that many of them lived in huts 'as the brute beasts among the mountains'.⁷⁶ Even the Irish chiefs he encountered, such as MacClancy in the north-west of the kingdom, in whose castle de Cuéllar found refuge for a time, were described in these terms. There can be little doubt that in the sixteenth century Irish society deviated sharply not only from English social and cultural norms, but from accepted western European norms as well.

⁷² Edward Waterhouse to Walsingham, 17 June 1579, TNA, SP 63/67/9; Drury to Walsingham, 26 June 1579, TNA, SP 63/67/12. Whether these were the same 'Germans' who were in Ireland in 1572 is difficult to know. In 1575, the English privy council granted a 'placart', written credentials, to a company of Germans for their tour around Ireland: *APC, 1571–75*, 402.

⁷³ Edward Morys to Burghley, 25 December 1587, TNA, SP 12/206/51.

⁷⁴ Examination of Don Alonso de Lusone, 13 October 1588, TNA, SP 63/137/15; Examination of Baltasar Lopes del Arbal, 13 October 1588, TNA, SP 63/137/16.

⁷⁵ Hugh Allingham, *Captain Cuellar's narrative of the Spanish Armada and of his wanderings and adventures in Ireland*, with an introduction and a full translation by Robert Crawford (London, 1897).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 32. The term 'salvajes' is used in the original Spanish account: Cesareo Fernandez Duro, *La armada invencible*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1885). I am very grateful to my colleague Professor Christopher Schmidt-Nowarra for his help with this. For Spanish efforts to comprehend (and to describe) the ethnic and political divisions which obtained in sixteenth-century Ireland, see Enrique García Hernán, *Ireland and Spain in the reign of Philip II* (Dublin, 2009), 7, 346–8.

However savage Irish society appeared to contemporary observers, Cecil had come to understand that the Tudor state would, at least in the short term, have to reach some accommodation with it. The Irish elite was the key to any accommodation, and they had to be handled carefully. For some chiefs were no longer noble in a purely Irish context: the O'Brien earls of Thomond, the Fitzpatrick barons of Upper Ossory, and the MacCarthy earls of Clancare held English noble titles which derived directly from the crown of England. They were peers of the realm and were thus as much a part of the peerage of Ireland as the temporal nobility who were of English ancestry. The words of Cecil's long-time servant John Clapham, though on occasion put directly into Cecil's mouth (or attributed to his pen), doubtless carried his master's sentiments: 'the Irish naturally are impatient of oppression, though otherwise lovers of justice, and they will readily obey such governors as seem to respect them, while they are permitted to use their own customs; but being provoked by wrongs and indignities, they are hardly reclaimed'. This passage underscores Burghley's willingness to accept some aspects of Irish culture until such time as English government and 'justice' was extended throughout the kingdom. The 'wrongs and indignities' to which Clapham referred were being perpetrated, he had no doubt, by Englishmen, from petty officers, whom he likened to 'hungry flies which bite more than those that are full repaired', to chief governors who, he pointed out, were 'inferior to many of their own nation in degree'.⁷⁷ Indeed, Fitzwilliam, at the start of his final stint as deputy, explained to Burghley the difficulty which he encountered dealing with Thomas Butler, eleventh earl of Ormond: compared with the earl, the deputy was 'but Will[ia]m Fitzwill[ia]m wthout nobylitie or other great tittle of honor or office at home'.⁷⁸ When in 1587 rumours abounded that Lord Deputy Perrot's recall was imminent Burghley was told that 'the people here hopeth that the same faulling owt to be true, that their erles and barons shall never hereafter be governed bye knightes being inferior degrees to them selves, but by some of the greatest pears of that realm'.⁷⁹ It is very likely that 'the Irish' of whom Clapham wrote also included Irish-born nobles of English ethnicity, like the earl of Ormond, whose social status in the kingdom was also under assault from low-born New English soldier/adventurers who increasingly were coming to dominate government in Ireland as Elizabeth's reign wore on. And it may be observed that each of the major rebellions against the crown in Ireland in the years after Shane O'Neill's death and before the outbreak of Tyrone's rebellion in the 1590s was led by Englishmen who received military backing from disgruntled Irish chiefs. The prospect of a more broadly conceived sense of Irishness emerging as a result of the behaviour of the New English was indeed a very worrying prospect for Cecil.

⁷⁷ John Clapham, *Elizabeth of England: certain observations concerning the life and reign of Queen Elizabeth by John Clapham*, ed. E. P. Read and Conyers Read (Philadelphia, 1951), 59. These words have been mistakenly attributed to Burghley himself: Graves, *Burghley*, 196.

⁷⁸ Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 10 November 1588, TNA, SP 63/138/14.

⁷⁹ Auditor Jenyson to Burghley, 26 January 1587, TNA, SP 63/128/17.

Clapham's thoughts on the Irish echoed those of Sir Thomas Cecil—Cecil's elder son born to his first wife Mary Cheke—who, though he had not, as yet, been to Ireland, boldly advised the queen:

To avoyde styrring of rebellyon in Irland, it wylbe co[n]venyent to take away y^e causes so muche as may be that be lyke to styrr & noryshe it, that is to say, to recover y^e myndes of all the nobylite of late by vry [very] hard dealyngs gretely greved, to permytte the nobylite to co[n]tynewe ther auntyent gretenes, strength, honor, & suerty, to take away y^e fere of conquest of late depely grafted in y^e harts of y^e wylde Iryshe, to wink rather at some pryvate dysorders that do not properly offend y^e crowne & by custome have of long tyme bene used in that realm.⁸⁰

This observation may be a representation of one side of a debate about which we know little but which was then ongoing among the queen's councillors over how to proceed in Ireland. There is a letter from what appears to have been a member of the privy council to Sir Henry Wallop, Fitton's successor as undertreasurer in Ireland, written at this time which alluded to 'our devisiion here at home in counsell about the causes of that cuntry'. Some councillors, it explained, were inclined to 'reformation', while others supported 'a tolleration of that nation to enioye their Irishe customes'. It was this division which, according to the writer, was the 'cheefe cause why thinges goe no better there'.⁸¹ Cecil, as we have seen, had for decades sought Ireland's 'reformation', but to achieve this end he was also prepared to tolerate Irish customs in the short term. Some of his colleagues, it would seem, were not prepared to wait.

As the queen's council in England deliberated, rebellion raged in Ireland and word spread of the soldiers' behaviour in the kingdom. In his 1579 publication, the soldier and author Thomas Churchyard wrote of the 'unquietness' of Ireland, where soldiers, in their strident efforts to defend the kingdom, were said to 'maks wife and children crie, and leavs the lande full bare'.⁸² The situation worsened considerably following the outbreak of rebellion in Munster and Leinster that year and the appointment of Lord Grey as deputy. The king of Spain heard lurid reports from his ambassador in London in August 1581:

The viceroy has given so much license to the English in the slaughter of Irishmen that they not only kill men, women, and children, of the insurgents, but they treat their friends in the same way. I am told that a councillor, condemning this behaviour, said that they had intelligence that one of the most intimate captains of the viceroy had invited 17 Irishmen to supper, and as they arose from the table he and another man had stabbed all of them to death.⁸³

An embarrassed Burghley wrote to Wallop: 'yt is no m[ar]vell that the people have rebellious hartes; for the Fleminges had not such cawse to rebell by the

⁸⁰ Thomas Cecil to queen, 28 January 1580, CP 148, fo. 19.

⁸¹ Letter to Wallop, 17 March 1580, CP, 11, fo. 35. The letter, which is a copy, was sent by 'M'.

⁸² Thomas Churchyard, *The miserie of Flaunders, calamitie of Fraunce, misfortune of Portugall, vnquietnes of Irelande, troubles of Scotlande: and the blessed state of Englande* (London, 1579).

⁸³ CSP, Spanish, iii. 153.

oppressions of the Spanyardes, as it is reported the Irish people have'. In 1582, Wallop defended the administration's treatment of the kingdom's inhabitants to Burghley, contending that it was 'the greate affection they beare to the Popish religion' and the fact that the Irish 'much hate o' nation' which was the true cause of disorder and the recent rebellion in Ireland, rather than the conduct of men in the service of the queen.⁸⁴

Yet Burghley was unshaken in his belief that disorders in Ireland sprang, in large part, from the oppressions of the soldier, and officials in local government (many of whom were soldiers). To this end, the lord treasurer saw that the suspension of martial law was included in a wide-ranging set of articles and instructions, which the queen signed and he countersigned in 1592, designed to address a range of problems throughout the kingdom.⁸⁵ The section on law was much the most detailed. It contained ten subheadings which sought to bring the execution of justice more closely into line with the dispensation of justice in England. The second subheading offers a window on both the state of justice in the kingdom by 1592 and the crown's proposal to reform it:

Where divers countries of late years have been reduced into shires, and have sheriffs and justices of assize yearly appointed for the same, with justices of peace also placed in the same shires. It is not convenient, and Her Majesty willeth that the formar officers, commonly called seneschals or captains, who served for countries where the laws had no common course, should not be permitted to have martial government . . . as they used to have exercising martial law and government to the oppression of the people, and the enriching only of themselves.

Burghley, as we have seen, held the common law to be the principal interface between the state and the Irish population. Thirty years earlier, in his dealings with Shane O'Neill, the then secretary had stressed the importance of the extension of common law to Irish areas, urging O'Neill to assist in the shiring of his country so that 'a session and an assembly of some councillors and lawyers might be stablyshed at Armagh to mynister Englyssh lawes to the people of Tyrone'; Cecil had also advised that the 'sonnes of the principall gentlemen' of O'Neill's country 'might be sent first into England to scoole, & also by learning of civiltie trayne the countrey to order'.⁸⁶ In 1590, Burghley penned a 'memorial' which outlined his plans both to have seneschals, under whose command Irish areas were often placed, deprived of martial law and, in counties where sheriffs were in place, to have 'the executio[n] of y^e laws be com[m]itted to y^e shyryves, as is or ought to be in y^e shyres of y^e English Pale'.⁸⁷ Burghley could only have agreed with the assessment of Robert Gardiner, the chief justice of the queen's bench in Ireland, that martial law, 'having been frequently granted to inferior governors, sheriffs, seneschals, captains . . . our

⁸⁴ Wallop to Burghley, 10 June 1582, TNA, SP 63/93/17.

⁸⁵ Articles containing things to be considered of by lord deputy and council in Ireland, and answered to Her Majesty, 31 May 1592, TNA, SP 63/164/49(i). See above, 106–7.

⁸⁶ Cecil's private memoranda of devices or means to be used with Shane O'Neill, March 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/43.

⁸⁷ Burghley's Memorial, 1590, TNA, SP 63/156/65.

poor subjects have been frequently shamefully deprived of life, liberty, and goods, and no decorum has been observed either in prosecution or execution, but a butcherlike “spoiling” of Christian blood.⁸⁸ Gardiner wondered how it was that in a Christian state ‘head silver’ or ‘head money’—that is, the money paid out by the government for the heads of rebels—could be awarded to those who in the name of justice brought in heads ‘never examining or knowing whose heads, whether of the best or worst’ they had taken.⁸⁹ The practice was never entirely brought to an end, however. According to Ormond, Burghley had, before his death in August 1598, told him of ‘Her Ma^{ty} pleasure, to give head money to such as wold cutt of any of the princypall trayto^s in accion accordinge the qualitie of the rebell to be cutt of’.⁹⁰ Indeed in late 1596 one Thomas Ball was paid £15 for having brought in the heads of seventeen of Feagh MacHugh O’Byrne’s men.⁹¹

Nevertheless, Irish society, and the ruling structures of the Irish polity which underpinned it, had to be dismantled and brought into accord with the society and government of Tudor England. Cecil’s support of plantation, the conclusion of surrender and regrant agreements with individual chiefs, and the provision of common law were all designed to undermine the authority of the native political order. In this, Cecil was holding to what was fast becoming an antiquated—a decidedly mid-Tudor—strategy for the extension of Tudor rule in Ireland.⁹² Cecil had become the embodiment of this older, and more moderate, voice on Ireland at court and on Elizabeth’s privy council. He was not alone. Late in 1583 James Croft, privy councillor and one of the few remaining politicians of Cecil’s generation, directed a tract to him and the queen entitled ‘A discourse on the reformacon of Irland’. Croft was a former soldier. He had served at Boulogne under Henry VIII, in Ireland as lord deputy in Edward VI’s reign, and in Scotland at the siege of Leith early in Elizabeth’s reign.⁹³ Croft decried the increasing resort to martial law in Ireland. He spoke of ‘Theise unexpert captaines and souldiers’,

that hathe slaine & distroied aswell the unarmed as armed, even to the ploughman that nev[er] bare weapon extending crueltie uppo[n] bothe sexes & uppon all ages fro[m] the babe in the cradle to y^e decreped age in sorte not to be named, and by Christian people not to be lookid uppo[n] in the acco[n] do not wante reasons to maintaine theire errores.

For Croft, it was the want of justice which ‘alyenated the mindes of the people’, though he hastened to add: ‘I meane not the mindes of the wylde Ireishe, ffor they nev[er] yet tasted the throughe force of the use of justice according to the English

⁸⁸ Draft proclamation to restrain martial law in Ireland, 4 January 1590, TNA, SP 63/150/4(i); Memorial for Ireland delivered by Justice Gardiner, 4 January 1590, TNA, SP 63/150/5. Burghley endorsed the latter document.

⁸⁹ For this practice, see David Edwards, “Some day two heads and some days four”, *History Ireland*, 17 (2009), 18–21.

⁹⁰ Ormond to Robert Cecil, 21 October 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.3)/118.

⁹¹ Book of payments under the privy seal, 16 January 1596, TNA, SP 63/197/33(i).

⁹² David Edwards, ‘Ideology and experience: Spenser’s *View* and martial law in Ireland’, in Morgan (ed.), *Political ideology in Ireland*, 127–57.

⁹³ S. G. Ellis, *s.v.* ‘James Croft’, in the *ODNB*.

administracion'. Croft bemoaned the fact that a situation had arisen in which the 'meer English nacyon repyne and grudge being governed by English lawes'. The tract went on to articulate the 'classic' model of extending Tudor rule in Ireland: the strengthening and extending of the English Pale through the provision of justice, the granting of lands to obedient Irish chiefs, and colonization.⁹⁴ It came at a time when arguments for the eradication of the Irish elite were gaining in currency among the New English and the soldierly element in Ireland. Edmund Spenser, the poet who had come to Ireland in 1580 as secretary to Lord Deputy Grey, and witnessed at first hand the rebellion in Leinster and Munster, became through his infamous tract *A view of the present state of Ireland* the most influential proponent of adopting a more aggressive policy toward the native political order in the kingdom.⁹⁵ In *Prosopopia; or, Mother Hubberd's tale*, published in 1591 but seemingly written around the time of his service to Grey, Spenser launched a scathing satirical attack on Lord Burghley's pride of place at the ageing court of Queen Elizabeth.⁹⁶ Likening the queen's oldest and most trusted adviser to a fox who misused his power to gather spoils to himself and his friends, Spenser made specific criticism of his alleged failure to support the soldier: 'Of men of armes he had but small regard, But kept them lowe, and streigned verie hard'.⁹⁷ By the time of its publication, Croft (whose name may have carried weight among soldiers still) was dead; so too were the old hands familiar with Ireland—Sussex (d. 1583), Sidney (d. 1586), Leicester (d. 1588), and Walsingham (d. 1590). Lord Burghley lived on, and his relatively moderate attitude toward the Irish, born of his Christian humanist principles and accentuated through decades of experience with Ireland and the Irish, was increasingly out of step with the younger generation of military men making their fortune in the embattled Tudor kingdom.

Much of what separated William Cecil from his contemporaries in Tudor government was his repeated efforts to comprehend, rather than to denigrate or seek to destroy outright, the inhabitants of the kingdom of Ireland and their culture. The numerous pedigrees and genealogies which he compiled for Irish clansmen from across the kingdom offer the clearest evidence of this tendency: in a society where lineage, politics, loyalty, and violence were intertwined they helped Cecil to stay abreast of the changing social and political geography of Ireland. Thus, when

⁹⁴ 'A discourse for the reformacon of Irland', 9 December 1583, Northamptonshire Record Office, Fitzwilliam (Milton) MS 67 (quotations, fos. 5^r, 9^r). Cf. Ciaran Brady, 'Comparable histories? Tudor reform in Wales and Ireland', in S. G. Ellis and Sarah Barber (eds.), *Conquest and union: fashioning a British state, 1485–1725* (London, 1995), 64–86.

⁹⁵ Edmund Spenser, *A view of the state of Ireland*, ed. Andrew Hadfield and Willy Maley (Oxford, 1997).

⁹⁶ Canny, *Making Ireland British*, 33–4; A. B. Worden, *The sound of virtue: Philip Sidney's Arcadia and Elizabethan politics* (New Haven, 1996), 63–5; Andrew Hadfield, *s.v.* 'Edmund Spenser', in the *ODNB*.

⁹⁷ Edmund Spenser, *Complaints containing sundrie small poems of the worlds vanitie* (London, 1591); Edwards, 'Ideology and experience', 142–3. For the suggestion that Spenser's fox represented (in an Irish context) Adam Loftus, archbishop of Dublin, see Thomas Herron, 'Reforming the fox: Spenser's "Mother Hubberd's tale"', the beast fable of Barnabe Riche, Adam Loftus, archbishop of Dublin', *Studies in Philology*, 105/3 (2008), 336–87.

in 1596 the rebellion of Hugh O'Neill and his Irish confederates intensified, Burghley employed his vast genealogical knowledge to see precisely (and literally) from whom the chief rebels sprang.⁹⁸ But there was more at work here than the application of political and military intelligence in the service of the state. Cecil compiled pedigrees of Irishmen along with those of English lineages in Ireland, like the Burkes of Connaught and the Fitzgerald earls of Kildare. Genealogies of Pale gentry, such as Thomas Finglas, New English soldier/administrators in Ireland, like the Bingham, are also evident, and sit beside the pedigrees he made of English and Welsh families, including his own, in the kingdom of England.⁹⁹ As master of the court of wards, it was Cecil's duty to keep track of such records. But his responsibilities in this regard did not extend to Ireland. That he did anyway suggests an effort through a familiar (in this case a written and visual) medium to locate and incorporate the kingdom of Ireland and its Irish and English identities into a wider Tudor society based on land, rank, and peerage.¹⁰⁰ Cecil was also a consistent advocate of seeing Irish chiefs raised to the peerage as English nobles. Though Elizabeth, in the end, raised only Donald MacCarthy to the peerage as the first earl of Clancare, Cecil saw the benefits for the kingdom of Ireland if Irishmen like Turlough Luineach O'Neill and the chief of the O'Flaherties held noble titles of the queen and sat in the House of Lords.¹⁰¹

The importance which Cecil accorded nobility and lineage was most strikingly visible for guests, which included Elizabeth herself, visiting his magnificent home at Theobalds in Hertfordshire. For there they were confronted with the renowned Green Gallery, a covered and enclosed walkway whose walls were adorned with murals of the geography of England and with the coat-of-arms of all of the kingdom's nobility and gentlemen. Trees were painted in green, one for every shire in the kingdom, and upon each tree hung the arms of the nobility who lived in each county.¹⁰² The Green Gallery along with Theobalds itself was lost in the next

⁹⁸ Genealogies of the Ulster rebels, 1596, TNA, SP 63/196/53.

⁹⁹ Note of the rising out... for the governor of Connaught, 18 January 1582, TNA, SP 63/88/34 (genealogy of the MacWilliam Burkes written on this); Petition of Attorney-General John Popham, 18 December 1587, TNA, SP 63/132/39 (pedigree of the Burkes of Castleconnell 'tricked' on the back of the document); Memoranda on the lands of earl of Kildare, 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/150 (brief pedigree of the earl of Kildare); An account made of my life... by Thomas Finglas, 1592, TNA, SP 63/167/62 (genealogy of Thomas Finglas 'tricked' on this); Richard Bingham to Burghley, 22 July 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/48 (the Bingham's genealogy 'tricked' on back).

¹⁰⁰ Notes on Irish pedigrees, TNA, SP 63/213/90–100; Transcriptions of Burghley's notes on Irish pedigrees, TNA, SP 31/16/70. For Burghley's documents relating to the Cecils' family history, see *Salisbury MSS*, viii. 287–8; Genealogical table, 1567, TNA, SP 13/h, fo. 13. In a postscript to a letter written to Robert Cecil in 1597, Burghley noted, with unmistakable pride, that he had had to dinner at his house 'of old and young, 14 descended of my body': *Queen Elizabeth and her times*, ii. 484–5.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Memorandum of letters to be prepared, May 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/76; Sidney's requests, 22 December 1575, TNA, SP 63/54/22; Malby to Walsingham, 25 May 1582, TNA, SP 63/92/65; Maginn, 'The Gaelic peers'.

¹⁰² On Burghley's 'passion for nobility and lineage', see Alford, *Burghley*, 6, 340–1. For the Green Gallery, see John Summerson, 'The building of Theobalds, 1564–85', *Archaeologia*, 97 (1954), 107–26; James Sutton, *Materializing space at an early modern prodigy house: the Cecils at Theobalds, 1564–1607* (Aldershot, 2004), 57–8.

century, but in the background of the well-known portrait depicting Lord Burghley in the 1590s astride his mule one can view Burghley's arms hanging from a tree. Nobility was a cornerstone of the society to which Cecil also belonged and through which his forebears, and then he, had advanced. Nobility was a cornerstone, too, of the English society that Cecil had worked for so long to create in Ireland. Ireland was not England, and its prominent families did not warrant a place on the wall of the Green Gallery in the Cecil home; but in time, once the reform of Ireland was complete, they might also assume such distinction.

In the meanwhile, William Cecil accepted that within the kingdom of Ireland aspects of Irish culture would continue to exist. He was sufficiently confident in his understanding of the amalgam of English and Irish culture which obtained in Elizabethan Ireland to invoke, in 1580, the ancient (and outlawed) Irish battle-cry, '*Abú*' (forever), in a letter to Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond. On that occasion William Cecil, first baron of Burghley, the lord high treasurer of England, wrote to reassure the head of the most influential English house in the kingdom of Ireland that provisions were en route to help him meet the papally supported rebellion in Munster, 'so as now merely I must saye, Butler aboo, agey[n]st all that cry as I here in a new language Papeaboo'.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Burghley to Ormond, 26 January 1580, TNA, SP 63/71/26. Since the parliament convened by Sir Edward Poyning, 1494–5, Englishmen in Ireland were legally forbidden to employ such battle cries as 'Butleraboo'. Rather, they were 'to call only on St George or the name of the sovereign lord the king of England': 10 Henry VII c. 20. See the List of the war cries of the Irish clans, TNA, SP 63/214/43.

7

Religion

The existence in Ireland of explicit devotion to the papacy two decades into Elizabeth's reign, so strikingly articulated in Burghley's letter to Ormond quoted above, raises the subject of the minister's attitude toward religion in the kingdom of Ireland. William Cecil was a devout and learned Christian, deeply committed to the branch of Protestantism which had over the course of the middle decades of the sixteenth century become manifest in the Church of England. And, like many Englishmen of his generation who reached adulthood in the reign of Henry VIII, he harboured a deep-seated fear of Catholicism. For Cecil, however, an ideological opposition to Catholicism, born of an education in a Protestant environment at the university of Cambridge and nurtured by an awareness, open to him through his political service, of the interrelatedness of religion and the survival of the Tudor monarchy, accentuated this fear.¹ The rebellions in Munster and Leinster (1579–83), which enjoyed the military and financial support of Pope Gregory XIII, and then the ever-present threat of a Spanish invasion of the Tudor kingdoms in the 1580s and 1590s, served only to reinforce these sentiments.² Yet the degree to which Cecil exerted a positive influence on the spread of Protestantism in Ireland and the erection of the administrative machinery of the Church of Ireland is a subject about which we are less certain. Indeed the progress of Protestantism itself in Tudor Ireland has been the subject of much debate, and little consensus, among historians.³ It is not the intention of this chapter to revisit the arguments of the debate on the success or failure of the Reformation in Ireland. It seeks rather to offer a fresh perspective on the subject of religion in sixteenth-century Ireland through the examination of William Cecil's attitude toward religion and his twin efforts to promote Protestantism and stamp out Catholicism in the kingdom.

Broadly, Cecil accorded the establishment of Protestantism a secondary role in his thinking on Ireland. This is borne out both qualitatively and quantitatively: he

¹ Malcolm Thorp, 'William Cecil and the anti-Christ: a study in anti-Catholic ideology', in Malcolm Thorp and Arthur Slavin (eds.), *Politics, religion, and diplomacy in early modern Europe* (Kirksville, Mo., 1994), 289–304.

² McCormack, *The earldom of Desmond*, 145–57; Christopher Maginn, 'The Baltinglass rebellion: Old English dissent or a Gaelic uprising?', *Historical Journal*, 47 (2004), 205–32.

³ Brendan Bradshaw, 'Sword, word and strategy in the Reformation in Ireland', *Historical Journal*, 21 (1978), 475–502; Nicholas Canny, 'Why the Reformation failed in Ireland: une question mal posée', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 30 (1979), 423–50; K. S. Bottigheimer, 'The failure of the Reformation in Ireland: une question bien posée', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 36 (1985), 196–207.

did not in his forty years of service to the crown devote a single memorandum or memorial exclusively to the subject of religion in Ireland, and Cecil's other paperwork pertaining to causes ecclesiastical is small relative to the other Ireland matters which occupied him.⁴ This is not to say that he viewed religion as a matter of lesser importance than the political extension and intensification of Tudor rule and English culture in Ireland, indeed for him religious uniformity, political control, and English 'civility' were inseparable; but like many Tudor officials he devoted most of his energies to securing political control in the kingdom, an implicit acknowledgement that the establishment of Protestantism throughout Ireland could not be achieved in any meaningful way until royal authority was well advanced. Meanwhile, those areas of Ireland which were under Tudor control, most notably the English Pale, had to be brought (and kept) in step with ecclesiastical developments in the Church of England. It was in this context that Cecil oversaw the direction of the always struggling Protestant Church in Ireland and, toward the end of his career, helped to found the kingdom's first university—Trinity College, Dublin—which was intended to be the self-sustaining mainspring of a preaching ministry which he believed would inevitably produce a strong reformed church in the kingdom.

The restoration of Catholicism under Queen Mary had swept away what little progress had been made in advancing Protestantism in Ireland in the previous two reigns. To the Elizabethan regime, and its principal secretary, thus fell the responsibility of re-establishing the Church of Ireland. But the provision of religious direction was also necessary: was a return to the Protestantism of the queen's half-brother's reign imminent or would Elizabeth introduce something more conservative along the lines of her father's church; or, perhaps, something more radical still? Elizabeth's religious settlement, approved by the English parliament's passing in April 1559 of the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity, provided that direction.⁵ Cecil played a key role in engineering the settlement. He was almost certainly the author of the anonymous and influential paper known as the 'device for the alteration of religion'. Written within a month of Elizabeth's accession, it stressed, among other things, the necessity of seeking legislative backing for any alteration of religion and outlined the challenges which the matter of religion presented. The 'device' identified Ireland as an area of particular concern: 'Ireland', its author argued, 'will be very difficultly stayed in the Obedience, by reason of the clergy that is so addicted to Rome'.⁶

⁴ Robert Ware, the seventeenth-century antiquarian and son of Sir James Ware, purportedly based some of his information pertaining to the religious history of Ireland on 'the memorials of the Lord Cecil', but Ware forged the documents which he attributed to Cecil. See, for example, Robert Ware, *The examinations of Faithful Communion Dominican friar, as Sir James Ware had them from the late Lord Primate Usher, being one of the memorials of the Lord Cecil* (Dublin, 1679); Philip Wilson, 'The writings of Sir James Ware and the forgeries of Robert Ware', *The Library*, 15 (1917), 83–94. The manuscript supposedly transcribed in 1656 by John King, dean of Tuam, from a 'memorial by Cecil' is also a forgery: Marsh's Library, MS Z 3 1 11.

⁵ Norman Jones, *Faith by statute: parliament and the settlement of religion 1559* (London, 1982).

⁶ Alford, *Burghley*, 91–2; John Strype, *Annals of the Reformation and establishment of religion* (Oxford, 1824), 393 (quotation); L. F. Solt, *Church and state in early modern England* (Oxford, 1990), 67–8.

Elizabeth's religious policy, her much-vaunted *via media*, forged between Roman Catholicism and Genevan Calvinism, would have to be extended to the kingdom of Ireland. It had become customary—though, in a strict interpretation of the constitutional relationship between England and Ireland, unnecessary—to seek the assent of the parliament of Ireland in introducing major legislation for Ireland that had had its genesis in England. That parliament was not convened until January 1560 provides an indication of the place accorded to securing religious uniformity within the Tudor kingdoms at a time when the government in Ireland was facing myriad problems ranging from the recalcitrance of Shane O'Neill to the economic hardships arising from a debased coinage. Thus, in the earl of Sussex's instructions for the government of Ireland, drawn up in July 1559, he received little in the way of religious direction, other than that he 'and such others of that counsaill, w^{ch} be natif borne subiects of this realme of Englande, do as moch as conueniantly maye with good order lye in them, use the rites and ceremonyes of the s[er]vice of god at y^e best in there houses, w^{ch} is by lawe here approved and appoynted'.⁷ To this Cecil added: 'for doing whereof, her Ma^{ties} will is, that none of them shalbe empeched or molested.' To whom the secretary referred in his addition was made clear in the next paragraph of Sussex's instructions which Cecil struck out with his pen and glossed 'to be left out' beside it:

that others natyue of that con'rey be not otherwise moved to use the same otherwise than w^t there owne conte[n]tations theye shalbe disposed, nether therin doth hir Ma^y meane to iudge otherwise of them than well, and yet for the better example and edification of prayer in the Chirche, it shalbe well doone, if the sayd councillors being of that co[n]trye borne, shall at tymes convenient cause ether in there own howses or in the chirches the letany in the English tonge to be used, w^t the reading of the piste and gossple in the same tong and the tenne co[m]ma[n]dme[n]ts.

Queen Elizabeth's indisposition to make windows into the souls of men is well known, but so too is her insistence on outward conformity—that she pursued neither in Ireland speaks to the caution with which the new regime approached the matter of religion in the other Tudor kingdom.⁸

Nowhere in Cecil's papers and memoranda pertaining to the government of Ireland in the early years of the reign does the subject of religion appear prominently. While political, military, and especially economic problems may have demanded more immediate attention, Cecil's reluctance to pursue a religious agenda in Ireland might also have been coloured by what he understood to be the hopeless state of religion there. Implicit in the account of a youthful Cecil supposedly employing his superior knowledge of theology to humble the Irish priests who in 1542 accompanied Conn Bacach O'Neill to the court of Henry VIII, was the backwardness of religious understanding in Ireland and especially among the Irish. Cecil's contemporary biographer described the meeting thus:

⁷ Queen's instructions to Sussex, 16 July 1559, TNA, SP 63/1/62.

⁸ See Patrick Collinson, 'Windows in a woman's soul: questions about the religion of Queen Elizabeth I', in *Elizabethan essays* (London, 1994), 87–118.

And talking long with them in Lattin, he fell [to a] disputation with the priests. Wherein he shewed so great lerning & witt, as he proved the poore priests to have neither. Who weare so put downe, as they had not a word to saie; but flong away in [a chafe:] no lesse discontented, then ashamed, to be foiled in such a place by so younge a berdless yewth.⁹

This impression was later confirmed when, in Edward's reign, Northumberland explained to him that the earl of Desmond, who had lately been put forward to serve as lord treasurer, was of the old religion if indeed he was of any religion at all.¹⁰ James Croft, the then deputy, offered Cecil a similarly troubling report on the difficulties confronting the reformed faith in Ireland:

I am besyde my myne other burdened with the setting forth of religion, wiche to my skyl I cause to be amended in euery place where I travall: and nevertheless through the negligence of the Bysshopes and other spyrituall mynistres, it is so barely looked unto, as the olde seremonies yet remayne. . . . The Busshops as I find, be negligent and fewe lerned, and none of any good zeale as it semeth.¹¹

Sussex had even found the brand of Catholicism practised in Ireland abhorrent, and urged Queen Mary to prioritize the reform of the Irish church.¹² Careful not to push what he deemed to be a spiritually backward population further into the embrace of the long-established religion when the crown's authority was both precarious and geographically limited, Cecil made no immediate effort to import the Elizabethan religious reforms to Ireland. Instead, preparations began in England and Ireland to introduce Elizabeth's religious settlement into the Irish parliament.

The ecclesiastical bills were sent, in accordance with Poyning's Law, to the privy council in England for approval in late 1559.¹³ When the legislation was returned to Ireland and came before parliament in January 1560, it was enacted into law within four weeks and without resistance.¹⁴ With Cecil's argument for English intervention in Scotland on behalf of the Protestant lords of the congregation reaching its crescendo in early 1560, securing the religious settlement in Ireland by a comfortable parliamentary majority was vital. Though the evidence is meagre, it would seem that Elizabeth's privy council had built up a party of reliable New English MPs, so as to give added support to the legislation in the lower house.¹⁵

⁹ Peck, *Desiderata curiosa*, 6.

¹⁰ Instructions to Mr Wood, 29 September 1551, TNA, SP 61/3/54; Northumberland to Cecil, 25 November 1552, TNA, SP 61/4/64.

¹¹ Croft to Cecil, 15 March 1552, TNA, 62/4/28. Cf. Brendan Bradshaw, 'The Edwardian Reformation in Ireland', *Archivium Hibernicum*, 34 (1976–7), 83–99.

¹² E. P. Shirley (ed.), *Original letters and papers in illustration of the history of the Church of Ireland, during the reigns of Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth* (London, 1851), 76–7.

¹³ A note containing certain alterations in the bills of Ireland from the statutes of England, January 1560, TNA, SP 63/2/1.

¹⁴ Henry Jefferies, 'The Irish parliament of 1560: the Anglican reforms authorised', *IHS* 26 (1988–9), 128–41.

¹⁵ Brendan Bradshaw, 'Beginnings of modern Ireland', in Brian Farrell (ed.), *The Irish parliamentary tradition* (Dublin, 1973), 67–87; id., 'The English Reformation and identity formation in Ireland and Wales', in Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Robertson (eds.), *British consciousness and identity: the making of Britain, 1533–1707* (Cambridge, 2004), 48–9.

A document written by Sussex and preserved among Cecil's papers reflects the gravity which the government accorded the parliament. 'For the settling of religion' in Ireland, Sussex suggested the reprisal of an extraordinary tactic used there 'at the renouncing of the Pope' in 1536: 'there may be some special men called to be of the Lords' House for that parliament, or during life at the Queen's pleasure'.¹⁶ Whether in fact the queen resorted to raising men to the peerage of Ireland on a temporary basis is unclear, but the ecclesiastical legislation quickly passed both houses and was made law.

With the Church of Ireland officially restored and the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity in place, however, the matter of religion again receded into the background. Vacant Church of Ireland sees were indeed filled—by Englishmen, where possible, most notably the bishopric of Kildare and the archbishopric of Armagh, by Alexander Craik and Adam Loftus, respectively. The latter was emerging as the most energetic figure in the Church of Ireland, and Cecil was instrumental in securing his appointment.¹⁷ Yet such appointments did little more than put a brave face on what was a struggling and, by English standards, terribly impoverished church. The new bishop of Kildare's letters to Cecil and Robert Dudley outlined the economic, social, and linguistic difficulties confronting him in Ireland. In July 1562, Sussex, in an oft-quoted passage, provided Cecil with a particularly bleak image of the state of religion in Ireland: 'the pepell w'owt dyscipline, utterly voyde of relygyon, come to divine s[er]vices to a May game'.¹⁸ It was in these circumstances that the privy council paid Archbishop Loftus and the bishop of Meath a significant sum of money to oversee the printing of an Irish version of the New Testament. That same year Cecil lent his support for an act of parliament in England for the translation of the bible into Welsh.¹⁹ There is no record of Cecil's connection to the proposed publication of the scriptures in Irish, but it must be presumed, in view of his commitment to the gospel and his record with the Welsh language, that he supported the move in Ireland. The ability of the Irish population to hear (and to read) the gospel was essential if greater support for the new religion was ever to be won. The technical matter of there being no Irish characters to be used in a printing press was subsequently addressed, but nothing came of the project and, years later, the privy council was left to seek repayment from the bishops if the work continued to go unpublished.²⁰

It was not until October 1563 that Cecil and the privy council returned to the subject of religion. A royal commission, consisting of Nicholas Arnold and Thomas Wrothe, was appointed to investigate alleged abuses in the garrisons. The privy

¹⁶ CP 18, fo. 85 (the document was misdated 1589: *Salisbury MSS*, iii. 459–60).

¹⁷ Sussex to Cecil, 29 November 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/76; Sussex to Cecil, 25 December 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/83; Craik to Cecil, 2 January 1562, TNA, SP 63/5/3.

¹⁸ Craik to Robert Dudley, 30 April 1561, TNA, SP 63/3/62; Craik to Cecil, 13 September 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/53; Sussex to Cecil, 22 July 1562, TNA, SP 63/6/57 (quotation).

¹⁹ Glanmore Williams, *Wales and the Reformation* (Cardiff, 1997), 350–1.

²⁰ Remembrances taken upon the account of William Fitzwilliam, 1567, TNA, SP 63/22/70; E. W. Lynam, 'The Irish character in print, 1571–1923', *The Library*, 4 (1924), 288–92; Felicity Heal, *Reformation in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford, 2003), 284–5.

council used this opportunity to instruct them to learn ‘in what sorte o’ lawes ar ther observed for the orders of relligion, and what disorders you fynde therin, and by what causes the same do aryse, and to note well who be of o’ nobilitie & counsell therin conformable, and who not’. The commissioners were also instructed to enquire into the possibility of transforming St Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin into a university ‘because’, it was claimed, ‘it hath been always required by our good subjects there, to have some university erected in that realm’. This scheme was familiar to Cecil: at the start of Edward’s reign he had taken upon himself to read the then archbishop of Dublin’s device to convert St Patrick’s into a university.²¹ St Patrick’s, it was still thought, ‘might be well converted, to be a place of publike teachinge, readinge, & learninge, and the revenues therof beinge well ordered, might well sustayne a sufficient nombre of readers, teachers, preachers, and of a competent nombre of schollers’.²² Cecil had penned a paper in September on the subject of the musters and garrisons, and then heavily edited the draft of the commissioners’ instructions pertaining to these matters.²³ The religious dimension to their mission was contained in a second and separate memorial written the same day. The draft of the religious instructions has not survived, but in the margin of the penultimate page of the commissioners’ instructions concerning the musters Cecil wrote ‘S’ Patrycks’ and, about the same time, endorsed another paper entitled ‘Device of a college to be erected in Dublin’.²⁴

The commissioners made their report on religion to the privy council in March 1564.²⁵ The tenor of their findings could hardly have come as a surprise to the secretary: ‘concerning religion and the favorers of it’, the commissioners wrote, ‘we ar sorie to saye what we fynde blinde ignorance, the leadre to sup[er]stition, so set bie, as it is harde to p[er]swade willingnes to here the troth’; they found ‘fewe earnest favorers of religion’ and intimated that the transformation of St Patrick’s (and more importantly the redirection of its revenues) into a university might provoke opposition from its prebendaries. They praised the work of Loftus and Hugh Brady, the bishop of Meath, but noted—apparently unaware that the latter was himself of Irish birth and Irish ancestry—that ‘the rest of the bishops as we here be all Irishe, we nede say no more’. Cecil, however, could take some solace in learning the commissioners’ view that ‘this people feare to offend, wherfore they be not to be dispayred, but to be hoped of’. They continued: ‘Ffor thoes we haue to do wth we fynd confirmable to lawes, and the Judges wth others of the Lawers readie as they seme to us, to execute the lawes for religion’; the commissioners, however, also

²¹ George Browne’s device for converting St Patrick’s into a university, 1 December 1547, TNA, SP 63/1/10.

²² A second memorial for Wrothe and Arnold, 20 October 1563, LPL, 614, fo. 143 (quotation). Cf. James Murray, ‘St Patrick’s Cathedral and the university question in Ireland, c.1547–1585’, in Helga Robinson-Hammerstein (ed.), *European universities in the age of Reformation and Counter-Reformation* (Dublin, 1998), 1–33.

²³ Cecil’s note of things to be ordered for the trial, reformation, and order of the payments of the garrisons in Ireland, September 1563, TNA, SP 63/9/26; Instructions given by queen . . . for execution of divers things relative to the musters, 20 October 1563, TNA, SP 63/9/45.

²⁴ Device of a college to be erected in Dublin, October 1563, TNA, SP 63/9/49.

²⁵ Commissioners Wrothe and Arnold to privy council, 16 March 1564, TNA, SP 63/10/34.

recommended 'that they meadle notth the simple multitude nowe at the first, but wth one or two bosting masse men in every shire'. On foot of this report, the government established a high commission for ecclesiastical causes, headed by Loftus, empowered to enforce the religious settlement.²⁶

The commission faced serious obstacles, however. The queen was not in a position to place significant resources at the commissioners' disposal. Tudor government was scarcely felt outside the English Pale and, following his decisive defeat of the MacDonnells at Glenshesk in May 1565, the threat posed by Shane O'Neill had become particularly acute.²⁷ In those areas subject to Tudor rule—those parts of the kingdom in which the commission was to function—the government was aware that adherence to the old religion was widespread, but with a standing army already causing tensions between the Palesmen and the Sussex-led government the privy council was reluctant to crack down too severely on recusancy. In summer 1565 Loftus explained to Elizabeth that he and his fellow commissioners had chosen juries out of the Pale parishes to enquire into the state of religion around Dublin. He claimed that they uncovered many offences, but that the jury members refused to bring charges against the Pale nobility and the greater gentlemen of the Pale. He sought Elizabeth's backing to proceed against them and appealed to Cecil for support because, he wrote, 'Youre honors most godlie inclination towarde the ghospel and pure religion, maketh mee bolde to trouble you'.²⁸

The secretary was concurrently preparing to strengthen the Protestant faith in Ireland through more indirect means. Cecil was at this time attempting to recruit, through the master of Trinity College, Cambridge, university-educated preachers in England so that they might be sent over to Ireland.²⁹ The secretary's interest in promoting the gospel in Ireland was well known in England. Edmund Grindal, bishop of London, wrote to Cecil in late 1567 to express his dim view of the rumoured candidate for the archbishopric of Armagh, vacant since Loftus' transfer to Dublin. But he used the opportunity to ask the secretary 'to talke a litle' with the messenger, whom Grindal described as an Irishman. Grindal hoped that with Cecil's encouragement this man 'shalbe on daye be a profitable minister in his country'.³⁰

Ultimately, however, it was the government which would have to take the lead if Protestantism was to advance along with the secular aspects of Tudor rule in Ireland. To this end, Cecil helped to ensure that religion formed an element of Sidney's plans in his first deputyship to extend English government throughout the kingdom. Cecil, as we have seen above, played a central role in the drafting (and redrafting) of the detailed set of instructions for the government of Ireland

²⁶ *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Henry VIII–18th Eliz.*, 489–90.

²⁷ Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 16 May 1565, TNA, SP 63/13/39.

²⁸ Loftus wrote two letters: one to Cecil and another to Elizabeth. He asked the secretary to deliver the latter to her: Loftus to queen, 17 May 1565, TNA, SP 63/13/42; Loftus to Cecil, 17 May 1565, TNA, SP 63/13/43.

²⁹ Dr Beaumont to Cecil, 12 December 1565, TNA, SP 12/38/10(i).

³⁰ Bishop Grindal to Cecil, 19 November 1567, TNA, SP 12/44/43.

communicated to Sidney in July 1565.³¹ ‘The principall and first care’ which Sidney was to observe in his government was

the due & reverent observation of all good laws & ordnances established in that realme for the maintenance of Cristian faith & religion, and that all meanes be used aswell by exa[m]ple as otherwise, that devotion & godliness may increase from the highest to the lowest, and errors & evil opinions may be restrained, supp[re]ssed & abolished.

A section of the instructions was then devoted to ‘the matters of religion’. It consisted of four articles. The first suggested that the bishopric of Ossory and the archbishopric of Cashel—both vacant and poorly endowed—might be united ‘so as the living might be mete for some p[er]son of such behavio^r’ as being bishop therof, might serve as a counsellor there in Munster hereafter, when a cou[n]sell should be there establyshed for gov[er]na[n]ce of the same partes’.³² The second article, which will be considered in greater detail below, pertained to the conversion of St Patrick’s Cathedral into a university; the third sought to prevent the clergy from alienating their possessions and the impropriations of their benefices and suggested the enactment of a statute to give legal force to the prohibition. The final article in this section commanded the commission for ecclesiastical causes to enforce, more severely, ecclesiastical legislation in the English Pale where hitherto it was widely reported that Catholicism was ‘passed over’.

Based on such evidence it has recently been argued that religious reform featured prominently in Sidney’s programme for national reform.³³ This contention offers a useful corrective to political historians’ tendency to view religion as a subject separate from politics. Religion and politics were merely different sides of the same coin: we need only look to the above suggestion that bishops might sit on Sidney’s projected regional councils. Yet the importance accorded to religion by Cecil and Sidney should not be overstated. The new lord deputy’s detailed instructions contained thirty-four articles. Only four articles, or a little over 10 per cent of the instructions, were devoted to ecclesiastical causes. The clear majority concerned secular matters.

Still, the final article relating to religion was potentially far-reaching, authorizing as it did the commission to begin an assault on the adherence to Catholicism in the Old English community. But in the final form of the instructions the language was greatly toned down. Sidney was now merely to consult with the ecclesiastical commissioners for the renewal of the commission.³⁴ In the second draft of the instructions, dated 9 July, Cecil heavily edited the article relating to the commission, striking out the lines which commanded the body to execute its instructions in the English Pale and replacing them with the wording which would appear in the document’s

³¹ Above, 83–4.

³² This article also asked that the bishopric of Limerick be enquired into, with a view to its bishop sitting on the projected council in Munster.

³³ Ciaran Brady and James Murray, ‘Sir Henry Sidney and the Reformation in Ireland’, in E. Boran and C. Gibben (eds.), *Enforcing Reformation in Ireland and Scotland, 1550–1700* (Aldershot, 2006), 14–39; Murray, *Enforcing the English Reformation in Ireland*, 17–18.

³⁴ Instructions for Sidney and council, 5 October 1565, TNA, SP 63/15/4.

final form.³⁵ In the end, the efforts of Sidney's first administration to promote Protestantism among the people (within or without the Pale) came to little. Neither Cecil nor the queen, and it is difficult to know who exactly took the lead, was prepared to hazard alienating Ireland's English population by pushing the commission for ecclesiastical causes, even after its renewal in July 1568, to proceed more vigorously.³⁶ Sidney, for his part, when commenting on the articles pertaining to religion in the initial instructions, had argued that 'the only way' to remedy the 'defects' of the clergy was to send 'lerned pastoures from hence [England], and by giving them competent livings there'.³⁷ However, the legislation underpinning the religious settlement was in place; Church of Ireland bishops were being regularly appointed; and the presence of the commission for ecclesiastical causes ensured a measure of outward conformity: until further political progress was made, that would have to suffice.

Cecil placed greater hope for the spread of Protestantism in the establishment of a university in place of St Patrick's. He had, as a young man, known the benefits of a university education, having studied at St John's College, Cambridge. The secretary, as we have seen, maintained a close affiliation with Cambridge, that focal point of English Protestantism, and was elected its high chancellor in early 1560. A university in Ireland, he believed, would serve as the fount from which home-grown clergy might spring, so providing the religious direction that the kingdom's inhabitants so desperately needed. Cecil was not alone in this belief. The bishop of Meath, Hugh Brady, emerged as the most ardent proponent from within Ireland of establishing a university, frequently reminding Cecil of such an institution's importance.³⁸ In early 1565 he wrote to the secretary: 'as touching Saint Patrikes that ther is nothing done I marvell, the thing so necessari, so much wished for here, so well liked of there, the promes of so noble a prince to performe it, and yeat nothing done'.³⁹ The plan had encountered difficulty from the start, however. The revenues of St Patrick's not only provided the livings for its prebendaries, they also formed a not insubstantial part of the archbishop of Dublin's income. Until he was translated to Oxford in 1567, Hugh Curwin, archbishop of Dublin and the lord chancellor of Ireland, resisted any effort to dissolve the cathedral.⁴⁰ Faced with this opposition, the royal commissioners made little headway: Cecil wrote to Arnold in early 1565: 'I am sorry to heare no good done in the survey of St Patricks, how it might serve for the comonweale, w^{ch} now serveth for lurking papists'.⁴¹ Later that

³⁵ Second draft of instructions to Sidney, 9 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/7.

³⁶ 'Names of the commissioners that have been, for ecclesiastical causes in Ireland, and that are desired to be now', July 1568, TNA, SP 63/25/52. On the limitations imposed on the commission, see commissioners to Cecil, 16 April 1571, TNA, SP 63/32/10(i).

³⁷ Sidney's opinion upon the minute on the instructions first devised for him, July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/3.

³⁸ For the contemporary belief that a university would contribute to the well-being of the broader community in Ireland, see Helga Robinson-Hammerstein, 'The "common good" and the university in the age of confessional conflict', in Ciaran Brady and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds.), *British interventions in early modern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2005), 73–96.

³⁹ Brady to Cecil, 10 January 1565, TNA, SP 63/12/7.

⁴⁰ Curwin to earl of Pembroke, 21 June 1564, TNA, SP 63/11/13; *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Hen. VIII–Eliz.*, 501.

⁴¹ Cecil to Arnold, 28 February 1565, TNA, SP 63/12/50.

year, the erection of a university featured prominently in Sidney's instructions for the government of Ireland. Cecil heavily annotated and corrected the document which restated the crown's desire to see a university established 'to bring up the yowth of that realme to increase knowledge & civility in sundry parts of the same where now nothing but barbaros and savage co[n]ditio[n]s remayneth'. The wording in the final form of the instructions asked the deputy to consider 'the best meanes for reforming & reducing the said colledge to the publicke benefite of learning in y^e realme'.⁴² In 1568, moreover, Elizabeth made explicit her support for the scheme, along with schools, and the construction of churches, so that her subjects in Ireland would no longer have to live 'without knowledge of God or of us'.⁴³ Loftus' transfer from Armagh to Dublin in 1567 might have been expected to further the matter of a university. Earlier in his career he had supported the dissolution of St Patrick's and the erection of a university in its stead; but following his appointment to the archbishopric of Dublin, Loftus showed himself as reluctant as his predecessor to see preaching clergy deprived of benefices.⁴⁴ Cecil's hopes of establishing a university in Ireland—the only practical way of training a native clergy to convert the inhabitants of the kingdom to Protestantism—had come to nothing.

As Cecil's efforts to establish a university in Ireland languished, a Catholic hierarchy continued to function in the kingdom. This was made clear when, in late 1564, the chance discovery by English soldiers in south-east Ulster of Richard Creagh, the papally appointed archbishop of Armagh, led to the primate's arrest and his incarceration in the Tower. The presence of the Catholic primate in London offered William Cecil a rare opportunity to interview the leader of the Roman church in Ireland.⁴⁵ However, Cecil did not visit Creagh in person. Instead, he sent him a list of questions to which the primate was to provide written responses.⁴⁶ The questions which he posed, moreover, were short-sighted, concerned as they were with the secretary's attempt to quantify how many men—in Ireland, in Rome, in Louvain, in England, and in Wales—knew of Creagh's movements, rather than a more searching effort to assess the state of the Catholic church in Ireland. Creagh's answers to Cecil's questions, which were provided the same day, presented the secretary with a quandary, for the archbishop used them to emphasize his loyalty to the crown, noting that he had, 'in diverse places', proclaimed 'the yoyfull lyfe that Irishmen have under England'. Creagh also touched on the desperate need for crown-sanctioned education in Ireland, especially the erection of a university, so that the Irish population 'should forsake theyr barbarous wildnes, crueltie, and

⁴² 'and savage co[n]ditio[n]s' was added in Cecil's hand: Instructions to Sidney... on his appointment to be deputy of Ireland, 4 July 1565, TNA, SP 63/14/2; Instructions for Sidney and council, 5 October 1565, TNA, SP 63/15/4.

⁴³ Canny, *Elizabethan conquest*, 64.

⁴⁴ Helga Robinson-Hammerstein, *s.v.* 'Adam Loftus', in the *ODNB*.

⁴⁵ Colm Lennon, *An Irish prisoner of conscience of the Tudor era: Archbishop Richard Creagh of Armagh, 1523–1586* (Dublin, 2000), 60–1.

⁴⁶ Questions by Cecil for the interrogation of Richard Creagh, 22 February 1565, TNA, SP 63/12/32.

ferocitie', and have knowledge of 'God and theyr princes'.⁴⁷ Here was the Catholic primate of Ireland accepting of Tudor rule and willing to work with the government to 'civilize' the native population in his archbishopric and in Ireland more generally. But Creagh also refused either to abjure papal authority or to aid the Church of England in any capacity.⁴⁸ His position, that adherence to the Catholic church could be reconciled with loyalty to a Protestant monarch, anticipated the early seventeenth-century argument advanced by Peter Lombard.⁴⁹ Cecil, however, was unwilling at this stage to countenance the existence of the Catholic faith within the Protestant Tudor state. He concluded his 1567 'Memoryall for Irland' by recommending that Creagh, whom he referred to as 'the preest in the tower', be brought up on charges of treason, either for his alleged association with Shane O'Neill (despite the fact that the primate and the O'Neill chief were regularly at odds), or for *praemunire*.⁵⁰ Creagh spent most of the remainder of his days in the Tower where, in 1585, he died. The Catholic primate of Ireland and Elizabeth's Protestant minister were in agreement on a great many points in relation to the kingdom of Ireland, but Cecil made no effort to engage with Catholicism, still the dominant religion in the kingdom, for he believed that to do so would be to lend approval to the existence within the Tudor state of a potential fifth column prepared to undermine the Protestant political and social order. The Creagh episode proved to be a missed opportunity.

In the following two decades securing the religious conversion of the people of Ireland continued to give way to secular considerations. Even the appeal made in 1576 by Cecil's one-time confidant, Henry Sidney, for the queen to place the reform of religion before the reform of the army and the law, in what was to be the lord deputy's last push to achieve the reform of Ireland, failed to convince Cecil of the benefits of according religion a higher priority in the government of Ireland.⁵¹ This can partly be explained by Cecil's more avid support after 1568 for colonization schemes. As Canny has shown, the belief that Ireland's Irish population had to be brought to civility before they could accept the Protestant faith was central to English rationalization of conquest and colonization. The conspicuous absence of religious devotion among the Irish, it was increasingly alleged, was evidence that the indigenous system of government had prevented its people from embracing Christianity. The Irish polity thus had to be destroyed before religious conversion could occur.⁵² How much Cecil accepted this line of thinking is difficult to say. He had, as we have seen, for long received negative accounts of religious practice in

⁴⁷ Creagh's answers to the questions delivered to him by Mr Secretary, 22 February 1565, TNA, SP 63/12/33; Lennon, *An Irish prisoner of conscience*, 63–5.

⁴⁸ Lennon, *An Irish prisoner of conscience*, 65.

⁴⁹ J. J. Silke, 'Primate Lombard and James I', *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 22 (1955), 143–55.

⁵⁰ Memorial for Ireland, 22 December 1567, TNA, SP 63/22/49. In his original draft of the 'memorial', the matter of Creagh was left unfinished. In the copy of the 'memorial', however, Cecil added, in his own hand, his position on Creagh. Cf. Memorial of the advices for Ireland to be declared to the queen by Cecil, 2 January 1568, TNA, SP 63/23/1.

⁵¹ Sidney to privy council, 27 April 1576, TNA, SP 63/55/34; Sidney to Cecil, 3 May 1576, TNA, SP 63/55/41.

⁵² Canny, 'The ideology of English colonization', 583–86; id., *Elizabethan conquest*, 125–6.

Ireland, and from the late 1560s became familiar with New English proposals for colonization which stressed the godlessness of the Irish.⁵³ In 1571 a Palesman named Rowland White furnished Cecil with a tract entitled ‘The dysorders of the Irissbery’ in which he described their religion as it existed in the ‘Irish Pale’:

theyr outwarde behavoyor sheweth to be the ffrute of no good trees for they exercyse no vertue nor yet refreyne or forbear any vyce but thinck it lawfull to doo everye one what hym lystethe as therebye shuld seme they neyther love nor drede godd not yet hate the devell.

Even allowing for the work’s rhetorical nature, that a Palesman and a convinced Protestant like White, with whom Cecil had corresponded before, should write these words may have lent the work added significance in Cecil’s mind.⁵⁴ Yet the recurring Catholic plots and religious-inspired rebellions in Ireland which characterized the last decades of the century and occupied so much of Cecil’s time and thinking would suggest that he accepted that the Irish (broadly defined) were Catholic; and this, rather than the alleged paganism or irreligion of the mere Irish, may very well have served as reason enough to prioritize the rapid extension of Tudor rule in Ireland through plantation over the more avid support for a preaching ministry.

The secular priorities of the government were especially evident in those areas where Tudor rule had spread without resort to plantation. Recent studies of the introduction of Tudor structures of government and law in south Leinster—in the O’Byrne and O’Toole lordships—and south Ulster—among the O’Rourkes and the O’Reillys—have shown that it was very much a secular process.⁵⁵ Burghley followed the development of Tudor rule in these regions closely. He compiled genealogies for leading members of the O’Byrnes and O’Tooles and, in his own hand, carefully annotated people and places on the new-made map of the counties—Wicklow and Ferns—which had been erected in place of their lordships.⁵⁶ Burghley struggled to achieve a political settlement in the remote O’Rourke lordship, so that it might be integrated more fully into the scheme—the so-called Composition of Connaught—which had, in 1585, commuted the military obligations of the province’s lords into a fixed payment to the state. To this end, he prepared, in late 1591, a rough map, or plot, showing the political divisions of O’Rourke’s country and requested further information on the state of the country from Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam.⁵⁷ Burghley was also familiar with a book written by some of the O’Reillys detailing abuses which they had suffered at the hands of sheriffs in the new-made county of Cavan; in 1596 he thought to insert a summary of the book’s

⁵³ The causes why Ireland is not reformed, June 1571, TNA, SP 63/32/66.

⁵⁴ Nicholas Canny, ‘Rowland White’s “The dysorders of the Irissbery”, 1571’, *Studia Hibernica*, 19 (1979), 155.

⁵⁵ Maginn, ‘*Civilizing’ Gaelic Leinster*; id., ‘The limitations of Tudor reform’, 429–60; id., ‘Elizabethan Cavan’, 69–84.

⁵⁶ Notes on Irish pedigrees, TNA, SP 63/213/90–100; Original map of Wicklow and Ferns, 1579, TNA, MPF 1/69.

⁵⁷ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 11 December 1591, TNA, SP, 63/161/36.

contents in a position paper which set out certain difficulties facing the crown in Ireland, notably the adherence of the O'Reillys to the earl of Tyrone.⁵⁸ Here, in these new English counties erected on what had been Irish lordships, religion scarcely featured in the government's efforts to establish political and social control. Indeed the archbishop of Cashel said as much about O'Reilly's lordship when he noted in late 1590 that the Catholic bishop of Kilmore exercises spiritual authority 'though that country is governed by English laws and officers'.⁵⁹ The introduction of a preaching ministry in such areas, let alone convincing the population there to embrace the gospel, was as yet impossible.

For those areas under English control, and populated predominantly by Englishmen, the commission for ecclesiastical causes would have to bridge the gap until a time when Tudor rule was established throughout the kingdom and a university was churning out ministers capable of spreading the gospel. But, with the papal bull *Regnans in excelsis* excommunicating Elizabeth in 1570, and with an increasing number of continentally trained priests, many of them the sons of the Pale aristocracy, returning to Ireland, the commission was faced with a potentially explosive problem of recusancy. In the months immediately following the St Bartholomew's Day massacre, moreover, Burghley read of an assembly of a 'generall counsell of ffriers' in Galway which reportedly denounced the English state and threatened to import 'the Spanishe inquisicon'.⁶⁰ Additional meetings, Burghley learned, were held near Limerick and in Ulster, the friars reportedly carrying themselves 'as though the pope were king of Englande and Irelande'. There was also, it would seem, an international element at work, with several friars thought to have travelled into France and a papally appointed principal of the Black Friars in Ireland reckoned to have entered the kingdom via Spain. Fitzwilliam, who furnished Burghley with the information, was circumspect: 'It is no newe thing to have fryers gad up and downe in Irland', though he admitted, 'I muche mislyke the tyme, occacon and maner of their collection'.⁶¹ For Burghley, the horrors of 23 August 1572 confirmed all his fears of the existence of an international Catholic conspiracy; they also vindicated his vigilance.⁶² He made notes on Fitzwilliam's intelligence, including the words 'spanish inq[ue]sition' which he wrote in the margin.

In these heady years Burghley communicated regularly with the commission's head, the increasingly influential Archbishop Adam Loftus. Loftus' rise and rise, in spiritual and temporal government in Ireland, owed much to Cecil's influence.⁶³ The two men had been on opposite sides in the vestiarian controversy of the mid-1560s, which saw the state rein in the puritan-leaning Protestants at Cambridge

⁵⁸ *CSPi*, vi. 181.

⁵⁹ Archbishop of Cashel's Notes, 17 December 1590, TNA, SP 63/156/12.

⁶⁰ Edward White to Fitzwilliam, November 1572, TNA, SP 63/38/52(i).

⁶¹ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 7 December 1572, TNA, SP 63/38/52.

⁶² Alford, *Burghley*, 198–9.

⁶³ Loftus wrote to Cecil of 'the sundry benefices that I have retheyned by yor meane so often do I fynde excedinge great cause, to praise god, and to be thankfull to you' and prayed God to give mercy unto Cecil and his house as St Paul had done for Onesiphorus—to which Cecil glossed '2 Timoth. i': Loftus to Cecil, 2 July 1570, TNA, SP 63/30/64.

and in London; but they found common ground with regard to the character and direction of religious policy in Ireland. In July 1570 Loftus wrote plainly on the subject of the appointment of a new lord chancellor, a position which Loftus himself coveted and would in 1581 come to occupy. The current chancellor, the religious moderate Robert Weston, dean of St Patrick's, was then seeking his recall on account of illness, and Loftus asked that the secretary use his influence to see someone appointed 'known to be a sincere godly, and faithfull man ffor, if either a dissemblinge papiste, either a colde or a carnall protestante shoulde be preferred... small comferte shall I have to remayne here'.⁶⁴ But while Cecil also supported a moderate course for religion in Ireland, he had showed himself unwilling (or unable) to persuade Elizabeth to accede to Loftus' requests to arm his commission with more wide-ranging legal powers. The arrest and imprisonment of recusants, it was thought, might unnecessarily provoke the largely Catholic community of the English Pale whose leading lights were then at the head of a well-organized political campaign to thwart Lord Deputy Sidney's efforts to impose a composition scheme.⁶⁵

Yet, with rumours in the mid-1570s that a Spanish invasion of Ireland was imminent, the government was forced to act: 2,000 soldiers were mobilized in Wales for service in Ireland and the restraints which had been imposed on the enforcement of the religious legislation were lifted.⁶⁶ In May 1577 the ecclesiastical commission was reconstituted as a high commission under Sidney's direction. Part of the decision to reconstitute the commission lay in the failure of its previous incarnation to answer the crown of the fines it had collected; but its commissioners were also granted more extensive powers to summon witnesses and imprison those in violation of the ecclesiastical statutes, so as to combat recusancy.⁶⁷ The new commission was, in large measure, successful in this: those prepared to ignore the ecclesiastical legislation remained proportionately few in number until the end of Elizabeth's reign; and in the first five years of its existence the commission levied fines in the Pale amounting to approximately £121 annually, an 86 per cent increase on the sums collected for the four years preceding it.⁶⁸ The imprisonment, and subsequent pardon, of the leading Pale noble, James Eustace, for hearing mass, however, reflects the ineffectiveness of assuming a negative stance on religion in Ireland without the willingness to mete out more severe punishment: just two

⁶⁴ Loftus to Cecil, 2 July 1570, TNA, SP 63/30/64. Weston, as it transpired, continued as lord chancellor until 1573; Weston to Cecil, 7 August 1570, TNA, SP 63/30/78.

⁶⁵ Viscount Baltinglass and other barons and gentlemen to queen, 10 January 1577, TNA, SP 63/157/1; Cf. Brady, *Chief governors*, 209–44.

⁶⁶ Privy council to lord deputy, 20 June 1574, TNA, SP 63/46/69; Walsingham to Burghley, 1 June 1577, TNA, SP 63/58/43; *APC, 1575–1577*, 360, 387–8.

⁶⁷ *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, no. 3047. There was some confusion surrounding which commission—the 1568 commission or the 1577 commission—had legal force. In 1580 the queen's chief justices decided that the latter commission was the only legal commission for ecclesiastical affairs: Opinion of Her Majesty's learned judges and council on the validity of the ecclesiastical commission, January 1580, TNA, SP 63/71/12.

⁶⁸ Robinson-Hammerstein, *s.v.* 'Adam Loftus', in the *ODNB*; Murray, *Enforcing the English Reformation*, 308.

years later in 1580 Eustace, now Viscount Baltinglass, unfurled the papal banner in Leinster and launched a Catholic crusade against Queen Elizabeth whom he referred to as 'a woman uncapax of all holy orders'.⁶⁹

The Baltinglass rebellion, with its fiery religious rhetoric and papal imagery, together with the Desmond rebellion, which had in fact seen Italian and Spanish troops, led by the papal legate Dr Nicholas Sander, storm ashore in Munster in support of the rebels, had a profound effect on Lord Burghley. For Burghley, the rebellions in Ireland were the latest and most serious incidence of a Catholic conspiracy to overthrow Elizabeth I. The failed northern rebellion, led by the Catholic earls of Northumberland and Westmorland in 1569, had offered proof of the existence of a Catholic conspiracy in England. The discovery in England, while rebellion raged in Ireland, of the operation of Jesuit missionaries led by Edmund Campion and Robert Parsons (Englishmen both of them) offered further proof of the immediacy of the dangers posed by Catholicism. Campion was arrested, tortured, and in late 1581 tried and convicted of treason: he, and several other Catholic priests, were executed at Tyburn in December. With the last remnants of the rebellions in Ireland stamped out with the killing of the fugitive earl of Desmond in mid-November 1583, and with continued rumours of Catholic plots against the queen, Burghley chose his moment to write a pamphlet in defence of Elizabeth's government. Entitled *The execution of justice in England*, the pamphlet, printed anonymously in December 1583, was primarily a justification of the execution of the Jesuit priests for treason.⁷⁰ Burghley was keen to show that Campion and his associates were not persecuted because of their religion. Rather it was their mission to bestir 'an horrible uproar and a manifest civil destruction of both realms' which had made them traitors and ensured them traitors' deaths.⁷¹ Burghley was indignant at the suggestion that the English Jesuits were martyrs:

And where the seditious trumpeters of infamies and lies have sounded forth and entitled certain that have suffered for treason to be martyrs for religion; so may they also at this time, if they list, add to their forged catalogue the headless body of the late miserable Earl of Desmond. . . . And herewith, to remember the end of his chief confederates, may be noted for example to others the strange manner of the death of Dr Sanders, the Pope's Irish legate, . . . died raving in a frenzy. And before him, one James Fitzmaurice, the first traitor of Ireland next to Stukely the rakehell. . . . A fourth man of singular note was John of Desmond, brother to the Earl, a very bloody traitor . . . was taken and beheaded after his own usage.⁷²

⁶⁹ Sidney to Loftus, 26 June 1578, TNA, SP 63/76/26(i); Sidney to Loftus, 18 July 1578, TNA, SP 63/76/26(ii); Maginn, 'Civilizing' *Gaelic Leinster*, 154–5.

⁷⁰ *The execution of justice in England for maintenance of publique and Christian peace* (London, 1584), printed in Robert Kingdon (ed.), *The execution of justice by William Cecil and a True, Sincere, and Modest Defense of English Catholics by William Allen* (Ithaca, NY, 1965); Alford, *Burghley*, 248–9.

⁷¹ In the printed version the reference to 'both realms' was replaced with 'a manifest bloody destruction of great multitudes of Christians': Alford, *Burghley*, 249.

⁷² *The execution of justice*, 29–30.

Yet linking the executed Jesuits directly to expected rebellions in England or actual rebellions in Ireland proved rather more difficult. Burghley might read of the presence of papal banners and troops in the queen's realm of Ireland and oversee the soldiers sent out of England to confront them; he might even hold in his hands the 'sanctus bell, and another toy after the manner of a crosse supporting a book' once belonging to Dr Sanders and sent to him in 1580 by Nicholas White; but hard evidence that Campion had supported or counselled rebels, such as would in most instances be necessary for a conviction for treason, was not forthcoming.⁷³ This liberal interpretation of the treason law left the government open to criticism, and before long William Allen, the leader of the English Catholics in exile, responded. Allen's reply, *A true, sincere, and modest defense of English Catholics*, attacked *The execution of justice* arguing that the 'the politiques of our country' saw 'a marvelous confederation of the Pope, King of Spain, Duke of Florence, and others for the invasion of the realm' where there was none. And 'that being shortly proved nothing, they feigned that the said Jesuits and priests were confederated with the Irish quarrel, and to give more color of somewhat they sticked not to rack Father Campion extremely for search of that point'.⁷⁴ Burghley, however, had made his own, and the crown's, official position clear: Catholicism would not be tolerated in the queen's kingdoms so long as the government considered it to pose a political threat.

What did this mean for the queen's Catholic subjects in Ireland? The creation of a more robust commission in 1577 had had little positive effect on the state of Protestantism in the kingdom. Lord Deputy Perrot's unambiguous support of the more coercive commission, and his ill-advised decision to introduce the English parliament's anti-Catholic legislation in the Irish parliament of 1585, put the government on a collision course with the Old English community. Facing war with Spain in the Netherlands, both the queen and Burghley instructed Perrot to adopt a more discreet approach to religion, lest the Catholic and increasingly disaffected Old English be driven to rebellion in greater numbers than those who had revolted in Munster and Leinster at the beginning of the decade.⁷⁵ Burghley expressed particular concern that the lord deputy's drive to tender the oath of supremacy to all government officers might 'breede a gen[er]all fewde of indangering mens lives, & losse of landes, & other things'.⁷⁶ In an Irish setting at least, it would appear that the lord treasurer was capable of reconciling the existence of Catholicism with his fear of Catholicism. But Burghley's rationalization should not be understood as toleration. Writing to Burghley five years later, Archbishop Loftus alluded to a letter in which the lord treasurer had despaired of the 'generall corruption of this realme in the cause of religion' and urged Loftus, and the lord deputy, to 'enter into some speedy consideration how the same may be remedied'.⁷⁷ Loftus attributed the

⁷³ White to Burghley, 22 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74/56; Gerrard to Burghley, 29 July 1580, TNA, SP 63/74/77; *The execution of justice*, xxxi–xxxii.

⁷⁴ *The execution of justice*, 79–80.

⁷⁵ Murray, *Enforcing the English Reformation*, 313–16.

⁷⁶ Perrot to Burghley, 24 September 1585, TNA, SP 63/119/32.

⁷⁷ Loftus to Burghley, 22 September 1590, TNA, SP 63/154/37.

rise in recusancy to the relative powerlessness of the ecclesiastical commission since the time of Perrot's parliament. The situation was not beyond hope, however. 'Things may be remedied without any danger, and with great gain to Her Majesty', he assured Burghley,

if the ecclesi[astic]all co[m]mission be restored, and put in ure: for this people are but poore and feare to be fyned, if liberty be lefte to my self, and such co[m]missioners as are well affected in religion, to imprison and fyne all such as are obstinate, and disobedient, and if they p[er]sist being men of hability to beare ther owne charges to send them into England for example sake. I have no doubt but wthin a shorte time they wilbe reduced to good conformity. If it be objected that this severe course may p[er]happs breed some stirres, I assure yor L.: ther is no doubt of any such matter for they are but beggars, and if once they p[er]ceive a thorough resolution to deal roundly wth them, they will both yelde, and conforme them selves.

Elizabeth, however, was not prepared to risk alienating her loyal Catholic subjects in Ireland by countenancing plans for her government to adopt a more aggressive stance on religion. Years earlier she had made clear her position to Lord Grey who, though he was dispatched to suppress men who had raised rebellion in the name of their Catholic faith, received warning from Elizabeth before he left for Ireland not to be too 'strict in dealyng w^t religio[n]'.⁷⁸ The queen, more easily than Burghley it would seem, was capable of accepting the Catholicism of her subjects in Ireland in return for their steadfast loyalty to her and outward adherence to her church. In July 1591, in a letter drafted by Burghley, she instructed Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam, who wished to send a group of Pale-based recusants over to England for examination, that such men should not be 'strayned in matters of religion and conscience' unless they exhibited a flagrant disregard for the established religion.⁷⁹

For the lord treasurer, a less risky, and in the long term a more effective, means to address the subject of religion in Ireland remained education. Burghley understood that it was only through the education of preachers that the gospel could be furthered, superstition ended, and the Protestant church allowed to flourish. To achieve this elusive goal the establishment of schools and a university was essential. The plan for converting St Patrick's in Dublin into a university had all but died since the later 1560s, but following the suppression of the rebellions in Leinster and Munster, and with the appointment of a new deputy, it reappeared in government thinking. In January 1584 Burghley joined his fellow councillors in instructing Sir John Perrot to consider by what means St Patrick's might be made a college 'ffor the better trayninge upp youthe . . . in the knowledge of God'.⁸⁰ Perrot laid out his plan in a letter to Burghley in August: it was, he wrote, 'a cause I know your Lordship favours greatly, I mean the advancement of learning amongst the

⁷⁸ Grey to queen, 22 December 1580, TNA, SP 63/79/25.

⁷⁹ Queen (in Burghley's hand) to Fitzwilliam, April 1591, TNA, SP 63/157/72; queen to Fitzwilliam, 26 July 1591, TNA, SP 63/159/22.

⁸⁰ A memorial for Perrot, January 1584, LPL, 632, fo. 57.

barbarous people'.⁸¹ Perrot deemed St Patrick's Cathedral superfluous on account of the nearness of Christ Church Cathedral and believed the former to be a haven for 'superstition'. He proposed to dissolve St Patrick's and to locate the law courts, then housed in 'an old hall' in Dublin castle, in the vacated buildings. As for its livings, which he reckoned amounted to 4,000 marks sterling annually, he recommended that they be redirected to serve as the foundation for two universities with two colleges in each. Predictably, Loftus and the prebendaries of St Patrick's mounted a vigorous campaign to thwart Perrot's device. In late 1584 the prebendaries dispatched a representative to court to present their petition to the privy council to have the dissolution of St Patrick's stayed.⁸² Loftus, for his part, appealed directly to Burghley to preserve the cathedral.⁸³ Burghley, however, had already withdrawn his support for Perrot's plan. He had written to Perrot in November to express his opposition to the dissolution of St Patrick's. Burghley made clear his support for the erection of a university, but suggested that the endowment should come from a combination of monies derived from a light parliamentary subsidy and the revenues of the ecclesiastical commission.⁸⁴ The privy council reiterated Burghley's thinking in a subsequent letter to Perrot. They wrote of the 'inconvenience' of redirecting the revenues of St Patrick's toward the erection of a university and urged him to consult with Loftus on the matter.⁸⁵ The collapse of the scheme to establish two universities in Ireland was later to feature in Perrot's treason trial: Burghley noted that Loftus and the bishop of Meath gave evidence that after reading Elizabeth's letter Perrot spoke 'evill words ag[ainst] y^e Q. for wrytu[n]g to hy[m] to forbear his p[ro]cedyngs about S^t Patryck'.⁸⁶

The way was now clear for Loftus to establish a university in Ireland on his own terms. He convinced the municipal government in Dublin to support his scheme to see a university erected in the city: in November 1591 the mayor, sheriffs, and corporation of Dublin petitioned the Irish privy council to seek approval from England to found a university on the site of the former priory of All Hallows.⁸⁷ In this Loftus had influential allies in the Ussher family whose three branches had become prominent in civic life in Dublin.⁸⁸ The Usshers were dedicated Protestants and were committed to the foundation of a university in Ireland. John Ussher, an alderman of the city, financed the first book in the Irish language to be printed in Ireland using an Irish type-set: an alphabet and Protestant catechism entitled

⁸¹ 'The Perrot papers', ed. Charles MacNeill, *Analecta Hibernica*, 12 (1943), 8. Perrot wrote a similar letter to Walsingham, 21 August 1584, TNA, SP 63/111/71.

⁸² Perrot to Walsingham, 16 November 1584, TNA, SP 63/112/72; Petition of the prebendaries of St Patrick's to privy council, December 1584, TNA, SP 63/113/56.

⁸³ Loftus to Burghley, 10 January 1585, TNA, SP 63/114/17.

⁸⁴ Burghley to Perrot, 6 November 1584, TNA, SP 63/112/68.

⁸⁵ Privy council to Perrot, 3 January 1585, TNA, SP 63/114/4.

⁸⁶ Collection in Burghley's hand of the material points against John Perrot, 15 November 1591, TNA, SP 63/161/19.

⁸⁷ Petition of mayor, sheriffs, and corporation of Dublin to [Irish] privy council, 4 November 1591, TNA, SP 63/161/8(i).

⁸⁸ Colm Lennon, "'The bowels of the city's bounty': the municipality of Dublin and the foundation of Trinity College in 1592", *Long Room*, 37 (1992), 10–16.

Aibidil Gaoidheilge & Caiticiosma.⁸⁹ Ussher had also in 1571 presented Burghley with a book proposing the reform of the Dublin staple and offered to donate his share of the profit toward the erection of a college.⁹⁰ More importantly, Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and the Irish privy council backed Loftus' scheme. John Ussher's nephew Henry Ussher—the Cambridge-educated archdeacon of the diocese of Dublin and future archbishop of Armagh—was dispatched to court to explain the proposition; but it was Burghley's support that was deemed most essential if the scheme was to proceed. Fitzwilliam wrote to the lord treasurer both to express his own support 'for the plantinge and erectinge of a colledge amonge this people wherby civilitie and true religion mought be encreased', and to seek the lord treasurer's favourable means to Elizabeth 'wherby the grante of an incorporation and p[ri]viligies p[er]teyninge therunto, accordinge to the manner of colledges accustomed in univ[er]sities maye be obteyned'.⁹¹ Loftus, writing the same day, reminded Burghley of his 'zeale to promote Godds true religion, and to further thadvance of good learninge' in Ireland.⁹² Burghley threw his weight behind the scheme and, in early 1592, Ussher was delivered of a warrant granting the queen's approval for the erecting of a university.⁹³ The foundation charter 'for the college of the Holy and Undivided Trinity by Dublin'—dated 3 March 1592—saw Adam Loftus made the university's first provost; William Cecil, first Baron Burghley, was made the first chancellor of Ireland's first university.⁹⁴

For Burghley, the erection of Trinity College, Dublin, represented the sum of his efforts to provide the Protestant faith in the kingdom of Ireland with a solid foundation. Modelled on the university of Cambridge, where Cecil's own ideas about religion were moulded, this university was to be the means whereby 'Godds true religion' and 'civilitie' would at last be introduced into Ireland. And there was little time to spare. A native centre of learning was of utmost importance in combating the recusants who were in increasing numbers returning to the kingdom from their studies at continental universities. In summer 1592 Burghley wrote to Fitzwilliam enquiring into reports, which had made their way to the queen, that mass was celebrated openly in Dublin city and its immediate environs. Loftus dismissed the notion of 'open massing', though he admitted to Burghley that 'in this people there is almost a general inclination to popery', and was in no doubt that secret masses were said among them. However the ecclesiastical commission, the other side of Burghley's religious strategy in Ireland, had done its work: in and around Dublin 'this people', he explained, 'stand in awe, both of Her Majesty's laws and authority'.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Mary Pollard, *A dictionary of members of the Dublin book trade, 1550–1800* (Oxford, 2000), 329; J. Kearney, *Aibidil Gaoidheilge & Caiticiosma* (Dublin, 1571).

⁹⁰ John Ussher to Burghley, 15 July 1571, TNA, SP 63/33/8. Ussher had been described to Cecil seven years earlier as 'a zealous man in Christ's religion': Thomas Wrothe to Cecil, 30 July 1564, TNA, SP 63/11/41.

⁹¹ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 4 November 1591, TNA, SP 63/161/9; Colm Lennon, *s.v.* 'Henry Ussher', in the *ODNB*.

⁹² Loftus to Burghley, 4 November 1591, TNA, SP 63/161/10.

⁹³ Points and affairs of Burghley's letter to the lord deputy, 13 January 1592, TNA, SP 63/163/9.

⁹⁴ *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Eliz.*, 345; *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, no. 5718.

⁹⁵ Lord deputy, chancellor, and Gardiner to Burghley, 31 May 1592, TNA, SP 63/164/40; Loftus to Burghley, 1 June 1592, TNA, SP 63/165/1 (quotations).

It was to Burghley that the leadership of Ireland's new university looked to secure the finances necessary to begin Trinity College's pedagogical function. Following an initial series of donations from across the kingdom, and from men of backgrounds as diverse as Fitzwilliam and Turlough Luineach O'Neill, securing a sufficient endowment to cover the university's current and future operating costs proved difficult.⁹⁶ Representatives of Trinity College wrote to Burghley so that he might encourage the army captains serving in Ireland to pay to the university the money which they too had promised.⁹⁷ This 'charitable benevolence', valued at £623 8½*d.* sterling, had not been received by 1594 and the privy council in Ireland wrote to Burghley on behalf of the corporation of Dublin in the hope that he would renew his efforts to see the money directed to the college.⁹⁸ In the meanwhile, the provost and fellows of Trinity College prevailed upon their chancellor to use his influence with Elizabeth to procure for the maintenance of their 'poore colledge' an annual settlement of £100 in fee-farm of lands attainted or crown lands found to be concealed in the kingdom. They reminded Burghley that though it was at present 'farre inferyo' to that 'famous unyv[er]sitie of Cambridge', Trinity College was 'of lyke nature' and that Cambridge, 'beinge alreddy in moste comfortable & flourishinge estate', had achieved this status through the lord treasurer's 'honorab[le] meanes'.⁹⁹ Trinity remained chronically underfunded, but the university struggled on: in early 1594 its professors began instructing students in 'both tounge[s] and liberrall scienc[es]' and continued to do so during the turbulent years that were to follow.

Burghley entrusted the spiritual direction of the university to Walter Travers, who succeeded Loftus as provost in June 1594. Travers' appointment is, on the face of it, puzzling. A former chaplain to Burghley and tutor to his son Robert Cecil, Travers was a presbyterian whose radical religious views had very nearly landed him in prison and forced him to leave England. So great was Loftus' fear of Travers' religious views that the outgoing provost took it upon himself to caution his successor against importing his puritanism into the church in Ireland.¹⁰⁰ Yet the fellows of the college chose Travers and Burghley showed himself to be a strong supporter of his appointment. Burghley believed him to be both loyal and, most importantly, virulently anti-Catholic; he saw little harm in Travers instilling his religious views in the centre of learning that he had helped to found in Ireland.¹⁰¹ More immediately, the appointment was a means to extricate his client from the difficulty he faced in England arising from Archbishop Whitgift's efforts to stamp out non-conformity. Nor was Travers the first religious controversialist

⁹⁶ Lord deputy and council to privy council [Burghley], 26 February 1593, TNA, SP 63/168/44.

⁹⁷ Lucas Challoner, Henry Lee, and Launcelot Mouney to Burghley, 14 March 1593, TNA, SP 63/168/60.

⁹⁸ Lord deputy and council to Burghley, 26 May 1594, TNA, SP 63/174/67.

⁹⁹ Provost and fellows of Trinity College to Burghley, 1595, BL, Lansdowne MS 75, no. 3 (quotations); Walter Travers to Mr Hicks, BL, Lansdowne MS 108, no. 59.

¹⁰⁰ Alan Ford, *s.v.* 'Walter Travers', in the *ODNB*.

¹⁰¹ J. P. Mahaffy, *An epoch in Irish history: Trinity College, Dublin its foundation and early fortunes, 1591-1660* (London, 1903), 82; on Burghley's fear of international Catholicism in the 1590s, see W. B. Richardson, 'The religious policy of the Cecils, 1588-98' (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1994).

with a connection to Cecil to find refuge in Ireland: the presbyterian theologian Thomas Cartwright, who ordained Travers in Antwerp, had served as Loftus' chaplain in the mid-1560s.¹⁰² Travers served as provost of Trinity College until shortly after Burghley's death in 1598, when he returned to England amid the tumult of Tyrone's rebellion.

Burghley's support for a presbyterian as provost of Trinity College may be viewed as indicative of the continued absence in Ireland of an entrenched and influential Protestant episcopacy prepared to voice its conservative doctrinal stance. Yet, weak though they were relative to their counterparts in England, Burghley accorded the bishops a central role in the maintenance and spreading of Protestantism in Ireland. Throughout his career, William Cecil took a special interest in the appointment of bishops in both kingdoms.¹⁰³ For it was the bishops, the spiritual peers of the realm, who were to function as the link between the government and the people in the dioceses and to whom the crown looked both to teach the word of God and to enforce religious law and policy; bishops were the cornerstones of an ecclesiastical framework which accompanied the erection of English structures of government in Ireland. Filling vacant bishoprics in the kingdom had already become government policy by the time of Sidney's first deputyship.¹⁰⁴ Sees which were vacant at the time of Elizabeth's accession, like Achonry, Armagh, Cashel, Meath, and Ossory, were all of them filled by 1567 and received regular appointments thereafter.¹⁰⁵ In 1566 Cecil wrote to Sidney of the necessity of having the number of bishops increased, 'so that the people might be taught and instructed better than I think they be'. Generally, Cecil refrained from proposing candidates himself and made clear, to Sidney at least, that the appointment of bishops depended on the lord deputy's recommendation, 'for in all such offices of charge there Her Ma^{tie} will be pleased to place such men as yo^u shall think metest for the places'.¹⁰⁶ Thus it was, in early 1566, that the earl of Sussex, who by then had left the Irish service, proposed his chaplain, Christopher Gaffney, for the bishopric of Ossory, and Cecil sought and secured Sidney's support. The queen then appointed Gaffney bishop in May 1567.¹⁰⁷ Gaffney, as his name suggests, was Irish, and though the sending over of English clerics to occupy bishoprics in Ireland was the option most preferred in government and at court, Cecil understood the difficulty of attracting Englishmen to take up impoverished livings outside the English Pale, and also the importance of bishops who could teach and instruct in the Irish tongue. The episcopal framework which developed in Ireland under Elizabeth, therefore, tended to be comprised of Irish bishops in the south and west with English-born bishops concentrated in the more lucrative sees in the east.

¹⁰² Dr Beaumont to Cecil, 12 December 1565, TNA, SP 12/38/10; Loftus to Cecil, 26 October 1570, TNA, SP 63/30/88.

¹⁰³ Usher, *William Cecil and episcopacy*.

¹⁰⁴ Note of the vacant sees in Ireland, 1561, TNA, SP 63/4/86; Memoranda of divers matters, 6 June 1562, TNA, SP 63/6/18; Memorial by Sussex, 13 June 1562, TNA, SP 63/6/23.

¹⁰⁵ *HBC*, 378–407.

¹⁰⁶ Cecil to Sidney, 1 March 1566, TNA, SP 63/16/34.

¹⁰⁷ *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Hen. VIII–Eliz.*, 499.

We have already drawn attention to the importance of the articles and instructions for government which Burghley sponsored and sent over from court in May 1592.¹⁰⁸ In these instructions designed to alter the course of Tudor government in Ireland there appeared three articles under the heading 'ordering of causes ecclesiastical'. Responsibility for this was placed squarely on the bishops to whom the lord deputy and council sent copies ('doubles') of each of the three articles pertaining to religion.¹⁰⁹ The first article instructed the deputy and council 'to p[ro]cure that the bishoppes in their dioces, and other ordinaries have ecclesiasticall jurisdiction do their duties in teaching & p[er]swading of the people bothe by example of their owne lives and by charitable instruccon to obaie the lawes established for uniformitie of religion'. It also sought to ensure that 'ecclesiasticall p[er]sons' were resident in their dioceses and that they were excluded from 'temporall exercises', such as keeping sessions and serving on commissions, lest they be distracted from their spiritual responsibilities in their dioceses. The second article expressed the concern at court that the churches themselves in the kingdom were in a state of disrepair and called for their re-edification. Without churches, and the space which they provided for prayer and the administration of the sacraments, it was feared that 'in time coming the people being so unprovided will fall into irreligion, the mother of all mischief and directlie to disobedience'. The final article cautioned the commissioners for ecclesiastical causes against encroaching on the bishops' responsibility to hear ecclesiastical causes within their regular jurisdiction.

That there existed in Ireland by 1592 a Protestant episcopal framework capable of receiving these articles is testimony to Lord Burghley's success in filling sees with crown-appointed bishops. Sixteen of the kingdom's twenty-five sees were, by then, occupied, including sees distant from Dublin, such as Killala, in north-west Connaught, and Ardfert in south-west Munster.¹¹⁰ Burghley might point to William Lyon, the English-born bishop of the united sees of Cork, Cloyne, and Ross, who it was reported had erected a 'proper' church and a 'fair' house in distant Munster, and who was generally regarded as an exemplar of a Protestant bishop, as evidence that the reformed church was functioning in the kingdom.¹¹¹ Burghley, however, must have been equally aware that five sees, concentrated in the north-west, had not had a resident Protestant bishop in over a decade, and that four others were vacant at the time the articles and instructions were issued.¹¹² He read, moreover, in a book on the state of religion in Connaught and Thomond sent to his attention in 1591: that the bishop of Killaloe, Maurice O'Brien-Arra, was more concerned with selling benefices than in promoting Protestantism; that the archbishop of Tuam, William O'Mullaly (Lealy), was an 'English Roman bishop of Connaught'; and that there was not more than one man born in Ireland that favoured the

¹⁰⁸ See above, 106–7, 161–2.

¹⁰⁹ Articles containing sundry things to be considered by lord deputy and council, May 1592, TNA, SP 63/164/49(i).

¹¹⁰ Compiled from *HBC*, 378–9.

¹¹¹ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 28 February 1589, TNA, SP 63/141/42; Fitzwilliam to Walsingham, 4 March 1589, TNA, SP 63/142/9.

¹¹² *HBC*, 378–407.

reformed church in the west.¹¹³ Bishop Lyon himself wrote to Burghley in 1595 and related how four Cork gentlemen had refused the mayoralty of the city on account of religion and explained that the Jesuits were there in sufficient numbers and influence to prevent physicians from treating Protestant clergy.¹¹⁴ Still, Burghley clung to the notion that religious instruction was the key to strengthening the reformed church which he had helped to erect in Ireland. In a letter to Burghley in late 1595, Archbishop Loftus noted 'that your Lo. wishethe to the churche of God here encrease of comfote by instructio[n] p[ro]cedethe fro[m] your wonted Christian care', but, he continued, 'suerly yf this churche were p[ro]vided for through out this kingdom as it is in these p[ar]tes, it might be compared wth any churchs in Europe for instruction'. In other words, as things stood, meaningful instruction in religion was only possible in and around Dublin and, as Loftus was quick to point out, this was only made possible through his own means and the 'many good & learned preachers beneficed here'.¹¹⁵ It would appear that by the 1590s the framework for ecclesiastical government in Ireland was greater than its ability to get on with the business of religious instruction.

Yet had William Cecil considered in the last years of his life whether, sixty years since the establishment of the Church of Ireland, the Reformation had failed in Ireland he would certainly have concluded that it had not. To have answered otherwise would have been to deny the existence of his queen's temporal as well as her spiritual sovereignty over the kingdom. The machinery of ecclesiastical government was in place in much of Ireland outside of Ulster; and once the crown's temporal authority was extended to the rest the church would, at last, be administratively whole. Cecil appreciated that this church had thus far engendered little support among the queen's subjects, but a university was now in place to cultivate a native clergy capable of spreading the gospel throughout the kingdom. To this end, an Irish cleric and prospective archbishop of Tuam named Nahemias Donnelan, having been 'trayned up in the university of Cambridg', was in 1595 nearing completion of an Irish translation of the bible at Trinity College, Dublin, 'for the better encouaragment of the natyves of this countrie'.¹¹⁶ For Cecil, the reform of religion in Ireland had not failed—the time was now coming into view when it might be properly begun. Historians, however, have with the benefit of hindsight come to see the decades in which William Cecil served Elizabeth as a crucial period when any chance which Protestantism had to put down roots in Ireland was forever lost.¹¹⁷ A recent attempt to introduce periodization to the Reformation in Ireland lends further specificity to the state of religion there in the later sixteenth century. It divides Elizabeth's reign into two periods: 1558/60–c.1580, a 'preparatory phase of confessionalisation' marked by religious uncertainty arising from the

¹¹³ Discourse on the contrarieties in religion by Henry Malby, 1591, TNA, SP 63/161/52.

¹¹⁴ Lyon to Burghley, 17 November 1595, TNA, SP 63/184/27.

¹¹⁵ Loftus to Burghley, 8 November 1595, TNA, SP 63/184/12.

¹¹⁶ Ormond to Burghley, 24 March 1595, TNA, SP 63/178/112; Loftus to Burghley, 28 March 1595, TNA, SP 63/178/132 (quotation).

¹¹⁷ Bottigheimer, 'The failure of the Reformation in Ireland', 196–207; Murray, *Enforcing the English Reformation*, 317–21.

rapid intensification and extension of Tudor rule in Ireland; and c.1580–1603, when rebellion and war gradually led to the emergence of a society divided into two confessional churches and in which politics and religion had begun to coalesce.¹¹⁸ Cecil was alive to the fact that he, through the ecclesiastical and secular machinery of the Tudor state, had failed to stamp out Catholicism, even in those areas firmly under royal control.¹¹⁹ Its continued existence provided fertile ground for the more militant brand of Counter-Reformation Catholicism, which emerged as a dynamic force in Catholic Ireland after c.1580 and found its clearest expression in the religious rhetoric employed by Hugh O'Neill and upon which O'Neill's war against Elizabeth was (nominally at least) based after 1596.

But Cecil's response in Elizabeth's reign to the challenge posed by a reinvigorated Catholicism in Ireland was insufficient. It was too traditional, too rooted in policies conceived in the mid-Tudor period when religion was much less of a polarizing force in the kingdom. To achieve religious reform Cecil had employed a three-pronged strategy: the working of an ecclesiastical commission to enforce conformity, the provision of a university which would produce a preaching ministry to spread Protestantism among the queen's subjects, and the appointment of Protestant bishops to provide the administrative framework of the established church. But Elizabeth's, and also his own, reluctance to provoke the Old English community prevented the commission from functioning as the deterrent it might have; the persuasive element to the strategy, the establishment of Trinity College, Dublin, came too late to have an impact in Elizabeth's reign. The failure of these first two aspects of Cecil's strategy ensured that the third would be lacking in substance. Cecil's unceasing efforts to see the secular attributes of Tudor rule extended and intensified in Ireland, meanwhile, were a direct cause of the fusion of Catholicism with politics and created a powerful movement against the state and the state-sponsored religion. In the year before his death Burghley was informed that Hugh O'Neill was demanding 'that all the inhabitantes of Irland may have free lib[er]ty of conscience'.¹²⁰ In this changed environment the traditional Tudor methods of enforcing the Reformation in Ireland which William Cecil espoused were no longer appropriate.

¹¹⁸ Ute Lotz-Heumann, 'Confessionalisation in Ireland: periodisation and character, 1534–1649', in Alan Ford and John McCafferty (eds.), *The origins of sectarianism in early modern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2005), 24–53.

¹¹⁹ In July 1583 Francis Touker, an English agent in Italy, informed Burghley that the pope had created an 'Irishman' bishop of Ross to whom he gave authority to make priests and who 'carried with him [into Ireland] great store of pardones and agnosdeis to the Pope's friends in Irelande': *Queen Elizabeth and her times*, ii. 207; Explanation of Walter Faranan's detection, supplication... concerning the disaffection in the Pale, September 1590, TNA, SP 63/154/35(i).

¹²⁰ Tyrone's petition, 23 December 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/114 (quotation); Thomas Jones, bishop of Meath, to Burghley, 28 December 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/122.

PART III
BURGHLEY'S IRELAND

This page intentionally left blank

8

The Kingdom of Ireland, 1598

On 9 August 1598 Sir Henry Wallop, treasurer-at-wars in Ireland, wrote a letter from Dublin addressed to Robert Cecil, the queen's principal secretary in England. Wallop explained how he was facing personal financial ruin on account of his service to the crown; after nearly two decades in Ireland he sought to be discharged from office. He told Secretary Cecil that he would have appealed to Burghley, but that he understood the lord treasurer, with whom he had clashed on so many occasions, to be gravely ill and to have lately withdrawn from court. Wallop expressed his hope that Cecil's father would soon recover.¹ But Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, was already dead. He had died days earlier in the small hours of 4 August 1598 at Cecil House on the Strand, the lord treasurer's London home. Burghley's death was not unexpected but it came as a blow to Queen Elizabeth. In the days that followed she mourned for the loss of a man who was not only her most trusted and longest-serving minister but also her friend; Cecil had been the last personal link to the world of the queen's youth and one of the few remaining certainties in a reign entering its fifth decade.

While Burghley lay dying, his son Robert had received intelligence that the traitor Hugh O'Neill had surrounded the Blackwater Fort and was busying his men with the 'plashing of passes, and digging deep hoales in the rivers, the more to distresse the army that shold come to releive y^r.'² On 14 August O'Neill and his Irish confederates ambushed and then obliterated a large army sent to revictual the garrison at the Blackwater. Marshal Henry Bagenal of Newry, the commander of the army, and 800 of his men, including twenty-five officers, were killed. An additional 400 men were injured and 300 more defected to O'Neill's standard. Blackwater Fort was officially surrendered to O'Neill two weeks later on 29 August, the day of Lord Burghley's elaborate funeral in Westminster Abbey.³ The battle of the Yellow Ford, as the encounter became known, was the greatest military defeat suffered by crown forces in Ireland in the Tudor period.⁴ All Ulster, with the exception of the heavily fortified garrison towns at Newry and Knockfergus in the east of the province, lay prostrate before an emboldened O'Neill whose channels of commu-

¹ Wallop to Robert Cecil, 9 August 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.3)/16.

² Fenton to Cecil, 24 July 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.2)/110.

³ G. B. Harrison (ed.), *The Elizabethan journals: being a record of those things most talked of during the years 1591–1603* (Ann Arbor, 1955), ii. 303–4.

⁴ Hayes-McCoy, *Irish battles*, 106–31 (esp. 127).

nication with Spain and overt support for international Catholicism were by now well established. It was the responsibility of the privy council in England to inform the aged queen of the 'dangerous estate' of her realm of Ireland and then—in conjunction with her council in Ireland, by then dominated by New Englishmen, two of whose members were serving as lords justice in the absence of a lord deputy—to frame some kind of response.⁵ Coming in the same year that Philip II launched another fleet to invade England, this was the most serious crisis which a Tudor sovereign had yet faced in Ireland and it would have to be confronted without William Cecil, the minister who was most learned in Ireland matters.

There was much at stake. Tudor rule in Ireland had in the nearly fifty years since William Cecil was first appointed secretary come to embrace the vast majority of the island. Four years before his death, Burghley could without exaggeration write in a memorial: 'all partes of Irland ar in good obedie[n]ce savy[n]g Ulster and a pece of Leinster und' Feagh Mc Hugh [O'Byrne]'.⁶ An analysis of the kingdom in a circuit, moving counter-clockwise from Dublin in Leinster through the provinces of Munster, Connaught, and Ulster, will reveal the extent, and something of the state and character besides, of the structures of Tudor government in place in Ireland in the year Burghley died. To look at the kingdom in this way is appropriate. Long before modern historians employed such a panoramic device—to no small effect—so as to show the political and social state of the country, some contemporary English observers were, by the later 1590s, moved by the outbreak of O'Neill's rebellion to take stock of Tudor government in the kingdom in this way. They did so with a view to demonstrating how best to defeat the rebels and to seeing Ireland finally reduced to English rule thereby.⁷ Burghley, moreover, in his own day and immediately after his death, was most closely associated with the policy of steadily extending Tudor law and government throughout the kingdom of Ireland, 'and for that purpose', as an anonymous commentator wrote to Elizabeth in 1599, the lord treasurer had been instrumental in seeing that 'the whole cuntrie was divided into sheers and accordingly there was appoynted sheriffes and othere officers to mynister both lawe and justice amongst the multitude'.⁸ The twin manifestations of Burghley's lifelong commitment to the administering of the kingdom of Ireland were thus the existence of counties and the operation of local government, and so it is upon these, the cornerstones of English government and society, that his record in Ireland should be assessed.

In Leinster, the southern borders of the English Pale were in 1598 under the government of Sir Henry Harrington, who had functioned as seneschal of the

⁵ Lords Justices Loftus and Gardiner and council to privy council, 16 August 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.3)/20.

⁶ Memorial for matters of Ireland, 24 October 1594, TNA, SP 63/176/64.

⁷ D. B. Quinn and K. W. Nicholls, 'Ireland in 1534', in *NHI*, iii. 1–18; The description of the realm of Ireland... and a brief discourse declaring how the service against the north rebels may be arranged, 1598, TNA, SP 63/201/157, printed in Edmund Hogan (ed.), *The description of Ireland and the state thereof as it is at this present in Anno 1598* (London, 1878); Report on the state of Ireland, 5 November 1597, LPL, 621, fo. 57).

⁸ A direction to queen's Majesty how to conquer Ireland, 1599, BL, Harleian MS 292, 78; A looking[glass] for Her Majesty... to view Ireland, May 1599, TNA, SP 63/205/72.

countries of the O'Byrnes and the O'Tooles for two decades.⁹ Nominally this area, which stretched southwards to counties Wexford and Carlow, was coterminous with the new-made shires of Wicklow and Ferns; but though Wicklow was represented in the lower house in the 1585 parliament—Harrington and Sir Edward Brabazon were returned as knights of the shire—the rebellion which emanated from the area's mountainous district in the early 1580s had torn apart any emerging framework for shire administration, ensuring that the district continued under Harrington's quasi-military rule.¹⁰ The two abortive shires were described in 1597 as 'unperfected, and not warranted by lawe, nor have sufficient ffreholders out of w^{ch} to choose sheriffes, and other competent officers'. Further south was the liberty of Wexford. Here, Sir Richard Masterson was seneschal, though an additional function of his office was to exert control over the O'Byrnes and the Kavanaghs, whose lordships to the north straddled Wexford and Carlow but sat primarily in what was to have been the county of Ferns.¹¹ To the west, the anciently established counties of Carlow and Kilkenny continued to boast substantial English populations and were thus subject to ordinary county administrations. The power and influence of Thomas Butler, tenth earl of Ormond, was a dominant feature in both shires, though especially in the former, which was described in 1597 as having 'the most shewe of civility of any other of the border counties'.¹²

Queen's and King's counties lay northwards of Kilkenny. Both had been erected into shire ground by act of parliament in 1557 in an effort to shield the approaches to the Pale county of Kildare from the midlands. The intervening forty years had seen the English settlements, initially established during Edward VI's reign round the garrisons planted in the Irish lordships of Leix and Offaly, put down firm roots.¹³ But the government's expropriation and subsequent warring down and persecution of the O'Mores and O'Connors meant that the government of both counties retained a distinctly military character. Queen's County in particular continued to be threatened by an aggressive remnant of the O'More clan and so was governed by a military man, Lieutenant Warham St Leger; part of that unsettled county—Ballyadams—was entrusted, meanwhile, to Robert Bowen as seneschal.¹⁴ Most of the lands attached to the barony of Upper Ossory lay in County Kilkenny, but the Fitzpatrick lord of Upper Ossory, it was said, 'rather sorteth himselfe to bee of the new countie called Queenes . . . and so in all criminal causes to bee tried by the late planted English, then by their auncient [English] enemies of the countie of Kilkennie'. King's County, though it had by 1597 reportedly 'growne rich &

⁹ Unless where otherwise stated, the foregoing circuit of the kingdom of Ireland is based on The description of the realm, 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/157.

¹⁰ Maginn, 'Civilizing' Gaelic Leinster, 136–9; Captain Thomas Reade to Robert Cecil, 20 November 1598, TNA, SP 63/102(pt.3)/167; Rowley Lascelles (ed.), *Liber munerum publicorum Hiberniae*, 2 vols. (London, 1852), i. 5.

¹¹ An abstract of several depositions concerning Richard Masterson, 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/155; Ormond to privy council, November 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.3)/39; *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, no. 5450.

¹² For a list of sheriffs in County Kilkenny and a discussion of the relationship between royal county government and Ormond power, see Edwards, *Ormond lordship*, 344–6.

¹³ Dunlop, 'The plantations of Leix and Offaly', 61–96.

¹⁴ *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, no. 5999.

wealthie and quiett', was under the lieutenancy of Sir George Bouchier. The O'Carroll lords of Ely, though their lordship was situated in County Tipperary, 'alwaies consented to bee under English government, & namely under the lieutenants of the King's county'. Bordering King's County to the north was Westmeath. Shorn by statute from the medieval county of Meath in 1542, it extended west to the Shannon where it embraced the Dillons' country which, in the later 1590s, was under the seneschalcy of James Dillon.¹⁵ County Longford, shired in 1571, was situated further northwards. Like Queen's and King's, Longford was erected on what had been an Irish country—in this case the O'Farrell lordship—only no English population was introduced. With very few English freeholders, the O'Farrells continued to dominate the land, even coming to occupy positions in the county administration, most notably the office of sheriff—in so doing, the O'Farrells appear to have been spared the military government reserved for ethnically Irish areas elsewhere in Leinster.¹⁶ Cavan, which was shired in 1579 and bordered Longford to the north-east, was also erected on an Irish lordship and had few English inhabitants; and like Longford, Cavan was not committed to the government of a seneschal. But the O'Reillys, from whose lordship the new shire was carved, were politically fragmented—a deliberate policy of successive governments—and were never in a position to dominate the office of sheriff the way that the O'Farrells had done. The government of Cavan was thus entrusted to the county's sheriff who was, invariably, an Englishman.¹⁷ The medieval county of Louth, which formed the northern border of the English Pale, was subject to ordinary shire administration. However, its borders were thought to have been 'the most dangerous' on account of their proximity to the larger Irish clans of south-east Ulster—MacMahons, the O'Neills of the Fews, and the O'Hanlons—and so were placed under the supervision of Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone, in the years prior to his rebellion.¹⁸

Leinster in 1598 was thus characterized by a mixture of ordinary English county administration, particularly in the medieval shires where Old English populations predominated, and military government, generally in ethnically Irish areas where Tudor rule had only recently been established. It was a very complicated framework for government which had developed in the province, and one which cut across the ethnic and political divisions which historians have for long accepted as basic features of later Elizabethan Ireland. At one level, the O'Farrells demonstrated that Irishmen might undertake the operation of county administration. But the success of the O'Farrells in a Tudor administrative framework did little to

¹⁵ James Dillon to Robert Cecil, 15 January 1597, TNA, SP 63/197/29.

¹⁶ Maginn, 'Elizabethan Cavan', 76–7; Fergus O'Farrell, sheriff of Longford, to lord deputy, 30 June 1596, TNA, SP 63/191/15(xi).

¹⁷ Though Cavan later came to be considered a part of Ulster, the county was treated as a part of Leinster during Elizabeth's reign: Maginn, 'Elizabethan Cavan', 69–84. Sir Henry Duke served as sheriff of Cavan until his death sometime in early 1596: lord deputy to privy council, 14 March 1596, TNA, SP 63/187/35.

¹⁸ County Louth was a part of the English Pale, one of the 'four obedient shires' in the later Middle Ages, but the 1597 circuit of Ireland included the county in its description of the province of Ulster.

diminish anti-Irish sentiment in certain English quarters. It was an Old Englishman, Christopher Nugent, the ninth baron of Delvin, for example, rather than a land-grabbing New English freebooter, who actively sought to acquire land in Longford and Cavan and who, in his suit to the queen, dismissed both shires as little more than 'wild Irish counties'.¹⁹ And the O'Farrell sheriff of County Longford himself complained to the lord deputy in 1596 of his own kinsmen's treachery.²⁰ In the Dillons' country in County Westmeath, meanwhile, James Dillon, the Irish-born government-appointed seneschal there, complained to Robert Cecil (because, Dillon claimed, he and his family had received so many favours from the secretary's father over the years) that one Theobald Dillon had usurped his office. This latter Dillon captained a company of horsemen in the queen's pay, but it was alleged that he had assumed the Irish form of his surname—'O'Dillon'—and had used the troops to take the 'absolute authoritie of the seneschal'.²¹

More typically in Leinster, however, men who would normally be classified as New English were entrusted with the government of Irish districts. Men such as Henry Harrington and Richard Masterson, for example, are often portrayed as representative of the New English in Elizabethan Ireland: English born, land-hungry, and disdainful of the native population whom they ruled with an iron hand.²² Yet here, too, the reality of the situation on the ground was more complex than historians have allowed. Both Harrington and Masterson had, by the 1590s, come under criticism from a cross-section of the English community for maintaining what were considered to be inappropriately close relationships with Irishmen. The capricious and grasping soldier Captain Thomas Lee preferred articles of treason against Harrington in 1597 for having allegedly turned a blind eye to the actions of Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne during the latter's rebellion; the seneschal also stood accused of harbouring traitors in the house he maintained in the O'Byrnes' country.²³ The accusations against Masterson in Wexford were more broadly based, and led to an inquiry into his actions as seneschal by the government of Lord Deputy Burgh. They were similar in tone to Lee's: the seneschal had allegedly sworn secret agreements with Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne as a means of protecting his lands and tenants from raids and securing restitution for goods taken.²⁴ Neither seneschal was found guilty, nor were they disciplined for their actions, but it is clear from the complaints against them that both men had found a *modus vivendi* with the people whom they governed, and this often meant tolerating certain aspects of Irish culture and engaging with Irishmen as a means of enforcing and maintaining their authority. This was, in short, typical of the interaction with the Irish community

¹⁹ Brief of Lord Delvin's suit to queen, June 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/132.

²⁰ Fergus O'Farrell to lord deputy, 30 June 1596, TNA, SP 63/191/15(xi).

²¹ James Dillon to Robert Cecil, 15 January 1597, TNA, SP 63/197/29.

²² Maginn, 'Civilizing' Gaelic Leinster, 135–7, 142–5; Brian Donovan, 'Tudor rule in Gaelic Leinster and the rise of Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne', in C. O'Brien (ed.), *Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne: the Wicklow firebrand* (Rathdrum, 1998), 118–49.

²³ Certain articles of treason preferred by Thomas Lee against Henry Harrington, May 1597, TNA, SP 63/199/70. For Lee, see John McGurk, *s.v.* 'Thomas Lee', in the *ODNB*.

²⁴ Abstract of several depositions concerning Richard Masterson, 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/155.

which had characterized English settlement in Ireland for centuries.²⁵ Nonetheless, the seneschal system had become a part of the fabric of royal government in the province which now stretched well beyond the traditional English Pale. Tudor rule was felt in every corner of Leinster by 1598, and even Burghley's earlier reluctance to classify Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne's mountainous redoubt as 'obedient' became difficult to sustain following the hunting down and killing in May 1597 of O'Byrne, by Captain Lee's men as it happened.

The province of Munster in the south was comprised in the late 1590s of five counties: Waterford, Cork, Kerry, Limerick, and Tipperary. Each was shired in the Middle Ages, reflecting the pattern of the initial wave of English settlement of the province, and each maintained the framework for shire administration into Tudor times. But the presence of two overbearing regional English magnates, the Fitzgerald earls of Desmond in counties Kerry, Limerick, and Cork and the Butler earls of Ormond in County Tipperary, and a host of lesser English lineages, such as the Fitzgibbons in Cork and the Powers in Waterford, often interrupted, and generally undermined, the functioning of royal government in Munster. The province also contained Irish districts in the south-west which were traditionally beyond the crown's authority. By 1598, however, the distribution of power and the character of English government in Munster had been transformed. The administration of County Waterford, outside the gates of the still thriving city, was dominated by the Power lineage as late as the 1530s; but in Elizabeth's reign the county's shrievalty was increasingly entrusted to men who were not drawn from the Power kinship group.²⁶ Waterford was described in 1597 as being 'as much under law as any other English shire of Ireland'. West of Waterford was County Cork, the kingdom's largest shire. The sheriffs of the county had made no proffers to the exchequer between 1558–78, but thereafter the sheriffs proffered regularly; the holder of the office, moreover, changed yearly, in keeping with the directives coming from England and in marked contrast to the practice in some other shires in Ireland.²⁷ The sheriff of Cork's jurisdiction included the once independent Irish countries in the south—Duhallow, Muskerry, and Carbery—much of which still belonged to the branches of the MacCarthys who had agreed to hold their lands of the crown.²⁸ Cork shared a border with County Kerry to the west. The former epicentre of Desmond power in the province and once the earl's palatine liberty, Kerry was by 1598 subject to standard English shire administration. Its southern half, known as Desmond, was roughly coterminous with the earldom of Clancare held by Donald MacCarthy

²⁵ Rhys Morgan and Gerald Power, 'Enduring borderlands: the marches of Ireland and Wales in the early modern period', in S. G. Ellis and Raingard Esser (eds.), *Frontiers, regions and identities in Europe* (Pisa, 2009), 113.

²⁶ Above, 23–4; Sidney to Cecil, February 1569, TNA, SP 63/27/38; Peter Carew to Cecil, 3 March 1569, TNA, SP 63/27/39; *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 295, 502, 725, 953, 1046, 1635, 1814, 2088, 3852, 4096, 5293.

²⁷ H. F. Berry, 'Sheriffs of the county of Cork: Henry III to 1660', *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, 35 (1905), 46–7; Edmund Gibbon, sheriff of Cork, to Burghley, 20 July 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/44, in which Gibbon requested to hold his office for more than a year.

²⁸ *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 5330, 5520.

More until his death, without legitimate male issue, in early 1597.²⁹ The crown had suggested in late 1571 that Desmond be erected into a separate shire, and while it was never properly shired, it was not uncommon for Desmond to be referred to as a county in its own right into the 1590s.³⁰ A single sheriff was sometimes appointed for both Kerry and Desmond, but seemingly just as often a separate sheriff was appointed for the latter.³¹ In the 1597 description of Ireland it was noted that Cork, because of its size, 'hath been tollerated to have twoe sheriffes, the one p[ar]ticular in Desmond, the other in the rest of the county, but this wthout ground in lawe, but by discrecon of Deputies'. County Limerick lay to the north-east. Lands in each of the Munster shires had been confiscated by the crown and allocated to English planters in the decade following the Desmond rebellion, but Limerick saw the greatest concentration of its territory, principally in the west of the county, earmarked for resettlement.³² The county outside Limerick city was, as near as can be ascertained, possessed of a framework of English shire administration.³³ Tipperary, which bordered Limerick to the east, was divided into two parts: the cross of Tipperary and the 'countie of libertie palatine' of Tipperary, belonging to Thomas Butler, eleventh earl of Ormond and the most influential nobleman in the kingdom. Sheriffs continued to be appointed in the former; the liberty, meanwhile, was governed by a seneschal, a justice, a sheriff, 'and divers other meaner officers' all of whom were appointed by the earl.³⁴

Since 1570 the government of Munster had been entrusted to a provincial president. The office of lord president, occupied since September 1597 by Sir Thomas Norris, had become the focal point of power in the province. Armed with powers of martial law, and head of a small military retinue funded by composition rents drawn from within the province, the president's authority overshadowed any other in Munster.³⁵ An exception was Ormond, but by the late 1590s the crown required the earl's services, regularly employing him elsewhere in the kingdom. The lord president was also the focal point of a provincial framework for English government which included, *inter alia*, his own council, a chief justice and a second justice, a queen's attorney at laws, and, as will be discussed in greater detail below, a provost marshal.³⁶ Norris could write to Burghley in 1597 that Munster was 'in reasonable good quiette', though he indicated that 'the granntinge oute', by the central courts, 'of writtes and cirtioraries' troubled the queen's subjects who were being deprived of the 'spedy execution of justice' on account of their having to

²⁹ Thomas Norris and William Robinson to Burghley, 15 January 1597, TNA, SP 63/197/26; MacCarthy-Morrogh, *Munster plantation*, 10.

³⁰ *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 1846. For references to 'the county' of Desmond, see for example *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 4518, 5762, 6034, 6123.

³¹ James Myaghe to Burghley, 6 July 1586, TNA, SP 63/125/3; Remembrances to pass from Her Majesty to lord deputy and council of Ireland, 26 April 1587, TNA, SP 63/129/30.

³² MacCarthy-Morrogh, *Munster plantation*, 9–10, 290.

³³ *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 828, 2815, 3261, 4443; A number of wrongs done to Her Majesty in Ireland, 18 July 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/33.

³⁴ See, for example, *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 4051, 4838, 4963.

³⁵ Lord deputy to privy council, 21 October 1592, TNA, SP 63/167/8.

³⁶ *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 6021, 6144.

travel to Dublin for legal remedy.³⁷ However, beneath the veneer of English government erected in Munster, the inhabitants of the province had yet to recover from the ravages of the last Desmond war. Waterford was described in 1597 as having been 'least infected' with the 'treason & traitors' of the Desmond rebellion, but it was also recognized that the county was 'yet yearley impoverished by the cesse & bearing of suche soldiers as were garrisoned there for expulcon of the rebelles'. It has been suggested, moreover, that as much as a third of the population of Munster had perished through violence, famine, and disease in the early 1580s; and there is evidence, as we have seen, to suggest that many more still had emigrated from Munster to England in the years which followed.³⁸ One might expect that the sudden depopulation of Munster was a stroke of good fortune for a government committed to repopulating the region with Englishmen, but the number of English undertakers willing to colonize Munster was insufficient: the English settler population in 1598 is thought to have been a mere 4,000.³⁹

In contrast to Munster, the counties of the province of Connaught in the west—Clare, Galway, Mayo, Sligo, Leitrim, and Roscommon—were of much more recent vintage, having been shired in Elizabeth's reign during the deputyships of Sidney and Perrot.⁴⁰ The province's southernmost shire, County Clare, was more or less coterminous with the O'Briens' country. Commonly referred to in English records as Thomond, the county contained the earldom of Thomond which, in 1598, was held by Donough O'Brien, the fourth earl. Sheriffs had been introduced in this Irish district in 1570, around the time of its shiring. Even with a framework for English government in place, however, the common law was slow to put down firm roots in the new county: sessions seem to have been held at Ennis in the 1580s, but by 1596 the attorney-general for Connaught wrote of his desire to see sessions held in the county.⁴¹ The government briefly included Clare in the jurisdiction of the president of Munster; after 1580, however, it was placed within the administrative unit of Connaught.⁴² To the north lay the much larger county of Galway. It boasted the town of Athenry and the large port of Galway, both remnants of medieval English settlement in the province. Much of the county outside the walls of Galway city was erected on the territory of Clanrickard which in 1598 was held by Ulick Burke, third earl of Clanrickard; most of the remainder of the county was formed from territories belonging to Irishmen, most notably the O'Maddens, the O'Kellys, and the O'Flaherties.⁴³ Sheriffs were appointed and

³⁷ Thomas Norris to Burghley, 11 October 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/10.

³⁸ Anthony McCormack, 'The social and economic consequences of the Desmond rebellion of 1579–83', *IHS* 34 (2004), 1–16; see above, 134.

³⁹ MacCarthy-Morrogh, *Munster plantation*, 118.

⁴⁰ These Elizabethan shires were erected in place of the medieval county of Connaught, which had from the thirteenth century until Tudor times nominally embraced the entire province.

⁴¹ Thomas Johnston Westropp, 'Notes on the sheriff of county Clare, 1570–1700', *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, 1 (1890), 68–80; *Fiantis Ire. Eliz.*, no. 5389; Gerald Comerford to [lord deputy?], 21 July 1596, TNA, SP 63/191/36.

⁴² *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 1424, 2885, 3667–8.

⁴³ Cf. Draft report of the certain commissioners showing the lands and chieftains of Munster and Connaught, 1586, TNA, SP 63/127/75.

sessions were held with some regularity (in the summer) in Galway, described in 1571 as the only 'norrice and place of civility and good order' in the province.⁴⁴ Yet while an English framework for government was established in the rest of Connaught by the late 1580s—by then all the land had been made shire ground and sheriffs were appointed in most of the newly erected counties—Tudor authority remained irregular.⁴⁵ A decade later the lord president of Connaught, Sir Conyers Clifford, informed Burghley that he had placed sheriffs in counties Mayo, Sligo, and Roscommon, but that the former two had had no sheriff for three years and that the latter had 'only the name of sheriff'.⁴⁶ And then there was County Leitrim: roughly coterminous with the remote and inaccessible O'Rourke lordship, it was the last county to be shired in Connaught (1585) and only began receiving sheriffs in 1589.⁴⁷

Like the province of Munster, the Elizabethan regime treated Connaught as a single administrative unit subject to the authority of a president. The military and legal powers of the president of Connaught, an office first created in 1569 and held since September 1597 by Conyers Clifford, were identical to those of his counterpart in Munster. But the experience of the presidents differed in that the presidents of Connaught were not confronted with a major rebellion of the kind which consumed Munster and resulted in the destruction of one of the province's leading magnates. Presidents of Connaught were inclined to work with the province's two leading noblemen—the earls of Thomond and Clanrickard—and so avoided outright confrontation.⁴⁸ The aggressive government of Clifford's predecessor, Sir Richard Bingham, had threatened to alienate the two earls, but Bingham's suspension in May 1596 and Clifford's subsequent rapprochement with Thomond and Clanrickard re-established good relations between the provincial president and the province's traditional local elite.⁴⁹ Yet despite Clifford's efforts to repair relations with the lords of north Connaught, most notably the Mayo branch of the MacWilliam Burkes, Tudor rule remained weak north of the town of Galway and vulnerable to incursions from Ulster.

⁴⁴ For the sheriffs of County Galway, see *Fiants Ire. Eliz.*, nos. 2807, 4045, 4356, 4995, 5741; for evidence of sessions held at Galway, see Henry Guldeforde to Walsingham, 21 July 1579, TNA, SP 63/67/39; Barnaby Googe to Burghley, 11 July 1583, TNA, SP 63/103/18; 27 October 1587, TNA, SP 63/131/65; *Fiants Ire. Eliz.*, no. 1711 (quotation).

⁴⁵ For Mayo, see *Fiants Ire. Eliz.*, nos. 2851, 4696, 4890; Bernadette Cunningham, 'Natives and newcomers in Mayo, 1560–1603', in Raymond Gillespie and Gerard Moran (eds.), *A various country: essays in Mayo history, 1500–1900* (Westport, Conn., 1987), 24–43. For Sligo, see W. G. Wood-Martin, *History of Sligo, county and town*, 3 vols. (Dublin, 1882–92), iii. 496; Mary O'Dowd, *Power, politics and land: early modern Sligo, 1568–1688* (Belfast, 1991), esp. 56–7. For Roscommon, see *Fiants Ire. Eliz.*, nos. 2949, 3523, 3892, 4835. Cf. Book of instructions touching the province of Connaught and Thomond, 11 July 1588, TNA, SP 63/135/80.

⁴⁶ Conyers Clifford to Burghley, 19 November 1597, TNA, 63/201/74. Clifford's assertion was not strictly correct, as a sheriff of Sligo was operating there in 1596: Complaint of Richarde Oge MacJonyn, sheriff of Sligo, 20 June 1596, TNA, SP 63/195/6(ii).

⁴⁷ *Fiants Ire. Eliz.*, nos. 4732, 5290.

⁴⁸ Cunningham, 'Political and social change in the lordships of Clanrickard and Thomond', 31–5, 64–107.

⁴⁹ For Bingham's government, see now Rory Rapple, 'Taking up office in Elizabethan Connacht: the case of Sir Richard Bingham', *EHR* 123 (2008), 277–99.

Ulster was almost entirely beyond the reach of Tudor government in 1598. Six new counties had been shired in the north-west of the province in September 1585 during the government of Lord Deputy Perrot; but the framework for Tudor government had scarcely been erected before the province's powerful, and still largely autonomous, Irish lords began resisting its implementation.⁵⁰ Tudor rule in Ulster was sufficiently weak for the O'Donnell lord of Tyrconnell, whose lordship had been shired as County Donegal, to eject from the shire the government-appointed (and English-born) sheriff in 1588—it took the lord deputy's personal appearance in Donegal to see a sheriff installed, and even then he had to concede that the shrievalty should be entrusted to O'Donnell's eldest son.⁵¹ In early 1592, however, another of O'Donnell's sons, Hugh Roe, lately escaped from his prison at Dublin castle, returned to the new shire, whereupon he expelled the rapacious Captain Humphrey Willis, by then the sheriff of Donegal, and, flying in the face of English law, saw that he was elected O'Donnell in place of his father.⁵² Hugh Roe O'Donnell was closely allied to his one-time brother-in-law Hugh O'Neill, the second earl of Tyrone and much the most powerful figure in Ulster. O'Neill's territory, bordering Donegal to the east, had also been shired in 1585, as County Tyrone; but the earl had resisted both the introduction of sheriffs, the subinfeudation of his lands, and the composition rents that he believed would accompany the establishment of Tudor rule. He also sought to have County Armagh united with Tyrone which it bordered to the south-east: O'Neill argued that the two shires, separate since their creation in 1585, were too poor to maintain more than one sheriff. O'Neill was holding out for something more: palatinate authority in an expanded Tyrone, not unlike that which the earl of Ormond possessed in Tipperary, and control of the traditional O'Neill vassal-chiefs, most notably O'Hanlon in Armagh and O'Cahan whose lordship to the north-east of Tyrone had been shired as County Coleraine.⁵³ But it was the government's hope that the establishment of English government in Maguire's country, lately erected as the County Fermanagh, which bordered Tyrconnell and Tyrone to the south, would allow the extension of Tudor rule deeper into the O'Neill and O'Donnell heartlands. In 1593, Captain Willis reappeared, this time as the sheriff of Fermanagh; however, as Fenton secretly related to Burghley, the northern lords saw Fermanagh 'as a bridge already made, to cary hir [the queen] over into Tyrone and Tyrconnell'. With the assistance of troops supplied by O'Donnell and O'Neill's brother, Maguire forced Willis to withdraw from County Fermanagh.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ *Fiants Ire. Eliz.*, no. 4763.

⁵¹ Perrot to Walsingham, 12 May 1588, TNA, SP 63/135/22; lord deputy to privy council, 31 December 1588, TNA, SP 63/139/25; *Fiants Ire. Eliz.*, no. 5301.

⁵² Chief Justice Gardiner to Burghley, 27 February 1592, TNA, SP 63/163/36; Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 2 June 1592, TNA, SP 63/165/3; McGettigan, *Red Hugh O'Donnell and the Nine Years War*, 50–2.

⁵³ Canny, 'Taking sides in early modern Ireland', 94–115; Hiram Morgan, 'Gaelic lordship and Tudor conquest: Tir Eoghain, 1541–1603', *History Ireland*, 13/5 (2005), 38–43; O'Neill to privy council, 5 November 1593, TNA, SP 63/172/13.

⁵⁴ Morgan, *Tyrone's rebellion*, 143–4; Fenton to Burghley, 2 August 1594, TNA, SP 63/175/36 (quotation).

The concerns of the Irish lords of Ulster about allowing Tudor rule to penetrate Fermanagh were well founded. They needed only to look to the recent experience of the MacMahons whose lordship, which bordered the Pale counties of Meath and Louth to the south, had been shired in 1585 as County Monaghan. Here, Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam's intervention in a succession dispute, which arose in 1589 following the MacMahon chief's death, greatly destabilized the MacMahons and led to the queen's decision two years later to divide the lands in the new county between eight leading clansmen and to settle some 280 freeholders beneath them.⁵⁵ Captain Thomas Henshaw was appointed seneschal of Monaghan and, by March 1592, Fitzwilliam could report to Burghley that

There hath bene this last weeke a sessions holden in the countie of Monaghan, the inhabitantes whereof of ev[er]y degree as well the chief gent as freholders seme greatlie to reioyce at the settled course that the same is nowe brought unto.⁵⁶

In this way, Monaghan was drawn into the orbit of south and east Ulster where Tudor rule was by the late 1590s making some headway. The Monaghan sessions formed part of a wider 'northern' or 'Ulster' assize circuit, which by 1593 also moved through counties Louth, Cavan, Down, and Antrim.⁵⁷ The latter two counties, which together marked the eastern extremity of the province of Ulster, had been shired in 1570.⁵⁸ Of the two, royal influence was stronger in Down on account of the government's considerable military presence at Newry and due to the more or less consistent loyalty shown to the state by successive leaders of the Magennis clan in the south of the county.⁵⁹ Antrim was another matter. Beyond the garrison town at Carrickfergus on the coast, where the royal sessions were held, the Clondeboy O'Neills, the MacQuillans of the Route, and the MacDonnells, who were 'of the race of the Scottes' in the eyes of Tudor officials but who in the second half of the sixteenth century had established a firm base along the coast to the north, were left to the military government of Captain Christopher Carlisle. These clans struggled (with one another and with Tudor officials) to reach an accommodation with the crown in whose county their lands now lay.⁶⁰ County Armagh, which bordered Down to the west, was the exception in south and east Ulster. It was to have been shired in 1570, but it was not in fact erected into a county until the following decade along with the Irish countries to the north-west.

⁵⁵ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 7 August 1589, TNA, SP 63/146/5; *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Eliz.*, 215–16; lord deputy and council to privy council, 25 October 1591, TNA, SP 63/160/48; E. P. Shirley, *The history of the county of Monaghan* (London, 1879), 84–91.

⁵⁶ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 17 March 1592, TNA, SP 63/163/66 (quotation); *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 5690, 5705.

⁵⁷ William Weston to Burghley, 28 August 1593, TNA, SP 63/171/21; Roger Wilbraham to Burghley, 7 September 1593, TNA, SP 63/171/30.

⁵⁸ *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, no. 1530.

⁵⁹ Information delivered by Hugh Magennis to Henry Bagenal, 25 April 1593, TNA, SP 63/169/23(v).

⁶⁰ Christopher Carlisle to Walsingham, 31 August 1588, TNA, SP 63/136/17; Roger Wilbraham to Burghley, 7 September 1593, TNA, SP 63/171/30. For Burghley's efforts to make sense of the tangled relationships in the north-east, see his genealogical notes, 1592, TNA, SP 63/167/53–6 and his marginal notes on: A note of the names of such gentlemen and their countries... as desire to surrender their lands... and to take the same again by English tenure, 1592, TNA, SP 63/167/66.

Thereafter, however, O'Neill disallowed the appointment of sheriffs in what he saw as the eastern portion of a single shire. Burghley had made clear his opposition to O'Neill's plan to see Tyrone and Armagh united. So, in an effort to avoid an open confrontation with the crown, O'Neill permitted his brother to be appointed sheriff of Tyrone and allowed one of the O'Hanlons to be made sheriff of Armagh in late 1592.⁶¹

The rebellion of the northern lords—led by Hugh O'Neill by proxy since Willis's expulsion from Fermanagh in April 1593 and openly from May 1595—was a direct result of the crown's efforts rapidly to extend its authority in north-west Ulster.⁶² The demands which O'Neill and O'Donnell made to the government in January 1596—most often noticed by historians for the lords' appeal for liberty of conscience—also included the insistence that 'no garrison sheriffe or officers shall remaine' in Ulster 'excepting the Newrie and Carrickfergus'.⁶³ On the eve of the confederate victory at the Yellow Ford in August 1598, both sides having failed to come to a lasting agreement on the future of Irish Ulster, O'Neill and his confederates had already achieved through force what he had earlier sought from the crown in return for peace: counties Donegal, Coleraine, Fermanagh, Armagh, and Tyrone were devoid of any framework for royal authority; Tudor rule had been thrown back to the extremities of Ulster, to the towns of Cavan, Newry, and Carrickfergus. Until the Yellow Ford, however, the confederates had made only halting inroads into the rest of the kingdom. O'Donnell had had some success in northern Connaught. He and his men poured across the Erne in spring 1595 sweeping all before them in counties Leitrim, Roscommon, Longford, and Cavan; in June, O'Donnell seized and subsequently razed Sligo castle, which controlled the critical passage between Ulster and Connaught. Of O'Donnell's exploits after Sligo's fall the Four Masters recorded: 'in the course of one month the greater part of the inhabitants of the district, from the western point of Erris and Umhall to the Drowes, had unanimously confederated with O'Donnell; and there were not many castles or fortresses in those places, whether injured or perfect, that were not under his control'.⁶⁴ But O'Donnell could not hold these territories outside of Tyrconnell indefinitely: by May 1597 the president of Connaught had won back much of the province and was preparing for an assault across the Erne.⁶⁵ In Leinster, meanwhile, Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne had in spring 1594 come out in support of O'Neill, so threatening to spread rebellion to the midlands and set the southern marches of the Pale alight as he had done fourteen years before. Yet so overwhelming was the government's military presence in Leinster by the mid-1590s that Lord Deputy Russell was able to drive the old O'Byrne chief from his mountainous

⁶¹ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 31 July 1593, TNA, SP 63/170/58.

⁶² On the rebellion's origins, see Morgan, *Tyrone's rebellion*, 143–4; Canny, 'Taking sides in early modern Ireland', 94–115.

⁶³ Demands of Tyrone and O'Donnell, 19 January 1596, TNA, SP 63/186/22(xv).

⁶⁴ *AFM*, s.a. 1595; Geoffrey Fenton to the lord deputy, 5 September 1596, TNA, SP 63/193/9(iii).

⁶⁵ Geoffrey Fenton to Robert Cecil, 21 May 1597, TNA, SP 63/199/44; Lord Deputy Burgh to privy council, 31 May 1596, TNA, SP 63/199/66.

redoubt and establish a garrison in its place.⁶⁶ O'Byrne fought on for another two years, and succeeded in diverting large numbers of troops from the Ulster theatre, but the days when the Leinster mountains were beyond the normal reach of royal authority were gone.

Still, with most of Ulster now outside of royal control and with the prospect of a Spanish invasion of Ireland growing ever more likely, the government had to take measures to ensure the security of the remainder of the kingdom.⁶⁷ And this meant undoing that which Burghley held to be the key to completing the reform of Ireland: the limitation of the use of martial law.⁶⁸ Just how successful were the government's efforts to see the normal operation of the common law established in the five years since the commissions for martial law had been called in is difficult to know. On the one hand, Burghley could take comfort from the report sent to him by Ralph Lane, the muster-master for Ireland. Lane had been an eyewitness to the sessions held in Roscommon. The 'peaceablenes' of Connaught, wrote Lane, 'was no lesse, then enye p[ar]te of Englande that is quietest, w^{ch} the manner of the scessions did shewe wherein I assure yo^r lppe there was as greate an appearance of the countrye, and as redye juries for the service of her mat^{tie}'.⁶⁹ On the other hand, the lord treasurer's 1596 inquiry into the conduct of Sir Richard Bingham, the disgraced former president of Connaught, revealed the continuing ambiguities, if not the clear abuse, in the government's dispensation of justice in the mid-1590s. Bingham, then in the Fleet facing myriad allegations of misgovernment, related to Burghley (who had requested copies of the president's commissions for the execution of martial law) that when he first came to Ireland every sheriff was possessed of powers of martial law, but that such commissions had indeed been 'called in'. Thereafter, only the provincial presidents retained the authority to execute martial law; such power, he reminded the lord treasurer, 'was ordenarelie geven by the L. deputies to gov[er]nors of the provinces under the seale of the realme'. But according to Bingham, a discussion of martial law was moot, for he insisted that not a single person had been put to death in Connaught by authority of martial law during the last seven years.⁷⁰ Burghley, however, had also read over a set of allegations made by Dermot O'Connor against Bingham the previous year in which O'Connor maintained that the lord president had executed several men by martial law, including two followers of the O'Connor clan—Owen MacDonnell and Gylleduff MacDowell—who it was alleged had

⁶⁶ David Edwards, 'In Tyrone's shadow: Feagh McHugh forgotten leader of the Nine Years War', in O'Brien (ed.), *Feagh McHugh O'Byrne*, 212–48.

⁶⁷ Burghley to Robert Cecil, 30 June 1595, TNA, SP 63/180/60.

⁶⁸ See above, 160–2. David Edwards first drew attention to the importance of the subject of martial law in Elizabethan Ireland in his 'Beyond reform: martial law and the Tudor reconquest of Ireland', *History Ireland*, 5 (1997), 16–21. He later fleshed out his views on the subject in 'Ideology and experience: Spencer's *View* and martial law in Ireland', 127–57. See also Ronan Keane, 'The will of the general: martial law in Ireland, 1534 to 1934', *Irish Jurist*, 30 (1995), 150–80.

⁶⁹ Ralph Lane to Burghley, 14 January 1593, TNA, SP 63/168/4.

⁷⁰ Richard Bingham to Burghley, 11 November 1596, TNA, SP 63/195/12.

been hanged 'by collo^r of marshall law' even though both men had procured the legal protection of a pardon.⁷¹

Yet whether provincial presidents were indeed the only royal officials empowered to exercise martial law in the mid-1590s was the subject of some uncertainty. A brief analysis of the function of the provost marshal in Ireland reveals glaring ambiguities in the dispensation of justice at a time when the government actively sought to control the abuse of martial law. At one level, the office of provost marshal was purely military in function. The knight marshal of Ireland, a position occupied successively by Nicholas and Henry Bagenal until the latter's death at the Yellow Ford, was empowered to appoint a provost marshal general of the army whose primary role, it would seem, was to maintain discipline in the army and assist the marshal in all military matters.⁷² But as in England, the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the provost marshal widened as the sixteenth century wore on, extending also to include the punishment of civilians deemed rogues or vagabonds. In Ireland, of course, there was always a fine line between 'idle and masterless folk' and rebels; as early as 1535, during Kildare's rebellion, there is mention of a provost marshal and other army captains presiding over the execution of rebel prisoners following the infamous siege of Maynooth.⁷³ With the establishment in Ireland of provincial administrations, the office of provost marshal became institutionalized in the west and south. Appointed by the deputy, these regional provost marshals were concerned primarily with the persecution of rebels in their respective jurisdictions.⁷⁴ By 1585, there was also a provost marshal for the province of Leinster; and following the arrival in Ireland of the remnants of the Spanish Armada Lord Deputy Perrot appointed provost marshals in the English Pale through which he believed Spanish survivors were being secreted to the ports. Perrot informed Burghley: 'I have sent order... to have 2 provost marshalls wth 6 horsemen betwene them, that shall ryde up & downe contynually through the Englishe Pale to execute of them as many as they shall mete'.⁷⁵ Typically, provost marshals were not granted explicit powers to exercise martial law. It was hardly necessary in the circumstances of the 1570s and 1580s when such commissions were widespread and the government's oversight of the dispensation of law was lacking. After 1592, however, a provost marshal's rounding up and execution of rebels was enough to draw comment from other crown officers. In August 1596, for instance, Captain

⁷¹ Grievous complaints of Dermot O'Connor exhibited to lord deputy and council, 30 November 1595, TNA, SP 63/184/40. Burghley tricked O'Connor's genealogy atop the document. Burghley also learned, albeit from Bingham's implacable enemy Geoffrey Fenton, that the 'chieftaines' of Sligo and Roscommon had also prepared books of the 'opp[re]ssions and violences' which the officers of Connaught had committed against them. The contents of these books, Fenton added, 'are hable to terrefie anie subject from his obedience': Fenton to Burghley, 1 December 1595, TNA, SP 63/185/2.

⁷² *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Eliz.*, 510.

⁷³ Lindsay Boynton, 'The Tudor provost-marshal', *EHR* 78 (1962), 437–55.

⁷⁴ Ralph Rokeby to Cecil, 4 January 1570, TNA, SP 63/30/4; Sidney to privy council, 27 April 1576, TNA, SP 63/55/34.

⁷⁵ Book of garrisons, 31 March 1586, TNA, SP 63/123/21; Perrot to Burghley, 10 November 1588, TNA, SP 63/138/14.

Warham St Leger, governor of Queen's County, alerted the lord deputy to the fact that Robert Bowen, provost marshal of Leinster, carried out his duties as if he was possessed of a commission to exercise martial law. St Leger complained that Bowen, who had only recently received a pardon for the 'murder and homicide' of a Kildare gentleman, 'hath allready done some execution', and apprehending another brought him to the ladder only to take him down and give him his life 'as though it were in him both to p[ar]don and execute'.⁷⁶ For St Leger, Bowen's exercise of martial law in a country where St Leger had the 'principal charge' was 'some tutch' to his reputation: he made clear that he did not desire that the deputy confer upon him the like authority, rather he sought to have Bowen restrained from the arbitrary dispensation of justice. Though not technically possessed of martial law, Bowen's patent appointing him provost marshal of the province put him at the head of six horsemen 'for the prosecution of the rebels, traitors, and malefactors who haunt the province'.⁷⁷ Discerning between a 'rebel' and an innocent civilian in the 1590s was difficult; proving that a provost marshal had overstepped his remit and confused the latter for the former was nearly impossible.

Such ambiguities, however, were rendered purely academic as Tyrone's rebellion intensified in 1596–7. In these circumstances, Lord Burghley could hardly have disapproved of the decision taken by Lord Deputy Russell in early 1597 to begin authorizing more widely the exercise of martial law in Ireland. Ormond had received a commission from the queen in August 1594 to aid in his prosecution of Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne in Leinster, and in summer 1596 Sir John Norris prevailed upon the deputy to appoint provost marshals 'upon the borders [of the Pale]' to execute by martial law; but it was not until January 1597, once he had already been informed of his recall, that Russell relented.⁷⁸ Between January 1597 and Burghley's death in August 1598 at least thirty-five separate commissions were issued empowering some sixty-six individuals, not including the provincial presidents and members of the privy council, to exercise martial law in the kingdom.⁷⁹ Those in receipt of commissions represented a cross-section of society in Ireland in the service of the crown. They were: sheriffs—of New and Old English ancestry; Pale nobility; New English soldiers; and Irish gentlemen. Among them was Captain Warham St Leger, governor of Queen's County, who received his commission to exercise martial law in January 1597; Robert Bowen, still the provost marshal of Leinster, was not explicitly empowered to proceed by martial law until July 1598.⁸⁰ The commissions always restricted the recipient's exercise of martial law to a named area—a barony, an Irish 'country', a county, or a region depending on the

⁷⁶ *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, no. 5999; Warham St Leger to lord deputy, 7 August 1596, TNA, SP 63/192/7(x).

⁷⁷ *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Eliz.*, 332.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 281–2; Certain notes by Sir John Norris, 16 July 1596, TNA, SP 63/191/46(i). For Russell's authority to execute martial law and to appoint others to do the same, see *Cal. pat. rolls Ire., Eliz.*, 286.

⁷⁹ *Fiantis Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 6028, 6068, 6074, 6084, 6092–3, 6103, 6127, 6135, 6164, 6199, 6202–17, 6221, 6223, 6227–8, 6237–8, 6240–1.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, nos. 6028, 6240.

circumstance; many of the commissions for martial law issued in 1598 came with a time limitation of two months. The earl of Ormond, named on a commission in February 1597 which authorized him to punish 'enemies and rebels' in Leinster with 'fire and sword', provided detailed figures of the numbers (and many of the names) of the men he had executed by martial law and also by the normal course of common law.⁸¹ According to Ormond's record, in the period beginning in February/March 1597 and ending in the month of Burghley's death nearly 1,000 traitors were put to death in or on the borders of Leinster alone.⁸² Though it is very difficult at this remove to estimate how many people were executed in these months, the total numbers for the kingdom killed in the name of the state must have been in the thousands.

That such authority was abused and that state-sponsored violence at this time extended beyond 'enemies and rebels' is vividly illustrated by the allegations levelled against Captain Thomas Lee by another captain in royal service—Charles Montague—in late 1597.⁸³ According to Montague, Lee apprehended one Art O'Toole seven miles outside of Dublin and 'there bounde him to a Maypole, and (the soldiors refusing to be y^e actors of so barbarous a crueltie dangerous to them selves) at his comaundment and for rewarde of Artes horsse and weapons, a base man of Leas [Leix] wth his thombes did thruste oute both his eyes'. Lee, formerly the commander of the royal garrison established in the territory which once belonged to Feagh MacHugh O'Byrne, had been granted a commission to execute martial law in Leinster in July 1597 and, the following September, the new lord deputy, Thomas Lord Burgh, issued a warrant empowering Lee to continue the exercise of martial law.⁸⁴ Only O'Toole was passing through Dublin in the service of the state—he was returning from a campaign against O'Neill and had been licensed by his captain to supply himself and others of his family with goods and weapons for further employment against the rebels in the north. O'Toole, Montague explained, was Lee's known enemy; and Lee, as we have seen, was also a rival of Sir Henry Harrington, the seneschal of the O'Byrnes' and O'Tooles' countries. Montague took little comfort from the fact that the privy council 'took bond' of Lee and imprisoned him for his 'contempt and indignitye to y^e state', for Lee, Montague claimed, 'under cullor of service, hopeth to shyfte yt of[f], and to kepe him self from reatche of y^e lawe'. For Montague, however, there was more at stake

⁸¹ *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, no. 6054.

⁸² Names of some notorious traitors executed by course of martial law, March 1597, TNA, SP 63/198/60; Ormond to privy council, 30 September 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/142; Ormond to Burghley, 22 March 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.i)/88; Ormond to Burghley, 7 April 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.ii)/6; Note of some traitors of Leinster... slain and executed by martial law, 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.ii)/6(iii); Ormond to Burghley, 19 April 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.ii)/12; A note of some traitors, 19 April 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.ii)/13; lord justices and Ormond to Burghley, 18 June 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.ii)/74; Ormond to Robert Cecil, 5 July 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.ii)/96.

⁸³ A note of such things as Captain Lee will be charged withal, 3 March 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.i)/73; Charles Montague certifieth Sir Henry Harrington, 27 October 1597, 28 March 1598 (copy), TNA, SP 63/202(pt.i)/95 (quotations).

⁸⁴ *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, no. 6135; A warrant to Thomas Lee, 16 September 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/124.

here than just Lee's abuse of his authority. His blinding of O'Toole threatened to push that still sizeable segment of the Irish population prepared to fight against O'Neill into the arms of the rebels:

Hereby many of y^e Irishrye, that before were inclinable to y^e service of Her Ma^{ty}, have taken cause of revolting, while others have denied, and are a stande, doubtfull of theire safetyes obraynge y^e State and English nation wth infidelitie, tearminge protections for traps to betray them: herebye the Tyrones strengthe is made y^e greater, and Her Ma^{ty}s service y^e more weakened, urdging the inhumane feet for an argument to distruste and flye of[f] from y^e English government and nation.

As it transpired, Montague was correct: Lee was eventually released on bail after nearly two years of imprisonment.⁸⁵ But the investigation subsequently carried out by the privy council into the allegations against Lee revealed multiple abuses in the exercise of martial law in Leinster.⁸⁶ Some of the material passed before Burghley; but Lee was a captain experienced in the Irish service whom Burghley had employed two years earlier to negotiate with Tyrone, and in the face of rebellion the lord treasurer was prepared to tolerate such abuses in the law.⁸⁷

The government's sanctioning of the widespread use of martial law in response to Tyrone's rebellion was part of a wider invasion of extraordinary martial government into the civil administration of the kingdom of Ireland from 1595. Burghley, as we have seen, had for long worked to see civil Tudor government extended throughout the kingdom: the erection of counties in place of Irish countries; the exercise of common law rather than martial law; the appointment of sheriffs instead of seneschals; and the reduction in the size of the army. He was, as the circuit of Ireland examined above showed, only ever partially successful in achieving these ends, and as Tyrone's rebellion intensified the argument for preserving (or establishing) English-style government in the localities became impossible to sustain. In the central administration too the lines between civil and martial government were becoming blurred in the face of open rebellion. But here a strategy was introduced which was designed both to isolate martial government and to allow for civil government to continue uninterrupted. A council for wars with membership separate from the Irish privy council was established and was, by summer 1595, in operation. In late 1594 Secretary Cecil had expressed his concern for Ireland 'wherin', he noticed, 'both martiall and civill governmen's ar beyond all reason, confounded'.⁸⁸ Elizabeth took a personal interest. The queen was displeased with what she viewed as the lord deputy and council's anaemic military and diplomatic response in early 1595 to what she held to be the insolent behaviour of Tyrone and his confederates.⁸⁹ The situation, she reasoned, now demanded military expertise, so the queen appointed the experienced commander Sir John Norris, then in favour at court, as

⁸⁵ McGurk, 'Thomas Lee', in the *ODNB*.

⁸⁶ Accusations against Lee, June 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.ii)/88(i-xvi).

⁸⁷ Lee to Burghley, 2 September 1596, TNA, SP 63/193/2.

⁸⁸ Memorial by Robert Cecil, October 1594, TNA, SP 12/250/20.

⁸⁹ Queen to lord deputy and council, 20 March 1595, TNA, SP 63/178/99; lord deputy to privy council, 20 March 1595, TNA, SP 63/178/101.

lord general of her forces in Ireland and insisted that the accompanying 'counsels of the warr shalbe managed by men of the sword'.⁹⁰ The council of wars was in fact comprised exclusively of men hived off from the queen's council in Ireland, some of whom, like Geoffrey Fenton, the principal secretary, were hardly experienced in martial affairs; the rest—Lord Deputy Russell, the Norris brothers, John and Thomas, Wallop, the undertreasurer, Ralph Lane, the muster-master, George Bouchier, the master of the ordnance, and the earl of Ormond—each had military experience but were also privy councillors.⁹¹

From the start, the formation of a new council posed problems. At one level Russell, who had requested reinforcements and the appointment of an experienced military subordinate to aid him, disagreed both with the queen's choice of Norris as lord general and her decision to bestow upon Norris powers commensurate to his own. Norris was in effect an independent commander of the queen's forces in Ulster while the lord deputy hovered round the Pale in an effort to root out O'Byrne from his glens.⁹² What was worse, Russell favoured an aggressive military campaign against the northern rebels and Norris was seeking to negotiate a settlement with Tyrone. Burghley was alive to the problem. Having read letters out of Ireland he confided in his son Robert that he saw 'no good things' and that after reading Norris's letters he saw a 'manifest dysjunction betwixt the Lord Deputie and hym'.⁹³ Writing to Secretary Cecil in October 1596, Russell spoke directly to the contention between himself and Norris and noted, 'yt would be more for Her Ma^{tie} that the whole might be trusted upon one man . . . than upon twoo that differ in opinion'.⁹⁴ This sentiment was echoed by Fenton who warned Burghley: 'So long as the treaty of pacification is in hand by some, and the wars are prosecuted by others, the state of the government will be more and more disordered'.⁹⁵ At another level, the remaining privy councillors perceived the new council of wars to be a body which wholly excluded them from dealing in martial affairs. Norris explained to Robert Cecil in June 1595 that when the lord deputy had first informed the councillors 'of the longe robe' that the queen intended to divide the council, it 'so distasted them' that they 'scarse geve any voyces'.⁹⁶ A year later the council of wars recommended that the two councils be reunited because the privy councillors, 'takinge themselves to be exempted from all consultacons tendinge to the martyall services', refused to enter consultations with them when military

⁹⁰ John Norris to Robert Cecil, 4 June 1595, TNA, SP 63/180/9. The order to establish the new council came from the queen's letter to her council in Ireland (lost it would seem) of April 1596: lord deputy and council at wars to privy council, 16 July 1596, TNA, SP 63/191/24.

⁹¹ Deputy and council at wars to privy council, 5 February 1596, TNA, SP 63/186/39; lord deputy and council at wars to privy council, 16 July 1596, TNA, SP 63/191/24. Richard Bingham, president of Connaught, was named a councillor in July 1596 but left for England in September. Lane, writing to Burghley in July 1595, said that he owed his appointment to the council at wars to Russell: Lane to Burghley, 12/24 July 1595, TNA, SP 63/181/54; *Fiants Ire., Eliz.*, no. 6054.

⁹² John McGurk, *s.v.* 'William Russell', in the *ODNB*.

⁹³ Wright (ed.), *Queen Elizabeth and her times*, ii. 455.

⁹⁴ Lord deputy to Robert Cecil, 8 October 1596, TNA, SP 63/194/13.

⁹⁵ Fenton to Burghley, 22 October 1596, TNA, SP 63/194/41.

⁹⁶ John Norris to Robert Cecil, 4 June 1595, TNA, SP 63/180/9.

questions arose.⁹⁷ Loftus, the leader of the privy council proper, together with the bishop of Meath complained to Burghley that they and their fellow councillors were restricted from dealing in martial causes.⁹⁸

Fenton, ever with the flair for the dramatic, summed up the situation in an appeal to Burghley: 'Unless yo' L. will consider...how the ii princypall heads, Menelaus and Scipio, may be compounded this broken governem[en]' might not soon be recovered.⁹⁹ A more accurate classical analogy to describe the government of Ireland in these years, however, might have been a triumvirate, for while military affairs were divided between Russell (Fenton's Menelaus) and Norris (Fenton's Scipio), the civil government, led by Loftus, formed a third grouping. Irish government was indeed 'broken', and Fenton was not far from the mark when he told Burghley that 'the first stepp must bee to reconcyte these ii heades, or to revoake one of them'. Burghley and the privy council in fact decided that Russell should surrender the sword of state, to Thomas Lord Burgh, and that Norris should be relieved of his command. This innovation in the government of Ireland had failed and the rebels had reaped the benefits. The privy council in England, led by Burghley, signalled their intention to return to more traditional forms of government in Ireland: rather than relying on the advice of a council of wars, the nobility of the realm would be convened to seek their counsel 'as hath been in former times accustomed in perill and danger'; and it was decided that in future the lord deputy would have the power to revoke any appointments made in Ireland.¹⁰⁰ The appointment of Lord Burgh as deputy temporarily reunited the government of the kingdom, but his sudden death in October 1597 saw the return of government divided between civil and military spheres: the queen appointed, with the apparent support of the Irish privy council, Loftus and Gardiner (one a cleric, the other a lawyer) lords justices and made the earl of Ormond lord general of her forces in Ireland with sole responsibility for military affairs.¹⁰¹ This arrangement continued for nearly eighteen months thereafter.

It was in these circumstances that the Tudor state confronted the aftermath of O'Neill's triumph at the Yellow Ford. O'Neill's rebellion developed into an Ireland-wide confederacy against English rule, threatening to overthrow everything which William Cecil had worked to build in Ireland over the course of nearly half a century in his service of the Tudors. In Leinster, resurgent O'Mores and O'Connors attacked the English colonies in the midlands and the sheriff of Kildare surrendered the town of Athy to the rebels. In Munster, following the arrival

⁹⁷ Council of wars to privy council, 16 July 1596, TNA, SP 63/191/24.

⁹⁸ Loftus and Jones to Burghley, 22 November 1596, TNA, SP 63/195/27. Loftus and council to privy council, 25 November 1596, TNA, SP 63/195/36; List of names of privy councillors 'as they satt in counsell before' Lord Deputy Russell, 7 April 1596, TNA, SP 63/188/15.

⁹⁹ Fenton to Burghley, 4 December 1596, TNA, SP 63/196/4. Cf. Fenton to Burghley, 13 January 1597, TNA, SP 63/197/20.

¹⁰⁰ Observations on the opinions of privy council, 26 December 1596, TNA, SP 63/196/27.

¹⁰¹ *Fians Ire., Eliz.*, nos. 6166, 6184; queen to council of Ireland, 29 October 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/34; queen to Thomas Norris, 15 November 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/72; Fenton to Robert Cecil, 7 May 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.2)/28.

in the south of confederate troops, the English plantation, so painstakingly established there over the last fifteen years, was overthrown. O'Donnell and his adherents, meanwhile, penetrated deep into Connaught, and Donnell O'Brien, with his brother the earl of Thomond absent in England, revived the chieftaincy, declaring himself the O'Brien before overrunning County Clare. A cursory reading of the Irish annals for 1598 gives the impression that the defeat of the royal army in the north gave rise to plunder and uncoordinated acts of violence throughout the kingdom. But there was more at work here. O'Neill had emerged as an alternative source of authority within Ireland, at once appealing to (and drawing on) traditional Irish forms of legitimacy and a new sense of Irishness based on Catholicism which did not discriminate against men born in Ireland of English ancestry. In this way, O'Neill commanded the dissident elements among the Irish of Leinster; in Connaught he lent assistance to a kinsman and challenger to the earl of Clanrickard who seized what he deemed to be his patrimony; and, in the south, O'Neill created a new earl of Desmond, the so-called *súgán* (straw rope) earl. In some ways, life in the purely Irish strongholds of the north-west continued much as it had earlier in the century, ostensibly untouched by outside events: the O'Kane chieftaincy, in what was now nominally County Coleraine, quietly changed hands in 1598 much as it had for centuries; and MacDonough was killed taking a prey from Breifne-O'Rourke, an area which was now County Leitrim in the eyes of the government. But, just as war had come to dominate politics and society in English Ireland, war increasingly became the central feature of Irish society. The annalists later recorded that it was on account of the refusal of the queen, and the council in England, to accede to the confederates' demands that war, which they referred to as 'coccaidh na n-Gaoidhel' (the war of the Irish), was resumed in earnest that summer. The privy council in Ireland echoed this sentiment, noting how the rebellion 'is now thorowly soared to an Irish warr, whose drifts and pretences are, to shake off all English gov[er]nm[en]t', and subtract the kingdom from her Ma^{ty}.¹⁰² There was concern in government circles, moreover, about the loyalty of the Old English. 'The lordes & gentlemen of this country birthe', an anonymous paper on the state of Ireland reported, 'ar tyed in affection to the rebels, both by the bonds of nature beinge allyed to them in blood, and by relligion, all beinge Catholiques, and do equally wth them repyne at the English government'. The townsmen, the paper continued, would never defect to 'the Irishe', 'but to remayne newtrall in this action is their desyre, beinge ether seduced by ther priestes to this strange alienation for feare of damnation, or ells they have some vayne hope to make themselfes free states yf the Englishe should be beaten out of the country'. Whatever about the alleged neutrality of the towns, in the months after William Cecil's death the inhabitants of Ireland were forced to throw in their lot with one side or the other.¹⁰³

¹⁰² *AFM*, s.a. 1598; lords justices and council to privy council, 31 October 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.3)/135.

¹⁰³ Paper on the condition of Ireland, 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.4)/181.

Yet the territorial advances made by O'Neill and his adherents outside of west Ulster in 1598 were short-lived. The commitment which Elizabeth showed to her kingdom of Ireland over the next few years—which the hundreds of thousands of pounds she directed toward Ireland and the unprecedented numbers of English and Welsh soldiers that crossed the Irish Sea attest—saw all of the confederates' gains rolled back. Richard Bagwell, upon whose work much of the above summary of the events immediately following the Yellow Ford is based, identified O'Neill's failure to 'press a victory home' as a problem inherent to 'Celtic armies'.¹⁰⁴ Rather than relying on some poorly defined weakness in the military capabilities of Irishmen, we might advance the view here that O'Neill's failure to make permanent his control over the confederates' new-won territories and erect an alternative government in Ireland owes more to the existence of a sturdy framework for English government which William Cecil had worked to create. By 1598, nearly five decades since Cecil first began administering the kingdom during the reign of Edward VI, three layers of English rule in Ireland can broadly be discerned: the older medieval settlements, most notably the English Pale and the port towns, where English people and culture were most deeply rooted; the more recent Tudor settlements, such as the plantations in Queen's and King's counties and in Munster; and the new shires and county governments erected on what had been Irish lordships. Cecil, of course, was most closely associated with the latter two layers of Tudor rule, and it is true that it was in these areas where royal authority crumbled with startling rapidity. Still, the loyalty of 'the English race in Ireland' (as the Old English were so-called in an anonymous tract penned sometime in 1598) held and the framework for Tudor rule that was then in place throughout the kingdom of Ireland—a central executive located in the heart of the English Pale tied to the provincial presidencies and the counties and their attendant features of local and ecclesiastical government—remained, and was there to be revived after the war was over.¹⁰⁵

The severity of the war in Ireland distorted this achievement. That it did so is fitting, for the war, and Elizabeth's difficulties in Ireland more generally, were not unrelated to the extension of Tudor rule in the kingdom. Burghley may have held up the introduction of English civil government and the normal operation of the common law in a kingdom divided into shires as the key to Ireland's reform, but aside from a few exceptions these were not the characteristics of government and society which came to define the Tudor kingdom of Ireland. The absence of substantial English gentry populations in the new shires, the government's failure to entrust a greater degree of local government to resident Irish elites, and the presence of a large standing army meant that government and society, especially outside of the areas of medieval settlement, more closely resembled a military occupation of a dominant minority than an English-style county community based on long-accepted ideas about obedience to the law and loyalty to the crown.

¹⁰⁴ Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, iii. 299–301 (quotation, 301).

¹⁰⁵ Discourse to show . . . the reformation of Ulster, 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.4)/75.

The rebellion which began in Ulster and spread throughout the kingdom was more an effort to thwart the introduction of English shire government into purely Irish territories by aggressive English captains than it was a religious crusade or a war to preserve a distinctly Irish way of life.¹⁰⁶ To what extent Burghley understood the price of his achievement in Ireland is impossible to say. But he died in August 1598 knowing that royal expenditure and the size of the army in Ireland had reached unprecedented levels, and that the war in the kingdom was steadily escalating. The war in Ireland had by then even reached into his home county in England where Burghley, as lord lieutenant of Lincolnshire, had raised hundreds of men for service in Ireland. Burghley also knew that if Philip II, who outlived him by a month, were to land a Spanish army in Ireland, the kind that had embarked for England earlier in the year, the military balance there might well be tipped in O'Neill's favour, endangering one and therefore both of the Tudor kingdoms.

¹⁰⁶ Canny, *s.v.* 'Hugh O'Neill', in the *ODNB*.

9

‘A carefull father for this poore realm’

In spring 1589 Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam reported to Burghley that Brian O’Rourke, chief of the O’Rourkes, had some years earlier taken ‘an ymage of a tall woman’ and wrote ‘Quene Elizabeth’ upon its breast. O’Rourke was purported to have then verbally abused the effigy of the queen before his gallowglass tied a rope round its neck and dragged it behind their horses along the ground, all while repeatedly beating it.¹ The incident later featured in O’Rourke’s well-known trial for treason in which he was found guilty and hanged on charges which included denying the sovereignty of Queen Elizabeth.² It is clear from Fitzwilliam’s allegation against O’Rourke (whether there is any truth to it is immaterial here) and from the rebel James Fitzmaurice’s proclamation earlier in the decade, that Elizabeth was a ‘she-tyrant’, that the queen was, in the minds of contemporaries, not only the head of the Tudor state but also its public representation. Her face was literally the face which marked the Tudor coinage as the currency of the kingdoms of England and Ireland—of this O’Rourke, who was accused years earlier of harbouring ‘coyners of money’, or counterfeiters, in his lordship, could have been in little doubt.³ The desecration, or even the alleged desecration, of an effigy of the secretary of state or the lord treasurer would hardly have had the same impact. Yet, in Tudor times and before, criticism of English government traditionally manifested itself in attacks aimed at the sovereign’s ‘evil advisers’, rather than at the monarch. Thomas Cromwell, for instance, was singled out in the Pontefract articles during the Pilgrimage of Grace as such a malign influence on Henry VIII.⁴ To strike at the queen, or to question her authority, in words or in effigy, was to strike at the state itself. Neither Elizabeth, nor any of her Tudor predecessors, would have thought of it any other way, and the enactment of the Tudor treason laws, most recently those of 1571 and 1585, was intended to help to deter such attacks—as Sir John Perrot found to his cost. Ireland, after all, was Elizabeth’s kingdom and its inhabitants were her subjects, as the 1571 act, passed in the English parliament but which explicitly extended to Ireland, made clear. But what of William Cecil, the minister behind the throne, whose hand guided Tudor rule in the two kingdoms during

¹ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 1589, TNA, SP 63/143/12. See also John Bingham to Burghley, 8 August 1591, TNA, SP 63/159/30.

² Hiram Morgan, ‘Extradition and treason-trial of a Gaelic lord: the case of Brian O’Rourke’, *Irish Jurist*, 22 (1987), 285–301.

³ Lord deputy and council to queen, 20 April 1578, TNA, SP 63/60/42.

⁴ Anthony Fletcher and Diarmaid MacCulloch (eds.), *Tudor rebellions* (5th edn., London, 2004), 34.

most of Elizabeth's reign? Was his name a byword for the Tudor state and its operation in sixteenth-century Ireland, or did he remain obscured by his mistress's shadow, known only to government officials and foreign diplomats? What follows in this short chapter will explore the extent to which William Cecil was associated with Ireland in the minds of his contemporaries and assess how his actions and role in the government of the kingdom were perceived. The evidence for such an undertaking is slim. The records of the Irish polity—the annalistic compilations and bardic poetry—make no reference to Cecil, a fact significant in itself; but beneath the praise (much of it written to him) for the minister's care for Ireland the scattered references to Cecil's reputation which have survived among the records of the Tudor state point to two things: that William Cecil was by the end of his career closely associated with the kingdom of Ireland and that there existed an undercurrent of animosity toward his role in the kingdom's government.

That Lord Burghley was possessed by the 1590s of an unrivalled knowledge, and also a long lifetime of personal memory, of government and society in Ireland has been demonstrated. There is evidence to suggest, however, that Burghley's relationship with Ireland had developed in the minds of officials in royal service into something more than his professional role as the queen's minister. In summer 1598, with the queen's military position in Ireland fast deteriorating in the face of the O'Neill-led confederation, Loftus and Gardiner, the lord justices, together with Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond, appealed to Burghley separately from the privy council. The old treasurer was then sick and recuperating away from court, having chosen not to involve himself 'with great affairs' until such time as he was to recover his health. But such was government concern in a kingdom then at war and without a deputy, and such was the belief of Loftus, Gardiner, and Ormond in Burghley's 'most honorable affection to Her Majesty's service' and his 'unwonted care of this miserable country', that they wrote anyway. They offered him a range of information for what they called Burghley's 'private satisfaction' but explained that their

greatest hope and comfort is, that God will restorre and spare y^r L. as a carefull father for this poore realm, nowe groaning in miserye, and that y^r L. will, in yo^r wonted respect, to hir Ma^{ties} service, and care of this her Kingdome, and us her poore servauntes and subiectes, contynue yo^r honorable endevo^s in furthering o^r reliefe wth all fitt meanes from thence.⁵

This rhetorical device of Burghley as the 'father' had appeared before. When representatives of the university in Dublin sought additional funding for their fledgling institution they appealed to Burghley, for who else 'hath this countrie founde comparable to yo^r good Lo. so tenderinge the welfare, and verie fatherly regardinge the good estate therof as yo^u have done'?⁶ In a 1596 letter to Burghley, Archbishop Loftus and Thomas Jones, bishop of Meath, referred to the lord treasurer as 'the

⁵ Lord Justices Loftus and Gardiner, and Ormond to Burghley, 18 June 1598, TNA, SP 63/102(pt.2)/74.

⁶ Lucas Challoner, Henry Lee, and Launcelot Mouny to Burghley, 14 March 1593, TNA, SP 63/168/60.

father of all good counsel in this age' and referred their humble opinions on Ireland to his 'fatherly wise considerations'; that year William Daniel, who had been sent to Galway to preach the word of God, also wrote to the lord treasurer 'whom', he claimed, 'God hath made a faithfull father to both Her Ma^{ties} realmes, to procure ther welfare & prosperity'.⁷ The following year, John Bell, vicar of Christ Church, presented a lengthy plan to uproot the Irishry to Burghley whom he described as 'an honorable father in this common wealth'.⁸ After the lord treasurer's death, Thomas White, mayor of Waterford, wrote to Robert Cecil that Burghley's fatherly care of their city would never be forgotten.⁹ Burghley had indeed become in his last years the grand old statesman of Elizabeth's court, whose wisdom and experience exceeded all others. The queen's faith in her longest-serving minister and oldest friend, meanwhile, was unshakeable. Burghley's power in these years is captured in a letter written to him in 1597 by Ralph Lane who, having fallen foul of Elizabeth amid accusations levelled against his execution of the office of muster-master in Ireland, claimed that he did not know which way to turn 'save to God and to Burghley the patron of justice and piety to all in general living under Her Majesty's royal sceptre'.¹⁰ Burghley might be cast in the role of the 'careful father'—of the Tudor kingdoms, of Ireland, of Waterford—in a way Queen Elizabeth could not be; and this was not only on account of the queen's sex: William Cecil maintained a level of interest in people, in places, and in the working of government and the direction of policy that exceeded any other person in power. In the course of his forty years of service to Elizabeth, fifteen men had occupied the position of chief governor of Ireland; apart from Elizabeth herself, Cecil was the only constant in the government of the kingdom in the queen's long reign.

But outside official correspondence in Ireland whispers of animosity toward Burghley were evident. Only traces of this sentiment remain, a not unsurprising fact considering how little can be known about the day-to-day functioning of society in Tudor Ireland, let alone reconstructing its public perceptions, outside of what the records generated by the state reveal; and though the treason law did not afford Burghley any protection from slanderous words, few persons were prepared to speak or write openly against the most powerful figure in Tudor government after the queen. Yet, the earl of Essex, who had arrived in Ireland in summer 1573 to colonize part of east Ulster, felt compelled to address in a letter to Burghley 'the iniuries offred to yo^r selfe by some slanderous detractors and setters foorth of lewde books againste yo^u and others'.¹¹ The authorship and content of the 'lewde books' is a mystery, but Burghley and his fellow councillor, Lord Keeper Bacon, seem to have been their primary target. Essex explained that he was 'sorie yf yo^u whose consideration dothe so well testifie yo^r owne innocency should be moved wth

⁷ Loftus and Jones to Burghley, 22 November 1596, TNA, SP 63/195/27; William Daniel to Burghley, 26 September 1596, TNA, SP 63/193/38.

⁸ Supplication to Burghley by John Bell, 1597, TNA, SP 63/201/156.

⁹ Thomas White to Robert Cecil, 20 July 1599, TNA, SP 63/205/116.

¹⁰ Lane to Burghley, 4 August 1597, TNA, SP 63/200/78.

¹¹ Essex to Burghley, 2 November 1573, TNA, SP 63/42/68.

theis libells, w^{ch} in verie deede consideringe from whence they come and to what scope they are directed', and assured him that they were 'rath[er] ornaments to doo yo^r hono^r, then able to p[er]swade eny thinge or any man to yo^r disadvantaige' and the 'vayne sounds of rumagates [renegades] and traie^{ss}'. In 1574, Burghley's kinsman Barnaby Googe wrote that upon his arrival in Drogheda he learned that Burghley had died, but was soon relieved to discover that the lord treasurer lived still. Another rumour of Burghley's death reached Ireland in spring 1580: Burghley read of the belief in Ireland that upon 'some advertism[en]^{ts} out of England' he 'was departed out of this world'.¹² In reporting to Burghley, however, Googe offered the following insight: 'nott onley such as were well disposed but even the verie adversaries lamented your death whiche in this countrey is much.'¹³

Like the books alluded to by Essex, Googe's forthright reference to the existence in Ireland of Burghley's adversaries suggests a certain animosity to the lord treasurer. Whether it was rooted in a disapproval of Burghley's methods of governing or the political policies with which he was associated, or rather just resentment of a high-placed government official in the public eye, is difficult to say. Read has observed that Cecil's 'sensitivity to public vilification was always the weak point in his armour'.¹⁴ But, as Elizabeth's reign wore on, the name 'Burghley' and his importance to the regime became better and more widely known. In England there were examples of 'libels' against him and plots to kill him. He had, in the early 1570s, uncovered a plot, far-fetched though it was, to assassinate him in his garden.¹⁵ Later, in May 1577, one Charles Ratcliff was interrogated for allegedly having said 'that Leyster and treasurer ar so nettled as they can not tell wheare to bestirre them'; in July 1580, Burghley learned of words uttered against him alleging that he had played a part in the duke of Norfolk's downfall.¹⁶ In early 1581 Burghley's name arose in the most unusual circumstances of a written exchange between a pirate seeking refuge in Spain and James Sidee, a captain in the royal navy. When the latter was cruising the waters off Spain seeking to capture the queen's subjects who, according to him, had rebelled against her, he received a hectoring letter from a man calling himself Barnaby O'Neill.¹⁷ O'Neill berated the captain, and Englishmen in general, on a range of mostly religious matters, noting, 'I troust you will bost and say at home to Burley that you have done wonders wheras you have not.'¹⁸ Sidee responded to the bizarre provocation by directing a sharp letter to O'Neill and, it would seem, challenging any critics of his behaviour to a duel. Sidee indicated that O'Neill was in fact a well-known pirate, named

¹² William Morgan to Burghley, 15 April 1580, TNA, SP 63/72/46.

¹³ Barnaby Googe to Burghley, 2 February 1574, TNA, SP 63/44/24.

¹⁴ Read, *Lord Burghley*, 322.

¹⁵ Alford, *Burghley*, 184–5.

¹⁶ Interrogatories to be ministered to Charles Ratcliff, May 1577, TNA, SP 12/113/28; Interrogatories to be ministered to John Bacon, May 1577, TNA, SP 12/113/30; William Parker to Burghley, 12 July 1580, TNA, SP 12/140/14.

¹⁷ Captain James Sidee to Captain Juan Pita, 19 March 1580, TNA, SP 63/72/13.

¹⁸ Barnaby O'Neill to 'General de los navios Englesse', 19 March 1580, TNA, SP 63/72/14.

William Hall apparently, and took it upon himself to defend the reputation of the lord treasurer:

Youe have requested me to shewe yo^r slannderous lybell unto Burley he ys a noble councilor, & one of the peares of the realme of Inglande the w^{ch} I do honer, and am lothe to troble his hono^r wth this raylinge lybell of so lewde a foole.¹⁹

By the 1590s there was also evidence, in both kingdoms, of a perception that Burghley was the linchpin which held the Protestantism of the Elizabethan regime together. An agent of Robert Cecil's, having travelled round Europe and through Scotland collecting rumours of Catholic intrigues against the queen, reported that 'the hatred conceived against you and your father, as the only scourges of Catholics, is wonderful'.²⁰ An examination in early 1597 of one William Thomson revealed that a Catholic priest from Waterford named Thomas White had claimed that 'if ever God gave him time and means to come into England it should cost him his life but he would be the death of the L. Treasurer; saueing, yf he were gone, the Catholikes should have mery dayes bothe in England and Ireland'. And this was not an idle boast according to Thomson: White together with another priest discussed hiring an assassin to poison Burghley.²¹ The following year the earl of Essex received intelligence that Valentine Thomas, described to Burghley as an Englishman who claimed to be 'a great intelligencer and dealer wth the Kinge of Scottes', was possessed of great knowledge of the movements of Catholic priests in the north of England and that he had made 'vile speeches' against Burghley. Thomas allegedly exclaimed, 'Oh... that tresuror spoyles all: he is a devil: were it not fo^r him all would goo well of our side'.²² To judge by the survival of this evidence, the government treated such words uttered against Lord Burghley very seriously, but found such talk impossible to stamp out.

Yet a more palpable strain of criticism was then emanating from the Tudor military establishment; and as the extent of Tudor military commitment in Ireland deepened, this criticism developed into an undercurrent of disaffection. In his recent exploration of the place and character of martial men with links to Ireland in Elizabethan political culture, Rory Rapple has argued that William Cecil harboured a disdain for soldiers. Soldiering, to Cecil's mind, was an inherently dishonest profession because wars, he believed, were so rarely fought for good or just reasons. In peacetime, moreover, the soldier became obsolete, or as Cecil memorably put it in his advice to his son Robert, 'like chimneys in summer'.²³ But this represented Cecil's view of the military in a purely academic sense. He must have

¹⁹ Captain James Sidee to Barnaby O'Neill, 21 March 1580, TNA, SP 63/72/15; *Calendar of state papers, foreign series, of the reign of Elizabeth, 1579–1580*, ed. Arthur John Butler (London, 1904), 194–5.

²⁰ J. Cecil to Robert Cecil, 30 December 1595[?], TNA, SP 12/255/22.

²¹ Examination of William Thomson, 5 March 1597, CP 38, fo. 93.

²² Edward Gray to Burghley, 4 March 1598, CP 49, fo. 51; Thomas Madryn to Essex, April 1598, CP 60, fo. 105.

²³ Rapple, *Martial power*, 19–20.

deemed Elizabeth's Irish wars, and thus the men fighting them, both necessary and just—it was he, after all, who attended to their oversight. Nor did he live to witness a time when the English soldier was without war in the kingdom of Ireland. Nevertheless, William Cecil, as we have seen, held soldiers responsible for manifold abuses and identified them as contributing to rebellion in Ireland. Cecil's administrative talents were many, but he was not a soldier—his presence at the battle of Pinkie in 1547 with Protector Somerset cut little ice with military men late in Elizabeth's reign. He was thus especially open to criticism from this quarter. As noticed earlier, one of Edmund Spenser's charges against Burghley in *Mother Hubbard's tale* (1591) was that the queen's minister had little appreciation for soldiers and that he actively sought to marginalize them.²⁴ The tenor of Spenser's comments was also evident in the work of Thomas Churchyard, that writer/soldier who, more than any other author in Elizabethan England, eulogized the virtues of martial men. In his *A generall rehereasall of warres* (1579) Churchyard wrote of the conflict which had arisen between what he referred to as the 'sword' and the 'pen'. 'The pen', he wrote, 'is ever giving a dash against the commendation of the sword.'²⁵ Whether such a comment was directed specifically at Burghley is hard to say, but it was certainly meant for men like him: civilians possessed of political power at the queen's court who allegedly did not show a sufficient appreciation for the sacrifices of military men.

Churchyard, over the course of his long military career, served in Ireland—in 1550–1 and 1575–6—offering vivid depictions in his written work of the position of the English soldier fighting in the Irish wars.²⁶ He attempted to convey to his readers some of the hardships which the soldier encountered there:

The strength and streaits are suche, that men must passe sointyme. The rocks and mountains are so straunge, whereon the soldiers clime: thei can not well be tolde, not numbred here a right. And touchyng mightie woods and boggs, I could name suche a sight: as would you wearie make, to read or looke upon.²⁷

Churchyard must have been alive to the soldiers' discontent with Burghley's handling of the wars in Ireland. As treasurer, with his hands on the purse strings, Burghley developed a reputation among the soldiery as one who placed efforts to conserve money ahead of the well-being of those fighting the queen's wars. After Burghley died, an anonymous tract chronicling the recent history of events in Ireland from August until October 1598 offered a startlingly forthright criticism of the lord treasurer.²⁸ Shortly following the defeat at the Yellow Ford, the tract explained, 'newes cam that the Lo. Threr of England (the Lo. Burleigh) was dead'. 'Ireland did not mourn' for him, the author continued, for:

²⁴ See above, 162.

²⁵ Quoted in Rapple, *Martial power*, 74.

²⁶ Raphael Lyne, *s.v.* 'Thomas Churchyard', in the *ODNB*; Thomas Churchyard, *The services of Sir William Drury, lord justice of Ireland, in 1578 and 1579* (London, 1580); *id.*, *A scourge for rebells* (London, 1584).

²⁷ Churchyard, *The miserie of Flaunders*.

²⁸ Portions of some manuscript history of the time, October 1598, TNA, SP 63/202(pt.3)/140.

The Lo. Threr in England (said they) hindred the service of Irelande upo[n] the information of some Captaines that wold not be out of entertaynement, & p[er]swaded the Queenes Ma^{tie} fro[m] tyme to tyme (as a good husband for her tresure) to send a handful of money & a handful of men both wth no sooner landed in Ireland, but melted away like hoar frost before the sunne & so the service co[n]tinued, rebellion encreased and the true subiects went to wreck.

Two decades earlier, Sir William Drury wrote to Walsingham that 'It ys sayd that sparyng & skantying off Her Ma^{ties} pursse is there the ondy marke you there [in England] schoot att'.²⁹

But that general sentiment, it would seem, narrowed in the following decades into a more specific criticism of the lord treasurer. In England, a soldier and the author of a well-known military treatise named Sir John Smythe, by his own admission, spoke against Burghley—according to certain testimonials he proclaimed the lord treasurer 'a traytor of traytors'—before the Essex musters.³⁰ Though he insisted that when he uttered these words at Colchester in summer 1596 he was 'overcome wth drinke & passion against the Lord Treasurer', Smythe, by then incarcerated in the Tower, offered a compelling defence of his speech against Burghley. He indicated that Essex had already witnessed thousands of its men 'pressed' into foreign service and, though his words were 'spoke unadvisedly', it was the lord treasurer 'who manageth the state under Her Ma^{tie}' and who was principally responsible for this 'destruction of his countrymen'.³¹ Smythe also appealed to the law. First, he raised the question of whether commissions carried sufficient legal authority to raise soldiers from the shires for foreign service, noting that in former times, specifically during Edward III's campaigns in France, all the men were volunteers. Second, Smythe stressed that 'The vehement wordes' he spoke were 'agaynste the L. Tresurer, and no wayes agaynste the Quene, ffor I doe not remember that I dyd so muche as onse name the Quene. All w^{ch} consydered I knowe that by no lawe nor justice you can receyve anye blame'.³² Regarding the former point, Smythe knew that he trod very close to calling into question the royal prerogative and pressed no further; but as we have seen he was on firmer ground with his second point. And it was probably for this reason that Burghley noted on a letter from the council to the attorney and solicitor-general: 'I re[qu]ire not to ch[ar]g hy[m] w^t his sla[n]d^r of me'.³³ On the other side of this, when the English soldier left England to fight for the queen, whether he was a volunteer or whether he was pressed, he was ultimately dependent on Burghley: for his food, for his clothing, for his lodgings, and for his pay. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Ireland. The soldiers understood this relationship. Noting the recent arrival

²⁹ Drury to Walsingham, April 1577, TNA, SP 63/58/5.

³⁰ Examination of John Lucas, Thomas Cockerell, and others, 12 June 1596, TNA, SP 12/259/16(i). For Smythe, see Artemis Gause, *s.v.* 'John Smythe', in the *ODNB*.

³¹ Examination of Sir John Smythe, 28 June 1596, TNA, SP 12/259/27.

³² John Smythe to privy council, 19 June 1596, TNA, SP 12/259/19; John Smythe to Thomas Mannoock, 13 June 1596, TNA, SP 12/259/27(i) (quotation).

³³ Privy council to attorney and solicitor-general William Waad and Francis Bacon, 27 June 1596, TNA, SP 12/259/26.

of victuals in 1580 during the Desmond rebellion, Edward Waterhouse remarked on Burghley's exceeding care in procuring victuals. 'The soldiers', Waterhouse continued, 'are so well pleased as I have not seene them at any tyme. Yo^r L. hath yo^r portion of their praiors, w^{ch} I am like to be effectull for they praise seldom'.³⁴ More often, however, the supply of victuals was lacking and the soldiers in Ireland held Burghley responsible for their continuous wanting.

Men like Churchyard, and Spenser to a lesser extent, may have taken it upon themselves to articulate to a wider audience, from time to time, the position of soldiers in the Irish service, but the soldiers' grievances more normally went without expression beyond the type related above by Waterhouse. However, the occupation of the lord deputyship of Ireland by Arthur Lord Grey de Wilton after July 1580 threatened to change that. Grey was both a nobleman and a soldier, having served earlier in his career on the Saint-Quentin campaign and at the ill-fated siege of Leith. In Ireland, he conducted an aggressive campaign over two years to suppress the rebellions in Munster and Leinster. Grey was quick to highlight the plight of the soldier in Ireland, but was keen to do so without appealing to Burghley. In November, after massacring the force of papal troops at Smerwick, the lord deputy wrote directly to the queen:

the travailes & toile of y^e soldiers hath been so excessive as they are . . . out of clothes the country & season so could as not possible in such plight to . . . continue it. I most humbly therefore beseech y^e Ma^{ty} in in consideration of y^e own service & compassion of y^e poore ragged & naked creatures to afford them a thorough pay otherwise sure great lacke to y^e service yt will bring & as litle gayne to y^e threasure by y^e delay.³⁵

Grey then restated in a letter to Walsingham the necessity of securing pay for the army.³⁶ He wrote to the treasurer two days later and apologized for not furnishing him with an account of events at Smerwick.³⁷ It was a cold letter—Burghley (presumably) underlined the lines in which Grey explained that he had set 'downe to the ll. [the privy councillors in England] the discourse' of the events at Smerwick and begged the treasurer's pardon for not making 'the same unto youe'. Grey had learned, forewarned by Walsingham it would seem, that Burghley was unhappy with the administration and distribution of victuals in Ireland. Burghley wanted Grey to investigate the men who were responsible for victualling in the kingdom and to reform the system so that a 'better iustnes and equitie' might 'be used to her Maiestie and the souldieure'. Grey, however, asked the treasurer to bear with him, explaining that his martial responsibilities had not allowed him the opportunity to scrutinize the written certificates of the receipt of victual or the conduct of victuallers. Here was the contention between the 'sword' and the 'pen' laid bare. In sharp contrast to his letter to the queen, the lord deputy did not provide the lord treasurer with an account of the state of the soldiers. But Grey reminded Burghley, in what was a parting shot,

³⁴ Edward Waterhouse to Burghley, May 1580, TNA, SP 63/73/24.

³⁵ Grey to Elizabeth, 12 November 1580, TNA, SP 63/78/29.

³⁶ Grey to Walsingham, 12 November 1580, TNA, SP 63/78/30.

³⁷ Grey to Burghley, 14 November 1580, TNA, SP 63/78/37.

that it was the treasurer who had recommended the appointment of Thomas Might as principal victualler in the kingdom even though Burghley now expressed 'no great liking of the election of the man as doubting of his habilitie'.

Grey's efforts to circumvent Burghley's influence initially appeared to have met with some success. Elizabeth became more keenly aware of the plight of the soldier and, in a letter to Grey which Burghley had no (apparent) hand in drafting, pledged to address the condition of the army.³⁸ Yet Grey's period as the figurehead for the English soldier in Ireland was short-lived. As we saw in Chapter 5, a clearly troubled Grey wrote to Burghley in early 1581 in an effort to defuse a possible rift with the treasurer which his letter to Elizabeth may have caused: upon learning of the state of the soldiers the queen sent 'a sharpe message' to Burghley, blaming him for the wants of the crown forces in Ireland.³⁹ Grey's implicit (and later his more explicit) criticism of the treasurer did little to improve the lot of the soldier. The rebellion in Ireland continued for another two years, costing the crown more than £200,000. Elizabeth groaned at the expense and Grey's ruthless campaign to root out rebellion and recusancy threatened to turn the entire political establishment against the deputy and, by extension, the soldier. It was in these circumstances that Grey was recalled in August 1582.⁴⁰

In the end, the discontent of the soldiers posed little threat to William Cecil's position or influence in the government of the Tudor state. By the 1580s Burghley was acknowledged by almost everyone at court, those in the Irish service and, most importantly, the queen herself, as the government minister most directly responsible for the kingdom of Ireland. Grey's efforts to improve the position of members of the military establishment in the kingdom by appealing to the queen over the head of the lord treasurer reveal the totality of Burghley's influence when it came to Ireland: she simply laid the problem before Burghley and expected him to attend to it. The complaints of the soldier, moreover, might only be taken so far: for all the difficulties in supplying soldiers in Ireland, they never lacked the equipment to wage war; nor did they ever starve to death (the same cannot be said of many of the native inhabitants of Munster in the 1580s). Were the dissatisfaction of the soldiers in Ireland to have coalesced with the more general and withering criticism of the treasurer's influence at Elizabeth's court, evident from the 1570s, then it is not inconceivable that Lord Burghley would have faced a serious political threat. Burghley took very seriously the criticism that he, in the words of the Spanish ambassador, 'held the helm, and that he did all in all'.⁴¹ In 1585 Burghley angrily responded to a host of anonymous aspersions made against him, including the accusation that 'England is beco[me] Regnu[m] Cecilianu[m]'.⁴² But, with the

³⁸ Elizabeth to Grey, 12 December 1580, TNA, SP 63/79/13–14.

³⁹ See above, 135.

⁴⁰ Maginn, 'The Baltinglass rebellion', 231; Elizabeth to Grey, February 1581, TNA, SP 63/80/87; Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 317–18.

⁴¹ Alford, *Burghley*, 185.

⁴² Burghley to William Herle, 14 August 1585, TNA, SP 12/181/42. On this more generally, see Natalie Mears, 'Regnum Cecilianum? A perspective of the court', in Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I*, 46–64.

possible exception of Spenser's *Mother Hubbard's tale*, the grievances of the soldier in Ireland never linked up with other criticism of Burghley, and, separately, neither carried sufficient weight to pose a serious political challenge.

Throughout his long career, Burghley was always careful to show that he was in fact a subject in the service of his sovereign. He conducted himself, in both his public and private affairs, with a discretion which made it more difficult for his rivals and enemies to accuse him of being a subject who had overreached himself in the way that other Tudor ministers, such as Cardinal Wolsey or Cecil's one-time patron, Protector Somerset, had. Much may be explained by circumstance: the court of Elizabeth I was not the court of a ruthless king embarked on an ecclesiastical revolution, nor that of a sickly boy-king. Still, Cecil understood and respected his limits: he rose to the peerage as a baron, though no further; he built grand houses rather than palaces; and, most importantly, he chose to use his considerable power and influence to pursue the destruction of Mary, queen of Scots, to promote a Protestant regime in Scotland, to effect the reform of Ireland—all popular causes in England—rather than to eliminate his rivals at court, or to attempt either to browbeat the queen into following a particular political direction, or to effect radical and sudden political or social change within the Tudor state. Burghley's influence may be described as the exercise of indirect power, in that the political directions undertaken by the state were often not easily attributable to him. For this reason, Burghley did not cut a dynamic public profile, which in turn made him difficult to pin as the queen's 'evil councillor', still less an 'alter rex', in the popular mind. There were, to be sure, widespread grumblings about him and political corruption in England in the 1590s, as the popularity of Spenser's *Mother Hubbard's tale*, and the similar parodies of Burghley it spawned, attest; but this was true of the regime more broadly in Elizabeth's final decade.⁴³ In Ireland, ironically the kingdom in which he wielded the greater influence, Burghley's name carried much less resonance. Outside of the Irish political establishment, which rightly understood him to harbour a special interest in the kingdom, and the army which held him accountable for soldiers' wants, Burghley remained far enough behind the throne that his close association with Ireland never entered into a significant segment of public consciousness.

⁴³ Anthony Petti, 'Political satire in *Pierce Penilesse his supplication to the divill*', *Neophilologus*, 45 (1961), 139–50; Richard Peterson, 'Laurel crown and ape's tail: new light on Spenser's career from Sir Thomas Tresham', *Spenser Studies: a Renaissance poetry annual*, 12 (1998), 1–36; John Guy, 'Introduction', in Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I*, 1–19.

Conclusion

William Cecil, Ireland, and the Tudor State

The William Cecil presented in this study, the man who administered the kingdom of Ireland on behalf of the Tudor sovereigns for nearly fifty years, is the same William Cecil acknowledged by English historians to have played such a pivotal role in the administering of the kingdom of England during the second half of the sixteenth century. Cecil's caution and conservatism, his meticulous attention to detail, his incessant searching out of additional information on all subjects, and his devotion to his faith, to his country, and to his sovereign are all attributes which the historian writing about him with respect to Tudor England will find familiar in his handling of Ireland matters. But Ireland was not England and, though his political influence and administrative responsibilities extended to both kingdoms, Cecil's relationship with Ireland was entirely different. If we are to accept the view that Cecil 'thought in absolutes', then Ireland must have severely tested his thinking.¹ For Ireland forced him, time and again, to compromise and to make exceptions, in effect forcing Cecil to see things not in black or white but in varying shades of grey. Physically separate from England, and possessed of both an English population with a well-developed apparatus of English-style government linked directly to the structures of power in England, and a majority Irish population whose society and political organization differed sharply from English norms, Ireland presented Cecil with a set of challenges quite unlike any he encountered elsewhere during his service to the Tudors. Here was a kingdom which Cecil held to be a rightful possession of the crown of England, but which during his lifetime was a kingdom in name only.²

Ireland possessed features of the kingdom of England, to be sure. In parts of the realm, like the city of Waterford, or within the sheltered areas of the counties of the English Pale north of the city of Dublin, government and society closely resembled conditions in England. There, society was not dissimilar to the society from which Cecil's own family emerged in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Cecil, however, never lost sight of the fact that the kingdom of Ireland required 'general reformatio[n]', that is it needed to be made more closely to resemble the kingdom of England, in its government, its language, its laws, its culture, and its religion. Broadly, the reform of Ireland under Cecil's direction assumed two forms. The first

¹ Alford, *Burghley*, 346.

² See above, 111

was the strengthening of Tudor rule in those areas where it had lapsed—either because Irish law and custom or an overbearing English family, such as the Powers of Waterford, had undermined the functioning of English government and society—or where it had, over time, simply fallen behind or come to deviate from practice in England, as in the absence in Ireland until 1571 of a prerogative court, like Star Chamber. The second form was the extension of Tudor rule, and its attendant features, to Irish districts, mainly in the north and west of the kingdom, which had never known English rule. Making a second Tudor kingdom in Ireland was thus Cecil's ultimate aim, and he worked to achieve this end longer than any other servant of the Tudors. His efforts represent a rare example in early modern Europe of a deliberate attempt on the part of a powerful royal servant at state building, rather than the haphazard and undirected process of state formation which predominated in the period.³

Tudor politicians and writers most often thought and wrote in terms of a very simple twofold approach to the kingdom of Ireland: that the crown should proceed there either by the 'sword', that is by coercion and military conquest, or by the extension of the 'law', that is by persuasion and assimilation. From Henry VIII's instructions given to his lieutenant in 1520 to proceed by 'amiable persuasions' and that king's preparedness to accept Irish customs which were not 'contrary to reason', to Edmund Spenser's advocacy in the 1590s of a thorough military conquest and the annihilation of the Irish elite whose removal would wipe the socio-political slate clean, the Tudor sovereigns seemingly wrestled with one of two choices. Modern historians were not slow to pick up on the sword versus the rod of justice motif. Indeed, the writings of Edward Walshe and later Sir William Gerrard, the lord chancellor of Ireland, all but spelled it out for them.⁴ The historian was thus confronted with the uncomfortable possibility that there was no overarching strategy behind Tudor policy in Ireland for most of the second half of the sixteenth century beyond coercion and persuasion. But in recognition of the fact that Tudor policy in Ireland combined a mixture of both, historians sought to find a deeper complexity in Tudor policy. They demonstrated that energetic chief governors, like Sussex and Sidney, backed by Cecil at court in the first decade of Elizabeth's reign, proposed specific and original plans for the reform of Ireland which were not so easily ascribed to one strategy or the other. Cecil seems to have understood this fact, as is evident from his 'Degrees for Gov[er]nme[n]t' which began with the words: 'the best is, to seke y^e reformatio[n] of Ireland as well be force, as by ordre'. Yet most contemporary Tudor thinking tended to revert to the basic binary distinction between coercion and persuasion. Sir William Fitzwilliam, after more than a decade in the Irish service, for instance, wrote to Burghley in 1572:

³ Michael Braddick, *State formation in early modern England, c.1550–1700* (Cambridge, 2000), 7.

⁴ 'Lord Chancellor Gerrard's notes of his report on Ireland, 1577–8', ed. Charles McNeill, *Analecta Hibernica*, 2 (1931), 93–291; above, 82–3.

I will presume to be plaine withe yo^r L... this people (as yo^r L knowithe) hath bin long nuseled in beastlie libertie and sensuall imunitie, so as they cannot abyde to heere of correction, no, not for the horriblest sins that they can comit. Till the sworde have thoroughlie and univ[er]sally tamed (and not meekend them) in wayne is lawe brought emougst them.⁵

Fitzwilliam, as we have seen, had a flair for the dramatic and was, it might be said, prone to such statements. Therefore the not dissimilar commentary on Tudor policy in Ireland made twenty or so years earlier by Sir John Mason, the English ambassador in France in Edward's reign, takes on added importance for the insight which it provides on the character of Tudor policy in Ireland. Amid talk of a French invasion of Ireland and the appearance at the French court in 1550 of the conspirator George Paris, Mason was moved to comment on Ireland:

We have thes many yeres past wasted there great som[m]s of moneye by p[ar]cell meale, which yf it had bye[n] spent to gither might p[er]happes have bredd more quyettes then we have at this p[rese]nt. Thies wylde beastes wolde be hunted a force, and at the beginning wolde so be braided before the hole hearde ioyne to gither as they might knowe wth whome they had to doo wherin the olde and necessarye pollicye hath byn to kepe them by all meanes possible as square bitwen them selves.⁶

The 'olde and necessarye pollicye' to which Mason referred to was the English strategy of keeping the Irish at variance with one another. Ostensibly, this was nothing more than rendering the enemy divided and therefore weak, but political decentralization in Ireland was also the (unintended) result of the strategy of assimilation pursued since Henry's reign which allowed Irish chiefs and wayward English lords to submit and then integrate into Tudor society individually. With the benefit of hindsight, Mason bemoaned the crown's failure to pursue in times past a more coercive policy which would have eliminated some Irish leaders in a grand show of English power. It may well be that the modern historian's ability—at the remove of five centuries—to scrutinize the course of Tudor policy and government in Ireland has lent the subject a complexity and a sophistication that it did not possess at the time. The *result* of the pursuit by the English crown in Ireland of a mixture of coercion and conciliation was bewilderingly complex, but thinking on the reform of Ireland in Tudor times tended to be quite basic, possessed as it was of only two options.

On balance, William Cecil advocated a conciliatory strategy for the extension of Tudor rule in Ireland, though he also saw the benefits which might more immediately accrue to the selective use of coercion and plantation. This was born, at one level, of his Christian faith and humanist education which conditioned him to believe that Irishmen, though savage, were redeemable. At another level, Cecil accepted that Ireland's Irish population and its English populations (be they Old

⁵ Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 25 September 1572, TNA, SP 63/37/60. Leicester wrote to Fitzwilliam in nearly identical terms the month before: Leicester to Fitzwilliam, 24 August 1572, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Carte MS 57, fos. 414–15.

⁶ John Mason to privy council, 29 June 1550, TNA, SP 68/9a, fos. 24–5.

or New) were, all of them, subjects of the English crown. There were, of course, social, cultural, linguistic, and religious differences between these groups, but these would all be moulded into a common Englishness as the reform of Ireland progressed. Such was Cecil's confidence in the superiority of English society that even the wildest of wild Irishmen could be convinced to abandon Irish ways, to hold his land of the crown, to accept an English title of nobility, to be instructed in the truth of the Gospels—in other words, to embrace English 'civility'. In the short term, however, Cecil accepted that Ireland would continue to be possessed of legal, cultural, and also of religious features which deviated from those of England.

But what of the sheriffs and seneschals, many of them English born, who abused martial law and lopped off the heads of Irishmen within the framework of English government which Cecil had so painstakingly helped to introduce in Ireland during Elizabeth's reign? Or the undisciplined and underpaid English soldiers whom Cecil had worked to feed, clothe, and transport to Ireland but who rampaged across the kingdom? Or the Old English families of the Pale, long the mainstay of civility in Ireland, who clung to the old religion and flirted with the new more militant strain of their faith emanating from the continent and putting down roots in their community? The completion of the reform of Ireland, Cecil could only hope, would render the English soldier in Ireland superfluous and would eliminate the political climate in which the payment of 'head money' could be countenanced. As for the continued existence of Catholicism in the kingdom, Trinity College would begin to educate a new generation of Protestant clergy which would, in turn, instruct the population in the new religion. Cecil understood that all of this would take time. Accordingly, he placed great emphasis on the gradual spread of English laws and governing institutions, which would be carried out through the shiring of Irish lordships and the provision of justice. In this way, the Irish would be made English 'little by little', as Cecil himself put it, and everything else would fall into place. But this incremental strategy toward a reformed Ireland took more time than Cecil was to have on this earth, and he presided over nearly half a century of reform. In August 1582, as rebellion in Ireland dragged on and Elizabeth made clear her refusal to pour any further treasure into the kingdom, Walsingham wrote to Burghley that he had lost all hope in the kingdom's reform.⁷ Though he never expressed his feelings in such plain terms, other than to Robert Cecil with whom he shared his 'melancholy cogitatio[n]s', such despairing over Ireland regularly crept into Cecil's thoughts in his last years. The alternative to the reform of Ireland, however, was frightening. For failure there, by Elizabeth's reign if not before, might result in the kingdom coming within the orbit of either France or Spain which would serve as a prelude to an assault on England. The duke of Northumberland once contemplated, if the report of a French ambassador is to be believed, offering the kingdom of Ireland to France in exchange for French backing for his faltering regime.⁸ In the changed European world of the later sixteenth

⁷ Walsingham to Burghley, 12 August 1582, TNA, SP 12/155/12.

⁸ *Calendar of letters, despatches, and state papers relating to the negotiations between England and Spain, preserved in the archives at Vienna, Simancas, Besançon, and Brussels*, vol. xi: *Edward VI and Mary, 1553*, ed. Royall Tyler (London, 1916), 113.

century, such a flight of fancy was no longer an option, no matter how grim the position of the English crown in Ireland. Thus when Walsingham thought of Ireland's reform he did so principally in terms of how it would affect England: were the reform of the kingdom to fail, he wrote, 'I woold to God I had no cause to dowbt of the conscervation of England'. Burghley did not need convincing on this score. It should come as little surprise then that in late 1593 Burghley, though he was aged and infirm, confided in his son: 'I ca[n]not but contynew my care for Ireland'.⁹ For him, the failure to complete the kingdom's reform was unthinkable and so his handling of Ireland matters continued until the weeks before his own death.

That Cecil employed terms like 'kingdom' and 'realm' to describe Ireland is significant, for it reveals something about his views on what we have in this book referred to as the Tudor state. For him, the Tudor state consisted of two separate kingdoms under a single crown: England and Ireland. The use of words like 'commonwealth' or 'state' to describe Ireland were not uncommon in Elizabeth's reign, and each might be used interchangeably with 'realm' or 'kingdom', but so bound up was the monarchical idea in Cecil's conception of the state that he consistently favoured the more traditional terminology. His outlook and the use of these terms are both captured in a draft of the instructions which the queen sent over to Ireland in April 1582. In an effort to bring the rebellion in Ireland to a speedy end, Elizabeth instructed her lord deputy and council to issue a 'pardon for all offences co[m]mitted against o^r state and person'—Burghley, who corrected the draft, underlined 'and person'.¹⁰

Still, much has been made of William Cecil's untried contingency plans to have the privy council rule England in the event of Elizabeth's death and until parliament selected her successor.¹¹ That he could envision an England, however briefly, without a sovereign speaks to his belief that the commonwealth, or the state, of England was not, or was no longer, automatically subject to the vagaries of dynastic succession in an age of confessional divisions and wars predicated on religion; that the commonwealth, manifested politically in the privy council and then in the houses of parliament, was in fact empowered to dictate the sovereign of England. The kingdom of Ireland did not factor directly into Cecil's planning for the frightening scenario which Elizabeth's untimely death would give rise to. But it is unlikely that he imagined that the death of Elizabeth would mark the end of the centuries-old association between England and Ireland. Cecil's career demonstrated that Ireland, unreformed and imperfect as it was, was a dependency of England which, so long as a Tudor sovereign sat on the throne, was the centre of a Tudor multiple monarchy; in the temporary absence of the monarch, Ireland and its inhabitants would, there can be little doubt, continue to be subject to the governance of an 'aristocratic republic' in England. In the next century, Oliver Cromwell would

⁹ Burghley to Robert Cecil, 1 December 1593, CUL, MS Ee.iii.56, no. 7.

¹⁰ Queen's instructions to be communicated to lord deputy and council, 3 April 1582, TNA, SP 63/91/4.

¹¹ Collinson, 'The monarchical republic of Elizabeth I', 110–34.

abolish the institution of monarchy itself and with it the regal union which had existed between the kingdoms of Scotland and England since the accession to the English throne of King James, but the association between England and Ireland, though technically also flowing from the crown of England, was different: Cromwell could not contemplate severing the link between the two (in this case former) kingdoms. By the time William Cecil had come to a position of political influence a century earlier the relationship between England and Ireland already ran too deep for a situation to arise in which the links between the two countries could be broken. By the time of his death, all of the resources of the kingdom of England were being harnessed to ensure that the English kingdom which Cecil had worked to make of Ireland would remain under the control of the English crown.

William Cecil's servant Edmund Tremayne once described his master as 'he that sitteth at the helm in the ship of government of this common weale'. Michael Pulman, in his study of the English privy council in the 1570s, was quick to add that Tremayne did not call Cecil the captain.¹² So long as Elizabeth lived, and she outlived Cecil by five years, the queen had the final say on almost every aspect of Tudor policy. When it came to Ireland, Elizabeth was less inclined to intervene in matters of policy because she knew a great deal less about her other kingdom than she knew about England, where she was born and where she lived her entire life. This might suggest that Cecil, with his unrivalled knowledge of Ireland at Elizabeth's court, did indeed don 'the captain's hat' when Ireland was concerned, that he was, in other words, the power behind the throne. But, as we have seen, Cecil, though closely interested in the fate of royal policy in Ireland and all aspects of the workings of Tudor government there, at no point attempted to devise policy for the kingdom. And herein lay one of the fundamental problems in the Anglo-Irish relationship. If policy-making did not originate with the queen, and policy-making did not originate with Cecil and the privy council in England, then where did it come from? It seems clear from Cecil's writings that he believed that the responsibility, both to formulate and to carry out policy in Ireland, lay with those men in, or who had first-hand experience of, the Irish service. When guidance was sought from England in summer 1582 for how best to proceed against the rebellion which had lately spread to Connaught, an exasperated Burghley explained to Secretary Walsingham, 'when y^e governor knoweth not what to doo to wstand it is hard for us here to gyve advise in such uncerte[n] cases'.¹³ Were the chief governors of Ireland empowered by the queen to get on with the business of extending and strengthening Tudor rule according to conditions on the ground, and were they given the necessary resources and time to see it through, as Cecil himself recommended in no uncertain terms, then the execution of royal policy in Ireland would have been a relatively straightforward endeavour. However, Elizabeth would never devolve absolute power in Ireland on one of her subjects, other than on Cecil perhaps; but as events were to show he was too important to the crown to be absented

¹² Tremayne to Burghley, 14 September 1579, TNA, SP 12/132/5; Pulman, *The Elizabethan privy council*, 239.

¹³ Burghley to Walsingham, 16 July 1582, TNA, SP 63/94/27.

in Ireland. Thus, in order for policy for Ireland to advance beyond a theoretical stage, and there was no shortage of suggestions put forth for how best to achieve the kingdom's reform, it had to gain backing at court and in council in England. Here Cecil's detailed knowledge of Ireland, its government, its inhabitants, its geography, gave his voice the greatest weight. Only then, once Cecil and other members of the council had discussed and then framed and shaped policy for Ireland based on the ideas of men who had served or were serving there, would it be presented to Elizabeth, who frequently scaled back whatever came before her in an effort to cut costs, though she might also, as we have seen, accept or reject the policy outright. It then fell to Cecil to make that which remained a political and an economic reality within the context of the broader concerns of the Tudor state; the queen's servants in Ireland, principally the chief governor, were then responsible for carrying out royal policy. The result was a paralysis of action that hindered Cecil's, and thus the crown's, efforts at every turn to see the reform of the kingdom completed.¹⁴

Cecil's conservatism may serve to confound, or to frustrate, the modern observer seeking to find the roots of modern English government. However, the urge to cast Cecil in the role of a 'proto' prime minister steadily grasping, or being handed, executive authority must be resisted. He showed himself time and time again to be a loyal servant of the Tudors and to be generally accepting of his subservient position—'serve God by serving of the queen, for all other service is indeed bondage to the devil,' an aged Lord Burghley famously reminded his son.¹⁵ Cecil was prepared to work within the existing framework of Tudor government rather than to seek to break out of that framework and create anew in the way Thomas Cromwell had done during the reign of Henry VIII. Indeed, Cecil's conservatism was made clear in his support for the adoption in 1578 of the *Ordinances for the government of Ireland* which Cromwell had adopted for the governing of the lordship forty-four years earlier, and which were themselves based on ideas for the reform of the Englishry which were older still. William Cecil's refusal, or his inability, to use his vast knowledge of Ireland and influence at court toward the development of an innovative and overarching political strategy ensured that the policy pursued by the Elizabethan regime in Ireland remained, much like Cecil's own thinking, derivative and reactionary.

It may be argued that to draw conclusions based on William Cecil's experience administering the kingdom of Ireland and to apply them to his career as a whole is to return to the old historiographical confines of 'English' history and 'Irish' history. But a central feature of this study was to show that Ireland—separate from England though it was—was part of the Tudor state, one of two Tudor kingdoms. Here, through an analysis of Cecil's long experience interacting with the peoples and the government of the kingdom of Ireland, we witnessed the uncomfortable and imperfect reality of early modern state formation as it unfolded.

¹⁴ Brady employed the phrase 'paralysis of policy' in 'Shane O'Neill departs from the court of Elizabeth', 13–28.

¹⁵ Read, *Lord Burghley*, 545.

The example of Ireland's integration into the Tudor state was a disaster by contemporary European and English standards alike.¹⁶ Cecil was all too aware of this. The minister must, therefore, shoulder his share of the blame for the devastation which occurred there during his service to the crown. But the limitations of his position vis-à-vis Ireland as it existed within the Tudor state must also be borne in mind. We have noticed how Elizabeth's refusal to grant full authority to her chief governors in Ireland forced Cecil to assume a level of responsibility for governing the kingdom which he deemed to be too great. But this was not tantamount to 'direct rule' from England. The men who served the queen in the government of her kingdom of Ireland maintained wide discretionary powers. The granting of martial law, for example, no matter Burghley's efforts to regulate its execution, was at the deputy's discretion; the queen's choice of bishops was also greatly influenced by the deputy who customarily recommended them; sheriffs, the men whom Burghley held up as the mainspring of English civil government in Ireland but who too frequently abused their position, were nominated by the chancellor, treasurer, the two chief justices, and the chief baron of the exchequer.¹⁷ And then there were the marauding and deleterious soldiers, corrupt clerks, and self-aggrandizing inferior officers in the Irish service whose degree of separation from Secretary Cecil and later Lord Treasurer Burghley was always great enough to insulate them from his efforts to police them. In terms of identity, too, the kingdom of Ireland provided a framework for separateness from England. In this way an Englishman, like Nicholas White, might be commended for his service to his queen and to Ireland.

Ireland was thus at once a dependent territory of the English crown and a state—or a kingdom as Cecil would have preferred it—which was accorded and maintained an identity separate from England and which functioned with an often overlooked degree of regional autonomy within a wider Tudor state ruled by an English monarch. The end toward which William Cecil worked so tirelessly for most of his life was the creation in Ireland of a second Tudor kingdom which shared with England not only a common monarch but also common forms of government and society. Burghley's life's work in the two Tudor kingdoms, and also his legacy, was summed up for him in such terms when in 1593 he was reminded that he was known to carry 'aveary fatherly care over these common weales, that peace and prosperitie may florishe in them both in your daies, and after yo^r decease'.¹⁸ But his sustained efforts to achieve the reform of Ireland founded on the very separateness of the two kingdoms. It was separateness from which flowed so much of the complexity and ambiguity in the Anglo-Irish relationship but which William Cecil was unprepared to challenge. The result was success in one Tudor kingdom and failure in the other.

¹⁶ J. H. Elliott, 'A Europe of composite monarchies', *Past and Present*, 137 (1992), 55; Ellis, *Ireland in the age of the Tudors*, 352–8.

¹⁷ Above, 185, 203; Loftus to Burghley, 4 December 1586, TNA, SP 63/127/4.

¹⁸ Lucas Challoner, Henry Lee, and Launcelot Mouney to Burghley, 14 March 1593, TNA, SP 63/168/60.

Bibliography

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

Bodleian Library, Oxford

Rawlinson MS B. 488

Carte MSS: 55–8, 131

British Library, London

Additional MSS: 15891, 48017, 62540

Cotton MSS: Caligula C III, Titus B XI, Titus B XIII, Vespasian F XII

Harleian MS 292

Lansdowne MSS: 8, 19, 69, 75, 81, 84, 98, 99, 102, 108

Cambridge University Library

Ee. III. 56: Private letters from Burghley to Robert Cecil, 1593–98

Hatfield House, Hertfordshire

Cecil papers: 11–12, 18, 24, 38, 44, 49, 58, 60, 144, 148, 151, 153, 157, 159–60, 207

Lambeth Palace Library, London

MSS 600–35: Letters and papers relating to the government of Ireland

MS 2009: Musters of the clergy

Marsh's Library, Dublin

MS Z 3 1 11

The National Archives, London

MPF 1/68: Hibernia, 1567

MPF 1/69: Original map of counties Wicklow and Ferns, 1579

SP 12 State papers, domestic, Elizabeth I

SP 13 Large documents

SP 31 Burghley's notes on Irish pedigrees

SP 52 State papers, Scotland, Elizabeth I

SP 60 State papers, Ireland, Henry VIII

SP 61 State papers, Ireland, Edward VI

SP 63 State papers, Ireland, Elizabeth I

SP 68 State papers, foreign, Edward VI

Northamptonshire Record Office, Northampton

Fitzwilliam (Milton) Irish MSS: 67, 93

PRINTED SOURCES

Acts of the privy council of England, ed. J. R. Dasent *et al.*, new series, 46 vols. (London, 1890–1964).

- Allingham, Hugh, *Captain Cuellar's narrative of the Spanish Armada and of his wanderings and adventures in Ireland*, with an introduction and a full translation by Robert Crawford (London, 1897).
- Annála rioghachta Éireann: annals of the kingdom of Ireland by the Four Masters from the earliest period to the year 1616*, ed. John O'Donovan, 7 vols. (Dublin, 1851).
- Annála Uladh, Annals of Ulster*, ed. W. M. Hennessy and B. MacCarthy, 4 vols. (Dublin, 1887–1901).
- The Annals of Loch Cé*, ed. W. M. Hennessy, 2 vols. (London, 1871).
- Beacon, Richard, *Solon his follie or a politique discourse touching the reformation of common-weals conquered, declined or corrupted* (Oxford, 1594), ed. Claire Carroll and Vincent Carey (Binghamton, NY, 1996).
- Boorde, Andrew, *The fyrste boke of the introduction of knowledge . . .* ed. F. J. Furnival (London, 1870).
- Brennan, M. G., and Kinnamon, N. J. (eds.), *A Sidney chronology, 1554–1654* (Basingstoke, 2003).
- Calendar of letters and state papers relating to English affairs preserved principally in the archives of Simancas*, ed. Martin Hume, 4 vols. (London, 1892–9).
- Calendar of letters, despatches, and state papers, relating to the negotiations between England and Spain, Henry VIII, 1542–1543: preserved in the archives at Simancas, Vienna, Brussels, and elsewhere*, ed. Pascual de Gayangos (London, 1895).
- Calendar of letters, despatches, and state papers relating to the negotiations between England and Spain, preserved in the archives at Vienna, Simancas, Besançon, and Brussels*, vol. xi: *Edward VI and Mary, 1553*, ed. Royall Tyler (London, 1916).
- Calendar of the manuscripts of the . . . marquis of Salisbury . . . preserved at Hatfield House*, 24 vols. (London, 1883–1973).
- Calendar of Ormond deeds*, ed. Edmund Curtis, 6 vols. (1932–43).
- Calendar of the patent and close rolls of chancery in Ireland, Henry VIII to 18th Elizabeth*, ed. James Morrin (Dublin, 1861).
- Calendar of the patent and close rolls of chancery in Ireland, Elizabeth 19th year to end of reign*, ed. James Morrin (Dublin, 1862).
- Calendar of patent rolls, Elizabeth I*, 9 vols. (London, 1939–86).
- Calendar of state papers, domestic series, of the reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth 1547–1580*, ed. Robert Lemon (London, 1856).
- Calendar of state papers, foreign series, of the reign of Elizabeth, 1579–1580*, ed. Arthur John Butler (London, 1904).
- Calendar of state papers relating to Ireland, 1509–1670*, 24 vols. (London, 1860–1912).
- Calendar of state papers relating to English affairs in the archives of Venice*, ed. H. F. Brown (London, 1897).
- Camden, William, *Annals, or, the historie of the most renowned and victorious princessse Elizabeth, late queen of England*, ed. R. Norton (London, 1635).
- [Cecil, William], *The execution of justice in England for maintenaunce of publique and Christian peace* (London, 1584), printed in Robert Kingdon (ed.), *The execution of justice by William Cecil and a True, Sincere, and Modest Defense of English Catholics by William Allen* (Ithaca, NY, 1965).
- Churchyard, Thomas, *The miserie of Flaunders, calamitie of Fraunce, misfortune of Portugall, unquietnes of Irelande, troubles of Scotlande: and the blessed state of Englande* (London, 1579).
- *The services of Sir William Drury, lord justice of Ireland, in 1578 and 1579* (London, 1580).

- *A scourge for rebels* (London, 1584).
- Clapham, John, *Elizabeth of England: certain observations concerning the life and reign of Queen Elizabeth*, ed. E. P. Read and Conyers Read (Philadelphia, 1951).
- Collins, Arthur (ed.), *Letters and memorials of state... written and collected by Sir Henry Sidney...*, 2 vols. (London, 1746).
- Ellis, Henry (ed.), *Original letters illustrative of English history*, 11 vols. (London, 1824–6).
- Elton, G. R. (ed.), *The Tudor constitution: documents and commentary* (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1982).
- Gilbert, J. T. (ed.), ‘Archives of the municipal corporation of Waterford’, in *Historical Manuscripts Commission 10th report, appendix V*, 265–358.
- Grey, Arthur, Lord Grey de Wilton, *A commentary of the services and charges of William Lord Grey of Wilton, K.G. by his son Arthur Lord Grey of Wilton, K.G. with a memoir of the author, and illustrative documents*, ed. Sir Philip de Malpas Grey Egerton (London, 1847).
- Harrison, G. B. (ed.), *The Elizabethan journals: being a record of those things most talked of during the years 1591–1603* (Ann Arbor, 1955).
- Hasler, P. W. (ed.), *The history of parliament: the House of Commons, 1558–1603*, 3 vols. (London, 1981).
- Haynes, Samuel (ed.), *Collection of state papers... left by William Cecil, Lord Burghley* (London, 1740).
- Hogan, Edmund (ed.), *The description of Ireland and the state thereof as it is at this present in Anno 1598* (London, 1878).
- Holinshed, Raphael, *The... chronicles of England, Scotlande and Irelande...* (London, 1577), ed. Henry Ellis, 6 vols. (London, 1807–8).
- Hore, H. F. (ed.), ‘The description and present state of Ulster by Marshall Bagenal, 20 Dec. 1586, with some interlineations by Lord Burghley’, *Ulster Journal of Archaeology*, 2 (1854), 137–60.
- and Graves, J. (eds.), *The social state of the southern and eastern counties of Ireland in the sixteenth century* (Dublin, 1870).
- The Irish fiants of the Tudor sovereigns, 1521–1603*, 4 vols. (Dublin, 1994).
- Kearney, J., *Aibidil Gaoidheilge & Caiticiosma* (Dublin, 1571).
- Lascelles, Rowley (ed.), *Liber munerum publicorum Hiberniae*, 2 vols. (London, 1852).
- Letters and papers, foreign and domestic, Henry VIII*, 21 vols. (London, 1862–1932).
- Mahaffy, J. P. (ed.), ‘Two early tours of Ireland’, *Hermathena*, 40 (1914), 10–15.
- MacNeill, Charles (ed.), ‘The Perrot papers’, *Analecta Hibernica*, 12 (1943), 3–65.
- Nares, Edward, *Memoirs of the life and administration of the Right Honourable William Cecil, Lord Burghley...*, 3 vols. (London, 1828–31).
- Nichols, J. G. (ed.), *Literary remains of King Edward the sixth*, 2 vols. (New York, 1857).
- O’Donovan, John (ed.), ‘The Irish correspondence of James Fitzmaurice of Desmond’, *Journal of the Kilkenny and South-East of Ireland Archaeological Society*, 2 (1858–9), 354–69.
- Peck, Francis, *Desiderata curiosa: or, a collection of divers scarce and curious pieces (relating chiefly to matters of English history) in six books...* (London, 1732–5).
- Perrot, James, *The chronicle of Ireland, 1584–1608*, ed. Herbert Wood (Dublin, 1933).
- Quinn, D. B. (ed.), ‘The bills and statutes of the Irish parliaments of Henry VII and Henry VIII’, *Analecta Hibernica*, 10 (1941), 108–15.
- (ed.), ‘Edward Walshes’s “Conjectures” concerning the state of Ireland [1552]’, *Irish Historical Studies*, 5 (1946–7), 303–22.

- Read, Conyers (ed.), *Elizabeth of England: certain observations concerning the life and reign of Queen Elizabeth by John Clapham* (Philadelphia, 1951).
- Sadler, Ralph, *The state papers and letters of Ralph Sadler*, ed. Arthur Clifford, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1809).
- Shirley, E. P. (ed.), *Original letters and papers in illustration of the history of the Church of Ireland, during the reigns of Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth* (London, 1851).
- Spenser, Edmund, *Complaints containing sundrie small poemes of the worlds vanitie* (London, 1591).
- State papers, Henry VIII*, 11 vols. (London, 1830–52).
- Statute rolls of the Irish parliament, Richard III–Henry VIII*, ed. Philomena Connolly (Dublin, 2002).
- Statute rolls of the parliament of Ireland, twelfth and thirteenth to twenty-first and twenty-second years of the reign of Edward IV*, ed. James Morrissey (Dublin, 1939).
- Strype, John, *Annals of the Reformation and the establishment of religion* (London, 1824).
- Talbot, Peter, [N.N.] *Politicians Catechisme, for his instruction in divine faith, and morall honesty* (Antwerp, 1658).
- Ware, Robert, *The examinations of Faithful Commin Dominican fryar, as Sir James Ware had them from the late Lord Primate Usher, being one of the memorials of the Lord Cecil* (Dublin, 1679).
- Wright, Thomas (ed.), *Queen Elizabeth and her times: a series of original letters...*, 2 vols. (London, 1838).
- Youngs, Frederic (ed.), *The proclamations of the Tudor queens* (Cambridge, 1976).

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Adams, Simon, 'The Dudley clientele and the House of Commons, 1559–1586', *Parliamentary History*, 8 (1989), 216–39.
- *Leicester and the court: essays on Elizabethan politics* (Manchester, 2002).
- 'Robert Dudley', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- Bryson, Alan, and Leimon, Mitchell, 'Francis Walsingham', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- Alford, Stephen, 'Reassessing William Cecil in the 1560s', in John Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy* (London, 1997), 233–53.
- *The early Elizabethan polity: William Cecil and the British succession crisis, 1558–1569* (Cambridge, 1998).
- 'Politics and political history in the Tudor century', *Historical Journal*, 42 (1999), 535–48.
- *Burghley: William Cecil at the court of Elizabeth I* (New Haven, 2008).
- Andrews, J. H., 'The Irish surveys of Robert Lythe', *Imago Mundi*, 19 (1965), 22–31.
- Bagwell, Richard, *Ireland under the Tudors*, 3 vols. (London, 1885–90).
- Barber, Peter, 'The minister puts his mind on the map', *British Museum Society Bulletin*, 43 (1983), 18–19.
- 'England II: monarchs, ministers and maps, 1550–1625', in David Buisseret (ed.), *Monarchs, ministers and maps: the emergence of cartography as a tool of government in early modern Europe* (Chicago, 1992), 57–98.
- Bartlett, Thomas, and Jeffery, Keith (eds.), *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996).
- Beckingsale, B. W., *Burghley: Tudor statesman, 1520–1598* (London, 1967).
- Berry, H. F., 'Sheriffs of the county of Cork: Henry III to 1660', *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, 35 (1905), 46–7.

- Boran, Elizabeth, and Gribben, C. (eds.), *Enforcing Reformation in Ireland and Scotland, 1550–1700* (Aldershot, 2006).
- Bottigheimer, K. S., 'The failure of the Reformation in Ireland: une question bien posée', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 36 (1985), 196–207.
- Bourne, H. R. Fox, *A memoir of Sir Philip Sidney* (London, 1862).
- Boynton, Lindsay, 'The Tudor provost-marshal', *English Historical Review*, 78 (1962), 437–55.
- Braddick, Michael, *State formation in early modern England, c.1550–1700* (Cambridge, 2000).
- Bradshaw, Brendan, 'Beginnings of modern Ireland', in Brian Farrell (ed.), *The Irish parliamentary tradition* (Dublin, 1973), 67–87.
- *The dissolution of the religious orders in Ireland under Henry VIII* (Cambridge, 1974).
- 'The Edwardian Reformation in Ireland, 1547–53', *Archivium Hibernicum*, 34 (1976), 83–99.
- 'Sword, word and strategy in the Reformation in Ireland', *Historical Journal*, 21 (1978), 475–502.
- *The Irish constitutional revolution of the sixteenth century* (Cambridge, 1979).
- 'The English Reformation and identity formation in Ireland and Wales', in Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Robertson (eds.), *British consciousness and identity: the making of Britain, 1533–1707* (Cambridge, 2004), 43–111.
- and Morrill, John (eds.), *The British problem, c.1534–1707: state formation in the Atlantic archipelago* (New York, 1996).
- and Robertson, Peter (eds.), *British consciousness and identity: the making of Britain, 1533–1707* (Cambridge, 2004).
- Brady, Ciaran, 'The killing of Shane O'Neill: some new evidence', *Irish Sword*, 15 (1983), 116–23.
- 'The O'Reillys of East Breifne and the problem of surrender and regrant', *Journal of Cumann Seanchais Bhreifne*, 23 (1985), 233–62.
- 'Conservative subversives: the community of the Pale and the Dublin administration, 1556–86', in P. J. Corish (ed.), *Radicals, rebels and establishments: historical studies XV* (Belfast, 1985), 11–21.
- 'Court, castle and country: the framework of government in Tudor Ireland', in Ciaran Brady and Raymond Gillespie (eds.), *Natives and newcomers: essays on the making of Irish colonial society, 1534–1641* (Dublin, 1986), 22–49.
- *The chief governors: the rise and fall of reform government in Tudor Ireland, 1536–1588* (Cambridge, 1994).
- (ed.), *Interpreting Irish history: the debate on historical revisionism, 1938–1994* (Blackrock, 1994).
- 'Comparable histories? Tudor reform in Wales and Ireland', in S. G. Ellis and Sarah Barber (eds.), *Conquest and union: fashioning a British state, 1485–1725* (London, 1995), 64–86.
- *Shane O'Neill* (Dundalk, 1996).
- 'Shane O'Neill departs from the court of Elizabeth: Irish, English, Scottish perspectives and the paralysis of policy, July 1559 to April 1562', in S. J. Connolly (ed.), *Kingdoms United? Great Britain and Ireland since 1500: integration and diversity* (Dublin, 1999), 13–28.
- 'The attainder of Shane O'Neill, Sir Henry Sidney and the problems of Tudor state-building in Ireland', in C. Brady and J. Ohlmeyer (eds.), *British interventions in early modern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2005), 28–48.

- Brady, Ciaran, and Gillespie, Raymond (eds.), *Natives and newcomers: essays on the making of Irish colonial society, 1534–1641* (Dublin, 1986).
- and Murray, James, ‘Sir Henry Sidney and the Reformation in Ireland’, in Elizabeth Boran and C. Gribben (eds.), *Enforcing Reformation in Ireland and Scotland, 1550–1700* (Aldershot, 2006), 14–39.
- Breathnach, Caoimhín, ‘The murder of Shane O’Neill: Oidheadh Chuinn Cheadchathaigh’, *Ériu*, 43 (1992), 159–76.
- Bryson, Alan, ‘Anthony St Leger’, in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- Buisseret, David (ed.), *Monarchs, ministers and maps* (Chicago, 1992).
- Burgon, J. W., *The life and times of Sir Thomas Gresham*, 2 vols. (London, 1839).
- Bush, M. L., ‘Protector Somerset and requests’, *Historical Journal*, 17 (1974), 451–64.
- *The government policy of Protector Somerset* (London, 1975).
- Canny, Nicholas, ‘The ideology of English colonization: from Ireland to America’, *William and Mary Quarterly*, 30 (1973), 591–3.
- *The formation of the Old English elite in Ireland* (Dublin, 1975).
- *The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland: a pattern established, 1565–76* (Hassocks, 1976).
- ‘Why the Reformation failed in Ireland: une question mal posée’, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 30 (1979), 423–50.
- *From Reformation to Restoration: Ireland, 1534–1660* (Dublin, 1987).
- ‘Identity formation in Ireland: the emergence of the Anglo-Irish’, in Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden (eds.), *Colonial identity in the Atlantic world, 1500–1800* (Princeton, 1987), 159–212.
- ‘Revising the revisionist’, in *Irish Historical Studies*, 30 (1996–7), 242–54.
- *Making Ireland British, 1580–1650* (Oxford, 2001).
- ‘Taking sides in early modern Ireland: the case of Hugh O’Neill, earl of Tyrone’, in Vincent Carey and Ute Lotz-Heumann (eds.), *Taking sides? Colonial and confessional mentalités in early modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2003), 94–115.
- and Pagden, Anthony (eds.), *Colonial identity in the Atlantic world, 1500–1800* (Princeton, 1987).
- Carey, Vincent, ‘The end of the Gaelic political order: the O’More lordship of Laois, 1536–1603’, in Pádraig Lane and William Nolan (eds.), *Laois: history and society* (Dublin, 1999), 213–56.
- ‘The Irish face of Machiavelli: Richard Beacon’s *Solon his follie* (1594) and republican ideology in the conquest of Ireland’, in Hiram Morgan (ed.), *Political ideology in Ireland, 1541–1641* (Dublin, 1999), 104–6.
- *Surviving the Tudors: the ‘wizard’ earl of Kildare and English rule in Ireland, 1537–1586* (Dublin, 2002).
- and Lotz-Heumann, Ute (eds.), *Taking sides? Colonial and confessional mentalités in early modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2003).
- Challis, C. E., *The Tudor coinage* (Manchester, 1978).
- Coleman, Christopher, and Starkey, David (eds.), *Revolution reassessed: revisions in the history of Tudor government and administration* (Oxford, 1986).
- Collinson, Patrick, ‘Windows in a woman’s soul: questions about the religion of Queen Elizabeth I’, in *Elizabethan essays* (London, 1994), 87–118.
- ‘The monarchical republic of Elizabeth I’, in John Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy* (London, 1997), 110–34.
- Connolly, James, *The re-conquest of Ireland* (Dublin, 1915).

- Connolly, S. J. (ed.), *Kingdoms United? Great Britain and Ireland since 1500: integration and diversity* (Dublin, 1999).
- *Contested island: Ireland, 1460–1630* (Oxford, 2007).
- Corish, P. J. (ed.), *Radicals, rebels and establishments: historical studies XV* (Belfast, 1985).
- Cosgrove, Art, *Late medieval Ireland, 1370–1541* (Dublin, 1981).
- (ed.), *A new history of Ireland, II: Medieval Ireland, 1169–1534*, ii (Oxford, 1987).
- and McGuire, J. I. (eds.), *Parliament and community: historical studies XIV* (Belfast, 1983).
- Cowman, Des, ‘The German mining operation at Bannow Bay, 1551–52’, *Journal of the Wexford Historical Society*, 11 (1986–7), 67–82.
- Crawford, Jon, *Anglicising the government of Ireland: the Irish privy council and the expansion of Tudor rule, 1556–1578* (Dublin, 1993).
- ‘Nicholas White’, in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- *A star chamber court in Ireland: the court of castle chamber, 1571–1641* (Dublin, 2005).
- Croft, Pauline, ‘Mildred, Lady Burghley: the Matriarch’, in *Patronage, Culture and Power: the early Cecils, 1558–1612* (New Haven, 2002), 283–300.
- (ed.), *Patronage, culture and power: the early Cecils, 1558–1612* (New Haven, 2002).
- review of Roger Turvey, *The treason and trial of Sir John Perrot* (Cardiff, 2005) on *H-Net Reviews in the Humanities and Social Sciences* (2007).
- Cruikshank, C. G., ‘Dead-pays in the Elizabethan army’, *English Historical Review*, 53 (1938), 93–7.
- *Elizabeth’s army* (2nd edn., Oxford, 1966).
- ‘From warlords to landlords: political and social change in Galway 1540–1640’, in Raymond Gillespie and Gerard Moran (eds.), *Galway: history & society* (Dublin, 1996), 97–130.
- ‘Edward Fitton’, in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- Cunningham, Bernadette, ‘Natives and newcomers in Mayo, 1560–1603’, in Raymond Gillespie and Gerard Moran (eds.), *A various country: essays in Mayo history, 1500–1900* (Westport, Conn., 1987), 24–43.
- Davies, R. R., ‘The peoples of Britain and Ireland, 1100–1400, 1: Identities’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th series 4 (1994), 1–20.
- *The first English empire: power and identities in the British Isles, 1093–1343* (Oxford, 2000).
- Dawson, Jane, ‘Two kingdoms or three? Ireland in Anglo-Scottish relations in the middle of the sixteenth century’, in Roger A. Mason (ed.), *Scotland and England, 1286–1815* (Edinburgh, 1987), 113–38.
- ‘William Cecil and the British dimension of early Elizabethan foreign policy’, *History*, 74 (1989), 196–216.
- *The politics of religion in the age of Mary, Queen of Scots: the earl of Argyll and the struggle for Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge, 2002).
- Dewar, Mary, ‘The authorship of the “Discourse of the Commonweal”’, *Economic History Review*, 19 (1966), 388–400.
- Dickens, A. G., *The English Reformation* (London, 1964).
- Dictionary of Irish Biography*, ed. James McGuire and James Quinn (Cambridge, 2010).
- Dolley, Michael, *Medieval Anglo-Irish coins* (London, 1972).
- ‘The Irish coinage, 1534–1691’, in T. W. Moody *et al.* (eds.), *A new history of Ireland* (Oxford, 1976), iii. 408–18.

- Donovan, Brian, 'Tudor rule in Gaelic Leinster and the rise of Feagh McHugh O'Byrne', in Conor O'Brien (ed.), *Feagh McHugh O'Byrne: the Wicklow firebrand* (Rathdrum, 1998), 118–49.
- Duffy, P. J., Edwards, David, and FitzPatrick, Elizabeth (eds.), *Gaelic Ireland, c.1250–c.1650: land, lordship and settlement* (Dublin, 2001).
- Dunlop, Robert, 'The plantations of Leix and Offaly, 1556–1622', *English Historical Review*, 6 (1891), 61–96.
- Edwards, David, 'The Butler revolt of 1569', *Irish Historical Studies*, 28 (1992–3), 228–55.
- 'Beyond reform: martial law and the Tudor reconquest of Ireland', *History Ireland*, 5 (1997), 16–21.
- 'In Tyrone's shadow: Feagh McHugh forgotten leader of the Nine Years War', in Conor O'Brien (ed.), *Feagh McHugh O'Byrne: the Wicklow firebrand* (Rathdrum, 1998), 212–48.
- 'Ideology and experience: Spenser's *View* and martial law in Ireland', in Hiram Morgan (ed.), *Political ideology in Ireland, 1541–1641* (Dublin, 1999), 127–57.
- *The Ormond lordship in county Kilkenny, 1515–1642: the rise and fall of Butler feudal power* (Dublin, 2003).
- 'The escalation of violence in sixteenth-century Ireland', in David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan, and Clodagh Tait (eds.), *Age of atrocity: violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2007), 34–78.
- "'Some day two heads and some days four"', *History Ireland*, 17 (2009), 18–21.
- Lenihan, Pádraig, and Tait, Clodagh (eds.), *Age of atrocity: violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2007).
- Edwards, Francis, *Plots and plotters in the reign of Elizabeth I* (Dublin, 2002).
- Edwards, R. Dudley, and Quinn, D. B., 'Sixteenth-century Ireland, 1485–1603', in T. W. Moody (ed.), *Irish historiography, 1936–70* (Dublin, 1971), 23–42.
- Elliott, J. H., 'A Europe of composite monarchies', *Past and Present*, 137 (1992), 48–71.
- Ellis, Steven, 'The struggle for control of the Irish mint, 1460–c.1506', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 78, sect. C (1978), 30–4.
- 'Thomas Cromwell and Ireland, 1532–40', *Historical Journal*, 23 (1980), 497–519.
- 'Parliament and community in Yorkist and Tudor Ireland', in Art Cosgrove and J. I. McGuire (eds.), *Parliament and community: historical studies XIV* (Belfast, 1983), 43–68.
- *Tudor Ireland: crown community and the conflict of cultures, 1470–1603* (London, 1985).
- 'Crown, community and government in the English territories, 1450–1575', *History*, 71 (1986), 187–204.
- 'Nationalist historiography and the English and Gaelic worlds in the late middle ages', *Irish Historical Studies*, 25 (1986), 1–18.
- *Reform and revival: English government in Ireland, 1470–1536* (Woodbridge, 1986).
- *Tudor frontiers and noble power: the making of the British state* (Oxford, 1995).
- 'The Tudors and the origins of the modern Irish states', in Tom Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds.), *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996), 132–4.
- *Ireland in the age of the Tudors, 1447–1603: English expansion and the end of Gaelic rule* (London, 1998).
- 'The Empire strikes back: the historiographies of Britain and Ireland', in S. G. Ellis (ed.), *Empires and states in European perspective* (Pisa, 2002).
- (ed.), *Empires and states in European perspective* (Pisa, 2002).

- 'An English gentleman and his community: Sir William Darcy of Platten', in Vincent Carey and Ute Lotz-Heumann (eds.), *Taking sides? Colonial and confessional mentalités in early modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2003), 19–41.
- 'Promoting "English civility" in Tudor times', in Csaba Levai and Vasile Vese (eds.), *Tolerance and intolerance in historical perspective* (Pisa, 2003), 155–69.
- 'Sir James Croft', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- and Barber, Sarah (eds.), *Conquest and union: fashioning a British state, 1485–1725* (London, 1995).
- and Esser, Raingard (eds.), *Frontiers, regions and identities in Europe* (Pisa, 2009).
- and Klusáková, Lud'a (eds.), *Imagining frontiers, contesting identities* (Pisa, 2007).
- with Maginn, Christopher, *The making of the British Isles: the state of Britain and Ireland, 1450–1660* (London, 2007).
- Elton, G. R., *The Tudor revolution in government* (Cambridge, 1953).
- *Reformation Europe, 1517–1559* (London, 1973).
- 'The Tudor revolution: a reply', *Past and Present*, 29 (1974), 26–49.
- *England under the Tudors* (3rd edn., London, 1991).
- Falls, Cyril, *Elizabeth's Irish wars* (London, 1950).
- Farrell, Brian (ed.), *The Irish parliamentary tradition* (Dublin, 1973).
- Fernandez Duro, Cesareo, *La armada invencible* (2 vols., Madrid, 1885).
- Fideler, P. A., and Mayer, T. F. (eds.), *Political thought and the Tudor commonwealth: deep structure, discourse and disguise* (London, 1992).
- FitzGerald, Charles William, *The earls of Kildare, and their ancestors from 1057 to 1773* (Dublin, 1858).
- Fitzsimons, Fiona, 'The lordship of O'Connor Faly', in William Nolan and T. P. O'Neill (eds.), *Offaly: history and society* (Dublin, 1998), 207–42.
- Flavin, Susan, and Jones, E. T. (eds.), *Bristol's trade with Ireland and the continent, 1503–1601: the evidence of the exchequer customs accounts* (Dublin, 2009).
- Fletcher, Anthony, and MacCulloch, Diarmaid (eds.), *Tudor rebellions* (5th edn., London, 2004).
- Ford, Alan, 'Walter Travers', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- and McCafferty, John (eds.), *The origins of sectarianism in early modern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2005).
- Fritze, R. H., 'Henry Wallop', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- García Hernán, Enrique, *Ireland and Spain in the reign of Philip II* (Dublin, 2009).
- Gillespie, Raymond, *The transformation of the Irish economy, 1550–1700* (Dundalk, 1991).
- *Galway: history & society* (Dublin, 1996).
- and Moran, Gerard (eds.), *'A various country': essays in Mayo history, 1500–1900* (Westport, Conn., 1987).
- Graves, Michael A. R., *Burghley: William Cecil, Lord Burghley* (London, 1998).
- Griffiths, R. A., 'The English realm and dominions and the king's subjects in the later middle ages', in John Rowe (ed.), *Aspects of government and society in later medieval England: essays in honour of J. R. Lander* (Toronto, 1986), 83–105.
- Grueber, Herbert, *Handbook of the coins of Great Britain and Ireland in the British Museum* (London, 1899).
- Guy, John, *Tudor England* (Oxford, 1988).
- 'The Tudor theory of "imperial" kingship', *History Review*, 17 (1993), 12–16.
- (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I: court and culture in the last decade* (Cambridge, 1995).
- 'The 1590s: the second reign of Elizabeth I', in John Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy* (London, 1997), 1–19.

- Guy, John, 'Tudor monarchy and its critiques', in John Guy (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy* (London, 1997), 79–109.
- (ed.), *The Tudor monarchy* (London, 1997).
- Hadfield, Andrew, 'Edmund Spenser', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (2004).
- Haigh, Christopher, *The English Reformation revised* (Oxford, 1987).
- *Elizabeth I* (2nd edn., Harlow, 1998).
- Hammer, Paul E. J., 'Patronage at court, faction and the earl of Essex', in John Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I* (London, 1997), 65–86.
- *The polarisation of Elizabethan politics: the political career of Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex, 1585–1597* (Cambridge, 1999).
- Hayes-McCoy, G. A., *Irish battles* (London, 1969).
- Heal, Felicity, *Reformation in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford, 2003).
- Herron, Thomas, 'Reforming the fox: Spenser's "Mother Hubberds tale", the beast fable of Barnabe Riche, Adam Loftus, archbishop of Dublin', *Studies in Philology*, 105/3 (2008), 336–87.
- Hoak, Dale, *The king's council in the reign of Edward VI* (Cambridge, 1976).
- (ed.), *Tudor political culture* (Cambridge, 1995).
- Hore, H. F., 'Irish bardism in 1561', *Ulster Journal of Archaeology*, 6 (1858), 165–67, 202–12.
- Hoyle, R. W., 'Place and public finance', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 7 (1997), 197–215.
- Hudson, W. S., *The Cambridge connection and the Elizabethan settlement of 1559* (Durham, 1980).
- Hurstfield, Joel, *The Queen's wards: wardship and marriage under Elizabeth I* (Cambridge, 1958).
- Jefferies, Henry, 'The Irish parliament of 1560: the Anglican reforms authorised', *Irish Historical Studies*, 26 (1988–9), 128–41.
- *Priests and prelates of Armagh in the age of reformations, 1518–1558* (Dublin, 1997).
- *The Irish church and the Tudor reformations* (Dublin, 2010).
- Jones, Norman, *Faith by statute: parliament and the settlement of religion 1559* (London, 1982).
- 'William Cecil and the making of economic policy in the 1560s and early 1570s', in P. A. Fideler and T. F. Mayer (eds.), *Political thought and the Tudor commonwealth: deep structure, discourse and disguise* (London, 1992), 169–93.
- Keane, Ronan, 'The will of the general: martial law in Ireland, 1534 to 1934', *Irish Jurist*, 30 (1995), 150–80.
- Lennon, Colm, 'Richard Stanihurst (1547–1618) and Old English identity', *Irish Historical Studies*, 21 (1978–9), 121–43.
- "'The bowels of the city's bounty": the municipality of Dublin and the foundation of Trinity College in 1592', *Long Room*, 37 (1992), 10–16.
- *An Irish prisoner of conscience of the Tudor era: Archbishop Richard Creagh of Armagh, 1523–1586* (Dublin, 2000).
- 'Nicholas Bagenal', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- 'Henry Ussher', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- *Sixteenth-century Ireland: the incomplete conquest* (2nd edn., Dublin, 2005).
- Longfield, A. K., *Anglo-Irish trade in the sixteenth century* (London, 1929).
- Lotz-Heumann, Ute, 'Confessionalisation in Ireland: periodisation and character, 1534–1649', in Alan Ford and John McCafferty (eds.), *The origins of sectarianism in early modern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2005), 24–53.

- Lydon, J. F. (ed.), *England and Ireland in the later Middle Ages* (Dublin, 1981).
- 'The middle nation', in J. F. Lydon (ed.), *The English in medieval Ireland* (Dublin, 1984), 1–26.
- (ed.), *The English in medieval Ireland* (Dublin, 1984).
- (ed.), *Law and disorder in thirteenth century Ireland: the Dublin parliament of 1297* (Dublin, 1997).
- Lynam, E. W., 'The Irish character in print, 1571–1923', *The Library*, 4 (1924), 288–92.
- Lyne, Raphael, 'Thomas Churchyard', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- Lyons, Mary Ann, *Church and society in county Kildare, c.1470–1547* (Dublin, 2000).
- 'William Fitzwilliam', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- MacCaffrey, W. T., 'Place and patronage in Elizabethan politics', in S. T. Bindoff, J. Hurstfield, and C. H. Williams (eds.), *Elizabethan government and society: essays presented to Sir John Neale* (London, 1961), 95–126.
- *The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics, 1558–1572* (London, 1968).
- *Queen Elizabeth and the making of policy, 1572–1588* (Princeton, 1981).
- 'William Cecil', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- 'Thomas Radcliffe, third earl of Sussex', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- MacCarthy-Morrogh, Michael, *The Munster plantation: English migration to southern Ireland, 1583–1641* (Oxford, 1986).
- McCormack, Anthony, 'The social and economic consequences of the Desmond rebellion of 1579–83', *Irish Historical Studies*, 34 (2004), 1–16.
- *The earldom of Desmond, 1463–1583: the decline and crisis of a feudal lordship* (Dublin, 2005).
- MacCraith, Mícheál, 'The Gaelic reaction to the Reformation', in Steven Ellis and Sarah Barber (eds.), *Conquest and union: fashioning a British state, 1485–1725* (London, 1995), 139–61.
- McDiarmid, J. F., and Collinson, Patrick (eds.), *The monarchical republic of early modern England: essays in response to Patrick Collinson* (London, 2007).
- McDowell, J. M., 'The devaluation of 1460 and the origins of the Irish pound', *Irish Historical Studies*, 25 (1986), 19–28.
- McEaney, Eamonn, 'Mayors and merchants in medieval Waterford city, 1169–1495', in William Nolan and Thomas Power (eds.), *Waterford: history & society* (Dublin, 1992), 147–76.
- MacGeoghegan, James, *Histoire de l'Irlande, ancienne et moderne, tirée des monuments les plus authentiques*, vols. i–ii (Paris, 1758, 1762); vol. iii (Amsterdam, 1763), trans. Patrick O'Kelly as *History of Ireland, ancient and modern, taken from the most authentic records, and dedicated to the Irish brigade* (Dublin, 1844).
- McGettigan, Darren, *Red Hugh O'Donnell and the Nine Years War* (Dublin, 2005).
- McGurk, John, *The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland: the 1590s crisis* (Manchester, 1997).
- 'William Russell', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- Maclean-Bristol, Nicholas, 'James MacDonald', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- Mahaffy, J. P., *An epoch in Irish history: Trinity College, Dublin its foundation and early fortunes, 1591–1660* (London, 1903).
- Maginn, Christopher, 'The Baltinglass rebellion, 1580: Old English dissent or a Gaelic uprising?', *Historical Journal*, 47 (2004), 205–32.

- Maginn, Christopher, 'English marchers lineages in south Dublin in the late Middle Ages', *Irish Historical Studies*, 34 (2004), 113–36.
- 'Shane O'Neill', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- 'Civilizing' Gaelic Leinster: the extension of Tudor rule in the O'Byrne and O'Toole lordships (Dublin, 2005).
- 'A window on mid-Tudor Ireland: the "matters" against lord deputy St Leger, 1547–8', *Historical Research*, 78 (2005), 465–82.
- 'The limitations of Tudor reform: the policy of "surrender and regrant" and the O'Rourkes', *Journal of Cumann Seanchais Bhreifne*, 43 (2007), 429–60.
- 'The Tudor policy of "surrender and regrant" in the historiography of sixteenth-century Ireland', *Sixteenth Century Journal: Journal for Early Modern Studies*, 38/4 (2007), 955–74.
- 'Elizabethan Cavan: the institutions of Tudor government in an Irish county', in Brendan Scott (ed.), *Culture and society in early modern Breifne/Cavan* (Dublin, 2009), 69–84.
- 'Whose island? Sovereignty in late medieval and early modern Ireland', *Éire-Ireland*, 44 (Fall/Winter, 2009), 229–47.
- 'Gaelic Ireland's English frontiers in the late Middle Ages', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 110, sect. C (2010), 191–215.
- 'The Gaelic peers, the Tudor sovereigns and English multiple monarchy', *Journal of British Studies*, 50 (2011), 566–86.
- Mears, Natalie, 'Regnum Cecilianum? A perspective of the court', in John Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I* (London, 1997), 46–64.
- Moody, T. W. (ed.), *Irish historiography, 1936–70* (Dublin, 1971).
- Martin, F. X., and Byrne, F. J. (eds.), *A new history of Ireland*, iii: *Early modern Ireland, 1534–1691* (Oxford, 1976).
- Mooney, Candice, *The church in Gaelic Ireland 13th to 15th centuries* (Dublin, 1969).
- Morgan, Hiram, 'The colonial venture of Sir Thomas Smith, 1571–1575', *Historical Journal*, 28 (1985), 261–78.
- 'Extradition and treason-trial of a Gaelic lord: the case of Brian O'Rourke', *Irish Jurist*, 22 (1987), 285–301.
- 'Hugh O'Neill and the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland', *Historical Journal*, 26 (1993), 1–17.
- *Tyrone's rebellion: the outbreak of the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland* (Woodbridge, 1993).
- 'The fall of Sir John Perrot', in John Guy (ed.), *The reign of Elizabeth I: court and culture in the last decade* (Cambridge, 1995), 109–25.
- 'British policies before the British state', in Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (eds.), *The British problem, c.1534–1707: state formation in the Atlantic archipelago* (New York, 1996), 66–88.
- (ed.), *Political ideology in Ireland, 1541–1641* (Dublin, 1999).
- 'Gaelic lordship and Tudor conquest: Tír Eoghain, 1541–1603', *History Ireland*, 13/5 (2005), 38–43.
- Morgan, Rhys, and Power, Gerald, 'Enduring borderlands: the marches of Ireland and Wales in the early modern period', in S. G. Ellis and Raingard Esser (eds.), *Frontiers, regions and identities in Europe* (Pisa, 2009), 101–28.
- Moss, Rachel, Ó Clabaigh, Colmán, and Ryan, Salvador (eds.), *Art and devotion in late medieval Ireland* (Dublin, 2006).

- Murray, James, 'St Patrick's Cathedral and the university question in Ireland, c.1547–1585', in Helga Robinson-Hammerstein (ed.), *European universities in the age of Reformation and Counter-Reformation* (Dublin, 1998), 1–33.
- *Enforcing the English Reformation in Ireland: clerical resistance and political conflict in the diocese of Dublin, 1534–1590* (Cambridge, 2009).
- Nicholls, K. W., 'Gaelic society and economy in the high Middle Ages', in Art Cosgrove (ed.), *A new history of Ireland: medieval Ireland, 1169–1534* (Oxford, 1987), 397–438.
- *Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland in the Middle Ages* (2nd edn., Dublin, 2003).
- Nolan, William, and Power, Thomas (eds.), *Waterford: history & society* (Dublin, 1992).
- O'Brien, Conor (ed.), *Feagh McHugh O'Byrne: the Wicklow firebrand* (Rathdrum, 1998).
- O'Dowd, Mary, *Power, politics and land: early modern Sligo, 1568–1688* (Belfast, 1991).
- Otway-Ruthven, A. J., *A history of medieval Ireland* (London, 1980).
- Oxford dictionary of national biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford, 2004).
- Oxford English dictionary*, ed. John Simpson and Edmund Weiner (2nd edn., Oxford, 1989).
- Palmer, William, *The problem of Ireland in Tudor foreign policy, 1485–1603* (Woodbridge, 1994).
- Parker, Ciarán, 'Pater familias and parentela: the le Poer lineage in fourteenth-century Waterford', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 95, sect. C (1995), 93–117.
- Peltonen, Markku, *Classical humanism and republicanism in English political thought, 1570–1640* (Cambridge, 1995).
- Peterson, Richard, 'Laurel crown and ape's tail: new light on Spenser's career from Sir Thomas Tresham', *Spenser Studies: a Renaissance poetry annual*, 12 (1998), 1–36.
- Petti, Anthony, 'Political satire in Pierce Penilesse his supplication to the diuill', *Neophilologus*, 45 (1961), 139–50.
- Pollard, Mary, *A dictionary of members of the Dublin book trade, 1550–1800* (Oxford, 2000).
- Power, Gerald, 'Migration and identity in early modern Ireland: the New English and Pale community', in S. G. Ellis and Lud'a Klusáková (eds.), *Imagining frontiers, contesting identities* (Pisa, 2007), 243–62.
- Pryde, E. B., Greenway, D. E., Porter, S., and Roy, I. (eds.), *Handbook of British chronology* (3rd edn., London, 1986).
- Pulman, M. B., *The Elizabethan privy council in the fifteen-seventies* (Berkeley, 1971).
- Quinn, D. B., 'Government printing and the publication of the Irish statutes', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 49, sect. C (1943), 45–130.
- 'Sir Thomas Smith (1513–1577) and the beginnings of English colonial theory', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 89 (1945), 543–60.
- 'Ireland and sixteenth century European expansion', *Historical Studies*, 1 (1958), 20–32.
- 'Henry VIII and Ireland, 1509–34', *Irish Historical Studies*, 12 (1960–1), 323–4.
- *The Elizabethans and the Irish* (Ithaca, NY, 1966).
- and Nicholls, K. W., 'Ireland in 1534', in T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin, and F. J. Byrne (eds.), *A new history of Ireland, iii: Early Modern Ireland, 1534–1691* (Oxford, 1976), 1–18.
- Rapple, Rory, 'Taking up office in Elizabethan Connacht: the case of Sir Richard Bingham', *English Historical Review*, 123 (2008), 277–99.

- Rapple, Rory, *Martial power and Elizabethan political culture: military men in England and Ireland, 1558–1594* (Cambridge, 2009).
- Read, Conyers, 'Walsingham and Burghley in Queen Elizabeth's privy council', *English Historical Review*, 28 (1913), 34–58.
- *Mr Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1955).
- *Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1960).
- Richardson, H. G., and Sayles, G. O., *The Irish parliament in the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia, 1952).
- Robinson-Hammerstein, Helga (ed.), *European universities in the age of Reformation and Counter-Reformation* (Dublin, 1998).
- 'Adam Loftus', in *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004).
- 'The "common good" and the university in the age of confessional conflict', in Ciaran Brady and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds.), *British interventions in early modern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2005), 73–96.
- Ronan, Myles, *The Reformation under Elizabeth, 1558–1580* (Dublin, 1930).
- Rowe, John (ed.), *Aspects of government and society in later medieval England: essays in honour of J. R. Lander* (Toronto, 1986).
- Ryan, Salvador, 'Windows on late medieval devotional practice: Máire Ní Mháille's "Book of Piety" (1513) and the world behind the texts', in Rachel Moss, Colmán Ó Clabaigh, and Salvador Ryan (eds.), *Art and devotion in late medieval Ireland* (Dublin, 2006), 1–15.
- Scott, Brendan, *Religion and reform in the Tudor diocese of Meath* (Dublin, 2006).
- (ed.), *Culture and society in early modern Breifne/Cavan* (Dublin, 2009).
- Sheehan, Anthony, 'Irish revenues and English subventions, 1559–1622', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 90, sect. C (1990), 35–65.
- Shirley, E. P., *The history of the county of Monaghan* (London, 1879).
- Silke, J. J., 'Primate Lombard and James I', *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 22 (1955), 143–55.
- Simms, Katherine, '"The king's friend": O'Neill, the crown and the earldom of Ulster', in J. Lydon (ed.), *England and Ireland in the later Middle Ages* (Dublin, 1981), 214–36.
- Skelton, R. A., and Summerson, J., *A description of maps and architectural drawings in the collection made by William Cecil, first Baron Burghley now at Hatfield House* (Oxford, 1971).
- Smith, A. G. R., *Servant of the Cecils: the life of Sir Michael Hicckes, 1543–1612* (London, 1977).
- *William Cecil, Lord Burghley: minister of Elizabeth I* (Bangor, 1991).
- Smith, Brendan, 'Keeping the peace', in James Lydon (ed.), *Law and disorder in thirteenth century Ireland: the Dublin parliament of 1297* (Dublin, 1997), 57–65.
- Smyth, William, *Map-making, landscapes and memory: a geography of colonial and early modern Ireland, c.1530–1750* (Cork, 2006).
- Solt, L. F., *Church and state in early modern England* (Oxford, 1990).
- Stone, Lawrence, 'Elizabethan overseas trade', *Economic History Review*, 2 (1949), 30–58.
- Summerson, John, 'The building of Theobalds, 1564–85', *Archaeologia*, 97 (1954), 107–26.
- Sutton, James, *Materializing space at an early modern prodigy house: the Cecils at Theobalds, 1564–1607* (Aldershot, 2004).
- Thorp, Malcolm, 'William Cecil and the anti-Christ: a study in anti-Catholic ideology', in Malcolm Thorp and Arthur Slavin (eds.), *Politics, religion, and diplomacy in early modern Europe* (Kirksville, Mo., 1994), 289–304.

- and Slavin, Arthur (eds.), *Politics, religion, and diplomacy in early modern Europe* (Kirksville, Mo., 1994).
- Tittler, Robert, *The Mid-Tudor polity, c.1540–1560* (Totowa, NJ, 1980).
- Treadwell, Victor, 'The Irish parliament of 1569–71', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 65, sect. C (1966), 55–89.
- 'Sir John Perrot and the Irish parliament of 1585–6', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, 85, sect. C (1985), 259–308.
- Turvey, Roger, *The treason and trial of Sir John Perrot* (Cardiff, 2005).
- Usher, Brett, *William Cecil and episcopacy, 1559–1577* (Aldershot, 2003).
- Walton, J. C., 'Church, crown and corporation in Waterford, 1520–1620', in William Nolan and Thomas Power (eds.), *Waterford: history & society* (Dublin, 1992), 177–98.
- Wernham, R. B., *The making of Elizabethan foreign policy, 1558–1603* (Berkeley, 1980).
- Westropp, Thomas Johnston, 'Notes on the sheriff of county Clare, 1570–1700', *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, 1 (1890), 68–80.
- White, D. G., 'Henry VIII's Irish kerne in France and Scotland, 1544–5', *Irish Sword*, 3 (1957–8), 213–25.
- 'The reign of Edward VI in Ireland: some political, social and economic aspects', *Irish Historical Studies*, 14 (1965), 197–211.
- Williams, Glanmore, *Wales and the Reformation* (Cardiff, 1997).
- Williams, Penry, *The Tudor regime* (Oxford, 1979).
- and Harris, G. L., 'A revolution in Tudor history?', *Past and Present*, 25 (1963), 3–58.
- Wilson, Philip, 'The writings of Sir James Ware and the forgeries of Robert Ware', *The Library*, 15 (1917), 83–94.
- Wood-Martin, W. G., *History of Sligo, county and town*, 3 vols. (Dublin, 1882–92).
- Woodward, D., *The trade of Elizabethan Chester* (Hull, 1970).
- Worden, A. B., *The sound of virtue: Philip Sidney's Arcadia and Elizabethan politics* (New Haven, 1996).

UNPUBLISHED THESES

- Brady, Ciaran, 'The government of Ireland, c.1540–83' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Dublin, 1980).
- Cunningham, Bernadette, 'Political and social change in the lordships of Clanricard and Thomond, 1569–1641' (MA thesis, National University of Ireland, Galway, 1979).
- McGowan-Doyle, Valerie, 'The Book of Howth: the Old English and the Elizabethan conquest of Ireland' (Ph.D. thesis, University College, Cork, 2005).
- Mannion, J. P., 'Landownership and anglicisation in Tudor Connaught: the lordships of Clanrickard and Hy Many, 1500–1590' (Ph.D. thesis, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2010).
- Margey, Annaleigh, 'Mapping during the Irish plantations, c.1580–1636' (Ph.D. thesis, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2004).
- Power, Gerald, 'The nobility of the English Pale in Tudor Ireland, 1496–1566' (Ph.D. thesis, National University of Ireland, Galway, 2008).
- Richardson, W. B., 'The religious policy of the Cecils, 1588–98' (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1994).

This page intentionally left blank

Index

- Achonry, diocese of 185
Adrian IV, pope 43
Agard, Thomas 47
Aibidil Gaoidheilge & Caiticiosma (1571) 183
Alen, John, lord chancellor 56–7, 73
Alford, Stephen 3, 81, 85, 103
Allen, William 180
All Hallows, priory of (Dublin) 182
Antrim:
 county of 87, 143, 201
 Glens of 85
 Route of 201
Antwerp 128, 185
Ardfert, bishopric of 186
Ards peninsula, the 87
Armagh:
 archbishopric of 185
 city of 86–7
 county of 201–2
army royal:
 attempts to reform the 120–3, 131, 138–9,
 207, 230
 corruption in the 121–2, 169
 discontent of the soldiers 7, 159, 162, 217–21
 indiscipline of the soldiers 132–3, 138–9,
 159–61, 230
Arnold, Nicholas, commissioner and
 governor 120, 142–3, 154, 169, 173
Athenry 76, 198
Athlone 45, 70, 87
Athy 209

Babington Plot 68
Bacon, Nicholas, lord keeper 84, 89, 215
Baeshe, Edward 127–8, 130
Bagenal, Henry, marshal 76, 191, 204
Bagenal, Nicholas, marshal 47, 204
Bagenal, Ralph 47
Bagwell, Richard 5, 8, 211
Ballyadams 193
Ballyshannon 109–10
Baltinglass rebellion, *see* Leinster rebellion
 (1579–83)
Bann, river 83
Barnewall, John, 3rd baron Trimblestone 73
Barnewall, Patrick, king's serjeant-at-law 51
Barrett, Edmund 105
Basnet, Edward 47
Beale, Robert 81
Bell, John, vicar of Christ Church 215
Belleek 107
Bellingham, Edward, governor 44–7
Berwick 127–9
Beverly, George 133, 136–8

Bingham, family 163
 Richard, president of Connaught 199, 203, 208
Black Friars 177
Blackwater Fort 191
Blackwater river 75, 109–10
Bland, John 129
Boleyn, Margaret 30–1
Boleyn, Thomas, 9th earl of Ormond and
 Wiltshire 30–1
Book of Common Prayer (1549) 45–6
Boorde, Andrew 43
 *The fyrste booke of the introduction of
 knowledge* 43
Borough, William 138
Boulogne, siege of 161
Bourchier, George, master of the ordnance
 194, 208
Bourne 15
Bowen, Robert 193, 205
Brabazon, Edward 193
Brabazon, William, undertreasurer 47
Brady, Ciaran 8, 84, 113, 124
Brady, Hugh, bishop of Meath 169–70, 173
Brehon Law, *see* Irish law
Brereton, Andrew 57
Brereton, William 47
Bristol 20, 127–8,
British Isles 6, 78, 85, 111
Brittany 78
Brooke, George, baron of Cobham 57
Browne, George, archbishop of Dublin 46, 170
Bundrowes 107
Burgh, Thomas, lord Burgh, governor 109–10,
 139–40, 195, 206, 209
Burghley, 1st baron, *see* Cecil, William
Burke, family (of Clanrickard) 24, 28, 39, 42,
 50–1, 163
 earls of Clanrickard 104
 Richard 'Sasanach', 2nd earl of Clanrickard
 50–1, 92, 97, 122
 Ulick 'na gceann', 1st earl of Clanrickard
 38–9, 42, 49–50
 Ulick, 3rd earl of Clanrickard 198–9
Burke, family (of Mayo) 163, 199
Butler, family 24, 30
 earls of Ormond 21, 24, 30, 196, 200
 Thomas, 7th earl 30
 Piers, 8th earl 24, 30–1
 James, 10th earl 38, 44
 Thomas, 11th earl 38, 97, 100, 135, 145,
 158, 161, 164–5, 193, 197, 200, 205–6,
 208–9, 214
 Katherine 24
Butler, Bartholomew, king of arms 153

- Calais 15, 28, 37, 78
Calendar of state papers, Ireland 101, 145
 Calvinism 167
 Cambridge 37, 71, 81, 86, 165, 177, 183–4, 187
 St John's College 34, 173
 Trinity College, 171
 Camden, William 150
 Campbell, Archibald, 5th earl of Argyll 85
 Campion, Edmund 179–80
 Canny, Nicholas 8, 86, 89, 175
 Carbery, lordship of 196
 Carey, Henry, lord Hunsdon 100
 Carlow, county of 193
 Carlyle, Christopher 201
 Carrickfergus 18, 87, 201–2
 Cartwright, Thomas 185
 Cashel, archbishopric of 172, 185
 Castle Chamber, court of 84, 224
 Câteau-Cambrésis, peace of 7
 Catholicism:
 attachment to in the English Pale 171, 177–81, 183, 188
 existence of a Catholic hierarchy in Ireland 174–5, 177, 186
 links to rebellion in Ireland, 147–8, 160, 164–5, 179–80, 188, 192, 210, 212, 217
 restoration of under Mary I 166
 Cavan:
 county of 176, 194–5, 201–2
 town of 202
 Cecil, family:
 Anne, daughter of William 64
 David, grandfather of William 15–16, 37, 144
 Mildred (née Cooke), second wife of William 37, 61, 66
 Richard, father of William 15, 19, 24–5, 28, 34–6, 57
 Robert, son of William and secretary of state 59, 78, 107, 109, 137, 184, 191, 195, 207–8, 215, 217, 226, 229
 Thomas, son of William 75, 159
 William, secretary of state, 1st baron of Burghley, and lord high treasurer:
 appointed lord high treasurer 59, 98, 113, 119–20
 appointed principal secretary to Queen Elizabeth 58, 80
 clients 55, 64, 69–74
 confidants 55, 64–9
 co-operation with other privy councillors on Ireland matters 8, 79, 84, 89–91, 103, 121
 death 59, 69, 191, 218
 execution of justice, The (1583) 179–80
 health 4, 90–1, 108–9, 137, 191
 interaction with Elizabeth on Ireland matters 4, 7, 98–103
 interest in genealogy 2, 162–4
 humanism 3, 37, 81, 100, 142–3, 162, 225
 maps 2, 55, 75–6, 88
 master of the court of wards and liveries 60, 163
 note-taking and papers 2–3, 58–9, 65, 79–81, 84, 86, 89–90, 92–8, 101–3, 106–10, 121, 152–3, 166–7, 170, 224, 228
 principal secretary to Edward VI 36–8, 51–2, 55–8, 79–80, 114–16
 Protestantism of 6, 36–7, 143, 165, 183, 225
 support for plantation policies 6, 86–9, 98, 123, 148–9, 156, 225
 support for a university in Ireland 166, 170–4, 181–5
 youth and education, 15–16, 19, 34–7, 81, 100, 144, 165, 167, 225
 Cecil House on the Strand 191
 cess 101, 124–6
 Channel Islands 78
 Chapuys, Eustace 43
 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor 15, 43
 Cheke, Mary, first wife of William Cecil 159
 Cheshire 69–71
 Chester 71, 127, 129, 130, 133, 136–8
 Christ Church Cathedral (Dublin) 182
 Church, pre-Reformation 18–19
 Churchyard, Thomas 159, 218, 220
 Clanrickard, earl of, *see* Burke family (of Clanrickard)
 Clapham, John 158
 Clare, county of 198, 210
 Clifford, Conyers, president of Connaught 109–10, 199
 coign and livery 23, 29, 51, 92, 96, 125, 154
 coignage (Ireland):
 'crying down' of 118–19
 debasement of, 58, 80, 114–17, 120, 137
 'Irish mint' in the Tower 114, 116–18
 mint in Dublin 115, 118, 150
 mint in London 118–19
 Colchester 219
 Coleraine, county of 200, 202, 210
 Colley, Henry 149
 Collinson, Patrick 82, 98
 colonization, *see* plantation
 concordatums 122, 133
 Connaught:
 Composition of 104, 176
 council/presidency of 87, 97, 122, 198–9, 204
 Lower (northern) 26, 199, 202
 medieval lordship of 16, 39, 42
 province of 27, 28, 39, 50–1, 70, 76, 97, 186, 192, 198–9, 202–3, 210, 228
 rebellion in 119, 122, 228
 Cooke, Anthony 37

- Cooke, Richard 61
 Cork:
 city of 29, 187
 county of 60–1, 196
 Cornwall 155
 Cosby, Francis 47
 Craik, Alexander, bishop of Kildare 169
 Cranmer, Thomas, archbishop of Canterbury 45
 Creagh, Richard, papal primate 174–5
 Croft, James, governor 57, 79, 83, 85, 89, 96,
 100, 102, 111, 115, 161–2, 168
 Croft, Pauline 4, 68–9
 Crofton, William 57
 Cromwell, Oliver 227–8
 Cromwell, Thomas, chief secretary 2, 37, 40,
 47, 213, 229
 Curwin, Hugh, archbishop of Dublin 84, 173
 Cusack, Thomas, lord chancellor 42, 44, 51
 Cushendun 129
- Daniel, Terence, dean of Armagh 154
 Daniel, William 215
 Darcy, William, undertreasurer 29–30
 Davies, Robert Rees 41
 Dawson, Jane 6, 78, 85
 Denmark, king of 80
 Derry 128, 130
 Desmond, earl of, *see* Fitzgerald family (of
 Desmond)
 lordship of 104, 135, 196–7
 rebellion, *see* Munster rebellion (1579–83)
 de Cuéllar, Francisco 157
 de la Couson 155
 de Spes, Guerau, Spanish ambassador 145
 de Vere, Edward, 17th earl of Oxford 64
 Devereux, Robert, 2nd earl of Essex 68–9, 137
 Devereux, Walter, 1st earl of Essex 87–8, 90,
 215–16
 Dickens, Arthur Geoffrey 9
 Dillon, family 194
 James 194–5
 Theobald 195
 Dingle, haven 155
 Dolley, Michael 119
 Donegal, county of 200, 202
 Donnelan, Nahemias 187
 Douglas, James, earl of Morton 100
 Dowdall, George, archbishop of Armagh 46
 Down, county of 201
 Drake, John 146
 Drogheda 118, 216
 Drury, William, lord justice and president of
 Munster 91–2, 157, 219
 Dublin:
 castle 20, 86, 182, 200
 city of 18, 20, 21, 24, 30, 32, 39, 44, 49, 85,
 118, 134, 138, 171, 182–3, 186–7,
 191–2, 198, 206, 223
 corporation of 182, 184
 county of 31, 118
- Dudley, John, earl of Warwick and duke of
 Northumberland 2, 36, 38, 45, 56–7,
 115–16, 168, 226
 Dudley, Robert, earl of Leicester 38, 62–3, 65,
 67, 70, 89–91, 99, 104, 121–2, 143,
 162, 216
 Duhallow, lordship of 196
 Dundalk 151
 Dungarvan 87
- Edinburgh, treaty of 81
 Edward I, king of England and lord of
 Ireland 101
 Edward III, king of England and lord of
 Ireland 92, 219
 Edward IV, king of England and lord of
 Ireland 27, 152
 Edward VI, king of England and Ireland 1, 2,
 7, 10, 36–8, 45, 48–50, 52, 55–8,
 79–80, 114–15, 161, 166, 168, 170,
 193, 211, 222, 225
 Edward, prince of Wales 20
 Elizabeth I, queen of England and Ireland 1–2,
 4–8, 10–11, 47, 52, 55, 58, 62–3,
 67–72, 80, 82–3, 86–7, 90–1, 98–105,
 107–8, 110–11, 113, 116–17, 119,
 122–6, 131, 134–6, 145, 148–9, 156,
 167, 174, 179, 181–5, 188, 191, 211,
 213–16, 222, 227–30
 reliance on William Cecil in Ireland
 matters 90–1, 109–10,
 191, 221
 Ellis, Steven 8
 Ely, lordship of 194
 England 127
 clergy of 138
 currency of 113–19
 troops levied in for Ireland 127–30, 132,
 137, 140, 211
 English:
 ‘civility’/culture in Ireland 2–3, 16, 18–20,
 23–4, 27, 56, 96, 124, 142–3, 145,
 149, 156, 158, 166, 175, 183, 226
 extension of shire government in Ireland 16,
 24, 44, 83, 124, 142, 146, 192, 212,
 224, 226, 230
 identity in Ireland 16, 19–23, 25, 144–8,
 226
 see also Old English
 language 19–20, 22, 45–6, 74, 144, 146,
 150, 155, 226
 law 3, 16, 18, 19–23, 28, 34, 40, 42, 44, 52,
 83, 93, 96–7, 105, 108, 111, 124,
 152–6, 160–2, 207
 Ennis 198
 Enniskillen 106–7
 Erne, river 109, 202
 Essex 219
 Europe 2, 15, 42, 79, 114, 157, 217
 Eustace, James, 3rd viscount Baltinglass 178–9

- faction at the English court 6, 10, 62–4
 Fauntleroy, Thomas 131
 Fenton, Geoffrey, secretary of state 133, 148,
 200, 208–9
 Fermanagh, county of 200–2
 Ferns:
 castle 71
 county of 76, 176, 193
 Finglas, Patrick, chief baron of the
 exchequer 17
 Finglas, Thomas 163
 Fitton, Edward, president of Connaught
 69–71, 73, 76–7, 122, 131, 143,
 154–5, 159
 Fitton, Edward (the younger) 70
 Fitzgerald, family (of Desmond) 88
 earls of Desmond 21, 62, 196
 Gerald, 14th earl 88–9, 93, 97–8, 125,
 136, 145, 147, 155, 179, 198
 James, 10th earl 32
 James, 13th earl 39, 44, 168
 James, *súgán* earl 210
 Joan, countess of Desmond 55, 61
 Maurice, 9th earl 29
 James Fitzmaurice 93, 129–30, 147, 179, 213
 John 145, 147, 179
 Fitzgerald, family (of Kildare) 24, 28–31, 39
 earls of Kildare 21, 24, 28, 47, 62, 163
 Gerald, 8th earl 28–9
 Gerald, 9th earl 28, 30–2, 34
 Gerald, 11th earl 90, 97, 145
 Thomas, 7th earl 153
 Thomas, 10th earl 38, 43, 47, 204
 Eleanor 153
 Fitzgibbon, family 196
 Fitzmaurice, *see* Fitzgerald, James Fitzmaurice
 Fitzpatrick (MacGillpatrick):
 barons of Upper Ossory 158, 193
 Barnaby (Brian), 1st baron 38–40, 44, 49
 Barnaby (Brian Oge), 2nd baron 38, 49–51
 Fitzwilliam, Brian 66, 127
 Fitzwilliam, William, governor 64, 66–71, 73,
 77–8, 89–90, 98, 102, 106, 112, 119–24,
 127, 143, 151, 153, 156, 158, 176–7,
 181, 183–4, 201, 213, 224–5
 Fleetwood, Thomas 118
 Flodden, battle of 30
 Florida 78
 Fort Governor 45
 Fort Protector 45, 48
 France 15, 19, 28–9, 33, 45, 50, 52, 63, 80,
 177, 219
 king of 80
 threatened invasion of Ireland by 51, 57,
 78–9, 225–6
 Francis I, king of France 28, 33

 Gaelic, *see* Irish
 ‘Gaelicization’ 24–5, 29
 Gaffney, Christopher, bishop of Ossory 185

 Galway:
 county of 198
 town of 24, 29, 110, 177, 198–9, 215
 Gardiner, Robert 105, 160–1, 209, 214
 ‘Geraldine League’ 40
 German (Austrian):
 miners in Ireland 115
 tourists in Ireland 156
 Gerrard, William, lord chancellor 60, 224
 Gladstone, William Ewart 2
 Glaseour, William 130, 133
 Glenmalure, battle of 135
 Glenshesk, battle of 171
 Gloucester, bishop of 138
 Goghe, John 76
 Googe, Barnaby 134, 216
 Gray’s Inn (London) 34
 Greenwich 38, 40
 Gregory XIII, pope 165
 Gresham, Thomas 116, 128
 Grey, Arthur, lord Grey de Wilton,
 governor 66, 132, 134–6, 159, 181,
 220–1
 Grey, Leonard, lord Grey, governor 40
 Greyfriars’ monastery (Cork) 61
 Grindal, Edmund, bishop of London 171

 Hall, William, alias Barnaby O’Neill 216–17
 Harrington, Henry 70–1, 192–3, 195, 206
 Hebbe, Ralph 146
 Henry II, king of England 16
 Henry VII, king of England and lord of
 Ireland 15, 20–3, 25, 29
 Henry VIII, king of England and Ireland 2, 10,
 15, 16, 19, 20, 28–35, 37–45, 47,
 49–50, 56, 73, 85, 96, 115, 144, 149,
 161, 165–7, 213, 222, 224–5, 229
 Henshaw, Thomas 201
 Herbert, William, earl of Pembroke 57
 Herefordshire 15, 37
 historiography:
 English 3–5, 72
 Irish 5, 8–9, 11, 65, 67–9, 82, 146, 165,
 172, 187, 192, 224
 ‘new British history’ 6, 7, 78–9, 229–30
 Hooker, John 85
 Howard, Thomas, 2nd duke of Norfolk 28
 Howard, Thomas, earl of Surrey and 3rd duke of
 Norfolk, governor 28, 30–3, 40, 46,
 72, 96
 Howard, Thomas, 4th duke of Norfolk 62–3, 216

 Irish:
 alleged irreligion of 168–9, 176
 constitutional status of the 18–19, 22, 28,
 33–4, 38–43, 50–1, 56, 85, 144, 148–9
 culture 16–17, 22–5, 40–1, 43, 44, 48, 51,
 142, 146, 149–52, 154, 158, 195, 224
 language 22, 25, 30, 41, 46, 52, 74, 143,
 150, 155–6, 164, 169, 182–3, 185, 187

- law 16, 18, 23, 33, 44, 96, 142, 149, 151–2, 154–5, 224
- military capabilities 17, 25–6, 31–2, 84–5, 211
- nationality 16–17, 25, 143, 147–8, 158, 210
- Sea 16, 62, 211
- social structures 16–17, 26–7, 33, 41, 43–4, 51, 142
- troops in the royal army 132–3, 139–40
- Isle of Man 128
- James V, king of Scots 43
- James VI, king of Scots 100, 110, 217, 228
- Jesuits 43, 179–80, 187
- Jobson, Francis 76
- Jones, Thomas, bishop of Meath 102, 182, 209, 214
- Kavanagh, chief/family 49
- Maurice 31
- Kelly, Alison 151
- Kent 146
- Kerry, county of 196–7
- Kildare:
- county of 193, 205
- earl of, *see* Fitzgerald
- sheriff of 209
- Kildare rebellion, *see* Fitzgerald, Thomas, 10th
- earl of Kildare
- Kilkenny:
- county of 23, 30–1, 69, 193
- town of 18, 22–3
- Killala, bishopric of 186
- Killary harbour 76
- Kilmore, bishopric of 177
- King's County 193–4, 211
- Kyffin, Maurice 138–9
- Knockdoe, battle of 29
- Knockfergus 97, 191
- Knollys, Francis 82, 89
- Lane, Ralph, muster-master of Ireland 59, 75, 139, 203, 208, 215
- Laudabiliter* 16, 42–3
- Lecale 45
- Lee, John 149
- Lee, Thomas 75, 195–6, 206–7
- Legge, Robert 68
- Leighlin castle 71
- Leinster:
- Irish of 210
- mountains of 110, 203
- province of 24, 28–9, 39, 76, 87, 192–7, 202, 204–7, 209–10
- rebellions in:
- (1569–70) 119
- (1579–83) 126, 130–6, 147, 159–60, 165, 179–81, 202, 220, 226–7
- Leith, siege of 161, 220
- Leitrim, county of 198–9, 202, 210
- Leix, lordship of 45, 48–9, 79, 193, 206
- Limerick:
- bishopric of 172
- city of 18, 46, 110, 132, 177, 197
- county of 196–7
- Lincolnshire 15–16, 19, 38, 212
- Liverpool 129
- Loftus, Adam, archbishop of Dublin 73, 102, 109, 169–71, 174, 177, 180, 182–3, 187, 209, 214
- Lombard, Peter, archbishop of Armagh 175
- London 6, 15, 28–9, 34, 43, 51, 85, 126, 133–4, 138, 152, 174, 178
- bishop of 73
- Longford, county of 194–5, 202
- lords of the congregation 80, 85, 168
- Lough Foyle 109–10
- Louth, county of 201
- Louvain 174
- Low Countries (Netherlands) 108, 157, 180
- Luther, Martin 36–7
- Lyon, William, bishop of Cork, Cloyne, and Ross 186–7
- Lythe, Robert 76
- MacCarthy, chief/family 31, 60
- Cormac Oge 32, 34
- Donald (MacCarthy More), 1st earl of Clancare 97, 158, 163, 196
- MacClancy, chief/family 157
- MacDonnell, chief/family 52, 85–6, 129, 171, 201
- Owen 203
- Sorley Boy 143
- see also* Scots, in Ireland
- MacDonough, chief/family 210
- MacDowell, Gylleduff 203
- MacGeoghegan, chief/family 44
- MacGillpatrick, *see* Fitzpatrick
- MacLean, Catherine, dowager countess of Argyll 154
- MacMahon, chief/family 32, 107, 194, 201
- MacNamara, chief/family 38
- MacQuillan, chief/family 201
- MacWilliam, Lower, *see* Burke (of Mayo)
- MacWilliam, Upper, *see* Burke (of Clanrickard)
- Magennis, chief/family 26, 201
- Magrath, Meiler, archbishop of Cashel 177
- Maguire, chief/family 107, 200
- Hugh 106
- Malby, Nicholas, president of Connaught 97
- martial law 105–6, 110, 160–2, 197, 203–7, 230
- Mary of Guise 80
- Mary, queen of Hungary 43
- Mary, queen of Scots 52, 72–3, 80, 111, 144, 222
- Mary I, queen of England and Ireland 49–50, 52, 58, 83, 116, 166, 168
- Mason, John 50, 128, 225
- Masterson, Richard 193, 195

- Maynooth, seige of 204
 Mayo, county of 198–9
 Meade, James 70
 Meath:
 bishopric of 185
 county of 28–9, 42, 194, 201
 Might, Thomas 130, 136, 221
 Mildmay, Walter 62, 89
 Monaghan, county of 201
 Montague, Charles 206–7
 Morgan, William 132
 Mountgarret castle (Wexford) 31
 Munster:
 council/presidency of 87, 97, 122, 148, 172, 197–9, 204
 famine in 134
 plantation of, *see* plantation, in Munster
 province of 18, 20, 21, 32, 39, 51, 61, 65, 76, 93, 96–7, 135, 155, 186, 192, 196–9, 209, 221
 rebellions in:
 (1569–70) 119
 (1579–83) 73, 82, 88, 98, 126, 129–36, 147, 159–60, 164–5, 180–1, 220, 226–7
 Musgrave, John 47
 Muskerry, lordship of 196

 Nenagh 45
 Neville, Charles 179
 Newcomen, Robert 138
 New English 10, 47–9, 69, 146, 148, 158, 162, 168, 176, 192, 195, 205, 226
 Newfoundland 133
 Newry 45, 97, 109, 191, 201–2
 Norfolk, duke of, *see* Howard
 Normandy 78
 Norris, John 107, 109, 205, 207–9
 Norris, Thomas 197, 208
 Northamptonshire 69
 Nowell, Laurence 76
 Nugent, Christopher, baron of Delvin 195

 O'Brien, chief/family:
 earls of Thomond 158
 Donough, baron of Ibracken and 2nd earl of Thomond 38
 Murrough, 1st earl of Thomond 38, 44, 49
 Donough, 4th earl of Thomond 198–9, 210
 Donnell 210
 O'Brien-Arra, Maurice, bishop of Killaloe 186
 Observant movement, 19
 O'Byrne, chief/family 32, 49, 176, 193, 195, 206
 Feagh MacHugh 110, 135, 196, 161, 192, 195–6, 202–3, 205–6, 208
 O'Cahan, chief/family 200
 O'Carroll, chief/family 44, 194
 Donough 31
 Owney 31

 O'Connor, chief/family 44, 48, 50, 91, 193, 203, 209
 Dermot 203
 O'Connor Sligo, Donough 105
 O'Donnell, chief/family 26–8, 43, 84, 87, 200
 Calavagh 152, 154
 Hugh 200
 Hugh Duff 27–8, 31, 101
 Hugh Roe 106, 200, 202, 210
 O'Donnelys, chief/family 151
 O'Farrell, chief/family 194–5
 Offaly, lordship of 45, 48–9, 79, 193
 O'Flaherty, chief/family 163, 198
 O'Grady, chief/family 38
 O'Hanlon, chief/family 26, 194, 200, 202
 O'Higgin, Miler, archbishop of Tuam 105
 O'Kane, chief/family 210
 O'Kelly, chief/family 198
 Old English 10, 69, 146–7, 172, 180, 188, 194–5, 205, 210, 225–6
 Olderfleet 87
 O'Madden, chief/family 198
 O'Molmoy, chief/family 44
 O'More, chief/family 32, 40, 44, 48, 50, 91, 193, 209
 Melaghlin 31
 Rory Oge 102
 O'Mullaly (Lealy), William, archbishop of Tuam 186
 O'Neill (of Clandeboyne), chief/family 201
 Brian MacPhelim 87
 O'Neill of the Fews, chief/family 194
 O'Neill (of Tyrone), family 26–8, 80, 85, 106, 152–3, 200
 Art Oge 27
 Conn Bacach, 1st earl of Tyrone 26–8, 31–2, 35, 38, 41, 43–4, 49, 57, 74–75, 85, 150–2, 154, 167
 Conn More 27–8, 153
 Hugh, 2nd earl of Tyrone 11, 74, 86, 89, 91, 97, 104, 106–10, 112, 137–8, 147, 158, 163, 177, 185, 188, 191, 200, 202, 205–7, 209–12, 214
 Matthew, baron of Dungannon 44, 150–2, 154
 Niall Conallach 27
 Shane 62–3, 84–7, 89, 102, 119–20, 127–9, 147, 149–54, 158, 160, 167, 171, 175
 Turlough Luineach 97, 163, 184
Ordinances for the government of Ireland (1534) 92–3, 229
 O'Reilly, chief/family 26, 176–7, 194
 Ormond, earl of, *see* Butler
 O'Roughan, Denis 68–9, 105
 O'Rourke, chief/family 26, 107, 155, 176, 199, 210, 213
 Brian, 213
 O'Shaughnessy, chief/family 38
 Ossory, bishopric of 172, 185
 O'Toole, chief/family 31, 49, 176, 193, 206

- Art 206–7
 Turlough 31, 40, 50
- Oxford:
 bishopric of 84, 173
 university of 146
- Page, William 44
- Pale (the English Pale) 20, 21, 24–6, 28, 30, 45, 56, 58, 74, 78, 86, 89, 106, 124, 130, 149, 160, 162, 166, 171–3, 178, 185, 192, 194, 196, 201–2, 204–5, 208, 211, 223, 226
- Palesmen 62, 71, 124–7, 134, 145–7, 171, 176–7, 181, 205
- Paris, George 80, 225
- Parliament of England 21, 37–8, 45, 103, 166–7, 169, 213, 227
- Parliament of Ireland 19, 21, 23, 28, 32, 42–3, 49, 84, 86, 104, 123, 163–4, 167–9, 180–1, 193
- Parsons, Robert 179
- Paul III, pope 43
- Paulet, William, lord high treasurer of England 56, 84, 113
- Pelham, William, governor 82
- Pembroke 25
- Percy, Thomas, earl of Northumberland 89, 179
- Perrot, John, president of Munster and governor 67–9, 73, 93, 97, 102, 104–5, 137, 158, 180–2, 198, 204, 213
- Petre, William 36
- Philip II, king of Spain 68, 80, 105, 108, 110, 145, 156, 159, 180, 192, 212
- Pilgrimage of Grace 213
- Pinkie, battle of 47, 218
- Pius V, pope 73
- plantation:
 ideology and policy of 83, 134–5, 162, 175–6
 in the Irish midlands 48–9, 52, 80, 211
 in Munster 6, 88–9, 91, 104, 111, 148, 156, 197–8, 210–11
 in Ulster 87–8, 90, 98–9, 103, 123, 149, 156, 215
- Pontefract, articles of 213
- Pottlerath 30
- Power, family 23–5, 196, 224
- Poynings' Law 21, 168
- provost marshal 197, 204–5
- Pulman, Michael 228
- Queen's County 193–4, 205, 211
- Radcliffe, Thomas, earl of Sussex, governor 60–6, 77, 81, 83–5, 89, 91–3, 96, 101–2, 111, 119–20, 127, 151, 154, 162, 167–9, 185, 224
- Randolph, Edward 128–9
- Rapple, Rory 7, 217
- Ratcliff, Charles 216
- Read, Conyers 3, 5, 7, 58, 216
- Regnans in excelsis* (1570) 177
- Richard III, king of England and lord of Ireland 20
- Richmond 90
- Roanoke Island 75
- Rome 28, 36, 42–3, 166, 174
- Roscommon, county of 154, 198–9, 202–3
- Russell, William, governor 202, 205, 208–9
- Sackford, Thomas 136
- Sackville, Richard 62
- St Bartholomew's Day massacre 177
- St George, cult of 18
- St Lawrence, Christopher, baron of Howth 147
- St Leger, Anne 30–1
- St Leger, Anthony, governor 39–46, 48–9, 51–2, 56–7
- St Leger, Warham 193, 205
- St Loo, William 129
- St Patrick's, cathedral of 47, 170, 172–4, 181–2
- Sander, Nicholas 179–80
- Scotland 2, 15, 18, 31, 45, 47, 50, 52, 63, 81, 85, 98, 100, 109, 111, 156–7, 161, 168, 217, 222, 228
- Scots 43, 80
 in Ireland 52, 78, 80, 86, 97, 143–4, 152, 201
- Seymour, Edward, duke of Somerset 2, 36, 45, 56, 218, 222
- Shannon, river 129
- Sidee, James 216–17
- Sidney, family 65
 Henry, governor 60–1, 63–7, 70–1, 77–8, 83–7, 91, 98–9, 102, 111, 120, 125–29, 145, 156, 162, 171–2, 175, 178, 185, 198, 224
 Philip 64
- Sidney, Thomas 64
- Simnel, Lambert 20
- Skeffington, William, governor 47, 92–3, 101
- Skiddy, Andrew 61
- Sligo:
 castle of 202
 county of 198–9
- Smerwick 88, 129–30, 220
- Smith, Thomas, secretary of state 86–7, 89, 103, 120
- Smith, Thomas, junior 123
- Smyth, Thomas, apothecary 118, 150–1
- Smythe, John 219
- Spain 11, 72–3, 110, 177, 216
 England's war against 104–5, 107–8, 111–12, 138, 140, 180
- Spanish Armada 104, 111, 157, 204
- Spanish and Italian landing in Munster 88, 126, 129, 164–5, 179, 220
- Spanish attitudes toward the Irish 157
- support for Hugh O'Neill 11, 104, 137, 192, 212
- threatened invasion of Ireland by 68, 78, 104, 107, 110, 112, 121, 165, 178, 203, 226

- Spenser, Edmund 143, 162, 218, 220, 224
A View of the Present State of Ireland
 162, 224
Protopopia; or, Mother Hubbard's Tale 162,
 218, 222
- Stanley, Henry 101
- Stanley, Thomas 118
- Stanyhurst, Richard, chronicler 19, 146–7,
- Staples, Edward, bishop of Meath 46
- Star Chamber, court of 31, 84, 224
- Statutes of Kilkenny (1366) 92, 146
- Stone, Lawrence 123
- Strangford Lough 76
- Stukely, Thomas 179
- Supremacy, act of 166, 169
 oath of 180
- surrender and regrant, policy of 39–44, 50–1,
 56–7, 96, 144, 152
- Sussex, earl of, *see* Radcliffe
- Tara, hill of 43
- Theobalds 61, 163
- Thomas, Valentine 217
- Thomond, earl of, *see* O'Brien
- Thomson, William 217
- Tipperary:
 county of 194, 196–7
 liberty of 197, 200
- Travers, Walter, provost of Trinity College,
 Dublin 184–5
- Tremayne, Edmund 70, 90–1, 125, 130, 228
- Trim 157
- Trinity College, Dublin 2, 11, 166, 183–5,
 187–8, 214, 226
- Tudor, Margaret, queen of Scots 15
- Tyrconnell, lordship of 28, 200, 202
- Tyrone:
 county of 200, 202
 earl of, *see* O'Neill (of Tyrone)
 lordship of 28, 97, 110, 160, 200
 Tyrone's rebellion, *see* O'Neill, Hugh
- Ulster:
 earldom of 16, 86–87, 152–3
 Irish of 106
 province of 27, 28, 57, 75, 78, 82–3, 85–8,
 91, 97, 104, 107–11, 129, 153, 155,
 174, 176–7, 187, 191–2, 194,
 199–203, 208, 211–12, 215
- Uniformity, act of 46, 166, 169
- Ussher, family 182
 Henry 183
 John 182–3
- Vaughan, Geoffrey 128–9
- Ventry bay 155
- vestiarian controversy 177
- Wales 2, 15, 24, 30–1, 37, 64, 68, 113,
 138, 178
 troops for Ireland levied in 127, 130, 132,
 137, 211
 Welsh language, 156, 169
- Wallop, Henry, lord justice and
 undertreasurer 99, 130–3, 139, 159,
 191
- Walshe, Edward 48, 224
- Walsingham, Anne 64
- Walsingham, Thomas, secretary of state 59, 64,
 82, 91–2, 100, 103–5, 109, 130, 133,
 135–6, 145, 157, 162, 219–20, 227–8
- Ware, James, antiquarian 166
- Ware, Robert, antiquarian 166
- Wars of the Roses 30
- Waterford:
 city of 10, 19–23, 34, 38, 61, 110, 118, 196,
 215, 217, 223
 county of 21, 22–5, 48, 196, 198
- Waterhouse, Edward 220
- Westmeath, county of 194–5
- Westminster Abbey 191
- Weston, Robert, lord chancellor 73, 89,
 93, 178
- Wexford:
 county of 31, 193, 195
 mining operation in 115–16
- White, Nicholas, master of the rolls 59, 65–6,
 69, 71–4, 77, 126, 134, 145, 147–8,
 155, 180, 230
- White, Roland 176
- White, Thomas, mayor of Waterford 215,
- White, Thomas, priest 217
- Whitehall 6, 10, 66, 149–50
- Whitgift, John, archbishop of Canterbury
 138, 184
- Wicklow:
 county of 76, 176, 193
 mountains 135
- Willis, Humphrey 200
- Wingfield, Jacques, master of the
 ordnance 61
- Winter, William, admiral 128, 130
- Wise, family 20, 22
 Andrew 57
 John, chief baron of the exchequer
 20–3, 25
 William 10, 19–22, 25, 27, 34–5, 38, 57
- Wolsey, Thomas, cardinal, lord chancellor of
 England 2, 29–30, 32, 222
- Wood, Thomas 57
- Wrothe, Thomas 169
- Yellow Ford, battle of 191, 202, 204, 209,
 211, 218
- Youghal 61